The command and administration of the fortress of Port Arthur

PART ONE Introductory Remarks

In the beginning of 1904 Port Arthur was a Russian station and had been designated as the official winter station for the Russian fleet. The prominence attached to it by the Russians and its importance to Japan, made it a matter of contention from the earliest moment of the war. As it afforded a reasonably good refuge for the opposing fleet it became imperative for Japan to destroy it at the earliest possible date.

The earlier history of the place and the manner in which it became a Russian possession will throw some light upon the present issue and help to clear up certain points that may come up later.

Historical Sketch of Port Arthur

early policies

Six days after the French and British allies had withdrawn from Peking in 1860, Russia and China concluded a treaty of the highest importance to Russia, whereby the eastern coast of Manchuria from the Amur to the Korean frontier, a district known later as the Maritime Province, was ceded to Russia. This and other efforts by Russia to approach the coast of the Sea of Japan were viewed by Japan with apprehension. During the period between 1861 and 1894 China and Japan had several differences concerning Korea. In 1885 an agreement was drawn up which continued until 1894 when a rebellion broke out in the Korean province. In the existing arrangement China and Japan were to have equal power in regulating Korea and each maintained a specified force in this country. In case either increased its force the other country was to be notified at once. In 1894, China, at the outbreak of the rebellion, sent 2000 troops to the scene and notified Japan. The latter occupied Fusan and Chemulpo with a mixed brigade. Japan had by this time become tired of the conditions of misrule there and, as China still claimed suzerainty over the province, insisted upon some guaranty of stable government in the province, and demanded reforms therein. But to this China refused to accede and after some delay and fruitless negotiations, hostilities began resulting in the Chino-Japanese war.

Japan was successful and China sued for peace, and the result of peace negotiations was a treaty drawn up at Shimonoseki, Japan, in which China recognized the full and complete independence of Korea, ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Laiotung Peninsula, and paid an indemnity of about 25,000,000 pounds sterling. The provision ceding the Laiotung Peninsula to Japan, if carried into effect would crush Russia's hopes for an open port on the Pacific and the dismemberment of China might be indefinitely postponed. Before this treaty was ratified France, Germany, and Russia joined in suggesting to Japan that she should forego the claim to territory on the mainland as it would threaten the lasting peace of the Far East. Japan was not prepared to resist such a combination and accepted the advice of the three powers, receiving about 5,000,000 pounds sterling instead of the Laiotung Peninsula.

BOXER COMPLICATIONS

During the Boxer rebellion Russia occupied Manchuria and under the final treaty thereafter, Russia was to evacuate that province. The evacuation of the territory was to take place in three sections of six months each. The first took place on time but the second did not and upon inquiry by the Chinese Minister as to the matter Russia presented seven requirements that should be fulfilled before evacuation would be continued; it was evident that China would not yield thereto. Great Britain, the United States and Japan formally lodged complaint against these new Russian demands, and finally on the 20th of April China refused compliance therewith. After this there was much negotiation, and many efforts were made to come to an agreement upon the questions. On January 13, 1904, Japan replied for the last time and pressed an early answer since it was known that Russia was improving her army and navy in the Far East. On February 6th negotiations were broken off by Japan and the Japanese Minister informed the Russian government that he had been directed to withdraw from Russia. Port Arthur was attacked on the night of the 8th of February.

MILITARY IMPORTANCE

Although Port Arthur, previous to its occupation by the Japanese in 1894, was an inconspicuous fishing village, it had increased in importance in a political and strategical sense as time went on, and in 1903 and 1904 became an important prize for which both nations were about to strive in a titanic struggle. At the beginning of the war a large part of the Russian fleet was based on Port Arthur and at that time their Pacific fleet was substantially equal to, if not superior to the fleet of Japan.

Japan had never forgotten or forgiven the action of the powers which had deprived her of her just reward of victory, and quietly bided her time when an opportunity would be presented for retaking the place by force. For ten years she silently prepared for that event. Japan therefore, in 1904, had sentimental as well as political and economical reasons for her great and persistent efforts against Port Arthur.

The importance of Port Arthur, the proportion, duration and unique methods employed in the siege, present to the mflitary student a wide field for investigation. The information that a careful analysis will extract therefrom will be valuable and useful in reference to similar cases in the future. In some respects use has already been made of deductions from study of the conditions in the fortress during 1904.* So far as is known to the writer, however, the benefits resulting from such study have been chiefly limited to material considerations; no treatment of the subject as herein proposed has been observed. Material defects are usually the first to be

* The defense of Port Arthur. Von Schwartz and Romanovski.

The Influence of the Experience of the Siege of Port Arthur upon the Construction of Modern Fortresses. Von Schwartz.

noticed, and are most easily identified and corrected. Any one can detect them and as a rule suggest a remedy.

In matters of organization and administration, where the element in man alone is involved, the subject is complex from the start, and successful operation demands the highest qualifications. In fact, complexities arise at every turn. The chief who is charged with the solution of such a problem should be firm, persistent, patriotic, of wide experience in human nature, keen in fathoming motives, of high integrity, and possess sufficient knowledge and ability to command respect and at least a certain amount of admiration from his subordinates.

The present case presents a composite result for consideration, with evidence as to the procedure of several of the prominent actors.

As the drama enacted at Port Arthur unfolds, it will be seen that all the motives, both positive and negative, which actuate men, played their parts and seriously complicated the stage setting and, in many cases, nullified the achievements of the players. Motives of patriotism and treachery, courage and fear, generosity and envy, friendship and hate, truth and falsehood, efiiciency and incompentency, wisdom and ignorance, criticism and flattery, strove so actively at cross purposes that the exact influence of each will never be known. In the present controversy we are dealing with the past actions of a group of human beings under great strain. To estimate, separately, the effect of each of the numerous mental, moral, and psychological agencies that were operating in, through, and amongst this group of men differing widely in character and antecedents, would be desirable but is impossible owing to incomplete data and lapse of time.

In our problem it is evident that deficient facilities, incompetent personnel, lack of definite ideals, non-arrival of reinforcements from the outside and a thousand other influences might react upon the situation and materially affect the outcome and thereby reduce this quest to an apparently hopeless undertaking.

The real issue is to eliminate from the result the effects of all agencies except those pertaining to Organization and Administration of the Fortress and through the process ascertain whether or not the systems in use were satisfactory or otherwise, and definitely identify any defects that may be found to exist therein. In the future, efficient systems of organization and administration will be required for our own large commands and even a knowledge of the defects of former systems will teach us what to avoid in our service and will go a long way towards establishing our own systems upon sound bases, and producing structures to withstand the test of war.

Sources and Nature of Evidence Available

To arrive at definite conclusions credible evidence must be obtained. Published accounts of the great siege are abundant but in many cases the statements can not be verified, or compared with reliable standards. In the following account doubtful statements have not been considered, and all matter has been carefully sifted and examined in the light of authoritative accounts in order to secure conclusions of reasonable accuracy.

After reading many volumes relating to the siege it was decided to accept the translation of the report of the Russian General Staff* as the most reliable basis of comparison and measure of accuracy. This report appears to be fair and not to favor anyone where criticism is due, makes no effort to cover defects and wrong doing where they exist and, in general, the statements agree with same made by independent writers just after the capitulation.

The report of the Russian General Staff and other reliable sources show that the organization of the fortress was very backward and was scarcely begun when the attack was made. On this date all considerations with respect to the administration of the fortress, just in process of formation, were matters for the future. The outbreak of war brought such urgent and rapid demands upon the authorities for organization and administration that little or no time was available for study of the needs of the case and perfect systems could not be expected. Surprise therefore need not arise from defects which came to the surface but from the fact that anything practicable was developed and adopted. The great siege has come and gone and it might be permitted to rest in peace were it not for the value that is to be gained from digging down into it once more for the purpose of ascertaining the sound principles which its systems embraced and the unsound ones which should be avoided in the future.

About two years after the capitulation, Nojine, official

* Translated by First Lieutenant Walter J. Biittgenbach, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army.

Russian war correspondent at Port Arthur, during the siege, and in charge of the Novy Kry in the fortress wrote a book entitled The Truth about Port Arthur, in which he presents charges of the gravest character against Generals Stoessel and Fock and members of Stoessel's staff. To a reader not familiar with the details of the situation his account appears to be partisan. Some time after the publication of this book charges were preferred against the two ofTicers mentioned above, against General Reis — Stoessel's chief of staff — and Lieutenant-General Smirnoff who was the real Commandant of the Fortress. These charges were so similar to those stated in Nojine's book that it seemed probable that they had been based upon the same. This was not the case but the book evidently added interest and impetus to the trials which followed. All the important accusations in The Truth about Port Arthur were embodied in the charges against the above named officers and the same allegations are embraced in the report of the Russian General Staff. In reference to important events at least it may be assumed that the accusations of Nojine were not overstated. He presents many details affecting the bad conditions in Port Arthur during the siege, particularly in reference to vicious administration. His statements wherever covered by other and wholly impartial writers, are substantially confirmed. He appears to have been a patriotic man and to have had some influence amongst the authorities at St. Petersburg. His account is accepted as correct unless at variance with some other reliable authority.

Then there are several war correspondents who were with the Third Japanese Army during the siege, and who entered the fortress after the capitulation. These men were not slow in estimating the situation and in publishing accounts of their observations. They all present a remarkable agreement as to existing conditions at the end, and, in so far as they cover the subject, they are in accord with the report of the Russian General Staff.

The charges preferred against the officers in question resulted from an investigation by a commission of certain aflegations made by General Smirnoff against Stoessel and Fock.

Colonel Roop was president of the commission that investigated the circumstances of the surrender of the fortress and it was upon the findings of this commission that the charges were based. Parts of the report of Colonel Roop are important as evidence in the case and furnish reliable information.

The written defense of Stoessel and Fock each in his own case before this commission, Stoessel in connection with his trial, and Fock in connection with the Roop commission, throws light upon the men and their motives and is valuable in the present case. It often happens that a man in trying to excuse himself of certain misdoings will throw more side lights upon his character and motives than can be effected in any other manner, and this may be said of the two ofTicers mentioned above.

The principal sources of evidence therefore consist of the following authorities.

1. Report of the Russian General Staff.

2. Histories and reliable reports.

3. Nojine's Truth about Port Arthur and his other writings.

4. War correspondents with the Third Japanese Army.

5. Reports of committees of investigation of the charges

made against officials of Port Arthur, and statements of ofTicers under charges.

6. Special reports of military attaches.

The views of the Russian General Staff will be given by quotations from its report with special reference to the main issues involved. Quotations from other sources will be designated by reference to the source and authority from which taken.

THE REPORT OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF

At the head of the civil administration of the entire Kwangtung District was a Civil Commissioner, attached to the Commanding General — generally an ofiicer of the rank of colonel — whose duties were assimilated to that of governor in Russia; under his control was the police of Port Arthur and the District of!icials— also officers. Thus in his hands was centered the entire administrative machinery of the Kwangtung District, with the exception of Dalni, which had its own municipal government. Members of the town council (magistrates), were the town doctor, the chief of police, town building inspector, a representative of the War Ministry, of the Navy, and of Finance, and three representatives from the town. During the war the chairman of the town council, Lieutenant- Colonel Morschinin carried out the duties of the Civil Commissioner.

Looking at the theater of war, it will be clear to any one that nature aided materially in converting Port Arthur into a powerful fortress. All circumstances favored this as the place of refuge for the squadron in the Pacific Ocean. In how far, these gifts of nature were utilized will become evident in the further history of operations.

Occupation of the Fortress

Without entering into the details of the political situation in connection with the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and the Kwangtung Peninsula, a few remarks upon the question at that time will now throw light upon the matter considered and help to form the background for the circumstances which led up to the siege of the place.

About the 1st of December, 1897, the ships of the Russian fleet went to Port Arthur for their winter station. On the 21st of March, 1898, the steamer Sswar and two of the Russian volunteer fleet proceeded from Vladivostok and anchored off Port Arthur, having aboard the 1st Battalion of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 4 guns of the First Battery, 1st East Siberian Rifle Brigade, and one section of Werchneudinsk Regiment of the Transbaikal Cossacks. The Squadron, at that time, was commanded by Admiral Dubassow.

On March 26th, pursuant to agreement with General Ssun, the Chinese Commander, it was agreed by China that the Chinese forces at Port Arthur were to evacuate the place on the 27th of March; the treaty was signed by the two powers and the Liaotung Peninsula became the property of Russia. On March 28th three ships were placed at the disposal of General Ssun for the purpose of removing his troops.

In October, 1898, there were at Port Arthur or in the vicinity, eight battalions of infantry, two of fortress artfllery, three batteries of twenty-four guns of field artiflery, one Cossack regiment, a company of sappers, three hospitals, two magazines, and twenty pieces of heavy artillery, the last being on the sea front.

After Port Arthur had been occupied by Admiral Dubassow, Colonel Wogak, General Staff, and Engineer Colonel Wasiljewski examined the country and agreed that the line of defense of the fortress must be pushed out beyond the line of the Wolf Hills. Later a report was made by Lieutenant- General Kenonowitsch-Corbazki, sent out by the department in October, 1898, containing the conclusions that the place must be converted into a land fortress with strong permanent works and a strong garrison to resist a superior attacking force for a long period; that the line of the main defense must contain Takushan, Dragon Hill, Temple Height, the "Eckberg" group. High Hill, Panluntshan, Waldschnepfen Hill, Salzberg and White Wolf. Liaoteshan was to be held as an observation point. The armament was to consist of 593 guns, 82 mortars and 18 companies of fortress artillery. The coast defense was to be strengthened by guns of great caliber and longer range — twelve 25-cm. guns, twelve 15-cm. guns, and sixteen 28-cm. guns. For the defense of Kwangtung it was estimated that at least 20 battalions of infantry with field artillery, 1 regiment of Cossacks and 18 companies of fortress artillery would be required.

He further reported that the positions of Kinchou as well as the country between Yunk and Victoria Bays should be strongly fortified. This report was submitted in April, 1899, and the War Minister, General Kuropatkin, considered it with care, after which the latter came to the conclusion that the question should be gone over in conference with the Chiefs of the Engineer and Artillery Administrations ; that in his opinion it would be necessary to settle upon a line of defense further in, containing several forts which would withstand heavy attacks, and requested that Admiral Alexieff be called in for final decision. From remarks upon this report by General Kuropatkin it is clear that the Ministry of War fully realized the necessity for a proper system of fortification for the Kwangtung, but sought to limit the cost thereof if possible.

A special board was then ordered consisting of State Secretary Sscolski, the Imperial Secretary, the Ministers of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, and the Head of the Navy Department, which was to determine absolutely the outlay necessary for the fortification of the Kwangtung. The opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs throws light on this question. On May 29th he said:

At present the condition of international affairs does not in any way menace our gradually fortifying the Kwangtung Peninsula. One such can only arise by lack of care in our case or by progress too rapid. One must not forget that the principal defense of Port Arthur, since the Russian flag has been raised there, does not depend on those troops that may be there but on the fact that all nations know that behind this place stands all of Russia.

This same point of view was held by other members of the board, but the Finance Minister added thereto that the demands of the Ministry of War should be somewhat curtailed from what the original scheme of fortification for the Kwangtung had shown. Although General Kuropatkin invited the attention of the Committee to the fact that during the time that the peninsula was held by the Chinese the requirements of the defense of the place had been worked out by western engineers who had found that it would require at least 20,000 men and 350 guns. The estimates of the Ministry for War were reduced to 11,300 men and 150 guns. Cost, careful or conservative state policy, and extreme confidence in the bravery of the Russian soldier were the chief considerations in this far-reaching conclusion. It was further recommended that the Ministry should not increase this number of troops because it would not only be an additional expense to the state but in addition would introduce a serious political danger. The conclusions of this board were binding on the Minister of War and he was obliged to execute them and was limited to the amounts of money based thereon. Finally Colonel Velicho of the Engineers, in 1899, was sent to Port Arthur with full powers. He was directed to determine the places and positions for the fortifications according to plan and, if this plan was not objected to by the military authorities at Port Arthur, was authorized to give immediate orders for beginning the work.

Project of Fortification

Colonel Velicho's scheme counted upon works that would require a garrison of 14,000 to 15,000 men. A Commission was named whose plan of fortification was approved on June 30, 1900. According to this plan, the sea front called for 124 guns arranged in 22 batteries, and the land front for 418 guns and 48 machine guns, the latter being divided into two fronts known as the east and the west fronts.

The work of construction of the forts actually commenced before June 30, 1900. Ample and timely appropriations would have permitted the completion of the works by 1904. As it turned out, however, they were not half finished by that date. It was estimated in the beginning that the cost of the fortifications would be 8,927,775 roubles but this turned out to be entirely too small and that the amount should have been 15,000,000. By the end of 1903 a little less than one-third this amount had been appropriated and of the latter more than

COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION OF PORT ARTHUR U

500,000 had been diverted in 1900 to build batteries not connected with the Kwangtung project but on account of the Boxer war. The Minister of Finance constantly endeavored to cut down the amounts authorized and the Secretary of War found it necessary to limit the Engineer Department.

No money ever became available for Kinchou and that point was just as received from China in 1897, although all persons and commissions had reported upon the importance of this place in the system of fortifications for the peninsula.

Further lack of money caused the designer, with the permission of the highest authorities, to make certain economical deviations from the regular rules by cutting down the proper thickness of concrete arches and walls which, as became evident later, fatally affected the successful defense of the place.

Thus it may be observed that competent officers made thorough and careful study on the ground of the requirements of the case and reported upon the cost of suitable fortifications. These reports, for reasons already given, were cut down almost fifty per cent and approved by heads of departments who could not possibly see any but the economic phase of the question. Thus in the first effort to prepare the port as a suitable base for the fleet the initial mistake in policy was made.

After having accepted a plan for the defense of the Kwangtung, money was so limited and so slow in coming that the works were scarcely one-third completed when the crisis came.

The scheme would have worked very well had the war not arrived but the deficiencies were not corrected before 1903 when it became evident that war with Japan was coming, and, at times, might be said to be imminent. The war cloud had always been above the horizon since 1898, and it is almost beyond belief that such neglect and such false economy could be advocated and enforced in the face of such a situation.

In commenting on this question Colonel Velicho said:

It is impossible to decide defense questions wisely when your superiors say to you "this city is very important and we shall assign a garrison of 25,000 men. That port is less important and we shall assign only 8000 men to defend it. Construct a fortress to fit a garrison of 8000 men."

The line of main defense was to be divided into two parts by the Lunho.

1. The east front ran from the Kreutzberg to the Lunho, a distance of 8.5 kilometers.

2. The west front from the Lunho to include White Wolf Mountain, a distance of 12 kilometers.

This necessitated the omission of Takushan, etc., from the line of main defense, which on account of its importance was to be prepared first, and forced the hills in front into a secondary line. Takushan and Siagushan should have been prepared as early as possible but as it turned out they were not prepared when the attack came and were of no use in the defense.

While money was not available for the completion of the defenses about 20,000,000 roubles had been spent on works, docks, etc., at Dalni, where a commercial station and harbor had been established during the same period. This expenditure made at the sacrifice of the defense was a serious mistake in view of the constant danger of war to which Russia was then exposed, and was a second mistake in policy.

Importance of Kinchou

The important position of Kinchou was not considered at all in the appropriations. This was known to be the key of the defenses to the peninsula and had been fully considered by those who had studied the subject. Colonel Velicho found certain contradictions in his instructions. He was directed to devise a scheme for the defense of the peninsula and at the same time was obliged to limit the same to a garrison of 11,300 men. This was impossible. The fortress was fortunate in having soon after the beginning of the war in all more than 50,000 men available for its defense.

Underestimation of the Enemy, and Power of Future Ordnance

In working the details of the defenses, Colonel Vehcho further says:

It is difficult to estimate what siege artillery the Japanese may bring against this fortress in a siege.

As in 1894 they had at their disposal a siege park of some 30 guns, among which were 12-cm. guns and 15-cm. mortars, so, at the least, foresight would demand that in future he should count on at least double that number of those guns. Finally, he estimated that the enemy would have in all 184 guns of which 144 would be field and 40 would be siege guns. On the strength of these conclusions he reduced the thickness of the concrete walls below that demanded by the rules in such cases.

Economic considerations demanded the reduction of the space of the casemates and the heights and thicknesses of the parapets and arches, to what might seem allowable in view of the weak siege artillery which would be opposed to them. The erroneous deductions made in the premises are now apparent from the numbers of 6-inch guns, 8-inch howitzers, 11 -inch mortars and long range 6-inch naval guns placed before the works and the preparation of a siege park of 300 guns to reduce the works after the failure of the first general assault. Thus in the fall of Port Arthur we obtain a clear idea of what economy did for Russia.

Under the conditions in 1903 and the certainty that war with Japan was imminent, the opinions of the special board became considerably modified. In 1903 Alexieff, commander of the forces of the Kwangtung, had gotten up a memoir stating the necessities and requirements of Port Arthur which he handed to the Minister of War. This contained but few items relating to the development and execution of the defenses and none touching upon hastening the progress of the same. Thus with diplomatic relations with Japan seriously strained in 1903, a rupture possible at any moment, and the situation becoming more and more serious, progress upon the fortifications was practically ignored.

Organization of the Command

In the fall of 1903 the first serious effort to organize the command of the fortress was made, and consisted in the following steps.

1. The appointment of Admiral Alexieff as Viceroy.

2. The organization at Port Arthur of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Brigade of four regiments, the assignment of Major-General Kondratenko to command the same, and the designation of this force as the garrison.

3. The reorganization of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Brigade and increase of the regiments from two to three battalions.

4. The organization of the 7th Rifle Artillery Detachment of three batteries of eight guns each.

5. The organization of the 4th Rifle Artillery Brigade, of four batteries of eight guns each.

6. The organization of a reserve battery of six 67-mm. guns.

7. The organization of a third battahon of fortress artillery, which reached Port Arthur on March 6th, 1904.

8. The organization of one company each, of fortress mine, telegraph, gensdarme and fire department first class. The latter was not finally organized for lack of the proper fire apparatus.

9. The appointment of a fortress commander, formation of a fortress staff, and fortress administration. By orders of superior authority, Lieutenant-General Stoessel was designated Fortress Commander.

10. For contingencies, 3,000,000 roubles were allotted to the Viceroy. This money might have been used for hastening the construction of the fortifications, but it became available only one month before the war and was too late to accomplish important results.