Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility

Front matter

Claus Dierksmeier

Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility

Translated by Richard Fincham

Contents

L Indien. een 1 1.1 Why Think About Freedom? „aaa ae 1 LLL Freien 4

1.1.2. Ficeedom and Everyday IR. A

1.2.2 Current Use of the Concept of Freedom ee 24

Chapter 1 A) Introduction Geek for

Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free.

John F. Kennedy

A genuine liberal will emphasize as crucial the complete correlation between the means used and the consequences that follow.

John Dewey

Freedom is a fascinating idea. It empowers and encourages all human beings towards a dignified life. More and more individuals and institutions appeal to the idea of freedom in order to overturn repressive life-circumstances. No one needs to explain the value of freedom to the oppressed. Wherever freedom is absent in practice, it is seldom lacking a cherished place in theory. The institutionalized consciousness of freedom, political liberalism, often grows in synch with the obstacles facing freedom.

But to identify and combat the lack of freedom is easier than shaping liberties already won. Wherever the harsh, black shadow of oppression is swept aside, the bright white light of freedom is refracted within the prism of the most multifarious ideas of liberty. The black and white of freedom fighters becomes replaced by the more nuanced ideological tinges of open societies. Within their colorful array of social and political blueprints, there resides both opportunities and dangers for liberalism. For within open societies, the once unquestioning urge for freedom now inexorably gives rise to the urgent question: Which freedom and whose freedom is to be upheld when the freedoms of some collide with the freedoms of others?

Freedom is constantly called upon to strengthen or to weaken certain conventions, to commend or to condemn individual, corporate, and collective practices, and to legitimize as well as to criticize political systems. Defenders just as much as detractors of the status quo alike, by invoking the selfsame ideal, are bringing to

© The Author(s) 2019 1 C. Dierksmeier, Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04723-8_1 light tensions within the idea of freedom. Does the freedom of the environmental campaigner have priority over economic freedom or vice versa? Does that of the champion of direct democracy have priority over that of the friends of parliamentary representation? Should religious liberty have priority over the freedoms of nonbelievers? Ought we to prioritize the freedom of those living today over that of coming generations? How are we to deal with the ecological damage and social side effects that unfettered economic freedom produces? How is economic freedom related to political freedom? Do they require and strengthen one another, or does the one in fact undermine the other? Might there be an excess of certain freedoms?

These questions stimulate vital deliberations: Do we adequately grasp the idea of freedom as such when equating it with a decrease of limitations and an increase in options? Or does freedom have immanent boundaries? Must even rules of fairness and commands of responsibility be considered as a diminution of freedom? Or do they rather articulate a desire for a freedom in and for sustainable ways of living? Are voluntarily chosen commitments negations or manifestations of freedom?

In short, as soon as freedom no longer fights with constraint and compulsion, liberalism begins to struggle with itself. Having eaten from the tree of knowledge and having learned the bitter lesson that the freedom of a few can ruin the presuppositions for the freedom of others — of everyone - liberal thinking lost its innocence. In its lack of social, moral, and ecological reflection today’s liberalism is confronted by its own original sin and deplores the loss of its former paradise of moral clarity. The haste with which many liberals these days reach for moral fig leaves bespeaks their embarrassed state of original ethical nakedness. From now on, it seems, the friends of freedom must make their home in a world endangered by freedom itself. Henceforth liberalism must live by the sweat of its brow and earn its bread through a reform of its own idea and ideal of freedom. The present work endeavors to contribute to this reform.

Reading this volume will be easier if one is from the outset clear about where this intellectual journey is going. For this reason, I would like, right at the beginning, to confess that this book is intended for various target-groups and therefore argues at different levels. The aims and tone of the presentation change precisely for this reason. First, I wish to give a new direction to the academic discourse concerning the philosophy of freedom. The main part of this book, up until and including Chap. 4, is dedicated to this purpose. Second, I wish to provide momentum to a morally, socially, and ecologically sustainable liberalism, which is the focus of the last chapter of the book. Both aspects, however, are essentially connected. The applied part requires academic foundations for its legitimacy and, conversely, the theory requires practical application in order to establish its relevance.

Yet those people who are theoretically dedicated to the idea of freedom are not always the same as those who practically care about the vicissitudes of liberalism. As a consequence, I have attempted to compose this study in such a way that it does not require everyone to work with academic meticulousness. All of the theoretical chapters therefore end with a section emphasizing their respective “results and implications.” Readers primarily interested in the practical consequences of my investigation will, by consulting these sections, be well prepared for their ultimate presentation in Chap. 5.

The academic aim of the book is easily enough stated, but not so quickly cashed out. First of all I wish to clarify the idea of freedom conceptually by readjusting the common distinction between negative and positive freedom into the dialectical conceptual dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative freedom (as is detailed in Sect. 1.2). I describe this dichotomy as dialectical since a closer consideration of both categories shows that, first, earlier theories of freedom are able to be conclusively traced back to those two categorical determinations whereby, second, a hierarchical ordering and prioritizing of quantitative and qualitative aspects arise so that, third, it becomes clear how the one uniform idea of freedom can be legitimately differentiated — from place to place as well as from one time to another — within different ways of living freely.

The perspective of quantity and quality chosen here is not entirely new.' Mainly we find the quantitative preoccupation championed in theories of “negativelyliberal,” libertarian or neo-liberal origin.” Conversely, the conception of qualitative freedom has some similarities with the concept of “positive freedom” (about which there is more in Sect. 1.2.3), although it is to be clearly distinguished from it as a result of its important procedural dimension. Qualitative freedom does not wish to stipulate ex cathedra which freedoms should apply to certain people and certain groups, but rather authorizes those respectively affected to come to an agreement themselves about that stipulation — in forms which could be justified in the name and interest of the freedom of all mankind. This aspect - the irreversible globality of the idea of freedom - is something which I shall expound on presently (in Sect. 1.1.1).

! Karl Mannheim (1893-1947), Erich Fromm (1890-1980), and Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) talk of qualitative aspects of freedom, but not in a technical sense. In these thinkers, the concept of “qualitative freedom’ surfaces only occasionally but is not systematically worked out. Certainly, even as early as 1979, Charles Taylor introduced “qualitative discriminations” within the philosophy of freedom, but he did not extend these ideas into a self-contained theory, see Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” in Alan Ryan & Isaiah Berlin, The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 177- 193. It should also be noted that, unlike what might be supposed by judging the book by its cover, Matthew Kramer in no way arrives at a theory of qualitative freedom, but rather attempts to trace back all qualitative dimensions of the idea of freedom to quantitative aspects (“the perimeter of a person’s latitude,” “the extent,” “the numerical expressions,” etc.) and then trace these back to a theory of negative freedom (“the sheer physical proportions”) (Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom [New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], 7-11). Yet in theoretical philosophy (looking for an alternative to debates about determinism versus indeterminism) the concept of qualitative freedom has already been tried out in Thomas Buchheim, Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit kein Traum sondern Drama mit Zukunft (Hamburg: Meiner, 2006). In regard to the practical philosophy in the foreground of this investigation and in systematic opposition to conceptions of quantitative freedom, the conception of qualitative freedom has up to now, as far as I am aware, not yet been worked out. I myself have, however, already sketched my own position in some essays, above all in: Claus Dierksmeier, “Qualitative oder quantitative Freiheit,” Rechtsphilosophische Hefte 12 (2007), 107-119; as well as in Claus Dierksmeier, “Welche Freiheit?”, Liberal, Vierteljeahreshefte ‚für Politik und Kultur 4 (2010), 9-13; and in Claus Dierksmeier and Michael Pirson, “The Modern Corporation and the Idea of Freedom,” Philosophy in Management, 9:3, 2010, 5-25.

For a definition and critique of “negative freedom” see Sect. 1.2. For the use of “neoliberal” see note 119.

The sociological, economic, and political aims of this study are connected in their intention of realigning liberalism: from a theory often only insufficiently reflecting upon its moral, social, and ecological responsibility to aconception which makes the idea of freedom’s immanent cosmopolitan obligation the center of its argumentative elaboration. I discuss this motivation in more detail in the following two sections of this chapter.

1.1.1 Freedom and Globality

Our little blue planet is home to all humankind — and is also increasingly perceived as such. Yesterday’s surroundings (Umwelt) are increasingly turning into today’s lifeworlds (Mitwelt), which noticeably impacts upon all local activities. Our actions here and now influence the living conditions of distant peoples and future generations. In addition to tribal leaders and local communities, regional subcultures and nation states, communes and clans, sheikdoms and states, fanatics and fundamentalists, ever more novel actors appear upon the world stage: Colossi of business and luminaries of science, media and militia, donors and sponsors, refuges and rockstars, hackers and whistleblowers, social networks as well as civil society movements all enter in the action and flux of the world. No longer restricted to the local level, the strands of activity so initiated mesh into a fabric ever more difficult to penetrate. The mutable stasis of formerly stable powers yields increasingly to the immutable dynamics of fluctuating forces. Thus the global exchange of commodities, information and people changes the face of the earth with breath-taking speed.

Humanity communicates, travels, and trades more freely today than ever before. One has ever easier access to news, commodities, and contacts. Global information, encounters, and incitements, which, still in the late nineteenth century, were the prerogative of a few learned travelers like Alexander von Humboldt, are now a matter of course to a constantly increasing number of world citizens. Speeded up by exponentially increasing exchange of information, innovative conventions rapidly take root. In the blink of an eye, lifestyles and idols from the most obscure corners of the planet or internet populate our global consciousness. The broadening of the views and insights as well as the increasing exchange of world-views (Weltbilder) and self-images (Selbstbilder) have encouraged and empowered many to liberate themselves from obsolete ways of life, to try other paths, and to begin something new: both within their communities and also by turning their backs upon them. — It is evident that this enhances the freedom of many, although, obviously, not all people.

This gain in options has a price. That the new communication media levels physical distances is one person’s blessing and another’s curse: Little remains private, practically nothing is local anymore; and where the citizens of this world are not controlling their information, their informational self-determination becomes a constantly endangered good. Likewise, economic freedom in a global economy, unrestrained by global governance contains enormous opportunities, but also serious risks: If left unprotected against the ice-cold wind of global profit seeking, many biological systems vanish, customs disappear, political orders fall, and languages die out.

Although there has always existed a cross-cultural exchange of commodities and information, our age differs dramatically from previous epochs. We live in a world no longer only of globalization, but rather of globality. In a world that in many respects is already cosmopolitan, since we increasingly devise private activities, local business dealings, and national politics with reference to their worldwide reception. Like it or loathe it, our interests are bound up with the interests of other persons and states. The domestic affairs of distant countries have long since developed into matters of national security. And the crises of the global commons (the over-fishing of the seas, the warming of the climate, the consumption of fossil fuels, etc.) are transforming yesterday’s national foreign policy into today’s global domestic politics (Weltinnenpolitik).” History has made us all cosmopolitans.

Whether by means of global epidemics or as a result of the epilepsies of the world market — we cannot but acknowledge that our actions produce remote effects as unforeseeable as they are unintended. Although single processes of globalization can still be slowed, stopped, and even reversed, this does not hold for the general trend. The breadth and depth globalization has already assumed compels us already to think in terms of the category of globality: A calculation on the planetary scale, the assessment of a long chain of consequences, an anticipation of world-wide developments. Therefore, whether we slow or stop any future impetus towards globalization, the fundamental change of paradigm remains: away from locally bounded economic and political bookkeeping and towards the perspective of globality.

Wherever the later significance of our activities surpasses our earlier intentions, we must face the following: Whatever we now bequeath the planet might be fully deciphered only in the future, but the responsibility for our message to coming generations already rests with us presently. This situation — the globality and intertemporality of the consequences of our actions — changes radically how freedom is experienced, perceived, and conceived. The extension of its responsibility towards the planetary as well as the future dimension forces itself upon the contemporary consciousness as an imperative of sustainability. Since freedom has an effect beyond the culturally familiar boundaries of space and time, it also must itself be evaluated beyond them. Whoever acts globally must act with cosmopolitan responsibility.

3 See Peter Dudy, Menschenrechte zwischen Universalität und Partikularität: Eine Interdisziplinäre Studie zur Idee der Weltinnenpolitik (Münster: Lit, 2002); Scott Jasper, ed., Securing Freedom in the Global Commons (Stanford, Califoria, 2010); and Kirstin-Maike Müller, Konzepte einer Weltinnenpolitik (Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg, 1999).

Global crises and problems force humanity to search for common solutions. The implementation of these solutions, however, often demands global institutions, and those institutions usually only work efficiently when founded upon common values. Yet, the more the current search for global moral criteria increases, the more suspicion many sense in regard to the values so summoned. Some shun every universalism and fear it might produce a global world order with uniform procedures crushing all cherished diversity. For reasons of cultural sensibility and moral empathy, should we not rather prefer the regional over the universal imperative? Should we not therefore support a cultural relativism of values and norms?

Certainly, an enforced world-monoculture that with uniform procedures did violence to all diversity is undesirable. In the age of globality, however, a relativistic stance, according to which each and everyone sees only their own norms as valid, is just as inappropriate. Wherever human beings interact, there is the threat of conflicts which require arbitration. Only at the utmost risk to our surroundings (Umwelt) and lifeworld (Mitwelt) can we live out our freedom without coordination. Only at the cost of the deepest mistrust on all sides can freedom dismiss all bounds and refuse every universal stricture. Where everyone is at once party and judge there is a threat of eternal strife. Each increase in the possibility of conflict enhances the yearning for the reality of arbitration.

In lockstep with the effects of private as well as collective politico-economic activity, the law must thus gradually develop beyond the bounds of national legal systems. And since every judiciary requires a legislative body and this, in turn, requires an executive, economic globalization creates the demand for a politically lawful globalization.‘ Yet, at the same time, laws and courts on their own cannot put things right. As the sword of the law often proves too short and at other times too coarse a weapon, juridical coercion (Zwang) must be supported by moral impulse (Drang). Actions reflect attitudes — and thus up to now no legal-system has survived, which was not also morally legitimated, complemented, and differentiated. Law and morals, although distinct, can only be successful when they are working together.

We thus have to consider what mediates between the particular and the universal, between families and state, between morality and law. The intermediary level of civil-society must be investigated in its own moral forms, differing from context to context. Whether freedom be granted in societies, organized in companies, channeled by networks, charged within movements, whether it manifests itself in trends, rites, or customs, in each such case and scenario, it comes with a certain, specific responsibility: an ethical dimension, which while closely corresponding with morality and right, does not culminate within them. Only when this intermediary level of ethicality (Sittlichkeit) is likewise included, can fair and sustainable structures for mankind’s economic networking and political striving be established (aufzubauen) and — catering differently to different contexts and cultures — extended (auszubauen).

“See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006).

Freedom must be balanced and differentiated by responsibility in three differing ways: On the micro-level of individual morality, on the meso-level of social conventions and norms, as well as on the macro-level of general law. All three levels — those of the individual, those of the associations, as well as those of governments — point towards the cosmopolitan framework they operate in. What affects all must also be effected by and in the interests of all. More than ever before, our thinking today therefore requires a moral compass for cosmopolitan questions, which adjusts and aligns morality, ethicality (Sittlichkeit), and law, notwithstanding their necessary functional differences. Our joint world requires a unifying ethos (Ethos).

While it was hitherto the hallmark of moral idealists to call for a use of freedom according to universalizable maxims, as if we were accountable to “the entire world,” now even self-declared realists recognize as the bellwether of the present that our enlightened self-interest increasingly overlaps with the precepts of moral cosmopolitanism. In amazement, the hardcore empiricist notices how an idealistic ethic (Ethik) proves itself to be a realistic methodology. In politics and economics, as well as in ecology and culture, it turns out time and time again that freedom endures only when used with cosmopolitan responsibility. Ethics features increasingly as a strategy of sustainability.

Then again, one person’s god is another person’s idol; truth over here equals heresy over there. The more intense the cultural exchange and the pace of social change become, the more sharply we confront the problem that regional customs, religious traditions, and the conventions of the past no longer enjoy ubiquitous and unquestioned authority. Every thrust of globalization narrows the scope of traditional ethics. And, with every increase in plurality, our life suffers the loss of long familiar bonds. To prevent the growing difference of individual norms resulting in an increasing indifference to all values, we urgently need to determine to which ethical standards we are to hold fast to in the future.

Universalist philosophers have forever attempted to outline precisely such goals and principles with authority for all of humankind. However, these attempts often suffered from two problems; from principle objections against their theoretical validity and from pragmatic doubts about their practical efficacy. On principle it was asked: Why, actually, should rules drawn up within one place or time also be valid in another? Pragmatically it was objected: How could values neatly drafted on the drawing board of pure thinking at all be adequate to the multi-colored fabric of our multi-faceted life?

Whoever wants to respond to the fact of our global existence and with a worldwide ethical pact must answer both objections. Can we find principles with the power to resolve — not only familiar — but also completely unprecedented problems? In order to motivate, as well as to legitimate global action we require an ethic that unlocks the past for the present, instead of one which, in its glance towards yesteryear, obstructs the path towards the future. At the same time, the factual divergence of norms found upon this planet is neither to be crushed nor concealed. We thus require an ethic in harmony with the different cultures and traditions of this world. The era of unilateral nationalism is over in politics just as much as in moral philosophy. The world needs universalism and difference; that is the cosmopolitan mandate, to which current theories in globalization ethics have to correspond.°

This book argues that, in this age of late modernity, such an ethic is best sought in the results of a qualitatively oriented idea of freedom. That may seem surprising: For does not every human being have a different view of freedom? Is not freedom therefore an idea that divides rather than unites? Is there really (only) one idea of freedom, which could be just as global and as differentiated as the very problems it aims to solve? Moreover we should consider: Why make freedom so central? Why burden the (too narrow?) shoulders of liberalism with the extensive topic of globalization? Do not Western attitudes thus become the measure of all things, with political predilections influencing our choice of principle, and occidental values from the outset suppressing the polyphony of the cosmopolitan symphony? I do not think so.

Within the ranks of all values proclaimed around the globe, freedom deserves a special place. Certainly, there are cultures which, according to their explicit self-understanding, are not based upon the idea of freedom. Yet everyone implicitly claims freedom qua self-determination, even and especially when the liberty to lead one’s life as one sees fit is denied. Even individuals and groups ascribing to completely illiberal modes of life place importance upon doing so autonomously. Any commitment to values, not least fanatical ones, becomes absurd when enforced. De facto therefore even fundamentalists lay claim to freedom: as and for self-determination. Consequently, they have no convincing reason to deny others theoretically the very same autonomy they themselves make use of practically. Since this individual freedom cannot be consistently denied, it must consequently be granted to others: All the liberal thinkers reconstructed within this book agree about that. For to recognize what one claims for oneself, and to approve what there is no good reason to militate against, is but the very nature of reason. In this indirectly self-justifying structure, the idea of freedom is unique, and thus recommends itself for the clarification of cross-cultural moral questions of value.

While the idea of freedom is invoked worldwide, people understand it extremely differently from one place to the next. No universal form seems to correspond to its global employment. Not everyone understands the same thing by freedom — quite the contrary. The genesis and validity of the idea of freedom appear severed; in places where freedom reigns in the kingdom of ideas, it does not necessarily manifest itself also in practice. Due to this variety of the understanding of freedom (both proclaimed and lived) and in the face of rising challenges and controversies produced by globalization, it is high time for a reassessment of the idea of freedom.

>See Anthony Appiah Kwame, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (London: Penguin, 2007); Claus Dierksmeier, Humanistic Ethics in the Age of Globality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Not incidentally, the discourse about the essence and value of freedom takes place globally. Some propagate an “Eastern” understanding of freedom (inner, spiritual freedom from dependencies and material desires) against a flatly hedonistic “Western” liberalism.’ Others locate the decisive rupture among conceptions of freedom, not so much between East and West, but rather between a conservative Northern and a progressive Southern ideal of freedom.* For example, within writings dealing with the philosophy of liberation, it is common to contrast the emancipatory ideas of freedom of the Global South against the North’s conceptions of freedom, which are often perceived as conservative.’ Does one therefore have to think about the planet as divided into different hemispheres of freedom, with the Northwest in the role of the insensitive egoist? Hardly. The struggle for the idea of freedom is not only a fight between states and regions, but also one well within those cultural spheres.!°

Even within the northwestern zone, stylized by such geographical schemes as the universal malefactor, one nevertheless finds extreme differences of opinion concerning how freedom is actually constituted. Angloamerican bestselling authors like Jeremy Rifkin and George Lakoff are good examples. Rifkin describes and supports, for instance, a tension between European (i.e. attractive and sustainable) and American (i.e. unattractive and ruthless) views about freedom.'! The emphatic dis-

6 For details see Rolf Steltemeier, Liberalismus: Ideengeschichtliches Erbe und politische Realität einer Denkrichtung (Baden-Baden, 2015).

7See Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa, Spiritual Liberation and Human Freedom in Contemporary Asia (New York: Peter Lang, 1990).

° See the contributions in Mabel Moraña, Enrique D. Dussel & Carlos A. Jáuregui, eds., Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) as well as in Carlos A. Jáuregui & Mabel Moraña, Colonialidad Y Critica En América Latina: Bases Para Un Debate (Puebla, Mexico: Universidad de las Américas Puebla, 2007); Kamilamba Kande Mutsaku, Desarrollo y Liberaciön: Utopias Posibles Para Africa y América (México, D.F. Tec de Monterrey, Campus Estado de Mexico: Porrüa, 2003) and Robert Taylor, ed., The Idea of Freedom in Asia and Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

!0See Oded Balaban and Anan Erev, The Bounds of Freedom: About the Eastern and Western Approaches to Freedom (New York: P. Lang, 1995).

1! Within this discourse there is a rather schematic attitude that “Americans hold a negative definition of what it means to be free and, thus, secure. For us, freedom has long been with autonomy. If one is autonomous, he or she is not dependent on others or vulnerable to circumstances outside of his or her control. To be autonomous, one needs to be propertied. The more wealth one amasses, the more independent one is in the world. One is free by becoming self-reliant and an island unto oneself. With wealth comes exclusivity, and with exclusivity comes security. [...] For Europeans, freedom is not found in autonomy but in embeddedness. To be free is to have access to a myriad of interdependent relationships with others. The more communities one has access to, the more options and choices one has for living a full and meaningful life. With relationships comes inclusivity, and with inclusivity comes security” (J. Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream [New York: Polity, 2004], 13). See also: Mark Leohard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (London & New York: Fourth Estate, 2005).

tinction between a rather compassionately-relational theory of freedom and a harshly-absolute one is, however, also found within the USA itself. Lakoff, for example, derives precisely this distinction from a conflict between the ideals of freedom of the Democrats and Republicans.'?

Such schemata are extremely limited in terms of their cognitive value; they fail to do justice to the phenomena in question by disguising overly the internal diversity of opinions within the described camps. It would, however, also be mistaken to believe that one gets closer to the truth by further differentiating through ever subtler subdivisions, for example, by distinguishing within the USA between the Republicanism of the coastal states and that of the inland states, and then again by differentiating between the urban, suburban, and provincial strata of the population, or by distinguishing along the lines of religious communities,” or breaking things down historically (along, e.g. the conflict lines of the American civil war).'* This all seems as pointless as it is laborious.

Supporters of different concepts of freedom exist in every culture, after all." There is no region upon the earth so homogenous that each and all of its proponents of liberal view-points would neatly agree upon one single conception of freedom.'® So, the fact that, in spite of their obvious unsuitableness, attempts at geographical clustering continue to put in an appearance, indicates, above all, an unsatisfied need for orientation in matters concerning freedom. Just as horoscopes react — though miserably ineptly — to a genuine striving for meaning within the human heart, those cultural-morphological derivations correspond to a similar type of need for clarity about the idea of freedom. My work aims to respond to this very yearning for order and orientation.

1.1.2 Freedom and Everyday Life

Our everyday life is shot through with the implications of our ideas about freedom. The prevalent conceptions of freedom diverge not only theoretically, but also lead to tangible practical differences. Intellectual indifference concerning questions of freedom thus translates, willingly or unwillingly, into an affirmation of predominant types of freedom. Whoever remains undecided still decides — namely for the

1? See George Lakoff, Whose Freedom? The Battle over America’s Most Important Idea (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).

13 See John G. Sperling & Suzanne Helburn, The Great Divide: Retro Vs. Metro America (Sausalito: PoliPoint Press, 2004).

'4 See Eric Foner, ed., Voices of Freedom: A Documentary History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011).