Before and After Gender

Front matter

BEFORE AND AFTER GENDER Sexual Mythologies of Everyday Life

Marilyn Strathern

Edited and with an Introduction by Sarah Franklin Afterword by Judith Butler

CHAPTER SEVEN Sex and the Social Order Afterword by Judith Butler References

Index of Names

Original Acknowledgments

‘The purpose of this book is to apply some of the findings of social anthropologists to a topic which they do not often treat on its own, male-female relations. It is intended to suggest a point of view rather than offer an original synthesis, and the ideas in it are drawn from many sources in addition to those specifically given reference. But although the point of view is one which an anthropologist might be expected to follow, it in no way amounts to an orthodoxy. At the same time, I have both taken much anthropological analysis for granted and been free with the material I quote. I hope the authors whose works I cite will find there has not been too much distortion.

Several parts of the book were written in collaboration with Joyce Evans, my mother. I thank her for her help in this way, especially for the reading she did and for perusing the manuscript. Joyce Evans has for many years lectured on women’s roles and “the woman question” to historical studies and literature classes, and any perspective I can lay claim to on the topic derives largely from what she has taught me.

MARILYN STRATHERN Port Moresby, 1974

Editorial Note

In the quoted material, paragraphs follow the original text, with occasional elisions, but not necessarily in the original order. Intervening or missing text is indicated by ellipses (. . .), while square brackets ([ ]) supply explanatory or linking material, or else an English term substituting for a vernacular. All original footnotes have been ignored.

Gratitude is offered to all of the authors and publishers who kindly gave consent for material to be reproduced in this volume: Robin Morgan, Wiley Publishers, Shirley Ardener, Stanford University Press, The CS Lewis Company LDT, International African Institute, Ann Oakley, Pearson UK, Taylor and Francis Group (UK), Fabian Society, Aboriginal Studies Press (with particular thanks to Kim Johnston), and the American Anthropological Association. ‘The author, editor, and publisher would also and especially like to thank Gavin Stevenson for his invaluable assistance.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

‘The Riddle of Gender

SARAH FRANKLIN

Written in Port Moresby in the early 1970s, Marilyn Strathern’s remarkable missing book makes an invaluable contribution to gender scholarship on several fronts.’ It would have had an immense effect on the questions it addresses had it been published sooner, and has for too long lacked a wider audience. It reads, like many feminist writings from the 1970s, with vivid contemporary relevance to questions of sex, sexuality, and sexual inequality. This is a classic 70s feminist text with a difference, however, as it offers a more complete theory of gender as a social and cultural form than any other writing from this era and interrogates how “woman” came to be a question at all. The intervening four decades since it was written allow us to appreciate the insights Before and after gender offers into changing forms of feminist argumentation, as well as their objects. These transforming frames of feminist thought cannot be aligned within an orderly genealogical sequence: the issues are too vast, too intertwined, and too important to be understood to have “evolved” in the manner we often associate with

1. I would like to thank Marilyn Strathern for agreeing to publish this book as well as Judith Butler for generously providing the Afterword. Hau Books has been an assiduous partner in this effort, and I am also grateful to the many authors and publishers who have agreed to allow lengthy citations from their work to be reprinted here.

xiv BEFORE AND AFTER GENDER this word—namely to progress. The thick palimpsest of debate that allows the twenty-first century reader to parse Strathern’s early engagement with the gender concept through the present lens of trans activism, queer theory, and cyborg feminism means that this text, in a sense, has not aged at all.

Indeed, the text remains extremely lively. The decision to retitle a work commissioned and written for a general audience concerning “men and women” to mark instead the many transformations in how gender is conceptualized expresses not only an intellectual, scholarly, and political ambition. There is another reason, too. Throughout this text the art of demonstration is at a premium, and it turns out to reveal even more than was originally intended. Part of the reason for this amplitude is that we get the several layers of icing hindsight allows to us add on top of what was a very impressive cake to begin with. We can slice this satisfaction several ways—in terms of how prescient so many of the insights offered here remain, in terms of the dexterity of argumentation and the quality of writing, and through the fascinating glimpses of how gender began to be rethought that flash past in the snapshots Strathern provides of the texts that influenced her thinking.

The manuscript was produced under commission for a series to be edited by Jean La Fontaine in association with the Royal Anthropological Institute. But the series fell through. The neatly typed completed manuscript was carefully labeled, wrapped in card, bound with string, tucked into a red box, and shelved. When the decision to publish this long waylaid manuscript had been taken, and the editing begun, it was an easy decision to agree not to make any other than minor and mainly typographical corrections because this is a beautifully written and argued book. It will undoubtedly be reintroduced into teaching not only because of its intellectual rigor and craft, and its vivid account of how gender works, but because the book could be used as a writing manual. The use of lengthy extracts from a wide range of sources—including ethnographies, songs, poems, feminist manifestos, novels, court transcripts, and scientific, literary, and sociological studies—reflected the original aims of the series for which the manuscript was commissioned, but they also allow the author to showcase her renowned skills of expression, interpretation, and analysis to great advantage. And they have the added advantage now of reminding us what a busy scene of debate feminist theory encountered in the 1970s.

I had the good fortune, I should declare at the outset, to have Marilyn Strathern as my first employer when I worked in the Manchester University Social Anthropology Department from 1989 to 1993 where she was then Chair.

EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION xv

A favorite occupation of my social group during this period was to religiously watch the Wimbledon Ladies singles finals every year in June, frequently featuring Martina Navratilova, whose exceptional athleticism earned her a reputation as one of the finest competitors of the twentieth century. In departmental seminars I was often struck by the similarly unbelievable speed and power with which Marilyn’s mind operated when she asked a question that began in one place, flipped over, was respun at yet another level, and ended up flying off the table at an unexpected angle before gently coming to rest at the feet of its recipient. These vivid and memorable displays of intellectual agility were never labored or lavish: they were neat, precise, polite, and carefully targeted. But as in a great rally on court, the thrill lay in the accumulation of momentum as the ideas whizzed back and forth and took on new dimensions in mid-air, all in the seemingly vast playground of a single person’s mind.

I felt a similar appreciation of the brilliant kinetic qualities of Strathern’s writing when I first read this book, which presents gender to us as a mechanism, argues it can be put to various kinds of use, and then pursues this idea in volley after volley of shot-perfect play. We might mistake the premise as an easy forehand lob: “relations between men and women may stand for other things.” We see the great control of pacing as Strathern demonstrates how many different ways that gender relations can be used to represent other things, and vice versa. This tactical display is both engaging and provocative, while maintaining an exemplary (and characteristic) level of composure and control. It would seem that one accomplished set piece after another is being played out in front of us as we move through chapters exploring symbolism, stereotypes, roles, marriage, the family household, personhood, sexuality, property, and individual freedom. It is only about mid-way through the book we begin to notice there are several other dimensions of the performance occurring simultaneously, and these become apparent—again in traditional Strathernian fashion—as the relation of the content to the form, the reader to the text, the texts to each other, and thus the whole apparatus of relationality as a game in play.

Ultimately, this book suggests, the instrumentality of relationality is not only isomorphic with gender—it is gender. It is this insight that animates the book initially, and throughout, at an increasing number of levels, which, cumulatively perform as well as explain what gender is and does. The form of the argument— its composition, pacing, and shot-reverse-shot reveals—is a crucial part of the way Strathern seeks to present gender relations to us. Her meticulously choreographed account reminds us that, like sociality, gender is still a riddle: yet her xvi BEFORE AND AFTER GENDER version of its devices and extensions intersects remarkably closely with themes that have become more prominent today, and will inspire others. Along the way, as we watch and learn the moves, our reading skills change, and with them our perceptions of not only how gender works but also what its workings reveal about how the world is made.

BEFORE GENDER

Gender, at the time the book was written, was only just coming into view. Strongly linked to the concept of “roles,” and practically oriented toward clinical issues of sex reassignment, the terms “women,” “female,” and “feminine” were much more common in both the anthropological and feminist literature of the time. Kate Millett ([1969] 1971) wrote of “sexual politics,” following Simone de Beauvoir’s (1972) account of “the second sex.” Germaine Greer (1970) described the plight of “the female eunuch,” and Betty Friedan ([1963] 1965) “the feminine mystique,” while Shulamith Firestone (1971) described “the dialectic of sex.” Feminist authors in the texts Strathern cites use “males and females,” “women’s subordination,” “female emancipation,” and of course “sex roles” and “sexual revolution.” Ann Oakley’s (1972) pioneering work on sex and gender is cited and extended in this book, which would have offered the most comprehensive definition of gender yet published if it had appeared in 1975— the same year that saw publication of Towards an anthropology of women. In particular, Stratherns account of gender as a symbol of relations, and thus a model of society itself, is unprecedented, as is her emphasis on the uses of gender as a social lever, instrument, or tool. Gender relations, Strathern argues, offer a way of thinking through other social categories, while intervening in them too. Gender relations not only “stand for” other kinds of relations but also make explicit fundamental features of relationality itself—including both its lively unpredictability and its intransigent continuities. Strathern goes so far as to suggest that gender is a verb masquerading as a noun in its capacity to “provide models of boundaries and relationships.” The concept of gender, she states in her conclusion, “itself assures a relationship.” When this symbol becomes an instrument, a means, and a mechanism to recast and contest other relations, the world is its canvas, and gender becomes a means by which “society can use the world to talk about itself.”

Unusually, Strathern’s model of gender, in addition to replacing “women”

and “men,” is used “globally” in the sense that it is seen as an elementary form

EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION xvii of sociality. This de-sexed, scaled-up model of gender is further distinguished by the way it is put to use in the text to do extensive analytical work. Gender relations, Strathern repeatedly shows us, are indexical of both social organization and its ambivalence, or undoing. Gender is one of the principal cultural forms of activating social agency—but one that is fraught with tensions that are both intimately personal and inherently political. The implications of these observations are presented both descriptively (using examples) and analytically (by using the gender concept to establish a new premise for “the woman question’). Strathern not only argues but stages her points, setting off deliberately opposed examples against each other, and then reversing the effect of contrast by revealing unexpected connections and similarities. Thus, what is remarkable, timely, and also timeless about this book is not only its bold take on the gender concept but the kinetic effects that it generates throughout between its content and its form. Fittingly, this style itself—of using gender as a performative analytic principle—offers a demonstration, and imitation, of what Strathern argues gender is, means, and does.

‘The set up for this thickly layered account of what gender is by way of imitating what it does initially takes the form of a familiar call-and-response sequence, in which questions are posed followed by observations to reach what appear to be conclusions. However, less conventionally, the conclusions are initially very brief: the first four chapters unfold like pleasantly unwinding paths of enquiry that seem to be heading for a conclusive ending, but instead appear to withhold the final “answer” that was their intended destination, leaving the curious reader to wander (and wonder) on independently, unaccompanied by the author, and encouraged to think things through for themselves.

‘The lessons in form here are important—politically, pedagogically, and analytically. In relation to what she calls “gender thinking,” and gender “as a way of looking,” Strathern distinguishes two levels of perception: conscious views and opinions about what men and women are like, and what she calls “mental operations,” which are less conscious, institutionalized frames of reference—including stereotypes, normative conventions, ideas of what is “natural” or customary, or assumptions about what is biologically innate. These devices are clearly explained in the opening chapters, which contain a condensed introduction to sociological analysis. Crucially, however, from the start, the text also withholds—it cautions and doubles back, it points to implications it refuses, and it hesitates. A constant theme is our own embeddedness in the subjects we are analyzing. Ultimately, then, the text cannot help but return to the fact that we are analyzing xviii BEFORE AND AFTER GENDER ourselves. This is the riddle of gender that has made it so attractive to so many analysts for so long—the two-way traffic of its formative effects, the shapes it makes and unmakes, the patterns we both can and cannot see because we are part of them.

RIDDLED WITH GENDER

Chapter One concerns “the seductive symbol’—the title itself a play on words. ‘The seductions of symbolism play a key role in the “sexual mythologies of everyday life” the book sets out to analyze and deconstruct. The seductively symbolic role of gender has two parts: we can analyze what is said about men and women—how they are depicted and symbolized—and then locate such descriptions in relation to behavior, action, social structure, et cetera (as in any typical anthropologist’s descriptions of “men’s and women’s roles”). But this is only part of the story, Strathern is keen to emphasize, because it is “only half the sexual mythology” (or not even half, as it turns out). We are not only concerned, she explains, with how people depict the sexes or their interactions: we miss the point of gender if we do not also consider “the many ways this interaction is used to talk about, becomes an idiom for, other things.” There is a third part too, it turns out, in terms of how gender messages are sent and received.

‘The first riddle of gender Strathern presents, then, concerns its complex functions as a symbol: the symbolic capacity for relations between men and women to “stand for something else,” she points out, may appear to be simple and ordinary but it is both arbitrary and ambiguous. Consequently, gender symbolism necessarily involves an ambivalent and often uncertain transfer of meanings. The qualities associated with gender (men are strong/vulnerable/ dominant, women are fragile/dangerous/subordinate) can vary, and since the means by which these are expressed can take different forms and produce a range of effects, the uncertainties accumulate. Using a relation as a symbol, she notes, raises complex issues because it is ambiguous to begin with and can become even more so through the process of transfer. In symbolism of this kind, both the quality being transferred (as a value) and its meaning remain highly arbitrary. This means that gender symbolism frequently contains so much noise it “obscures the identification of a single direction.”

A key point for Strathern, developed through a complex series of examples at the outset of her text, is that part of the riddle of gender is that it is not about

EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION xix men and women: gender is everywhere, and we are everywhere riddled by it (as Shakespeare knew well). This is a difficult point to begin with, and it is established through careful steps that instruct us not only in terms of descriptive content—concerning rituals and beliefs associated with wedding ceremonies in two very different cultural settings—but how to read the ways in which anthropologists have reported and interpreted their observations of such events. Amid these examples Strathern adds another: a feminist critique of sexual mythologies that subordinate women. ‘This illustration introduces yet another strand of her argument throughout—that we need a kind of ethnography of the feminist understanding of “the woman question.” It is not only a feminist anthropology she is after but also an anthropology of feminism.

‘The first chapter ends abruptly with a quotation from Simone de Beauvoir—whose women “dream the dreams of men.” This is directly preceded by an extract from Edwin Ardener (1972), whose men cannot hear the dreams of women at all because they dont know how to communicate with them. ‘This provocative contrast sets up two of the most important themes of Before and after gender, in which the terms “myth” and “mythology” are often used as if they meant “model” or “modeling.” Indeed this same conflation is the subject of both de Beauvoir’s and Ardener’s arguments about gender. For de Beauvoir, men are both the model and the modelers, whereas for Ardener the case is more one of two sets of irreconcilable models. Strathern’s presentation of gender as a relation that models relations—both in the sense of representing and intervening—is her first object lesson that gender is about much more than

«“ » women.

GENDER IS RIDICULOUS

Chapter Two introduces the concept of the stereotype—a complicated term that is often oversimplified in a nonironic exemplification of the social process it names. Greek in origin, combining “stereos” meaning “firm or solid” with “typos” meaning “impression,” the term derives from the printing industry, and was introduced in 1850 to mean “image perpetuated without change.” It entered the human sciences through its modern psychological sense, introduced in the 1920s, of an adaptive response to a complex reality that takes the form of simplification. The stereotype connects an inner cognitive order to “the world outside”’—the title of Strathern’s Chapter Four. Here, we are returning to the xx BEFORE AND AFTER GENDER theme that “sex is a peg on which other things can be hung,” only with an eye to parody, caricature, and ridicule.

Under the subheading “making men and women” we are introduced to Gregory Bateson’s ([1936] 1958) account of gender “buffoonery” along the Sepik River in New Guinea. Men’s affectation in important public settings of an “overemphasis” of masculine pride, combined with a “clowning” and “theatrical” attitude, is considered both “superficial” and “normal,” he reports. This exaggerated and parodic performance of masculinity reaches its peak in the men’s house in displays that are at once “noisy, angry and above all ironical” combining “violence with histrionic gesture” and working up to a “high pitch of . . . excitement.” In contrast, the women seem “jolly,” “cheerful,” “cooperative,” and “unostentatious.” Strathern notes these “marked contrasts in the reported behavior of men and women” and cheerfully proceeds to the next example. This is again from Bateson, describing the ways that men imitate women:

They put on the most filthy old tousled skirts such as only the ugliest and most decrepit widows might wear, and like widows they were smeared with ashes. Considerable ingenuity went into this costuming, and all of it was directed towards creating an effect of utter decrepitude. On their heads they wore tattered old capes which were beginning to unravel and to fall to pieces with age and decay. Their bellies were bound with string like those of pregnant women. In their noses they wore, suspended in place of the little triangles of mother-of-pearl shell which women wear on festive occasions, large triangular lumps of old sago pancakes, the stale orts of a long past meal.

In this disgusting costume and with absolutely grave faces . . . the two “mothers” hobbled about the village each using as a walking stick a short shafted paddle such as women use. Indeed, even with this support, they could hardly walk, so decrepit were they. The children of the village greeted these figures with screams of laughter and thronged around the two “mothers,” following wherever they went and bursting into new shrieks whenever the “mothers,” in their feebleness, stumbled and fell and, falling, demonstrated their femaleness by assuming on the ground grotesque attitudes with their legs widespread. (Bateson [1936] 1958: 12)

‘The parody of gender Bateson describes is part of the Maven ceremony through which Iatmul maternal uncles celebrate the achievements of their nephews, and he continues:

EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION xxi

Finally they came to the big canoe which [their nephew] had made—the achievement which they were celebrating. They then collapsed into the canoe and for a few moments lay in it apparently helpless and exhausted . . . with their legs wide apart in . . . attitudes . . . found . . . amusing. Gradually they recovered and picked up their paddles, and sitting in the canoe in the bow and stern (women sit to paddle a canoe, but men stand), they slowly took it for a short voyage on the lake. When they returned they came ashore and hobbled off. The performance was over and they went away and washed themselves and put on their ordinary garments. (Bateson [1936] 1958: 13-14)

Women also perform parodic gender imitations along the Sepik River, and these, too, are described by Bateson:

The majority of the women, when they put on the garments of men, wear the smartest of male attire. . . . [On one occasion] their faces were painted white with sulphur, as is the privilege of homicides, and in their hands they carried the decorated lime boxes used by men and serrated lime sticks with pendant tassels whose number is a tally of men killed by the owner. This costume was very becoming to the women and was admired by the men. In it the women were very proud of themselves. They walked about flaunting their feathers and grating their lime sticks in the boxes, producing the loud sound which men use to express anger, pride and assertiveness. Indeed so great was their pleasure in this particular detail of male behaviour that the husband of one of them, when I met him on the day following the performance, complained sorrowfully that his wife had worn away all the serrations on his lime stick so that it would no longer make a sound.

Bateson interprets these reciprocal instances of gender ridicule as part of a conversation between women and men about their respective roles. But Strathern wishes to push the form of the stereotype to reveal more about what gender is and does. She describes the stereotypical caricature as a “manipulation” of gender that works both because it is a rigidly defined form, and isn’t: it may appear to describe a familiar reality but instead comments on it, and evaluates it, and therefore intervenes in this reality in an instrumental way. As Bateson’s examples so effectively illustrate, the stereotype, in the context of a parody, is not reductive at all: indeed it is eloquent, and can evoke a whole range of emotions, in the way theater releases the imagination from the real—not through xxii BEFORE AND AFTER GENDER reduction but amplification. Mockery, parody, caricature—these are complex forms of commentary that undo precisely the forms they imitate. To ask here what the “messages” of such exaggerated gender performances might be is to introduce a very open-ended question indeed.

In turning next to the work of Margaret Mead (1935), Strathern introduces a more somber aspect of gender ridicule—the harsh, shaming, and destructive consequences for individuals whose gender is not “correctly” made. Why do such rigid gender expectations exist, Mead asks, and to what cost is this “dichotomy of social personality” enforced?

Any society that specializes its personality types by sex, which insists that any trait—love for children, interest in art, bravery in the face of danger, garrulity, lack of interest in personal relations, passiveness in sex-relations [. . .]}—is inalienably bound up with sex, paves the way for a kind of maladjustment of a worse order. . . . In addition to, or aside from, the pain of being born into a culture whose acknowledged ends he can never make his own, many a man has now the added misery of being disturbed in his psycho-sexual life. He not only has the wrong feelings but, far worse and more confusing, he has the feelings of a woman....

‘Thus the existence in a given society of a dichotomy of social personality, of a sex-determined, sex-limited personality, penalizes in greater or less degree every individual born within it. Those whose temperaments are indubitably aberrant fail to adjust themselves to the accepted standards, and by their very presence, by the anomalousness of their responses, confuse those whose temperaments are the expected ones for their sex. So in practically every mind a seed of doubt, of anxiety, is planted, which interferes with the normal course of life. (Mead 1935: 290-306 passim)

And so the riddle of gender continues: we are riddled with gender, but gender is ridiculous. It is absurd to expect so large a group of people as half the population to share the same qualities that radically demarcate them from the other equally large and diverse group of people who are supposed to be their polar opposites. ‘The premises that stereotypes operate as a kind of filter of variation in order to ease social function, or dampen the sharp edges of social complexity, are illogical in the context of gender. In this context, stereotypes—like myths—are cultural forms that can be manipulated to depict, to comment, to evaluate, to mock, to shame, to play, and to entertain. As these examples show, gender can be rigidly

EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION xxiii prescriptive but also meaningfully opaque: its rationalities of conformity can themselves stand for absurdity and rupture.

On these points, Strathern returns to her dialogue with de Beauvoir, citing at length her trenchant critiques of male solipsism and its crushing subordinations. But in her pursuit of a more anthropological feminism, she also carefully raises her doubts:

De Beauvoir has given an analysis of why females as a sex should be so endowed with conflicting attributes that they appear ambiguous. She is concerned to show how these myths about the nature of women define for men a concept of the individual. She is concerned with the limits of personal freedom and identifies women as a primary medium through which men see themselves as acting on the world, on nature. These concerns undoubtedly draw heavily on European tradition, on philosophies which have been preoccupied with notions of individuality, free will, mortality, and such like. It is illuminating in this regard to consider the prominence which sexual intercourse has in her account. It is women’s sexuality she suggests, which allows for so much play on the theme of ambiguity. (p. 55)

In the end, Strathern suggests, “one might suggest that de Beauvoir is really dealing with the place (and use) of sexuality in Western thought, and not, as she would suggest by some of her examples, human thought in general.” For it is in the European tradition especially, she notes, that sexual relations are used to symbolize other types of encounters—and this is not the case in all societies.

Carnal knowledge, possession of the flesh, mortality and release of the spirit, boundaries of freedom, domination of the natural world—some of these themes can be traced in European thought back to Medieval times and beyond. Sexual intercourse flows through these notions as a symbol of the ultimate ambiguity: it is a means of subduing Nature, and makes Nature yield forth her blessings; it is also the means by which Nature subdues man, for insofar as he is prey to the temptations of the flesh, he is not in control of his own destiny. But I am not sure whether sexual intercourse holds quite the same symbolic place in, say, Iatmul thought. (p. 57)

Indeed it is particularly unlikely that European, British, English, or Anglican models of sexuality would approximate those of the Sepik peoples given that they are not even shared among the travelers on a London double-decker bus.

xxiv BEFORE AND AFTER GENDER

As we have seen over the forty years since this book was written, the symbolic role of both sexuality and sexual intercourse has undergone significant and rapid change. In Chapter Three, Strathern addresses a perennial feminist theme in which such dramatic changes have not been so evident, namely the housewife and her labors. This chapter too is about the form of forms, and here it is the contents of models that will concern us.

MODEL HOUSEWIVES

Models, famously, have many uses. Anthropological models are used in Before and after gender to illustrate how gender forms connect disparate aspects of social life—from domestic cooking rituals to the formalities of chieftainship. But these examples also model for us conventions of anthropological analysis and interpretation. The book was written in the era when many formal modeling conventions in anthropology were under dispute: an earlier emphasis on the formal lineage structures of African societies to model kinship and politics was giving way to a new emphasis on ritual, symbol, and performance—accompanied by a new prominence for symbolic anthropology and what came to be known as “the interpretive turn.” Strathern was to be instrumental in these changes, in particular through introducing a new emphasis on personhood and self, and drawing on her expertise in Melanesian ethnography to challenge some of the overarching analytic habits of her generation—including an overreliance on the familiar binarisms nature vs. culture, domestic vs. jural, formal vs. informal, and male vs. female. Many of these critiques, her book suggests, were equally relevant to feminist analyses, and to the project of undoing some of its own “stuck” dichotomies of subject vs. object, individual vs. society, freedom vs. oppression, and men vs. women.