Aging and Self-Realization

Front matter

HANNE LACEULLE

CULTURAL NARRATIVES ABOUT LATER LIFE

[transcript | Aging Studies Volume XVII

Chapter 1—Introduction | 1 1.1 Prologue — An exemplar of “aging well” | 11 1.2

Introducing the thematic domain and background of the study | 13 1.2.1 Lack of meaning-generating narratives about later life | 13

1.2.2 Aging in an era of self-realization | 15

Objectives of the study | 18

A hermeneutic approach | 19

Some terminological issues | 21

Positioning the study in the philosophical and gerontological field | 26 1.6.1 Positioning in moral philosophy | 26

1.6.2 Positioning in gerontology | 27

Chapter outlines | 29

Chapter 2—Living and aging in late modernity | 33 2.1

2.2 Late modernity, an era of self-realization? | 34

2.3

Features and dynamics of the late modern world | 35

2.3.1 A life of one’s own: reflexive individualization | 36

2.3.2 Living in a post-traditional context | 38

2.3.3 A globalizing world | 40

2.3.4 Structural and systemic influences on individualized lives | 41 2.3.5 Repression of meaning and morality | 43

2.3.6 The moral identity crisis of late modern man | 45

2.4 Implications for late modern aging | 46

2.4.1 A (much) longer life in a complex world | 47

2.4.2 Individualization and diversification: an old age of one’s own? | 47 2.4.3 Third Age and Fourth Age | 49

2.4.4 Structural and systemic dynamics impacting late modern aging | 52 2.4.5 Aging well as an individual responsibility | 53

2.4.6 Existential vulnerability and the fragile experience of meaning | 55

2.5 Conclusion | 58 2.5.1 Ambivalences of self-realization in late modernity | 58 2.5.2 Reframing late modern self-realization discourse | 59

Chapter 3—Cultural narratives and counter narratives about aging | 63 3.1 Introduction | 63 3.2 Cultural narratives and counter narratives | 64

3.2.1 Cultural (master) narratives and their role in identity-building | 64

3.2.2 Damaging effects of cultural narratives | 67

3.2.3 Moral agency and the importance of recognition | 69

3.2.4 Narrative repair through agency-enhancing counter narratives | 73 3.3 Cultural narratives about later life | 76

3.3.1 Cultural and critical gerontology on the cultural positioning

of aging | 76

3.3.2 Decline narratives | 79

3.3.3 Age-defying narratives | 81

3.3.4 Limitations of existing cultural narratives on aging | 83 3.4 Conclusion: In search of viable counter narratives about aging | 86

Chapter 4—Self-realization | 93 4.1 Introduction | 93 4.2 Introducing self-realization | 94 4.2.1 The purpose of self-realization | 96 4.2.2 The self in self-realization | 101 4.2.3 The practice of self-realization | 106 4.2.4 The timing of self-realization | 109 4.3 Exploring the best in us | 12 4.3.1 Selected historical and philosophical interpretations of the best in us | 113 4.3.2 Three threads: autonomy, authenticity and virtue | 117 4.4 Self-realization and aging | 120 4.4.1 Self-realization and the shrinking of the future | 120 4.4.2 Self-realization and radicalization of existential vulnerability | 123

Chapter 5—Narrative identity and moral agency | 127 5.1 Introduction | 127 5.2 Introducing narrative identity | 128 5.2.1 Life and self as stories | 128 5.2.2 The relation between life and narrative | 130 5.2.3 Narrative integration and unified personhood | 132 5.2.4 Narrativity and aging | 134

5.3 Three interpretations of narrative identity | 136 5.3.1 Marya Schechtman — Narrative self-constitution | 136 5.3.2 Hilde Lindemann — Narrative identity as a social practice | 139 5.3.3 Kim Atkins — Narrative identity and moral identity | 142

5.4 From narrative identity to moral agency | 145

5-5 Conclusion: composing a definition of moral agency | 153

Chapter 6—Autonomy | 159 6.1 Introduction | 159 6.2 Introducing autonomy | 160 6.2.1 Historical roots of autonomy discourse | 160 6.2.2 Harry Frankfurt: A dominant contemporary account | 162 6.3 Selected alternative accounts of autonomy | 163 6.3.1 Charles Taylor: Autonomy and the strong evaluation of desires | 164 6.3.2 Laura Ekstrom: Autonomy and the coherence of our value orientation | 165 6.3.3 Diana Meyers: Autonomy and the conditions of its practicability | 166 6.3.4 Relational view: Autonomy, interdependence, socialization and power | 169 6.4 Autonomy in the context of aging | 174 6.4.1 Harry Moody: The communicative approach | 175 6.4.2 George Agich: The phenomenological approach | 176 6.4.3 Martha Holstein and colleagues: The relational approach | 178 6.5 Evaluation of the discussed accounts on autonomy | 180 6.6 Conclusion: Towards an individuating conception of autonomy | 182

Chapter 7—Authenticity | 189 7.1 Introduction | 189 7.2 Introducing authenticity | 190 7.3 Selected philosophical accounts of authenticity | 194 7.3.1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Romantic heirs | 194 7.3.2 Existentialist views of authenticity | 197 7.3.3 Charles Taylor’s ethics of authenticity | 203 7.3.4 Diana Meyers — Authenticity and intersectional identity | 205 7.4 Authenticity in the context of aging | 207 7.4.1 Spiritual perspectives on aging | 207 7.4.2 Existential perspectives on aging | 209 7.4.3 Art of living perspectives on aging | 210 7.5 Evaluation of the discussed authenticity accounts | 212 7.6 Conclusion: Towards authenticity as a social and moral practice | 215

Chapter 8—Virtue | 219 8.1 Introduction | 219 8.2 Introducing virtue | 219 8.3 Selected accounts of virtue ethics | 223 8.3.1 Aristotle: Virtue as ‘nobility of the soul’ | 223 8.3.2 Alasdair MacIntyre: Virtue as a remedy for the modern “moral crisis” | 226 8.3.3 Christine Swanton: Pluralistic virtue ethics | 229 8.4 Virtue in the context of aging | 235 8.5 Evaluation of the discussed virtue accounts | 239 8.6 Conclusion: Towards virtue as attitudinal concretization of moral agency | 244

Chapter 9—Conclusion | 251

9.2 Recapitulation of the argument | 252

9.3 Advancing older people’s moral agency | 257

9.4 Objections to the self-realization discourse | 264 9.4.1 Elitism/demandingness objection | 265 9.4.2 Self-centeredness objection | 266 9.4.3 Social structure/social justice objection | 266 9.4.4 Western/masculine bias objection | 268 9.4.5 Moralism/paternalism objection | 269 9.4.6 Mental/cognitive ability objection | 270

9.5 Unanswered questions | 273

9.6 Final thoughts | 274