Maine de Biran's philosophy of will...

Preface

No special account of Maine de Biran’s philosophy has before appeared in English, and the sources are rendered somewhat dif¬ ficult by the author’s highly involved style. It has seemed, there¬ fore, that a somewhat extended exposition of his work may prove useful. In the composition of this monograph my object has been two-fold : to give a statement of Biran’s system, and to show his exact position in the history of speculative thought. As a result of careful investigation, I have found it necessary to call attention to the unitary character of the system, which, as a matter of fact, centers around the single idea — will. This conclusion is, of course, opposed to the view of Naville, who in his introduction to the CEuvres ineelites divides Biran’s work into three sharply distinguished periods. I am convinced, however, that this divi¬ sion rests on insufficient grounds. For in the idea of activity is to be found the keynote of the entire philosophy. This idea is clearly evident in the writings assigned by Naville to the earlier and the later periods, as well as in the more important works that were written during the intervening years.

On the whole, it may seem surprising that I have not emphasized more strongly the importance of Biran’s philosophy. It is per¬ haps unusual in a work of this kind to minimize the significance of the subject. However that may be, I have to confess that the motive which led me to begin my study, the expectation of find¬ ing elements of permanent value in Biran’s philosophy based on frequent references to him as ‘ the French Kant,’ has scarcely been realized by my subsequent investigation. Even with the most sympathetic interpretation, Biran cannot be placed among philosophers of the first rank. Kant’s great significance does not consist merely in his emphasis on the activity of mind against the empiricists, but rather in the fact that he shows that the activity in which the nature of mind is expressed is universal and objective in character. Biran, however, remains at the point of

iii

IV view of empiricism ; for his epistemology is developed from the sub¬ jective psychological fact of will, and continues relative to the end. The universal and necessary character of causality is left unex¬ plained. His psychology aims at being introspective and factual, but is lost in a bewildering mass of abstractions. I have shown that he stands for a position which is neither a third view correla¬ tive with empiricism and rationalism nor a synthesis of these two recognized systems, but rather an extension of the former — a development of the Locke-Condillac school, yet a development that is still on the same epistemological plane.

Finally it should be noted that my conclusions in regard to Biran’s relation to subsequent philosophical positions refer exclu¬ sively to the logical connection of his ideas, and not to his indirect influence, which was certainly very great, but which I have made no attempt to estimate. With this reservation, my results indicate that his effect on later thought, e. g., on that of Cousin or of Renouvier, was not extensive.

In working out this subject I have received most valuable ad¬ vice and suggestions from Professor J. E. Creighton, under whom I had been studying during the time devoted to the composition of the monograph, and from Professor Ernest Albee, who very kindly read my manuscript at an early stage.

Bainbridge, N. Y.

N. E. T.

Contents

Section. Page.

I. Life and Works . i

II. Objections to Naville’s View of Biran’s De¬ velopment . 3

SECTION I. Life and Works

Maine de Biran was regarded by Cousin as “ the first French metaphysician of our time.” 1 Two reasons are sufficient to ex¬ plain why this estimate was not made earlier or more generally accepted. Biran was not, like his great contemporary Kant, a teacher of philosophy. His career, as far as it was public, was almost entirely in the field of politics. To the men of his time he was better known as a statesman than as a philosopher. But the most important cause which contributed to his failure to gain early recognition was the fact that he published very little work. He was never quite satisfied with the form in which he had ex¬ pressed his thought. The result was that his principal writings were left unfinished. Adequate material for estimating the value of his system was provided only by posthumous editions of his works.

The life of Biran was uneventful. He was born November 29, 1766, and died July 20, 1824. His father was a physician of the town of Bergerac, in the southwestern part of France. He was educated in the neighboring town of Perigueux, where he studied Condillac’s philosophy under the direction of the doctrinaires. In 1785 he became a life-guardsman, but early in October of that year was wounded in the arm. He then went to Grateloup and remained there during the Reign of Terror. Subsequently he held several administrative offices in the prov¬ ince of Dordogne. But in 1809 he was chosen a member of the legislative assembly; and after 1812 he established his residence permanently at Paris. He was a member of the commission which took advantage of the reverse that Napoleon had sus¬ tained in Russia to demand guarantees of the peace of Europe and the liberties of the French citizens. After the Restoration, Biran was a member of the Chamber of Deputies until his death,

1 Maine de Biran, CEuvres Philosophiques , Vol. I, p. xi.

I except in the single session 1817. He voted at first with the liberals, but afterwards with their opponents. The change was due not to inconsistency, but to a desire to support the royal power which was in his opinion the only safeguard against anarchy or despotism.

Biran’s first philosophical work was the Influence de Vhabitude y which, in 1802, won for him the prize offered by the Institute of France. Three years later he received another prize from the same source, for his Decomposition de la pensee . In 1807 he re¬ ceived special mention by the Berlin Academy for his Memoire sur Vaperception interne immediate . Finally, in 1811, he received the prize from the academy of Copenhagen for his Memoire sur les rapports du physique et du moral de l *homme . The first essay, together with an anonymous Examen des legons de philosophie de Laromiguiere in 1817, and Une exposition de la doctrine de Leib¬ nitz in 1819, 1 were the principal works which he gave to the public during his life. But to appreciate the system as a whole, the Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie and the Nouveaux essais d 'anthropologic, which were first edited by E. Naville in 1859, are indispensable. The first may be called Biran’s master¬ piece. This work, which was begun in 1811, was incomplete when Biran went to Paris and was developed at his leisure during several succeeding years. In the Introduction, the author says he intended to unite the three prize essays into a work more sys¬ tematic and more carefully elaborated than the writings which he had presented to the various societies. He was led to adopt this plan from the fact that the three essays were the same in idea, dif¬ fering only in the degree of development and in the form in which the idea was expressed. 2 The Nouveaux essais d'anthropologie (1823-24) is a fragment; but is very important, since it embodies the final expression of the author’s philosophy of religion. This work reproduces many of the ideas in the Psychologie , and thus clearly shows the internal connection in all Biran’s philosophy.

1 In the Biographie Universelle, Vol. 23.

2 Cf CEuvres inedites, publiees par Naville, Vol. I, pp. 34-35.

SECTION II. Objections to Naville’s View of Biran’s Development

At the outset it should be said that under the title, “ Philo¬ sophy of Will,” I do not limit myself either to the period or to the characteristics of Maine de Biran’s work, which that name might suggest to one who was familiar with Naville’s exposition. In the Nouveaux essais there is a classification of the observed facts of human nature, which Naville takes as a key to three suc¬ cessive stages in the thought of the philosopher. Biran finds an animal life that is characterized by impressions, appetites, and movements, of physiological origin, and subject to the law of necessity ; a human life resulting from the appearance of free will and self-consciousness ; and a life of the spirit which begins when the soul frees itself from the rule of the lower tendencies and turns to God, there to find repose. On the analogy of this classifica¬ tion, which is taken to indicate Biran’s development, Naville has described the system under three divisions: — a stage (i 794-1804) in which Biran is influenced by the work of Condillac and agrees with Cabanis and de Tracy in regarding sense impressions as the origin of thought; a philosophy of will (1804-1818) when Biran develops with all its consequences the fact of the activity of mind ; and finally (1818-1824) a philosophy of religion. 1 Favre agrees with Naville on this point. “ Maine de Biran passed from the sensationalism of Condillac to a doctrine based on the self, and finally reached a third phase in which he gave the self a sup¬ port : God.” 2 Although Naville does not regard these divisions as absolute, since he recognizes that the first period contained in germ the principles which became explicit in the second period, and that early in the development of the philosophy of will there were tendencies apparent which indicated the mystical character of Biran’s later thought; yet so much importance is attached to the distinctions that they determine the form of the exposition.

1 Op . cit., I, pp. v-viii.

2 Essai sur la metaphysique et la morale de Maine de Biran , p. 6.

While admitting the practical ["convenience of this division, I think that it conveys an erroneous impression of the relations of the several parts of Biran’s work. In the principal essay of the first period (1794-1804), the Influence de l habitude , we already find the idea really fundamental to Biran’s philosophy. The significance of the consciousness of effort and of will is here clearly stated. Only by a voluntary movement which meets a resistance, that is, by an effort which is a relation between a sub¬ ject and a limit, do we gain a basis for consciousness of self and knowledge of the external world. A single passage will show how far Biran was removed from the philosophy of Condillac which Naville makes the dominant element in the first period.

“ Effort necessarily carries with it the perception of a relation between the being which moves, or which wills to move, and some object which is opposed to the movement. Without a sub¬ ject or a will that determines the movement, and without a term which resists, there is no effort. And without effort there is no knowledge or perception of any kind.” 1

In view of this and similar passages, we may regard the first period not so much as a distinct stage in the thought of the phil¬ osopher as an incomplete expression of the one idea of conscious activity which came to clear light in the second period. The doctrines which Naville takes as characteristic of the first stage were not the results of Biran’s own thought, but rather the in¬ heritance which he received from the school of Condillac. They were the subject matter, not the product, of his early philosophi¬ cal activity.

Merten notes the fact that the notion of effort appears in the first pages of the essay on habit; but he says : “ It is easy to see that it is only a question here of effort conceived as the correla¬ tive term of the impression.” 2 But if “impression” is taken to mean an effect produced on the organism by something entirely external and foreign to the organism, we find that effort is not always correlated with impression even in the essay on habit. For example, Biran says : “We cannot doubt that the educa-

1 CEuvresphilosophiques , Vol. I, p. 27.

2 Etude critique sur Maine de Biran , p. 9.

OBJECTIONS TO NAVILLE’S VIEW tion of what are usually considered merely as the sense organs begins only by the development of their individual or associated activity.” 1 It will be noticed that Biran says ‘education,’ not ‘ existence ’ : the organism is here regarded as susceptible to im¬ pression prior to any experience of effort. If, on the other hand, by impression is meant the consciousness that the will meets a resistance, effort is correlated with impression not only in Biran’s earlier, but also in his later, work. Similarly, the distinction of the third from the second period is due to a change in the sphere of application, rather than in the essential character of the prin¬ ciple. In the philosophy of will the principle is applied to the individual. In the philosophy of religion as far as it is a self-con¬ sistent system, the principle of conscious activity is considered also in extra-individual relations. At the beginning, Biran was exclusively interested in a psychological account of mind, and only at a later date did he take up the questions concerning man’s wider relations to society and the world. 2 Even at this later period these more fundamental problems never received adequate treatment. But this point will be worked out in more detail after we have given a general statement of his system.

Accordingly, in the treatment of Biran’s philosophy of will, we shall not limit the consideration to the period indicated by Naville’s division (1804-1818), but shall devote some attention to the earlier writings and also to the later development of the philos¬ ophy. It will, of course, remain true, however, that our study will have an especial reference to the second period, since it is here that Biran’s ideas are most clearly stated, and that his views have most significance for the history of philosophy. This is the period of his most systematic and extended work, the Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie .

1 CEuvres ph ilosophiques, I, p. 99.

2 Gabriel Tarde has recently pointed to this individualistic feature. Maine de Biran found that the “ experiences of touch, sight, and hearing, in which it (the child) felt itself at once subject and object, stood out in high relief from the ordinary impressions of touch acting upon foreign substances, and from the usual impressions of sight and hearing. . . . But what Maine de Biran did not see is this : That stranger still and standing out yet more sharply on the background of our external perceptions, is our perceptions of other people.” Interpsychology. International Quarterly ,Vol. VII, No. I, p. 62.

Section III

Biran's Relation to Earlier Thinkers : Locke, Condillac, Kant, and Reid.

Before considering Maine de Biran’s philosophy in detail, it is well briefly to review the work of his direct predecessors in reference to the special points in which their opinions are related to the principle which he makes ultimate. This reference will show the nature of the philosophical thought which was domi¬ nant in France in his time, and also the specific manner in which he reacted against the current sensationalism; it will enable us to estimate his position at the beginning of his career, and also to determine the extent of his development. Comparison with the historical environment will lend distinctness to his lead¬ ing ideas and will make it possible to determine more exactly the significance of their application in his system. With this end in view we shall attempt to trace the idea of the activity of the self as it is found in the work of Locke and of Condillac. But in this connection the treatment can be no more than a mere outline ; and naturally cannot include even the mention of many impor¬ tant elements in the views of these philosophers.

At this point we may notice a definition of sensationalism. 1 Cousin, who found it congenial and advantageous 2 to call himself a disciple of Biran, brought the name into use. With him the term designated the least developed of the four common philo¬ sophical positions. The three types of thought correlative with it were idealism, skepticism, and mysticism. 3 He employed it to characterize the school of Condillac. But in a wider sense it has been applied to various thinkers, sometimes to denote a material¬ istic metaphysics, at other times an empirical epistemology, or finally a hedonistic ethics. Especially in the second of these senses the term was applied to the views of Condillac and in a

1 Cf. Beaulavon’s definition in La grande encyclopedic.

2 Picavet, article Biran in ibid.

3 Cf. Cousin’s History of Modern Philosophy (translated by O. W. Wight), Vol. II, Lecture IV.

lesser degree to those of Locke. The epistemological aspect of these systems is important in relation to Biran.

Locke could accept without hesitation the empirical dictum, Nihil est in intellectu quod non priiis fuerit iu sensu. But a care¬ ful consideration of his account of experience reveals the pres¬ ence of self-activity in his theory of knowledge. All the materi¬ als of knowledge and reason come from experience. This experience, however, includes the observation not only of “ ex¬ ternal sensible objects” but of the “internal operations of our minds.” 1 This “perception of the operations of our own mind within us,” the second “fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas,” is named specifically Reflection, and “ though it is not sense as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it (sense) and might properly enough be called internal sense” 2 It is evident that, for Locke, the material derived from reflection has at least equal value with the products of sensation. The mind “ observes its own actions . . . and takes from thence other ideas which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.” From reflection we derive the idea of perception and of will. “The power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will.” 3 Besides these simple ideas and their various modes there are other ideas that may be derived from reflection, e. g., power. We observe “in ourselves that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies that were at rest.” 4 Power is classified as active and passive. While ideas of both active and passive power are derived from our experience of the external world, “ our senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds.” 5

In comparing Locke with Biran, it is very important to notice his conception of will. In the chapter on power, he makes will and understanding examples of power. In regard to the first he

1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, Ch. i, § 2.

*Ibid., II, Ch. i, §4.

* Ibid., II, Ch. VI.

'Ibid., II, Ch. VII, §8.

says : “We find in ourselves a power to begin or to forbear, con¬ tinue or end several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or . . . the motion of any part of the body ... in any particular instance is what we call will.” 1 These powers of mind, which are sometimes called faculties, should not be supposed “ to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions.” 2 The nature of the will is also evident from the treatment of the question of freedom. The agent is at liberty to follow the preference of his mind; but to ask if the will has freedom is to ask if one power has another power.” 3 Volition “is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it,” 4 while “freedom consists in the dependence of the existence ... of any action upon our volition of it.” 5

The secondary place which the will holds in Locke’s scheme is further shown by a consideration of his view of spirit. Finite spirit is one of the three varieties of substance, yet in the mental operations of thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc,, which we refer to a spiritual substrate “ we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit as we have of body.” 6 In the section on the intuitive knowledge of our own existence, Locke is so far from making will the core of being that he does not even mention it as one of the forms of consciousness in which we find direct and indisput¬ able evidence of existence, although he would no doubt be will¬ ing to include it as coordinate with the “ I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain ” and “ I doubt.” 7 Finally, it is not the will that makes the self as in Biran. “ Nothing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same person : the identity of sub-

1 Op. cit., II, Ch. XXI, § 5.

* Ibid., II, Ch. XXIII, § 5.

' Ibid., IV, Ch. IX, § 3.

stance will not do it; for whatever substance there is, however framed, without consciousness there is no person.” 1

In the system of Condillac, there is presented a form of empiri¬ cism which differs in many respects from that of Locke and which is especially important in the present connection. The Traite des sensations appeared in 1754. It is the aim of the author to show that all knowledge is derived from sensation. By means of sen¬ sations the soul is modified and all its knowledge and faculties are developed. The problem here is not so much the nature of the mind as the character and origin of mental operations. With reference to the philosophy of Locke, Condillac makes the follow¬ ing criticism: “The greater part of the judgments which are united to all sensation escaped him [Locke]. He did not realize that we must learn to touch, to see, and to hear, etc. All the faculties of the soul appeared to him as innate qualities.” 2 Reflec¬ tion is not a source of ideas coordinate with sensation. Locke did not carry his analysis far enough. “ The sensations after having been attention, comparison, judgment, finally become reflection.” 3 It is not our purpose to trace the system of trans¬ formed sensations as they are variously related to the original sensation, which Condillac builds up in describing the developing consciousness of his statue. But with reference to Biran it is necessary to consider, at least very briefly, the place of desire and will in the view of the author of the Traite des sensations.

The sensations from the first have an affective quality. While the statue is for itself nothing more than the single sensation to which it attends, that sensation is agreeable or disagreeable. Ex¬ perience is pleasant or unpleasant even before there is any com¬ parison of experiences. Pain cannot make the statue desire a state that it does not know. The first sensation, however agree¬ able or disagreeable it is, cannot lead to desire. 4 Only when the statue notices that it can cease to be what it is and become what it has been, will desire arise from a painful state. 5 Desire is the

'Op. cit., II, Ch. XXVII, §23.

2 Traite des sensations. Extrait raisonne , pp. 6 and 7 (Houel ed.).

« Cf. ibid., I, Ch. II, § 3.

5 Cf. ibid., I, Ch. II, § 4.

activity of the faculties of the soul when they are directed upon a thing of which we feel the need. It presupposes the idea of something better than what is at present existent, and also a judgment of the difference of two successive states. 1

With Biran will is absolutely distinct from desire, with Condil¬ lac it is a further development of desire. The memory of having satisfied some desires gives the hope of being able to satisfy others. Although the outcome is not certain, confidence in¬ creases in proportion as the need is felt to be great. The statue then does not limit itself to desiring; but it wills. Will is “an absolute desire, that is, a desire of such a nature that we think the thing desired is in our power.” 2

Personality is not constituted by the activity of the will as in Biran, but is dependent upon memory. With the first sensation there is no personality ; but with a change of sensation the self “judges that it is the same which has existed before, in another manner, and it says * I.’ ” 3 This consciousness of self is so far from being dependent on will that it is even antecedent to desire. “ Before being able to say ‘ I desire ’ one must be able to say ‘ I.’ ” 2 The sense of touch is a unique form of sensation. It is the first in importance in the animal life. % Condillac names touch the fundamental feeling. He even identifies it with personality. This feeling and the ego of the statue are “ only one thing in origin.” 4 It is by this sense that the statue discovers its body and learns that there is an external world. This result is effected by movement; but contrary to Biran’s theory, the movement by which we discover the non-ego is involuntary. It is determined by the pleasant or unpleasant character of sensation ; but the organism reacts without any plan. Prevision is unnecessary, obedience to nature alone is sufficient. In consequence of the organization of the statue, its muscles move its limbs on the oc¬ currence of an unpleasant stimulus “ and it moves without a plan as even without knowing that it moves.” 5

1 Cf Op. cit., I, Ch. Ill, §§ i and 2.

2 Ibid., I, Ch. Ill, §9.

3 Ibid., I, Ch. VI, §2.

*Ibid., II, Ch. I, §3.

* Ibid., II, Ch. IV, §2.

biran’s relation to earlier THINKERS I I

With the discovery of something beyond the self, which is brought about through the sense of touch, the statue finds that the essential character of each sensation is that it leads to some knowledge. This reference beyond itself transforms the sensa¬ tion into an idea. “ Every impression which conveys knowledge is an idea.” 1 Knowledge is thus independent of volition. It is the final result of the transformation of the sensation. In the beginning the sensation had an affective attribute, but not voli¬ tional character ; and this last step in the development which changes sensation to idea is effected by the influence of an exter¬ nal stimulus upon a purely passive organism.

Although we cannot doubt the existence of body to which we must refer sensible qualities, yet we are quite cut off from the hope of any real knowledge of the object. For “considering the origin of ideas it is clear that they present to our statue nothing but qualities variously combined. The statue perceives, for ex¬ ample, solidity, extension, divisibility, figure, and motion united in all that it touches ; and it has consequently the idea of body. But to the question, What is a body ? it can only answer, it is there, that is to say, you will always find there, solidity, extension, divisibility, and figure.” 2 The words being and substance are devoid of positive significance. Our knowledge is sufficient for our needs. An intuitive knowledge of the reality of the self, which Locke finds by reflecting on the operations of the mind, and which Biran finds in the consciousness of effort, is unneces¬ sary in the system of Condillac.

The important characteristic of the system, for us, is the fact that in this account of origins, Condillac does not make the will fundamental. The will together with memory, comparison, re¬ flection, etc., is derived from an original, affectively qualified sen¬ sation. Knowledge of the not-self does not depend upon will, but the reverse is rather true, since will is a form of desire, and desire implies knowledge of the not-self. This difference in the treatment of will is the essential distinction between Condillac and Biran. We shall see later that there is a striking similarity

1 Op. cit ., II, Ch. VIII, § 28 .

2 Ibid., IV, Ch. VI, § 9 .

I 2 between their forms of exposition and also in their explanations of important points.

From Condillac we proceed to consider briefly the form of contemporary empiricism, with which our philosopher was most closely connected. Maine de Biran’s first important work was a study of the influence of habit on the various modes of conscious activity. Destutt de Tracy was chairman of the committee which awarded the prize to this essay. He was also the leading repre¬ sentative of the idealogists. In 1796 he had invented this name to mark out what he and his friends believed to be the proper line of philosophical activity. Metaphysics was discredited, in their opinion, because it applied to researches on the nature of being and in regard to the origin and first cause of things, which they held to be useless. Psychology meant the science of the soul and also referred to first causes. Idealogy, on the contrary, treated questions of origin as unanswerable. Whether we study within or without ourselves all we can hope to accomplish is to acquire a deeper knowledge of the laws of nature. Idealogy adopted purely scientific methods of research. It aimed to be the basis of grammar, logic, ethics, pedagogy, and social science. By exclusive attention to the empirical study of mind, de Tracy hoped to develop a system which should be more firmly estab¬ lished and more fruitful in results than the pre-revolutionary phi¬ losophy had been. Next to Destutt de Tracy the most important of the idealogists was an intimate friend of Biran, named Cabanis, who was especially distinguished for his physiological researches.