Speculations VI

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Michael Austin Robert Jackson punctum books * brooklyn, ny

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Part 1: Hegel according to Meillassoux 1.1 Meillassoux’s criticism of Hegel

As I have mentioned, judging from the references to Hegel in After Finitude Meilassoux’s interpretation of Hegel is quite traditional. Let us look at these critical remarks in a little more detail.

Firstly, Meillassoux claims that Hegel represents a kind of metaphysics which “consists in absolutizing the correlation itself”’* On Meillassoux’s account, the problem correlationism poses to traditional forms of dogmatic metaphysics or naive realism is that it seems impossible for thought to get outside of itself: how can we claim to think things which are independent from thought, when we can precisely only ever think them? Anything which we suppose to ‘really exisť can only appear to us as mediated by, or correlated with, our subjective mode of experience.*s One way of dealing with this correlationist argument is what Meillassoux calls ‘subjectalism’. Subjectalists, of which he claims Hegel is the paradigmatic example, argue that objective reality is itself in some way subjective, or that human subjectivity is just a special case of a more general principle which applies to all levels of reality. Meillassoux’s examples are,amongst others, Nietzsche’s Will to Power, Leibniz’ monads, Schopenhauer’s will, perception in Bergson, Deleuze’s ‘life’ or ‘larval subjects’, and reason or spirit in Hegel.*®

16 AF 37; IRR 3. The value of the term subjectalism, Meillassoux claims, is that it covers both idealism (Hegel) and vitalism (Nietzsche, Bergson,

It is not exactly clear what Meillassoux’s criticism on this point is. Sometimes, he appears to accuse Hegel of being a metaphysician, where Meillassoux defines metaphysics as any position which claims that there is an absolutely necessary entity.” The criticism would be, then, that Hegel postulates a necessary entity, namely spirit, while for Meillassoux all things or entities are necessarily contingent. However, this criticism would be off the mark, since, whatever else we can say about Hegel, it is clear that for him the absolute (or spirit, or reason for that matter) is not an entity. It is rather precisely Hegel’s goal to show, in the Logic, that every attempt to set up a limited or determined concept as an ultimate principle of truth necessarily fails. As for Meillassoux, for Hegel every thing is necessarily determined, limited and finite, and therefore contingent.”

Although Meillassoux is here not completely clear in his terminology, we should assume that his criticism of metaphysics in this sense (postulating a necessary entity) applies primarily to pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics.’ His criticism of Hegel then takes a slightly different tack.

Deleuze), whereas the latter normally presents itself as a criticism of the former (IRR 4-5;6).

18 Meillassoux’s view that spirit is a metaphysical entity is arguably a result of the greater focus, in the French tradition, on the Phenomenology of Spirit over the Science of Logic. The Logic can be read as a series of failed attempts to determine the absolute in terms of traditional metaphysical concepts such as ‘a’ thing (unity, determination, limitation, finitude etc.) or oppositions such as essence/appearance, finitude/infinity. As Paul Franks shows, Hegel’s concern here is rooted in the shared German idealist concern with the problem of the ‘unconditioned’ status of the absolute, which in turn is rooted in pre-Kantian rationalism. See Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). The thing with the unconditioned (das Unbedingte) is precisely that it is not a thing (Ding) (see Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002],11.). I will return to the matter of Hegel’s views on contingency further down.

19 Ibid.

As Meillassoux notes, after Kant’s critique of dogmatism it had become impossible to claim straight forward knowledge of a necessary entity qua ‘thing in itself’. Hegel’s approach, therefore, was to claim that what is absolutely necessary is the way in which things appear to us - what Meillassoux calls the “the a priori forms of knowledge,” and which he identifies elsewhere with the laws of nature and logic.*° Whereas, for Kant, the necessity of these “correlational forms” could not be proven, and they could therefore only be described, Hegel thought that their necessity could be deduced.” For Kant, the way reality appears to us is necessary only for us, and it is possible that the way reality is in itself is different from the way it appears. By contrast, for Hegel, on Meillassoux’s account, if the necessity of the correlational forms can be proven, it doesn’t make sense to suppose that there is an unknowable world ‘in itself lying behind appearances. This, then, is the sense in which Hegel ‘absolutizes’ the correlation. The way Meillassoux distinguishes here between Kant and Hegel is going to play an important role in the rest of this paper. As I will argue further down, the core of Meillassoux’s own argument for the necessity of contingency actually depends on this shift from Kant to Hegel.

Meillassoux’s second criticism of Hegel concerns the notion of contradiction. Meillassoux argues that, because contingency is absolutely necessary, contradiction is impossible: ifa contradictory entity did exist, this entity would be necessary, since it could support all contradictory predicates, including that of being and non-being. However, since he believes to have shown, with his proof of the principle of factiality, that contingency and contingency alone is necessary, there can be no necessary entity; therefore, a contradictory entity is equally impossible.” It is on this point that Meillassoux both learns from Hegel, and sees himself as going beyond him in a crucial way. As he writes in the interview with Harman:

Hegel, along with Marx, was my only true master: the one on whom I had to depend in order to achieve my own thinking ... To my mind, believing in real necessity (metaphysics) and defending it with the greatest degree of rigor, obliges one to become a dialectician, and thus to be condemned to the stating of contradictions. Hegel understood this better than anyone. He unveiled the core of all metaphysics as a pure and simple contradiction, and demonstrated that if one wishes to continue to defend the former absolute necessity, it would be necessary to rehabilitate the notion of contradiction, which is the irrational notion par excellence. And here we find the true greatness of the dialectic: it exhibits the contradictory character of all real necessity. And conversely, it indicates the price that must be paid by the absolute refusal of all ontological contradiction: the related refusal of any necessity of things, laws, or events.”3

This is the context in which, in After Finitude, Meillassoux accuses Hegel of being a “thinker of absolute identity.’*4 It is precisely because he affirms contradiction that Hegel has to reduce all becoming and difference to identity, and all contingency to necessity.” Meillassoux reaffirms this point a few pages later: although Hegel admits a “moment of irremediable contingency” into his system, this moment is introduced only to show that nothing, not even contingency, escapes the necessity of the Hegelian absolute. Contingency,

23 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 168-169. 24 AF7o.

25 As Zizek notes, however, Hegel does not actually claim that contradictory entities can exists. It is precisely the impossibility of contradiction which causes finite things to be destroyed: “In another ambiguous (mis) reading of Hegel, Meillassoux claims that the dialectical principle of contradiction (contradictions are really present in things) excludes any change: change means a transformation of p into non-p, ofa feature into its opposite, but since, in a contradiction, a thing already is its opposite, it has nowhere to develop into ... Here, however, Meillassoux misses the point of Hegelian dialectical movement: contradiction is necessary and at the same time impossible; that is, a finite thing precisely cannot be simultaneously A and non-A, which is why the process through which it is compelled to assume contradiction equals its annihilation” (Less than Nothing, 628).

in Hegel, is “deduced from the unfolding of the absolute, which in itself, qua rational totality, is devoid of contingency. Thus, in Hegel, the necessity of contingency is not derived from contingency as such and contingency alone, but from a Whole that is ontologically superior to the latter.”>°

On Meillassoux’s reading, therefore, Hegel is not only a thinker of absolute identity, but also of rational totality, the Whole in which all differences are reconciled. This is the orthodox view of Hegel which has been propagated, in one way or another, by most of the luminaries of the continental tradition, including Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault. This view, however, is challenged by many contemporary Hegel scholars. Zizek’s and Gabriel’s interpretations, which we will discuss further on, are the most interesting for this discussion, because (unlike most scholars who publish in English) they engage directly with the ‘French version of the thesis that Hegel is a thinker of totality, which Meillassoux seems to adhere to.” Their disagreement with Meillassoux with regards to his interpretation of Hegel centre precisely on these two points: the status of necessity and contingency in Hegel, and the question of totality. As we will see, both Zizek and Gabriel argue that Hegel is not a thinker of totality, at least not in the sense generally ascribed to him, and that this is why Meillassoux’s critique of Hegel fails.

1.2 Hegel’s role ih the argument for the prihciple of factiality

Aside from Meillassoux’s rather throwaway criticisms, Hegel plays a less obvious but much more interesting role in Meil-

27 Many of the prominent Anglo-American Hegel scholars also try to defend a Hegel who is not dogmatic or ‘metaphysical’ in the traditional sense, either through a ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretation (e.g. Pippin or Brandom) ora ‘revised metaphysical’ interpretation (e.g. Beiser, Stern or Houlgate). The background of their debate is quite different, however, and it does not really overlap with Meillassoux’s concerns. For a brief overview of this issue, see Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 53-57. I return to this issue in some more detail in footnote 62 below.

lassoux’s central argument in After Finitude: his proof of the principle of factiality, or the necessity of contingency. This argument, which offers a rational proof of Meillassoux’s own position, is the core of his thesis, and it seems to me that it is also the most difficult and the least clearly argued part of the book. Because the rest of Meillassoux’s theses - including the possible derivation ofa mathematical absolute, the status of ancestral statements, the critique of correlationism, the derivation of the principles of non-contradiction and contingent existence, and the non-totalizability of the possible - depend on the success of this argument, Meillassoux’s entire project stands or falls with it.

What does Meillassoux seek to demonstrate in this argument? Firstly, that everything which exists could really be otherwise, and secondly, that this principle constitutes the only absolute: “First, that contingency is necessary,and hence eternal; second, that contingency alone is necessary.”** He tries to prove this through a rational argument where, firstly, he assumes that, as he puts it in Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition, “the space of the philosophically thinkable” is exhausted by a number of contrasting positions”? and, secondly, he proceeds by eliminating each position one by one in order to show that his version of speculative materialism”. is the only tenable one.

The most important step of the argument is the confrontation between correlationism and idealism. Before we deal with this argument directly, two questions of terminology arise which need to be clarified first. The first has to do with the distinction between various forms of idealism, and the historical philosophers who Meillassoux takes to have held

28 AF65. 29 IRR7, footnote 3.

30 Meillassoux also uses the term ‘speculative materialism’ to refer to other theories which claim that it is possible to think something which exists independently from thought, such as Epicureanism (AF 36). These varieties of naive materialism have been refuted by correlationism, however; so Meillassoux’s speculative materialism is in fact a ‘revised’ speculative materialism.

these positions. The second question is about the various expressions which Meillassoux uses to refer to the ‘correlational forms’, the necessity or contingency of which is at issue in the argument.

In After Finitude, the distinction Meillassoux draws between subjectivist metaphysics, subjective idealism and absolute idealism is not very clear. In Iterations, Reiteration, Repetition Meillassoux acknowledges this problem, and attempts to clarify his position by grouping together all three of these positions under the header ‘subjectalism’* As I will argue, however, the argument for the principle of factiality depends in an important sense on a distinction between subjective and absolute (or Hegelian) idealism.3

In order to be as clear as possible, let me try to set out these distinctions in some detail. In the wake of Kant, it is traditional to distinguish between three forms of idealism: Kantian transcendental idealism, ‘subjective’ idealism and ‘objective’ or ‘absolute’ idealism. Subjective idealism (usually associated with Fichte) and absolute idealism (associated with Schelling and Hegel) are two alternative responses to what the German idealists saw as the central problem with Kant’s philosophy: his postulation of an unknowable thing-in-itself, and the danger of scepticism arising from the attendant two-world metaphysics. Put very crudely, subjective idealism would attempt to reduce the objectivity of the things-in-themselves to the positing activity ofan absolute T or ‘Ego’, while absolute idealism would seek to explain both the objective and subjective aspects of experience in terms ofa unifying ‘ground’ or ‘absolute’.3

32 Meillassoux refers to Hegel’s idealism as “absolute idealism” (AF 38) as well as “speculative idealism” (AF 59).

33 Of course, these distinctions, and the extent to which individual philosophers can be allocated to one form of idealism or another, is the subject of extensive debate. See Beiser, German Idealism. Beiser includes both Kant and Fichte under subjective idealism, and Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, Schelling and Hegel under absolute idealism. As Beiser shows, the difference between subjective and objective idealism is easily exaggerated

In After Finitude, Meillassoux uses the term ‘subjective idealism’ in a much broader sense. Under this term (for which he also uses ‘subjectivist metaphysics’ ),?+ he seems to sweep together a great number of philosophical positions: Berkeley, those philosophers who “absolutize the correlation” (including Hegel and Schelling, as well as Leibniz, Bergson, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Deleuze), and the ‘subjective idealist’ in the argument for the principle of factiality, who corresponds more precisely to the subjective idealist in the sense mentions above. As I mentioned, he clarifies his position in Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition by classing all of the above as subjectalists. However, this does not solve the problem altogether. Firstly, one might reasonably disagree with the way Meillassoux jumps over all distinctions, not only between different forms of idealism, but also between idealism and all other forms of ‘subjectalism’. More importantly for the present argument, however, Meillassoux himself does actually distinguish between subjective idealism and speculative or absolute idealism (i.e. Hegel), while at the same time appearing to conflate them. In the argument for the principle of factiality Meillassoux presents the position of the ‘subjective idealist’ as follows. The subjective idealist maintains that “I cannot think of myself as no longer existing without, through that very thought, contradicting myself. I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now.”35 The subjective idealist maintains, therefore, that subjectivity - mind, ideas, thought, consciousness - is necessary, because denying its existence gives rise to a contradiction. Ata stretch, this position might be attributed to Berkeley or Fichte, but it hardly seems appropriate to describe Schelling’s philosophy of nature or Hegel’s absolute idealism. As the argument proceeds, however,

(and is partly the result of Hegel’s own reading of his predecessors as ‘subjective’ idealists). For example, Fichte’s concern with the existence of an objective reality runs much deeper than the caricatured portrayal as a subjectivist by Hegel and others would suggest.

Meillassoux does seem to also include the “speculative idealist” in this position.?° But elsewhere in After Finitude he ascribes quite a different position to the “absolute” or speculative idealist, who he there identifies explicitly with Hegel. From this alternative point of view absolute idealism consists not in claiming the irreducibility of thought, but in absolutizing the correlation. As I mentioned above, in Hegel’s case, this absolutization consists in claiming that the “correlational forms”, the “structural invariants” in our experience of the world are absolutely necessary, as opposed to Kant’s claim that they are merely necessary for us.3’ As I will argue, the difference between these two variants of idealism, although implicit and not clearly marked by Meillassoux himself, is important to his argument for the principle of factiality and greatly influences the conclusions we can draw from it. To understand this point we have to return to Meillassoux’s distinction between Hegel and Kant, in order to explain what

36 Meillassoux sneaks in the speculative idealist almost unnoticed: the correlationist has to think the contingency of reality as a real possibility, because otherwise “it would never have occurred to you not to be subjective (or speculative) idealist” (AF 59).

38 Adrian Johnston argues that Meillassoux’s conflation of various forms of idealism is part of his strategy. Johnston points out that Meillassoux does not give conclusive arguments against idealism: he seems to hold that a Berkeleyan position of extreme solipsism is rationally irrefutable. Instead, he tries to show that correlationists, who maintain that the world in itself is unknowable, are forced to choose between realism and absolute idealism: Meillassoux “tries to force non-absolutist correlationists (such as Kantian transcendental idealists and various stripes of phenomenologists) to choose between realism (such as that of anti-correlational speculative materialism) and absolute idealism (which, as Meillassoux’s reference to Berkeley reveals, is presumed without argument to be prima facie untenable in its ridiculous absurdity)” (‘Hume’s Revenge: A Dieu, Meillassoux?’, 98). This interpretation seems accurate, especially from the vantage point of Meillassoux’s clarification in ‘Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition’. But the ambiguity about the status of the idealist remains. What is the “absolute idealism” to which Johnston refers above? Is it the (Berkeleyan) philosopher of absolute subjectivity, or the (Hegelian) absolute idealist?

he means by ‘correlational forms’. The question of the status of these correlational forms runs throughout the argument for the principle of factiality. It is important to point out the connection between a number of different terms which Meillassoux uses, at different points in After Finitude, to refer to the same thing. What he calls, in relation to Kant and Hegel, the “a priori forms of knowledge” or “correlational forms” he refers to later as “invariants” or “structural invariants” which “govern the world.”4° These structural invariants are, moreover, identified with the laws of nature and logic, “physical and logical laws.’* The difference between Kant and Hegel (or, in the argument for the principle of factiality, between the correlationist and the idealist) is that Kant argued that, while our experience of the world is governed by such structural invariants (his categories and the forms of time and space), and these invariant forms of our experience are indeed necessary ‘for us’, we cannot conclude from this that they are absolutely necessary, because it is possible that the way things are in themselves is actually very different from the way they are given to us. On Meillassoux’s view, Hegel, as we have seen, maintained that these structural invariants (for Hegel, these would be the concepts of the Science of Logic) can in fact be proven to be necessary and are therefore themselves absolute, and not merely the way our experience happens to be constituted. The point I want to make is that because the aim of Meillassoux’s argument for the principle of factiality

40 AF 39; 53-54. Comparing these two passages shows that Meillassoux identifies the correlational forms, structural invariants and laws of nature and logic: “Facticity ... pertains to those structural invariants that supposedly govern the world - invariants which may differ from one form of correlationism to another, but whose function in every case is to provide the minimal organization of representation: principle of causality, forms of perception, logical laws, etc.” (39). “By turning facticity into a property of things themselves - a property which I am alleged to know - I turn facticity from something that applies only to what is in the world into a form of contingency capable of being applied to the invariants that govern the world (i.e. its physical and logical laws)” (54).

is to show that the laws of nature and logic are contingent, and he identifies these laws with the Kantian or Hegelian correlational forms, the ultimate referent of the ‘idealist’ in this argument is the Hegelian absolute idealist and not the subjective idealist.4? The issue at stake in the argument is the necessity or contingency of the laws of nature and logic, the structural invariants of experience, and not just the existence of something independent of thought. Meillassoux has presented Hegel as the thinker who maintains that these structural invariants are necessary; therefore, it would seem to be Hegel who is the main foil in Meillassoux’s argument against correlationism. Although this is not how Meillassoux himself presents his argument, my point is that Hegel’s role in the argument is greater than Meillassoux lets on.

Let us look at Meillassoux’s argument in some more detail to make this point clear. The argument takes the following course. According to Meillassoux the correlationist (e.g. Kant) wants to argue that it is possible, but not necessary that the world in itself is completely different from the way it is given to us. According to correlationism, we simply cannot know whether there is a metaphysical absolute beyond what we experience, or whether the way we experience things is eternally necessary. On correlationist terms, it is therefore perfectly possible that the idealist (on my reading, Hegel) happens to be right that the structural invariants of experience are necessary, but it is illegitimate for the idealist to claim that we can know this absolutely.

Accordingly, as Meillassoux claims, for the correlationists we are dealing with “possibilities of ignorance”: various forms of metaphysical dogmatism (the claim that there is a substantial absolute of this or that kind), idealism (the claim

42 Brassier makes the same point implicitly. His reading of Meillassoux’s argument for the principle of factiality also takes the difference between Kant and Hegel on the necessity of the correlational forms as a starting point, and argues that the main opposition in Meillassoux’s argument is between strong correlationism and the Hegelian absolutization of these correlational forms, or the “cognitive structures governing the phenomenal realm” (Nihil Unbound, 65).

that the forms of our experience are absolutely necessary) and even speculative materialism (the claim that it is really possible for these forms to change without reason) are all possible, in the sense that we do not know which of these (mutually exclusive) options is really the case. All we can know is what is in fact given to us in experience. Meillassoux, on the other hand, wants to claim that we can really know that it is actually possible for everything to change without reason; that “the in-itself could actually be anything whatsoever and that we know this.”4 How does Meillassoux move from the epistemological claim of correlationism to his own ontological claim? As he puts it himself: “How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance?”*+

How does he accomplish this move from ignorance to knowledge? This is the crux of the argument for the principle of factiality in After Finitude, where he tries to fix the correlationist on the horns ofa dilemma.* Either a) the correlationist admits that the “structural invariants” of our experience - the laws of nature and logic - could really be otherwise, instead of his original claim that we simply cannot know whether or not they are different in themselves from how they appear to us, or b) he has to admit to idealism, because if these laws could not really be otherwise, that means they are absolutely necessary - the position, we have seen, which Meillassoux ascribes to Hegel.

Meillassoux repeats the argument in slightly different forms. The difference between these versions to me does not seem trivial, and it rests precisely on the status of the idealist, which, as I noted, changes over the course of the argument, something about which Meillassoux is not very clear. The ‘subjective idealist’ in the first argument - the conversation between dogmatist, atheist, agnostic, subjective idealist and speculative materialist - maintains that it is impossible for me to think my own death, and that therefore thought itself is absolute, since it cannot think its own absence.*° As I mentioned above, this seems to correspond more closely to the subjective idealist in the traditional sense (Berkeley or Fichte, as opposed to absolute idealists such as Hegel). Meillassoux then argues that the (correlationist) agnostic cannot refute the subjective idealist without maintaining that it is possible to think something which exists independently from thought - i.e., something non-correlational. Because the subjective idealist holds that it is impossible to think my own death, the correlationist has to argue precisely that I can think my own death, not just as a correlate of my thought (because this would lead back to subjective idealism) but as a real possibility. In the second, more general version of this argument, Meillassoux makes it clear that the argument not only forces the correlationist to concede that something can exist independently from thought, but also that the structural invariants of our experience, the laws of nature and logic,” could be different from the way they are and could change for no reason whatsoever. Here, as indicated by the stress on the facticity of the correlational forms or structural invariants, Meillassoux does seem to be referring to Hegel: this argument depends on the distinction between Hegel and Kant made earlier, and the idealist here stands in for both the “subjective” and the “speculative” idealist.4* Meillassoux’s argument could be summarized in the following way. Note that Meillassoux is not just concerned to show, against the subjective idealist, that there is a reality

47 With regard to the laws of logic, it must be remarked that Meillassoux claims that at least one fundamental law of logic - the principle of non-contradiction - is necessary, and that this necessity can be derived from the principle of factiality (see below; AF 80; Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Potentiality and Virtuality’, in The Speculative Turn, 232). Given his identification of the ‘laws of nature and logic’ with the ‘structural invariants of experience’, it seems likely that the laws of logic which, on his view, are contingent, are more determined sets of ‘laws’ such as Kant’s categories and Hegel’s concepts.

independent of thought. The main thrust of his argument is to prove that the laws of nature and logic, the way in which things necessarily appear to us, could themselves be subject to change. I think the argument can be reduced to a simple logical disjunction, which takes two different forms:

1a. Either it is really possible for the structural invariants of our experience (the ‘for-us’) to be different from the way things are in themselves (the ‘in-itself’), or it is not.

1b. If it is not really possible, this means that some form of idealism holds, because then the structural invariants of our experience are absolute.

1c. If we refuse to accept idealism, therefore, it is really possible for the in-itself to be different from the for-us. But ifthis possibility to be otherwise is a real possibility, the correlationist can no longer claim that we simply do not know whether the “structural invariants” of our experience, the laws of nature and logic are necessary or not: we know that they are not necessary, because they could really be different from the way they are, presently, for us.

In order to escape idealism, Meillassoux argues, the correlationist has to continue to distinguish between the ‘for-us’ and the ‘in-itself’. The idealist’s claim is that there is no difference between the way things appear to us and the way they really are, because we know that the way things necessarily appear to us, the structural invariants of our experience, are in fact absolutely necessary. But Meillassoux’s speculative solution also leads to the collapse of the distinction between in-itself and for-us. What the correlationist took to be a difference between the world as it is in itself (which is unknowable) and the world as it appears to us (which is necessary, but only for us) is in fact a difference between the world as it appears to us and another really possible way in which the world might appear to us. There is, therefore, no unknowable in-itself just as there is no deeper reason underlying appearance: all there is are contingent things, contingent laws and contingent thoughts. “There is nothing beneath or beyond the manifest gratuitousness of the given - nothing but the limitless and lawless power of its destruction, emergence or persistence.”49

Meillassoux’s argument could therefore be rephrased as follows:

2a. Either it is really possible for the structural invariants of our experience to be other than they are, or it is not.

2b. If it is not really possible, we have to affirm idealism, because then these invariants would be absolute.

2c. Therefore, if we reject idealism, the structural invariants of our experience - the laws of logic and nature - can really be otherwise.

We can now see how Meillassoux proves the necessary contingency of all things. He eliminates, step by step, the possible candidates for what might exist necessarily. The contingency of everyday things, such as vases and books, is readily apparent: they might not exist, and when they exist they can be destroyed. The only other candidates for absolute existence are the correlation (either in the form of a simple hypostatization of thought or mind, or in the form of some transsubjective principle such as life, will or spirit), and the structural invariants of our experience, i.e. the laws of nature and logic. Since he has demonstrated the non-necessity of thought’s existence in the argument about death, and the non-necessity of the laws of nature and logic in the argument sketched above, there can be no necessary entity, and the contingency of all things must be the only thing which is absolutely necessary.5°