On Global Citizenship

Front matter

CRITICAL POWERS

Series Editors:

Bert van den Brink (University of Utrecht), Antony Simon Laden (University of Illinois, Chicago), Peter Niesen (University of Hamburg) and David Owen (University of Southampton).

Part 2 Responses 2 The Authority of Civic Citizens Anthony Simon Laden 3 James Tully’s Agonistic Realism Bonnie Honig and Marc Stears

4 Pictures of Democratic Engagement: Claim-Making, Citizenization and the Ethos of Democracy Aletta J. Norval

5 To Act Otherwise: Agonistic Republicanism and Global Citizenship Duncan Bell

6 Civil Disobedience as a Practice of Civic Freedom Robin Celikates

7 Modern versus Diverse Citizenship: Historical and Ideal Theory Perspectives Andrew Mason

8 Instituting Civic Citizenship Adam Dunn and David Owen

Part3 Reply

9 On Global Citizenship: Replies to Interlocutors James Tully

329 349

List of Contributors

Duncan Bell is a senior lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, and a Fellow of Christ’s College. He is the author of The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton University Press, 2007), and several edited collections, the most recent of which is (with Joel Isaac) Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Robin Celikates is associate professor of political and social philosophy at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam and an associated member of the Institut fiir Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) in Frankfurt am Main. His most recent book is Kritik als soziale Praxis. Gesellschaftliche Selbstverstandigung und kritische Theorie (Criticism as Social Practice. Social Self-Understanding and Critical Theory), with a preface by Axel Honneth (Campus, 2009).

Adam Dunn is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Citizenship, Globalization and Governance at the University of Southampton. He is currently completing a book manuscript on Hannah Arendt: Judgment, Action and Institutions.

Bonnie Honig is Nancy Duke Lewis Professor in the Departments of Modern Culture and Media (MCM) and Political Science at Brown University. Her most recent book is Antigone, Interrupted (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Anthony Laden is professor of philosophy, and Chair, of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Illinois Chicago. His most recent book is Reasoning: A Social Picture (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Andrew Mason is professor of political theory in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. His most recent book is Living Together as Equals: The Demands of Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2012).

List of Contributors vii

David Owen is professor of social and political philosophy in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton. His most recent book is Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality (Acumen Press, 2007).

Marc Stears is professor of political theory, university lecturer, and fellow, University College (currently on leave as chief speechwriter to the leader of the opposition, Rt Hon Ed Miliband, MP). His most recent book is Demanding Democracy: American Radicals in Search of a New Politics (Princeton University Press, 2010).

James Tully is distinguished professor of political science, law, indigenous governance and philosophy at the University of Victoria. He is fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and emeritus fellow of the Trudeau Foundation. In 2010 he was awarded the Killam Prize in the Humanities for his outstanding contribution to scholarship and Canadian public life. His two-volume work, Public Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge University Press, 2008), was awarded the C. B. Macpherson Prize by the Canadian Political Science Association for the best book in political theory written in English or French in Canada 2008-10. He is consulting editor of the journals Political Theory and Global Constitutionalism, co-editor of the Clarendon Works of John Locke and former co-editor of the Cambridge Ideas in Context Series.

Series Editor’s Foreword

On Global Citizenship and Public Philosophy

James Tully’s lead essay for this volume offers a substantive reflection on citizenship as the main upshot of his investigations of contemporary global politics. In this essay, Tully distinguishes two modes of citizenship - modern/civil and diverse/civic — that align with ‘restricted’ and ‘oper’ practices of democracy. The ‘modern citizen’ stands towards citizenship as a status-securing liberty within an institutional framework of rules that compose democratic rule, whereas the ‘diverse citizen’ is oriented towards citizenship as the freedom of participation — as actors in contexts of governance engaged in democratic praxis, not the citizen of an institution (e.g. a state) but the free citizen of the ‘free city’: that is, any kind of civic world or democratic ‘sphere’ that comes into being among them. Tully’s aim is to show us that when we adopt this civic stance it becomes clear that another world is not simply possible but actual, that civic citizens engaged in contesting norms of governance from local to global contexts and in cooperatively organizing themselves are a widespread feature of our common world.

This essay is also, however, an exemplification of an approach to political philosophy that Tully terms ‘public philosophy’ - and in order to contextualize Tully’s essay as well as the responses to it, it may be helpful to offer a sketch of this approach.

For Tully, political theory is to be understood as the methodical extension of the self-reflective character of historically situated practices of practical reasoning and not as a distinct higher-order activity of theoretical reflection on these situated practices of practical reasoning. As such political theory is not oriented to legislating the nature and limits of practical reason (e.g. by trying to provide a general theory of justice) but to the reflective elucidation and negotiation of the contents

Series Editor’s Foreword ix and bounds of practical reason. The authority of the reasons offered by political theory are not to be seen as modelled on the commands of a rational legislator specifying, for example, the form of the just society but rather as more akin to invitations to consider looking at our political relationship in a different way. We can distinguish three steps in Tully’s ‘public philosophy’ that comprise its critical activity.

The first is that, following Wittgenstein, Skinner and Foucault, it grants a primacy to practice, that is, it focuses on the practices of governance and the exercise of freedom within and over the norms of these practices that shapes the forms of thought, conduct and subjectivity characteristic of the present. From Wittgenstein, Tully draws out the point that Arendt’s understanding of the practice of freedom - of speaking and acting differently in the course of a language game and so modifying or transforming the game - is not a special feature of politics or a form of freedom restricted to certain modes of human interaction but, rather, is a general feature of human practices and relationships. Tully takes Skinner and Foucault to be the primary inheritors of this outlook. In the case of Skinner, this involves tracing the intersubjective conventions that govern political reflection in a given context in order to show how political actors in that context have exercised their freedom in modifying those conventions. In the case of Foucault, it involves providing a genealogy of the problematizations in terms of which we understand ourselves as bound by certain limits; a genealogy which is, at the same time, a redescription of those limits. Foucaults approach shares both Arendt’s understanding of the activity of freedom as modification or transformation of games of governance and the view of Wittgenstein and Skinner that such freedom is a feature of any and all human practices, but Foucault also develops Nietzsches point that this activity of freedom is an agonistic relationship and, thereby, links the following elements together: the practice of freedom, the modification of the rules governing the relationships among players in the course of a game and agonistic activity. Public philosophy in Tully’s sense begins with the calling into question, and concern to x Series Editor’s Foreword modify, a game of government on the part of those subject to it. In this respect, it is best construed as an expression and an enabling of the agonistic activity of freedom.

The second step is that Tully does not attempt to develop a normative theory as a way of adjudicating or evaluating the calling into question of the game of government. Rather public philosophy engages in what might be termed ‘redescription with critical intent. First, public philosophy focuses on disclosing the historically contingent conditions of possibility for the practices of governance in question and the form of problematization that it exhibits before, second, offering a redescription that alters the self-understanding of those subject to it, and struggling within it, in ways that enable them to perceive the arbitrary constraints in what is given as universal, necessary and obligatory. Public philosophy achieves this objective through two elements. The first, adopting Wittgenstein’s practice of perspicuous representation, is designed to bring to light the unexamined conventions of the language games within which the problem and proposed solutions to it arise. The second, combining Foucault with the Cambridge School, is a genealogical account of these language games designed to free us from the hold of these unexamined conventions.

The third and final step in Tully’s critical activity is that this historical and critical relation to the present does not stop at calling a limit into question and engaging in a dialogue over its possible transformation, but also attempts to establish an ongoing mutual relation with the concrete struggles, negotiations and implementations of citizens who experiment with modifying the practices on the ground. Public philosophy does not aim to speak for those subject to government, but rather aims to provide them with resources for speaking for themselves.

This practice of political theory was given initial, and incomplete, expression in Strange Multiplicity where Tully addresses the question of the constitutional accommodation of cultural diversity. A critical survey identifies a range of conventions that inform contemporary constitutionalism and serve to exclude or assimilate cultural diversity. A genealogical investigation of contemporary constitutionalism identifies

Series Editor’s Foreword xi two distinct modes of constitutionalism - modern and common - which exhibit radically different practical attitudes to the issue of accommodating cultural diversity. The former, which is dominant, adopts a monological perspective and unilaterally gives expression to a claim to establish just constitutional rules (where this claim is predicated on the stages view of history that identifies the modern European state with a republican constitution as the rational form of polity). Tully shows how this practical attitude was forged in and through the imperialist context of Europe’s encounter with the New World as a way of justifying the appropriation of land without native consent (e.g. Locke), the denial of international standing to aboriginal peoples (e.g. Kant and Vattel) and the destruction of aboriginal culture and customs in the name of enlightened progress (e.g. Pufendorf, Sieyes and Paine). By contrast, common constitutionalism adopts a dialogical perspective which expresses the anti-theoretical claim that constitution-making is a practical skill guided by the conventions of mutual recognition, consent and cultural continuity. Tully provides a series of examples of how this practical attitude led to the acknowledgement of aboriginal peoples and a conceptualization of a constitution as a form of accommodation of cultural diversity. In the light of this genealogical account, the struggles of aboriginal peoples can now be seen as anti-imperial struggles for self-rule generated by the imposition of modern constitutionalism and resolvable through the practice of common constitutionalism. Following Strange Multiplicity, Tully worked further on freedom and power, coming to see that these struggles are best conceived agonistically, not as struggles for recognition but as struggles over recognition. It is not a matter of aiming at dialogical consensus on a just final settlement since there can always be reasonable dissensus concerning any such settlement. Rather it is a matter of following practices of civic freedom such that those subject to a practice of governance can contest and transform it. It is this step that completes Tully’s understanding of the approach that he comes to call ‘public philosophy’ and which leads him to elaborate the implications of his revised view of freedom for multinational democracy and extend his analysis to encompass the xii Series Editors Foreword history of Western imperialism before and after decolonization as well as contemporary global politics and international law. These elements are drawn together in his most major work to date: the two-volume Public Philosophy in a New Key - and further extended in the essay on citizenship offered in this volume. As this essay makes clear, Tully’s public philosophy is an invitation to take up the civic stance and to practise freedom.

David Owen

Part One Lead Essay

James Tully

1. Introduction: Global citizenship as negotiated practices

‘Global citizenship’ has emerged as the locus of struggles on the ground and of reflection and contestation in theory.’ This is scarcely surprising. Many of the central and most enduring struggles in the history of politics have taken place in and over the language of citizenship and the activities and institutions into which it is woven. One could say that the hopes and dreams and fears and xenophobia of centuries of individual and collective political actors are expressed in the overlapping and conflicting histories of the uses of the language of citizenship, the forms of life in which they have been employed and the locales in which they take place. This motley ensemble of contested languages, activities and institutions constitutes the inherited field of citizenship today.”

1 For an introduction to this broad field see H. Anheier, M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and F. Holland, eds, Global Civil Society 2004-2005, London: Sage, 2004; L. Amoore, eds, The Global Resistance Reader, London: Routledge, 2005; J. Brodie, ‘Introduction: Globalization and Citizenship beyond the Nation State, Citizenship Studies 8 (4): 323-32, 2004; N. Dower, An Introduction to Global Citizenship, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003; N. Dower and J. Williams, eds, Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction, New York: Routledge, 2002; D. Held and A. McGrew, eds, The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Polity, 2003; C. McKinnon and I. Hampsher-Monk, eds, The Demands of Citizenship, London: Continuum, 2000.

I mean by ‘field’ the field of human action, the field of academic research and the ecological field in which these are carried on. Similarly, ‘language of citizenship’ refers to the broad range of vocabularies or discourses of citizenship practices, policies and theories.

The language of ‘global’ and ‘globalization and the activities, institutions and processes to which it refers and in which it is increasingly used, while more recent than citizenship, comprise a similarly central and contested domain. Globalization has become a shared yet disputed vocabulary in terms of which rival interpretations of the ways humans and their habitats are governed globally are presented and disputed in both practice and theory. It thus constitutes a similarly contested field of globalization.

When ‘globalization’ and ‘citizenship’ are combined they not only bring their contested histories of meanings with them, their conjunction brings into being a complex new field that raises new questions and elicits new answers concerning the meaning of, and relationship between, global governance and global citizenship. When we enquire into global citizenship, therefore, we are already thrown into this remarkably complex inherited field of contested languages, activities, institutions, processes and the environs in which they take place. This conjoint field is the problematization of global citizenship: The way that formerly disparate activities, institutions, processes and languages have been gathered together under the rubric of ‘global citizenship, becomes the site of contestation in practice, and formulated as a problem in research, policy and theory, to which diverse solutions are presented and debated.’

The reason why the uses of ‘citizenship; ‘globalization’ and ‘global citizenship’ are contestable, rather than fixed and determinant, is, as Wittgenstein classically argued, because there is neither an essential set of necessary and sufficient criteria for the correct use of such concepts nor a calculus for their application in particular cases. The art of understanding a concept like ‘global citizenship’ is not the application of a universal rule to particular cases. Rather, the uses of such complex concepts in different cases and contexts do not have one set of properties in common, but - from case to case - an indeterminate

° For this approach see J. Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key, 2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, volume I, chapters 1 and 3.

family of overlapping and crisscrossing ‘similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. What ‘we see, therefore, is not a single rule (definition or theory) being applied in every case, but, rather, ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.* A language user learns how to use a concept by apprenticeship in the practice of use and discrimination in everyday life, by invoking (defeasible) similarities and dissimilarities with other cases and responding to counterarguments when challenged, and thereby gradually acquiring the abilities to use language in normative and critical ways in new contexts.”

Since the use of concepts with complex histories ‘is not everywhere circumscribed by rules, Wittgenstein continues, ‘the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier’® It is almost always possible, to some indeterminate extent, to question a given normal use, invoke slightly different similarities with other historical uses or interpret a shared criterion differently, and argue that the term can be extended in an unexpected and unpredictable way, which is nevertheless ‘related’ to other, familiar uses, and to act on it (and sometimes the act precedes the argumentation for the novel use).’ Use, and therefore meaning, is not the application of a transcendental or official theory of citizenship. It is an indeterminate spatio-temporal ‘negotiated practice’ among partners in relations of dialogical interlocution and practical interaction in which the possibility of going on differently is always present.* This pragmatic linguistic freedom of enunciation and initiation - of contestability and speaking otherwise - within the weighty constraints of the inherited relations of use and meaning is, as we shall see, internally related to

+ L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997; for an exploration of this account of learning and understanding language see Tully, Public Philosophy 1, chapter 2.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 75.

Ibid.; note also p. 75.

See J. Medina, The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity, Albany: SUNY Press, 2002, pp. 141-94; J. Medina, Language, London: Continuum, 2005, pp. 139-67.

oN A u a practical (extralinguistic) freedom of enactment and improvization within the inherited relations of power in which the vocabulary is used.’ It is the reason why the history of citizens and citizenship is not the unfolding of some transhistorical definition that the grand theories claim it to be. It is not the endless repetition of the same formula, stages of historical development towards a predictable end, an instrument controlled by the hegemonic class or the dialectical overcoming of antagonistic forces. Unfortunately for theorists and fortunately for human beings, it is precisely the unpredictable ‘deeds and events we call historical."

The creation of the conjunction ‘global citizenship’ could be seen as a prime exemplar of the innovative freedom of citizens and non-citizens to contest and initiate something new in the practice of citizenship. The multiplicity of contests that extend citizenship into the field of globalization (conceived formerly as a realm of predictable historical processes impervious to civic action), could be construed as the initiatory act of global citizenship that opens a new field of possibilities of another, more democratic world. While partly true, the actual existing inherited field of global citizenship is much more complex, and the possibilities of initiating and carrying on civic action much more contextually situated within the field, than this abstract formulation could unintentionally lead one to believe. If we wish to become effective global citizens then there is no alternative to undergoing the apprenticeship of learning our way around this complicated field and coming to acquire the practical abilities of thinking and acting within it and the critical abilities of seeing the concrete possibilities of going beyond its limits. This exploration of the field is thus an apprenticeship manual in becoming who we can be - local and global citizens.

° This contextual freedom of enunciation and enactment (words and deeds) is an aspect of civic freedom (Subsection 5).

1 H, Arendt, ‘What is Freedom?; in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, p. 169; see Tully, Public Philosophy I, chapter 4.

2. Two modes of citizenship: Preliminary sketch

Among the many contested meanings and corresponding practices of global citizenship I would like to focus on two and their traditions of interpretation. Many of the most important struggles around the globe today are over these two modes of global citizenship and the struggles themselves consist in their enactment. Here a ‘mode of citizenship’ refers to the ensemble comprised of a distinctive language of citizenship and its traditions of interpretation on the one hand and the corresponding practices and institutions to which it refers and in which it is used on the other." The two I wish to examine have been interpreted in different ways and related to different traditions of citizenship under different names in a wide variety of academic and activist literature: for example, global citizenship from above versus global citizenship from below, low intensity versus high intensity global citizenship, representative versus direct, hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic, cosmopolitan versus place-based, universal versus multiversal. I call these two families ‘modern’ and ‘diverse’ citizenship. I call modern citizenship in a modern state ‘civil’ citizenship and in a global context ‘cosmopolitan’ citizenship. The corresponding names of diverse citizenship are ‘civic’ and ‘glocal. ‘Glocal’ and ‘glocalization in the diverse citizenship tradition refer to the global networking of local practices of civic citizenship in contrast to the use of ‘global’ and ‘globalization in modern/cosmopolitan citizenship.” The comparative explication of these two historical and contemporary vocabularies and the practices in which they are used aims to bring to light the shared field of citizenship from their different orientations. I begin with a

This account of modes of citizenship is adapted from Wittgenstein’s concept of languagegames and Foucault’s concept of practical systems. See Tully, Public Philosophy 1, chapters 1-3. In these chapters I have used the general category of practices rather than modes. However, in this case, citizenship is taken as a practice in one tradition and an institution in the other, so the use of practice as the generic term would elide this crucial difference.

I am indebted to Warren Magnusson for introducing me to the concept of and literature on glocal citizenship.

preliminary sketch of two general aspects of citizenship as a way of introducing them.”

The first and most familiar aspect is that modern citizenship is the modular form of citizenship associated with the historical processes of modernization and colonization: that is, (1) the modernization of the West into modern nation states with representative governments, a system of international law, the decolonization of European empires, supranational regime formations and the development of global civil society; and, in tandem, (2) the dependent modernization and citizenization of the non-West through colonization, the Mandate System, post-decolonization nation-building and global governance of the former colonies. The language of modern citizenship, in its civil and cosmopolitan forms, presents successive idealizations of modern Euroamerican citizenship as the uniquely universal module for all human societies. This allegedly universal mode of citizenship is also presented as the product of universal historical processes or stages of development under successive discourses of progress - civilization, modernization, constitutionalization, democratization and now globalization - that began in Europe and have been spread around the world by Euroamerican expansion and continuing hegemony. These two features of modern citizenship - a universal institutional form of citizenship conjoined with a universal set of historical processes that bring it to the non-West under Western tutelage - are articulated and debated in, respectively, modern normative theories of citizenship and social scientific theories of modernization from the eighteenth century to today.

In contrast, diverse citizenship is associated with a diversity or multiplicity of different practices of citizenship in the West and non- West. The language of diverse citizenship, both civic and glocal, presents citizenship as a situated or ‘local’ practice that takes countless forms in different locales. It is not described in terms of universal institutions and historical processes, but in terms of grass roots democratic or civic

13 This preliminary sketch is developed in more detail in the following sections and it draws on the chapters in Tully, Public Philosophy.

activities of the ‘governed’ (the people) in the specific relationships of governance in specific locales and the glocal activities of networking with other local practices. Whereas modern citizenship focuses on citizenship as a universalizable legal status underpinned by institutions and processes of rationalization that enable and circumscribe the possibility of civil activity (an institutional/universal orientation), diverse citizenship focuses on the singular civic activities and improvizations of the governed in any practice of government and the diverse ways these are more or less institutionalized or blocked in different contexts (a civic activity/ contextual orientation). Citizenship is not a status given by the institutions of the modern constitutional state and international law, but negotiated practices in which one becomes a citizen through participation.

Second, the language of modern citizenship, especially the theories, histories and comparative taxonomies, not only elaborate a theory of modern citizenship with its membership codes, rights and duties and corresponding institutional preconditions, it also characterizes all other practices of citizenship in relation to its unique form as the universal standard. Other modes of citizenship are classified as either not really citizenship at all (not meeting any of the modern criteria) or, if some modern criteria are present, as primitive, pre-modern, traditional or customary stages of proto-citizenship on the historical path (cultural, economic, cognitive, political) to full modern citizenship as the telos, and as requiring some form of direct or indirect guidance from the self-described more advanced, civilized or developed races, nations or peoples. That is, the kind of critical theory that has accompanied modern citizenship since the eighteenth century critically organizes all other forms of citizenship in the world as ‘lower’ or ‘inferior’ in relationship to its form as the regulative ideal. This feature of the language of modern citizenship is called the ‘subalternization or colonization of other forms of citizenship: bringing them to language under a description of their subalternity or coloniality relative to modern citizenship."

14 W. D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

The language of diverse citizenship, in contrast, characterizes other forms of citizenship as singular and historically contingent and critically compares them in terms of various similar and dissimilar aspects and from the perspectives and normative criteria of each.’ From these perspectival and critical comparisons, modern citizenship (like all forms of citizenship) is seen as one singular, historical form of citizenship among others, with its strengths and weaknesses relative to others, yet presenting itself in false (circular) claims to universality (formulated in different ways over the last 200 years) that legitimate its global imposition. That is, the kind of critical attitude that accompanies practices of diverse citizenship and contextualizes or ‘provincializes’ modern citizenship and its universalizing language, usually but not necessarily by a historical or genealogical contextualization.'’* The aim of this critical attitude is to free us from the hold of the globally dominant language of modern citizenship as the pre-emptive language of disclosure of all forms of citizenship and enable us to see it as one language among others. In so doing, it de-universalizes modern citizenship (for, as we have seen, its claim to universality is internal to the globally dominant language of modern citizenship) and desubalternizes other modes of citizenship (discloses them in their local languages and histories). Modern citizenship can thus be put in its place as one singular (and imperious) mode in a global field of diverse alternatives and the critical work of comparisons and contrasts from different perspectives and norms of assessment can begin. This difficult practice of situated critical freedom is not a change in theory but in attitude or ethos - in the way one sees and acts in the world of citizenship and its possibilities.”

That is, the diverse tradition studies citizenship in the comparative and analogical way Wittgenstein outlines in the Introduction. For these two contrasting genres of reasoning, the modern and the diverse, see Tully, Public Philosophy I, chapter 1.

See D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000; and D. Chakrabarty, Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

For the contrast between a ‘critical theory’ and a ‘critical attitude’ see Tully, Public Philosophy I, chapter 3.

Section One: Modern Citizenship 3. Modern civil citizenship

The tradition of modern citizenship takes as its empirical and normative exemplar the form of citizenship characteristic of the modern nation state." Citizenship (both civil and cosmopolitan) is defined in relation to two clusters of institutional features of modern nation states: the constitutional rule of law (nomos) and representative government (demos). The constitutional rule of law is the first condition of citizenship. The ‘civil’ law (a formal legal order) and its enforcement by a coercive authority establishes (literally ‘constitutes’) the conditions of civilization, the city (civitas), citizenship, civil society, civil liberty and civility (hence ‘civil’ citizenship). By definition the ‘outside’ is the realm of the uncivilized: barbarism, savagery, the state of nature or war or the uncertainty of informal, customary law and unenforceable natural law. A person has the status of citizenship in virtue of being subject to civil law in two senses: to an established and enforced system of law and to the ‘civilizing, pacifying or socializing force of the rule of law on the subjectivity (self-awareness and self-formation) of those who are constrained to obey over time. This is why cosmopolitan citizenship and global civil society depend on some form of legalization or constitutionalization of the global order analogous (in various ways) to the modern nation state.

Relative to the constitutional rule of law, modern citizenship is defined as a status (state or condition). This civil status is usually

18 For the background to Section Two see J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 as well as Tully, Public Philosophy I, chapter 6, and Tully, Public Philosophy II, chapters 1, 2, 4 and 7; C. Tilly, Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; D. Held, Models of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity, 1996; J. Dunn, Democracy: A History, Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2005; M. R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; S. Halperin, War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Q. Skinner and B. Strath, eds, States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; E. Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; and the references in note 1.