Modern Islamic Thinking and Activism

Front matter

Modern Islamic Thinking and Activism Dynamics in the West and in the Middle East

CURRENT ISSUES IN ISLAM Editorial board

Baderin, Mashood, SOAS, University of London

Part I: Modern Islamic Thinking

2. Fethullah Gülen, Tariq Ramadan and Yusuf al-Qaradawi: The pluralisation of Islamic Knowledge 33 Erkan Toguslu

3. Tariq Ramadan and Abdullahi An-Na’im’s Islamic gender reform in the Brussels Moroccan community 51 Thierry Limpens

4. The Contribution of Sufism to the Construction of Contemporary Europe’s Islam 77 Eric Geoffroy

Part II: Secularism, Islam and Public Sphere: Turkey and Egypt

5. Post Secularism, Post-Islamism and Islam in the Public Sphere 91 Ihsan Yilmaz

6. The Arab Revolutions and Islamic Civil Society IOI Emilio Giuseppe Platti

7- The Muslim Brotherhood and the Democratic Experience in Egypt 127 Roel Meijer

Part III: Contemporary Islamic Social Activism Voluntary Welfare Organizations Jonathan Benthall

9. Tradition and Modernity in Social Islam: The Case of Muslim NGOs in Jordan Egbert Harmsen

10. Fighting Poverty with Kimse Yok Mu Thomas Michel u. Translocality and Hybridization in Current Modern Islamic Activism Erkan Toguslu and Johan Leman

IĜI

CHAPTER I Contemporary Islamic Activism and Muslims

In this book we invited some authors to look at the basic issues that Islam faces today, touching political, cultural, spiritual and economic dimensions in which Muslims are involved to develop their understanding and strategies in different geographical and national contexts. We asked them to do that by focusing on some very precise situations. Such an approach cannot be a complete one. We are very conscious that such analysis has its weaknesses. But it surely also has some very strong points. It avoids analyses that are so general that they become quite abstract and can never be found in the reality of social and cultural praxis at grassroots level.

So, the chapters in the book focus on some areas of applied Islamic principles and understandings including welfare organizations, educational institutions, political implications in civil society and spiritual authority. Confronted with modernity and a Western form of secularism, Muslim socio-religious activism develops a Muslim-self at various dimensions and intersection points. The exploration of Muslim implications in these socio-economic and political domains enables us to analyse the new salient identity of Muslims.

The recent debates on current issues in Islam emphasize the question of the Muslim adaptability-compatibility in a global civil society and how to contribute to it. In this regard, the different aspects of Muslims living in Britain, France, Egypt, Turkey and so on show how they engage with modernity and pluralism. The chapters offer an analysis of a contextualized and localized Islam in the modern world while having different ideological, identical positions. The chapters look

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ERKAN TOĞUŞLU AND JOHAN LEMAN at various types of Islamic groups and identities in different frames. Inside the confines of one volume we will try to be attentive to a variety of interpretations in the Islamic tradition, i.e. also looking at Sunni and some new Sufi dynamics. The multidisciplinary view of certain Islamic figures, organizations, ideologies and thinking provides some elements to figure out Islamic socio-religious activities.

The chapters investigate the characteristics and dynamics of Islamic activism in politics, social work and intellectual thought. They pose the question whether the change and transformation of this activism offers new points for the development of civil society and democratization at the social-political and intellectual level. It also analyses how this Islamic-Muslim activism can be comprehended in terms of democracy, modernity, and also in social work.

A loose definition of Islamic activism

The term Islamic activism refers to Muslim engagement in different socio-economic problems, not just in terms of politics. Thus, Islam is not taken as a political factor. This indicates the endeavours of ordinary Muslims who are inspired in their activities by an Islamic framework (Fuller 2004). According to Fuller, political Islam conveys a body of ideas that emphasizes certain political thinking derived from religion to suggest how society should be ordered (Fuller 2004: xı). This framework includes discourses, public actors, organizations, symbols, idioms and rhetoric as well as religion (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). Islamization refers to the organization of politics, state, law and society according to Islamic principles and religious rules. Researchers use this concept widely to analyse the political activism of Muslims (Roy 2004 and 1994; Kepel 2003). Salwa Ismail defines the terms Islamism and islamization (or re-islamization) interchangeably to signify a process of changing the nature of the social sphere through religious symbols, signs and actions. In her formula, all ordinary Muslims who believe and follow Islamic practices are actors in the islamization project. She gives the examples of Muslim entrepreneurs and veiled female Muslims who promote the principles and values of Islam. This personal engagement is ascribed in the identity politics of Islamism (Ismail 2004: 616). This sort of misleading account that Islamism is everywhere is often countered by the complex analysis of religious activities such as Muslim agency and particular practices of piety (Mahmood 2005; Deeb 2006), possible ways to modernity (Göle, 2000; 2005)

and the emergence of a pious bourgeoisie (Haenni 2005; White 2012; Yankaya 2013). The new public-private practices (Göle 2006; 2002; Deeb 2006) cannot be purely reformulated in the Islamist lens and picture. However in the following pages Ismail notes that the new forms of religious sociability cannot be reduced to the label of post-Islamism, new age Islamism. For her, these labels obscure the differentiated situations and complex realities of Muslim identifications in relation to globalization and post-modernity (Ismail 2004: 626). However, Islamic activism in this formula is ambiguous, since this meaning can be applied to every ordinary Muslim. Thus the view that Islam as politic is the blueprint of Muslims does not encompass what is going on at the social level to understand the aspiration of young Muslims who do not refer to Islamist utopia or Islamist politics (Haenni 2005; Nasr 2009). Islamic activism is manifested as an orientation of praxis through different orientations that emphasize several sources of Islam. Then the question is whether Islamic movements and groups maintain their Islamist ideology or over time change their politics, their understanding of society. Many studies treat Islamic activism in terms of religious revivalism and a manifestation of loyalty-authority; however this phenomenon can be analysed in different categories of social sciences such as social movement theories (Bayat 2010). How can a large population be defined in terms of social-religious activism referring to different understandings of Islam, from a very conservative, essentialist one to the very tolerant, modern and pragmatic? What is the actual emergence among Muslim activists and intellectuals in politics, charity and education? What constructive role does religion play in stabilizing and strengthening civil society today?

In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, more complex modern forces of demographic shifts, economic disparity, cultural transformation, political turmoil and social crises should be considered as the key factors to explain the socio-religious activism happening among Muslims. The disruptive change in and transformation of societies where Muslims live describes a malaise of modernity (Taylor 1998). The social transformation, economic crises and experience with modernity deepen and extend this malaise in various ways from ambiguity to strengthening a revival of religion and religious particularities in public spheres as a result of this malaise. In a secular worldview, Islam is always questioned and interrogated, as it can be adjustable and flexible to change. In other words, individualization, pluralism, democracy, human rights and gender issues are the main challenges that Muslims encounter in the western world (Bayat 2007; Bilgin 2011; Hashemi 2009). How can Islam take care of and respond all these

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I2 issues? Islamic actors witness these challenges as a replacement of old identities and practices with new ones and patterns. This replacement has sometimes happened in a brutal way, creating violence, rupture and failure. To understand these changes and ruptures, this book looks at different aspects of Muslims’ presence and experience with this malaise of modernity which is manifested in similar debates on secularism, democracy, human rights, and social cohesion.

Islamic social movements working in different areas and emphasizing new cultural-religious identities contribute to the extending of public space and civil society. They do not want to turn from it (Yavuz 2003: 21), but the civic side is embedded in the socio-religious activities to actualize their politics, strategies and practices. Islamic activity is conceptualized as “signifying agents of engaged in the social construction of meaning” (Wictorowicz 2004:15). It creates collective action through Islamic frameworks and notions. The social mobilization of Muslims via different Muslim thinkers, organizations and movements brings with it the idea that multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2000; Géle 2000) are emerging from this social construction of meaning. Muslim scholars have influenced this emergence of Islamic modernity and Muslim politics as explained by Eickelman and Piscatori (1996).

Islamic scholars: making Islamic reasoning in secular coding

Muslim thinkers and activists cannot be reduced to a single pattern of Islamic behaviour or religious orientation, simply using Islamist-Islamic intellectuals and ulema (Abu-Rabi 1996; Zaman 2002). Islamic scholars vary politically and ideologically (Mandaville 2007). The first part of this volume looks at these particular differences and variations to describe autonomous labels of Islamic scholars, often described using the references taken from Islam. Islamic scholars can be understood as part of the religious-cultural contexts; in each their respective roles and influences are diverse. Thus, among Islamic scholars, intellectuals and thinkers, they have actively committed to a modern, secular and democratic debate. They support discursive elaboration of democratic Islamic thought. Toguslu’s and Limpens chapters examine how Islamic scholars use Islamic reasoning to deal with contemporary issues. Some notions such as maslaha and nasiha have gained importance for understanding the circulation of Islamic idioms and narratives which has become a tool implying the role of Muslim scholars in the new socio-political debates. Toguslu reflects on how

Giilen, Ramadan and Qaradawi apply the classical concepts and how they consider these concepts in the articulation of Islamic reasoning referring to secular language. These conceptions formulated by these contemporary scholars shape Islamic knowledge faced with secular knowledge. Making Islamic reasoning in secular coding fits well to describe and categorize Muslim scholars’ engagement with modernity and pluralism (Esack 1997; Hefner 2005). This approach manifests the rational-comprehensive engagement of Muslim scholars and places them at the centre of Islamic thinking. Limpens’ formulation in this volume on conservative-liberal and reformist Muslim thinkers analyses Ramadan’s and an-Naim’s influence on Muslim women living in Brussels. The emancipation of women constitutes one of the emblematic issues in Europe to categorize Muslim thinkers. The case of LGBT has become more interesting to discuss how young female Muslims adopt the liberation discourses of Ramadan and an-Naim in a small-scale area in Brussels.

It is interesting to see that these scholars do not develop an opposition to “Western ideas”. Instead, we argue that many elements come into play, such as citizenship, entrepreneurial sensitiveness and secularism issues, when Islamic scholars discuss a question. The fear of Muslim terrorism has spread and been manipulated in public opinion (for an example of the effects of it see Leman 2012). It thus becomes a common comment and argument that assumes Islamic scholars nourish these sectarian, fundamentalist religious values and strategies of militant Muslims that foster anti-modernism, secularism and the West. They have been suspected of harbouring anti-modernism, misogyny and hatred messages. In this vein, Metcalf underlines how Deobandi madrasas and ulama are accused of always being part of terrorism (Metcalf 2002). This sentiment against Muslims is widely present in all strata in Europe among different ideological positions. Parekh highlights the European liberal anxiety about Muslims concerning their non-integration and their particular situation (Parekh 2006). To tackle this anxiety, Muslim scholars’ role has primarily become important in suggesting and discussing new possibilities and ways to construct a meaningful dialogue and understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims. In this context of misunderstanding and suspicion, the new interpretations of Islamic knowledge and Islamic training have gained importance. A reasonable and workable Islam in Europe depends, on this argument, on the intellectual side of Islam, and training of imams who can put into practice a change in Muslim theology adaptable to European values such as democracy, human rights, gender equality and secularism (‘Toguslu 2012).

The Sufi path is another important element in this workable Islam in Europe. Along with the first two chapters, islamologist Eric Geoffroy draws on a reading of Sufi thought and its influence in Europe, especially among French contexts and converts. His analysis seeks to show how Sufi terminology spread out in Europe and attracted non-Muslims. The notion of spiritual taste (zhahwk) is recognized as a part of this contribution to the spread of Islamic knowledge (Geoffroy 2010). For Geoffroy, young Muslims in Europe look forward to more open and nonstrict use of Islamic knowledge and practices. The Sufi terminology, idioms and symbols endorse this demand in some circles by contributing to whole debates and current issues in Islam. It is explained that Sufis deal with the internal side (batin) of Islam that is approved by many Islamic scholars (Hodgson 1974: 219).

Indeed, Sufi and traditional brotherhood networks are effective in the dissemination of Islamic knowledge as practice. They help people to preserve continuity with the corpus of socio-religious practices (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). Many scholars examine the influence of Sufism as an alternative to political Islam in the dissemination of knowledge (van Bruinessen 2009).

Although some Islamic scholars are politically active and engage in politics in radical ways, the chapters in this book look at traditional, modern and reformist Muslim thinkers. Their primary focus is on religious renovation in secular and democratic contexts. Their message influences distinctive political thought, not as a political party as they have not directly participated in politics. In fact, these scholars have never played a leadership role among Muslim political activists. In the next part, Yilmaz, Meijer and Platti call attention to the great variations in state-religion-society relations that constitute the multiple ways of practising the politics of Muslims.

Islamic activities as Muslim politics

Debates on Islamic activism have been focused on politics since the 1960s and since the Arab revolutions. Islamic activism is directly linked to the political area and power relations (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). In the so-called Muslim world, the political participation of Islamic movements has been considered as the end of democracy, because in line with this argument, when they arrive and control power, they end democratic secular regimes. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers, this perception is widely accepted and circulated in academia. Islam is considered as an emerging threat to the liberal democracies. The al-Qaeda attacks on 11 September 2001 resurfaced this debate.

Many Islamist activists think sovereignty is not divisible and reject the idea of democracy and human rights, because it is a contradiction of God’s sovereignty. According to these political islamists, an Islamic society based on sharia rules and a theocratic regime can work with the rules of God and not humans’ values and norms. The objective of the political Islamist is the creation of an Islamic state in which politics serves only the sharia rules.

However, Islamic activists do not form a homogenic and monolithic structure. An apparent question is to place Muslim politics into the wider multiple and shifting contexts, in this sense, Muslim politics is not unique (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 20-21). The various varieties of political Islamists now use different discourses and implement several politics from democracy to fundamentalism. They participate in democratic rules in the existing political system. They now see democracy as a non-vulnerable element of the political regime, which can be a basis of the Islamic system and Islamic values (Brusse and Schoonenboom 2006). They do not oppose human rights and do not consider them as a product of western models. They try to connect Islamic ideas with democracy and human rights to reconcile secular thought with Islamic thinking by formulating political programmes, joining in coalitions, producing policies on different socio-economic problems and issues (Yilmaz 2012). All of these processes push Islamist activists to re-think in secular worlds, because they are facing secular problems. They are now fighting against fundamentalist, not secular ideologies. The younger generation, often nourished by Islamist ideas and political thinking, coming from the grassroots level, have become more familiar with human rights, democracy, and liberty issues through participation in socio-economic life. They develop ideas against political oppression, social injustice, fraud and corruption. They do not use the same dialectic, Islamic utopia, top-down organizational model (Haenni 2005), do not admire apologetic, non-reasonable Islamist discourses. In this vein, the examples of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in Turkey are very keen to observe this change and evolution in a broader sense.

The young generation in the party and movement want to transform the Brotherhood into a political party. In this process, they are looking at the Turkish model, the AK Party experience. They want to separate the movement from the political party (Meijer in this volume). However, for Meijer, the biggest problem of the Brotherhood is its insufficient embracing of politics, which results in a

I5 duality between acceptance and rejection of a parliamentary democracy and a constitution. The social transformation of and cultural change in Arab society contributed to the change in the Brotherhood. It had become embarrassed by the Islamist populist rhetoric of “Islam is the solution”. Indeed, the paradoxes still emerge in the politics of the Brotherhood and between different streams in the party. Initially, following the example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islamist movements abandoned their initial radical standpoint against democratic rules. They adopted pragmatic solutions which drove these groups towards accepting the constitutional system. One of these examples is the shift seen in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Under the Mubarak regime, they ceased to use violence and renounced armed Islamic struggle saying that using violence delegitimized their Islamic cause and principles. They created the Freedom and Justice Party to compete in the political debates and elections. Mohammed Morsi was elected in the summer 2012 from this party. This engagement and creation of a political party during the last elections can be understood as a sign of the acceptance of secular rules of the political process. This decision can be regarded as a strategic adaptation and acceptance of the Brotherhood’s leaders; at the same time the old Islamic elites have been pressed to distance themselves from fundamentalist political ideology. This enables them to open up to the general public and to gain the support of Egyptians. This pragmatic turn resulted in a discursive and epistemological change appearing in theological discussions on the sovereignty of God, engaging in politics, democracy and pluralism. Despite this evolution and moderation, some members kept their political Islamist identity forging dichotomist ideological positions on Islam, democracy and liberalism. The development of new notions embracing liberalism in terms of economy opens up new spaces for new actors, new elites and a young generation frustrated with Islamic slogans and Islamic utopia. The other aim is to encourage economic liberalization that provides new opportunities for the middle class to overcome the authoritarian and corrupted elite’s control over the political and economic system (Perthes 2004).

This is why in a country such as Egypt, a sharp contrast remains between old elites and new elites who negotiate between them the possible future scenarios on democracy and Islam, pluralism. There are still major problems in representing all parts of society, including minority groups and non-Muslims, in the coming constitution. The struggle about the essence and substance of the political regime, whether Egypt is to be a pluralist Islamic democracy or an authoritarian regime, is on the table. Two chapters (Yilmaz and Platti) echo the familiar problem of interiorization of the democratization and secular ideals in the coming constitutional processes in Turkey and in Egypt. The proposed chapters in the new constitution guarantee freedom of speech and in some cases (prohibiting blasphemy) limiting this freedom; the state is considered the primary means of protecting religion and religious values.

Why is there a resistance to democratic change in the so-called Muslim world? What went wrong, as Bernard Lewis asked in his book? (Lewis 2002). The core problem is political; however; the uprising of the middle class in Egyptian economic life has much more to do with the new society adopting new values and shrinking into a kind of authoritarian politics. Some scholars argue that the lack of civil society and democracy in Muslim societies is the result of Islamic fundamentalism, a unique problem linked with Islam (Lewis 1990). The perception of the Middle East and, more generally, Muslim exceptionalism argued that Muslim societies tend to be static and resistant to change (Bayat 2010; Lakoff 2004). Thus, Muslim activists have trouble with adopting human values, liberalism and human rights, and there is always a gap between modern western values and Islamic countries (Bielefeldt 2000).

Another explanation focuses on the forced, top-down modernization in Muslim societies. Different processes of modernization initiated by Western or westernized elites in Muslim societies are considered to be colonialism, instead of innovation, a quick imitation, a catch up process to close the gap between the west and Islam. This policy undertaken by modernized elites creates a discrepancy between elites and wider society. Political and social changes are top down, not to be internalized by the public. These reforms and political measures did not engage and incorporate civil society. Turkey and Iran are the best examples, as both countries exercised a forced modernization.

In the case of Egypt, the military and the new business elites are the key elements and allies of Morsi before the election of 2012. Their concern is to maintain the stability of the regime after Mubarak; thus they do not target the promotion of Sharia law in the country. Within this transition process, one should acknowledge the continuation of the military’ role in politics. This is similar to the Turkish situation where military force has played a major role in every dimension to guarantee the secular regime. Political power does not allow a free space for civil society and civil actors. It is very important how political power, including Islamist and Salafi groups, shapes the public sphere and civil society. In fact, the authoritarian character remains even in the revolutionary change which ended the Mubarak regime. In order to protect the regime and the hegemony of the state over civil society, the military is the determinant. The biggest mistake of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is that in some cases it is found to be very opportunist in its thirst for power. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) thinks and develops its policies at state level. This strategy does not let it go back to its non-state social mission in support of the change coming from society, continuing its efforts in education and supporting the middle class. Thus, the middle class and the young generation in the Brotherhood take the initiative to change their state oriented politics. In Mubarek’s times, its supporters already experienced the failure of its strategy.

Some members of the MB noticed the growing discrepancy between real politics and high Islamic ideals, political Islam. In this vein, MB goes in different directions having various factions, some of which follow a more liberal economic programme and model and do not believe in an Islamist utopia; others probably become more radical and concerned more with state oriented politics. Whatever does happen in the MB, Egyptian society will rise against any kind of authoritarianism, corruption and social injustice. The major dilemma is to understand the new socio-economic direction that society wants to go in. Social justice and economic development will be key elements in the new process of politicization in the Arab regimes. According to the optimistic evolution among young educated Arabs, new elites emphasize practising new models. In recent years, a “Turkish model” has spread in the media to give an example in which democracy and Islam live side by side, an educated middle class grows and becomes the transporter of Muslim democracy and Muslim politics. However, an anomaly has appeared in Turkish politics during the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP-Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) reign. When the Arab spring spread out into the Middle East, many democrats and intellectuals sought for a model and experience among Muslim countries, and they turned to the AKP’s experience. At that time, Turkey seemed to combine Islamic values with economic prosperity, democracy and secularism. The Gezi protests in Taksim square and the corruption investigations in 2013 have changed this hopeful image of the “Turkish model. The last corruption investigation seriously damaged the image of the AKP that made meaningful constitutional reforms between 2003 and 2011. The AKP has become more authoritarian and tries to control civil society, religious groups and the economy by creating big companies that support the AKP’s policies. Reference to the religious values, prohibition of alcohol in certain public areas and the abortion debate signifies a return to the old Islamist discourses. [hsan Yilmaz’s chapter gives an insight into the dilemma of being secular and religious in politics. The AKP’s example characterizes this dilemma after the 2011 elections. Meijer follows this dilemma in the pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt whose candidate, Mohammed Morsi, won the presidential election in 2012 before being deposed by the military. It did not respect the balance between different groups in the country. As many ask, has the Arab Spring turned into an Arab Winter? The rise of Islamist parties after the toppling of longstanding dictators in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt seems to suggest so. How can we begin to make sense of these events? The second part of this volume answers these questions, drawing upon lessons from the early phases of the Arab revolutions.

Charity and social welfare networks

The third part focuses on faith-based NGOs among Muslim activists in order to understand their missions and activities that are based on Islamic concepts, discourses and sense. Are there any specific differences between Muslim-Islamic aid organizations and non-Muslim ones? How do humanitarian principles go hand in hand with Islamic values? What are the changes and challenges for Islamic aid organizations? In these three chapters, we follow some fault lines to demonstrate their identity, their mobilization channels and local-transnational networks.

Charity and almsgiving have been transformed from family-individual care and beneficence to the social welfare system (Singer 2008: 176). This transition was accompanied by the development of secular-religious philanthropy’ and voluntary associations who deal with the question of poverty and development. However, the traditional forms of charity and individual efforts still continue as the modern welfare state system progresses well. Organizations and foundations linked with faith-based communities and movements participate and involve themselves in charity activities. Over time, charity is mixed with various actors, individuals, organizations, professionals, religious movements, states and governments. Each of these new actors expands the borders and the meaning of charity and humanitarian aid in Islamic terms. The increasing of a “mixed economy of charity” raises the question of how Islamic charity is defined. Is it a social welfare net, a humanitarian programme, an Islamic missionary activity? In the coming chapters, the discussion focuses largely on the charitable organization, network, discourses and objectives of NGOs which participate in the work of social-educational services, public works and economic projects. In the classical time before modern times, the most visible charitable individuals were rulers, dynastic families and wealthy people (Singer 2008). After the modernization in the nineteenth century, the growing middle class took the initiative in implementing new charity institutions and activities, and individuals en masse joined in charitable giving thanks to religious belief which is the fundamental part and impetus of the social safety networks.

The month of Ramadan and religious holidays are the occasions and times when Muslims are more sensible and attracted by NGOs and states. The shifting point of the traditional charity is the contribution coming from contemporary governments in the form of social welfare assistance, public service and international aid (Singer 2008: 179). The Turkish Kzzzlay, supported directly by the state, is one of the examples that classify this social welfare system as charity. However, the connection between the state’s social welfare responsibility-duty and charity is not apparent voluntarily, because it is the state’s obligation towards its citizens. This connection is another complex debate on charity and the social welfare system (Ostrower 1996). As Singer puts it, the state’s motivations and obligations are somehow different from individuals’ and NGOs. Spiritual and religious considerations have strong influence on the individual’s decisions. The welfare system’s connection with charity has been analysed in connection with public-private relief and rehabilitation efforts, to provide minimum living conditions for the citizens. However, after the 80s, an economic liberalism re-opened the doors to local actors and religious organizations which regained the social work arena. It is noted that the role of religion in social service is increased and highlighted in the recent studies (Cnaan 1999). Sometimes, the line between government politics and faith-based initiatives is blurred. The zakat (obligatory almsgiving) and sadaqa (voluntary almsgiving) are two examples of the blurred areas of Islamic charity. There is state-organized collection of zakat in many Muslim countries (Clark 2003; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Singer 2009). The idea of social justice would be achieved by major non-economic means, which is zakat. In this regard, zakat is not a part of charity, but it is a fulfilment of the Islamic mission and Islamic economic thought. Zakat takes a central place in the moral economy.

In the contemporary application of zakat, or more generally in Islamic safety nets, there is an extention of the traditional use of zakat in new conditions and contexts. The classic regulation on zakat, sadaqa has been reinterpreted and adopted to take into account the changing of boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims, certain issues such as gender, poverty and mass education, as we follow in different examples in this book. In opposition to the idea of state oriented charity organization and zakat distribution which envisages the state as the agent of the aid, Kimse Yok mu and Islamic Relief provide such examples of the civil society organizations that have been stimulated, created by individuals, social movements and religious groups. The funds collected by these civil organizations and NGOs have been used in the creation of schools, clinics, water wheels, the distribution of food, and helping poor people. In some cases, Muslims choose to donate to civil organizations rather than a state institution (Scott 1987; Scott 2013).