A system of ethics

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Author's Preface To The American Edition

In responding to the request of my friend Frank Thilly to speed this book on its journey, I feel impelled, first of all, to express to him my hearty thanks for his kindness in presenting my Ethics to his fellow-countrymen in their native tongue, a service which he has already performed for my Introduction to Philosophy.

From my earliest youth I have had the feeling that a people closely akin to us dwelt beyond the ocean. This feeling was, perhaps, first aroused by the fact that not a few of the companions of my youth had found a new home on the other side ; in my native land, Schleswig-Holstein, from which the Anglo-Saxons once sailed westward over the sea, the migration to the West still continues. Since then the years have woven many new bonds of union. And so it is now a special source of pleasure to me, also, as an author, to come into closer contact with the great nation which has shown such remarkable energy in establishing itself in the new world.

It is my earnest wish that this book may also contribute a little to strengthen the ties of spiritual fellowship uniting the two kindred peoples. We Germans well know, and gratefully confess, that no nation of the earth more deeply appreciates and more thoroughly understands the products of German thought than the United States of North America.

FRIEDRICH PAULSEN.

Berlin-Steglitz, September 27, 1898.

Preface To The First German Edition

Ich glaube nicht dass ich viel eignes neues lehre,

Doch denk' ich von der Muh > mir zweierlei Gewinn ;

Einmal, dass ich nun selbst an Einsicht weiter bin ;

Und auch der dritte Grund scheint wert nicht des Gelachters :

— RUCKERT.

FROM THE PREFACE TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION

The second edition of this work, which has been so kindly received by a large circle of readers, embraces, in the main, the same contents as the first ; I have, however, so far as I was able, made improvements here and there. The second book, especially, has been worked over ; I hope that the fundamental concepts have gained somewhat in definiteness, and that the entire treatment has been somewhat rounded out. Perhaps this will make it a little easier for some of the critics to understand the conception of life and its values on which my system is based.

This new edition, however, is still open to the objection, which has been repeatedly urged against me, that the treatment of the fundamental questions is much less searching and thorough, while the questions of the day receive more attention than they deserve in a philosophical treatise. I have not been able to make up my mind to enter upon a more detailed discussion of the principles, because I do not believe that great prolixity in these matters will do any one much good. The philosophers, of course, have long ago worked out their own principles ; to the readers, however, who do not lay claim to this title, the significance and fitness of the fundamental notions will be proved more easily by the ability of the latter to explain particular cases and to solve concrete problems. I have been equally unwilling to ignore the questions which are moving our age ; the books that have nothing to say to their times, and therefore fill their pages with unx FROM THE PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

timely logical quibbles, or with endless historical-critical discussions, are plentiful enough as it is, and there has, thus far, never been a lack of tiresome books in Germany. There are books that are timeless because they are written for all times; but there are also timeless books which are written for no time. This book does not belong to the first class, nor would it like to belong to the second.

And now that I have begun to make confessions, let me confess further that this book was not written for philosophers at all ; God forbid that I should presume to think for people who are already overburdened with thoughts. I had in mind readers who have, in some way or other, been stimulated to meditate upon the problems of life, and are looking for some one to guide them, or, if that sounds too presumptuous, for some one to discuss these questions with them. Should any such take up this book and not lay it aside disappointed, the author's ambition will have been thoroughly realized. Besides, I do not believe that a new system of moral philosophy is either necessary or possible ; the great constructive principles have already been so thoroughly developed by Greek philosophy that they are, in the main, satisfactory even to-day. To bring the old truth into living touch with the questions which preoccupy our age, is, in my opinion, the most important function of a modern ethics. Nor do I believe that I am mistaken in the assumption that this view is somewhat widespread in our times. Perhaps there has never been so little disagreement concerning the problem and principles of moral philosophy since the days of Christian Wolff as exists at present.

Let me here briefly outline the conception towards which the thought of the age seems to be tending; I call it the teleologicjil view. It is limited and defined by a double antithesis. On the one side, by hedonistic utilitarianism, which teaches that pleasure is the thing of absolute worth, to which virtue and morality are related as means. In opposition to

FROM THE PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xi

this, teleological ethics contends that not the feeling of pleasure, but the objective content of life itself, which is experienced with pleasure, is the thing of worth. Pleasure is the form in which the subject becomes immediately aware of the object and its value, Intuitionalistic formalism is the other antithesis. This regards the observance of a system of a priori rules, of the moral laws, as the thing of absolute worth. In opposition to this, teleological ethics contends that the thing of absolute worth is not the observance of the moral laws, but the substance which is embraced in these formulas, the human historical life which fills the outline with an infinite wealth of manifold concrete forms ; that the moral laws exist for the sake of life, not life for the sake of the moral laws.

This is the form which Aristotle, the founder of ethics as a systematic science, originally gave to it. This conception controlled the entire Greek thought, and modern ethics too adhered to it, until it was overthrown by Kant's great reaction in favor of a formalistic intuitionalism. Teleological ethics, however, at once found an eloquent and warm defender against formal moralism in Schiller, and in a certain sense Speculative Philosophy also returned to the old view. At present this science is again turning into the old channels under the influence of the modern biological conceptions.

Introduction

Paob Nature and Function of Ethics 1

1. Definition (1) — 2. Position in the System of Sciences (1) — 8. Function (4) — 4. Method (6) — 5. Moral Law and Natural Law (13) — 6. Concept of Perfection (17) — 7. In what Sense Universal Validity may be Predicated of Morality (19) — 8. Practical Value of Ethics (25).

CHAPTER I The Conception op Life and Moral Philosophy among the Greeks S3

1. The Greek People's Conception of the Value of Life (35) — 2. Socrates (3 9)— 3. Plato (41) — 4. Aristotle (48)-— 5. Stoics (53) — 6. Epicureans (56) — 7. Common Characteristics of Greek Ethics (58).

CHAPTER n

The Christian Conception of Life 65

1. Christianity is Supernaturalistic (65) — 2. Its Contempt for Learning (67) — 3. for the Natural Virtues (68) — 4. for Courage (69) — 5. for Justice (71) — 6. Its Relation to the State (72) — 7. to Enjoyment and Art (74) — 8. to Wealth (77) — 9. to Honor (78) — 10. Mercy, the Christian Virtue (81) — 11. Christianity aad xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Family-Life (84) — 12. The Eternal Life (87)— 13. The Liberalistic Conception of Christianity (89).

CHAPTER III The Conversion of the Old World to Christianity ... 98

I. The Old World's Opinion of Christianity (98) — 2. Cause of the Change : Decline of Ancient Morality in the Roman Empire (100)

— 3. The Moral Self-consciousness of the Imperial Period : Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Neo-Platonism (106) — 4. Craving for a Religion of Redemption (110) — 5. Superiority of Christianity (112) — 6. Analogous Development in the Hindoo World (113).

The Middle Ages and their Conception of Life . . . .116

1. The Conversion of the Germanic Nations (116) — 2. Mood and Mode of Life (118) — 3. The Clergy (119) — 4. Historical Necessity on Part of the Church to Assimilate the World (121).

CHAPTER V The Modern Conception of Life .... 126

1. Characteristics of the Modern Era (126) — 2. Renaissance (127)

— 3. Reformation (129) — 4. The Love of Knowledge (135) — 5. Francis Bacon and his Dream of the Future (137) — 6. R. Descartes and his Programme of Civilization (140) — 7. The Modern Science of the State: Thomas Hobbes (143) — 8. Leibniz (144) — 9. The Self-satisfaction of the Modern Era (145) — 10. The Nineteenth Century : Pessimism, Nietzscheanism (147) — 11. Relation to Christianity (155).

CHAPTER VI Mediaeval and Modern Moral Philosophy 169

1. Theological Moral Philosophy (169)— 2. Catholic Moral Theology (172) — 3. Modern Moral Philosophy; Thomas Hobbes (179) — 4. Spinoza (181) — 5. Shaftesbury (185) — 6. Hume, Bentham, Mill, Spencer (189) — 7. Leibniz, Wolff (193) — 8. Kant (194)

— 9. Goethe, Schiller (201) — 10. Speculative Philosophy (203)

— 11. Schleiermacher (205) — 12. Herbart (208) — 13. Schopenhauer (209).

TABLE OF CONTENTS XT

Book II Fundamental Concepts And Questions Of Principle

Paob Metaphysical and Psychological Introduction 219

CHAPTER I Good and Bad: Teleological and Formalistic Conceptions . 222

1. Possible Conceptions (222) — 2. The Teleological Conception (224)

— 3. Subjective-formal and Objective-material Judgment (226) — 4. The End Justifies the Means (233) — 5. The Importance of the Particular Act (240) — 6. Provisional Repudiation of Egoism (243) — 7. Summary (248).

The Highest Good : Hedonistic and Energistic Conceptions . 251

1. Critique of Hedonism : Pleasure not the End of Action (251) — 2. A Modified Form of the Hedonistic Theory (258) — 3. Significance of Pleasure from the Biological Standpoint (264) — 4. Pleasure not the Criterion of Judgments of Value (268) — 5. Positive Definition of the Highest Good (270) — 6. Historical Confirmation (273) — 7. Further Remarks (275) — 8. An Objection (283).

CHAPTER III Pessimism 28?

1. Pessimism as a Mood and a Theory (287) — 2. Hedonistic Argument (289) — 3. Moralistic Argument (297) — 4. The Historical- Philosophical Argument in the Hedonistic Sense (308) — 5. in the Moralistic Sense (314) — 6. Summary (318).

1. Theodicy (321)— 2. Physical Evil (322) — 3. Moral Evil (325)

— 4. Consequences (332) — 5. Death (335).

CHAPTER V Duty and Conscience 340

I. Origin of the Feeling of Duty (340) — 2. Relation between Duty and Inclination (346) — 3. Critique of the Kantian View (350)

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— 4. Further Errors of the A-prioristic-intuitionalistic Moral Philosophy (355) — 5. Conscience (363) — 6. Individualization of Conscience (368) — 7. Moral Nihilism (373) — 8. The Popular Usage of Language (377).

CHAPTER VI Egoism and Altruism 379

1. No Absolute Opposition (379) — 2. The Effects of so-called Egoistic and Altruistic Acts (383) — 3. and their Motives Overlap (386)

— 4. Our Judgment of Egoistic and Altruistic Acts (391) — 5. Relation to the Evolutionistic Theory (394).

CHAPTER VII Virtue and Happiness 400

1. Effect of Conduct on Welfare (400) — 2. Effect of Welfare on Character (407).

CHAPTER VIII Relation of Morality to Religion ... 415

1. Hiatorical Connection, its Causes and Effects (415) — 2. Necessary Inner Connection (421) — 3. Relation between Religion and Science (425) —4. Cause of Unbelief (433) — 5. The Belief in Immortality (439) — 6. Objections (446).

Chapter IX

1. Historical Orientation (452) — 2. Presentation of the Facts (457) — 3. Responsibility (460) — 4. The True Meaning of Human Freedom (467).

CHAPTER I Virtues and Vices in General , . 475

The Education of the Will and the Discipline of the Feelings, or Self-Control 483

1. Self-control (483) — 2. Temperance ; Asceticism (485) — 3. Modesty (491) — 4. Courage (495) — 5. Independence, Perseverance, Patience (498) — 6. Equanimity (500) — 7. Wisdom (503).

TABLE OF CONTENTS xrii

CHAPTER VI Honor and the Love of Honor 569

1. Nature of Honor (569) — 2. Its Significance for Moral Development (571) — 3. The Love of Honor as Pride (573) — 4. The Love of Honor as Humility (576) — 5. Self-confidence and Self-knowledge (578)— -6. Modesty (581).

CHAPTER VII Suicide 584

1. The Facts (584) — 2. How we Judge the Facts (586) — 3. The Causes (590).

CHAPTER VIII Compassion and Benevolence 592

1. Compassion (592) — 2. Benevolence (599).

CHAPTER IX Justice 599

1. Nature and Natural Foundation of Justice (599) — 2. Its Significance (602)— 3. Need of a Positive Legal Order (603) — 4. Punishment and the Right of Punishment (606) — 5. Duty to xriu TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Defend the Rights of Others and of Self (613) — 6. Magnanimity and Forgiveness (616) — 7. The Principle of Rights (624) — 8. Incongruity between Law and Morality; Necessary Wrongs (627)

— 9. The Law Falls short of the Demands of Morality (633).

CHAPTER X Love of Neighbor 688

1. Definition and Limitations of the Duty (638) — 2. Almsgiving (641)

— 3. Selfishness (648) — 4. Significance of Love of Neighbor (652) — 5. Gratitude (655) — 6. Love of Home, of Country, of Humanity (656).

CHAPTER XI Veracity 664

1. Negative Aspect: the Lie (664)— 2. Why Condemned (666) — 3. Calumny, Flattery, Hypocrisy, Perjury (669) — 4. Lie of Necessity (672) — 5. Why this Rigorism? (681) — 6. Positive Aspect: Veracity in Relation to the Individual (685) — 7. The Public Communication of the Truth (688) — 8. Why the New Truths are Persecuted (690) — 9. In how far this is Necessary (695) — 10. Is the Destruction of Error under all Circumstances a Duty ? (698).

INTRODUCTION — NATURE AND FUNCTION OF ETHICS

1. Ethics is, according to the Greek signification of the term, a science of customs or morals (Sitten).

There are two forms of a scientific treatment of morals : the historical-anthropological and the practical. The first we find, for example, in Herodotus and in Herbert Spencer's Descriptive Sociology. It investigates and describes the customs of different peoples and times ; we might call it ethography. The second inquires into the worth of human customs and modes of behavior ; its object is to guide us in the proper conduct of life. The Greeks applied the term ethics to investigations of the latter kind. It was Aristotle who gave to this science its name and systematic form. — The following introductory remarks will endeavor to define provisionally the nature of such a science.

2. All scientific discussions may be divided into two classes : theoretical and practical, theories and technologies, sciences proper and arts. The former aim at knowledge, the latter seek to control things by human action, they tell us how to make the world subservient to our purposes.

According to the above definition, ethics belongs to the practical sciences ; its function is to show how human life as such must be fashioned to realize its purpose or end. Consequently, it stands at the head of the practical sciences, embracing them all in a certain measure, for all arts ultimately serve a common purpose : the perfection of human life. This is as true of the art of shipbuilding and commerce as of the art of education and government. Hence, the corresponding arts are subordinated to ethics, the theory of the art of life, or included as its parts.

All practical sciences are based on theories. They are merely the application of theoretical truths to the solution of practical problems. The theoretical science to which ethics bears this relation is the science of man, anthropology and psychology. Presupposing a knowledge of human nature and the conditions of human life, ethics undertakes to answer the question : What forms of social life and what modes of individual conduct are favorable or unfavorable to the perfection of human nature ? A comparison with another practical science will make the relation clear. The function of medicine is to teach men the physician's art ; and the object of this art is to aid the body in reaching its perfect development, to bring about favorable conditions, to ward off dangers, to remove disturbances ; dietetics and therapeutics together perform this function. Physical anthropology forms the theoretical basis of medicine. We may, therefore, say : Ethics bears the same relation to general anthropology as medicine to physical anthropology. Based on the knowledge of corporeal nature, medicine instructs us to solve the problems of corporeal life, to the end that the body may perform all its functions in a healthy manner during its natural existence ; while ethics, basing itself on the knowledge of human nature in general, especially of its spiritual and social side, aims to solve all the problems of life so that it may reach' its fullest, most beautiful, and most perfect development. We might, therefore, call ethics universal dietetics, to which medicine and all the other technologies, like pedagogy, politics, etc., are related as special parts, or as auxiliary sciences. With this view the founder of systematic moral philosophy, Aristotle, wholly agrees.

A remark will not be out of place here. It is easy to see that the arts are not really new, independent sciences. Science deals with the nature of things. The fact that objects may be modified by our action does not constitute a special phage of their nature. Science might, therefore, confine itself to calling attention to this in occasional interspersed remarks ; physics might, for example, in discussing the subject of steam, add the following note : Such and such particular properties of gases enable us to utilize them as motors. The technologies would thus be inserted into the theories as corollaries.

If human beings were essentially theoretical beings, they might, perhaps, be satisfied with such a procedure. But such is not the case ; they are, rather, pre-eminently practical or volitional beings. The practical problems are earlier and more important than the theoretical problems. The sciences, we may say, without going far amiss, have been invented to solve problems ; knowledge is, at least in its first beginnings, a means to practical ends. Thus> anatomy and physiology are means to the art of healing ; geometry, as the name indicates, a means to the surveyor's art. Similarly, philosophy, or the universal theoretical science, owes its origin to the question concerning the meaning and object of life. Yes, we may go still farther and say : The ultimate motive impelling men to meditate upon the nature of the universe will always be the desire to reach some conclusion concerning the meaning, the source, and the goal of their own lives. The origin and end of all philosophy is consequently to be sought in ethics.

The priority of the practical sciences is shown in a remarkable way by the form which scientific instruction has assumed on its highest stage. Our university sciences are absolutely governed by practical ends. The medical sciences do not really form a systematic science ; they are united by a practical aim : the medical faculty is a technical training school for physicians. It draws all such theoretical sciences into the sphere of its instruction as it regards essential and useful to the technical training of its students. In this way, physiology and anatomy, which, in a classification based on purely theoretical principles, would, of course, be grouped under the natural sciences, under the title biology, came into the faculty of medicine. The same is true of jurisprudence and theology. Neither of these is a special, independent science ; the faculties of law and theology are technical training schools, the former for judges and officials, the latter for preachers and spiritual advisers ; and whatever knowledge is required by the members of these professions, they draw upon and make subservient to their goal. A purely theoretical classification of the sciences would place all these subjects either under the head of history or philosophy. The question as to what was or is the law in any particular country belongs to history, as well as the question concerning the essence or the historical development of a particular religion. The question, however, concerning the nature of law in general and its significance for human conduct belongs to practical philosophy ; the question concerning the nature of God and the constitution of the universe, to metaphysics. — We have here an illustration of the truth that knowledge exists for the sake of life, not life for the sake of knowledge.

3. Let me add a few further statements concerning the function and method of ethics.

It has a double function to perform : to determine the end of life, or the highest good, and to point out the way, or the means, of realizing it.

It is the business of the doctrine of goods {Guterlehre) to establish the goal, or the highest good. It will, to forestall the contents of a subsequent chapter, regard as the highest good, stating it in a general formula, a 'perfect life, that is, a life leading to the complete development of the bodily and mental powers and to their full exercise in all the spheres of human existence, in close communion with other closely related persons, and fully participating in the historical and spiritual life of society at large. The term welfare ( Wohlfahrt) may also be employed to designate this goal, — which would suggest the subjective element involved in it, or the fact that such a life yields satisfaction ( Wohlgefuhl). Here, however, we must guard against the misconception that this feeling of satisfaction or pleasure is what gives life its real worth. The feeling is not the good, bat the form in which the good is known and enjoyed by the subject.

The other function of ethics is to show by what inner qualities and modes of conduct the highest good, or the perfect life, is attained and realized. This problem is solved in the doctrine of virtues and the doctrine of duties (Tugend- und Pflichtenlehre). The doctrine of duties describes in general formulae how we must conduct ourselves in order successfully to solve the problems of life, that is, attain to perfection. The doctrine of virtues sets forth how we must fashion the character, or the will, in order to realize that goal : it makes clear to us that prudence, courage, justice, veracity, are qualities which enable us correctly to solve the problems of life, while their opposites, thoughtlessness, cowardice, and pleasure-seeking, inconsiderate selfishness and base mendacity, hinder the realization of the perfect life.

Here, however, we must at once call attention to an important fact. The means employed to realize the perfect life are not merely external, technical means, having no independent value, but they are at the same time parts of its content. Just as the means of dietetics, work and exercise, rest and sleep, as functions of life, at the same time form constituents of bodily life, so the virtues and their exercise form the contents of the perfect life. Or, to use a different illustration : Each part in a good poem is a means of expressing and unfolding the whole, otherwise it would be a superfluous episode ; and, conversely, every means also necessarily forms a part of the poem itself and as such possesses its own poetic value. So, too, everything in moral life is both a means and a part of the end, something that exists for its own sake and for the sake of the whole. The virtues have absolute worth as phases of the perfect man, but they are at the same time valuable as means, in so far as the perfect life is realized through them. In both cases, however, a difference may be noted. Not all the parts of a work of art have the same value when compared with the purpose underlying it, nor are the different virtues equally important as means of realizing the perfect life. Similarly, the different duties may be graded according to their importance.

4. Let us now inquire into the method of ethics. What is the source of its knowledge ? How does it prove the truth of its propositions ?

It is customary to distinguish between empirical and rational knowledge. The latter, of which mathematics is the prototype, deduces propositions from definitions and axioms, and demonstrates them logically ; that is, it shows that they follow as necessary consequences from the principles. Empirical sciences, on the other hand, like physics and chemistry, observe facts and reduce them to general formulae, which aim to express the uniformity in the behavior of things ; such formulas we call causal laws. The proof of the truth of these propositions does not consist in showing their logical connection with certain presupposed definitions, but in pointing out that they adequately express an observed causal connection.

It seems to me to be an indisputable fact that ethics resembles the natural sciences, rather than mathematics, in its method. It does not deduce and demonstrate propositions from concepts, but discovers the relations which exist between facts, and which may be established by experience. Such and such a mode of conduct has such and such an effect ; that is the general form of its argument. Or, to state it in the converted form in which the causal connections are expressed in all practical or technical sciences : In order to produce or prevent such and such results, such and such means are necessary. Quod in contemplatione instar causae^ id in operatione instar regulae, says Bacon ; the causal law becomes a practical rule. But the correctness of the rule is proved by the causal connection ; and causal connections are ascertained by experience alone. Experience proves that cleanliness, exercise, fresh air, are means of preserving health. So, too, experience proves that prudent and rational conduct, a regular vocation, a well-ordered family life, are conducive to life ; and that indolence, shiftlessness, dishonesty, and malice have the tendency to make life miserable and to destroy it.

The rationalistic view denies to ethics its empirical character. It claims that propositions of morals are neither capable nor in need of empirical proof. It regards them as the expressions of an innate faculty, conscience, or practical reason, which judges and legislates a priori. It asserts that everybody knows what is right or wrong without any experience. Experience decides what is advantageous or disadvantageous in its effects, but everybody knows before all experience what is good or bad, and no experience of what human beings really do or what may be the actual effects of their action can place in doubt or correct this immediate knowledge of what they ought to do.

Our answer is : It is indeed true that mankind did not await the coming of moral philosophy in order to distinguish between good and bad. Morality is older than moral philosophy, and there could be no moral philosophy without morality as its presupposition. It arises as the reflection on an existing positive morality, which governs life and judgment, and which is not destroyed or made superfluous by its appearance. It is also true that something like an inner voice speaks to the individual : You ought to do this, you must not do that ! and that too without any reasons, in the form of an unconditional imperative. This inner voice we call conscience. We shall recur to the anthropological explanation and teleological interpretation of these things later on. Here, however, I should like to show that it does not follow from this that moral philosophy must be an a-prioristic or rational science. Let the science of dietetics again serve as an illustration to explain our meaning.

What was said of the moral conduct of life may also be applied to bodily life. Just as men did not await the coming of moral philosophy before distinguishing between good and bad, they did not wait for the appearance of the science of dietetics in order to distinguish between the wholesome and the unwholesome. Long before medicine or any science existed, hungry men ate, the thirsty quenched their thirst, and the shivering covered themselves with skins. The question : Why do they do this, why is bread good for the hungry, and water for the thirsty ? would have seemed as strange to them as the question : Why is stealing wrong ? seems to our schoolboys. It is self-evident ; no other reason can be given for it. Here, as everywhere else, scientific investigation begins by regarding everything that has previously been accepted as self-evident, as a problem. After men had lived for untold ages according to the absolute imperatives of a naturalistic dietetics and an equally naturalistic therapeutics, which continue even to this day in the prescriptions or absolute imperatives of popular dietetics and medicine, what we call scientific medicine arose. Slowly and gradually, by means of observation and experiment, we have come to understand the organization of the body and its relation to the external conditions of life, and have thus been gradually enabled to prove the appropriateness of methods and cures which have long been practised, and to eliminate useless or harmful ones, and to employ new ones in their stead.

Moral philosophy occupies a similar position. It, too, is confronted with a naturalistic, unscientific, traditional morality. Just as bodily life was originally governed by instincts and blind habits, without physiology, so the entire human life, especially social life, was originally governed without science, by a kind of moral instincts, These moral instincts of peoples are called customs (Sitten). I employ this term to designate all those obligatory habits and forms of life, all those customs and laws, which uniformly govern the life of every member of a community. Like the dietetic rules, these customs appear in the consciousness of the individual in the form of absolute commands, which assign no reason for their validity. Thou shalt not kill, rob, or defraud a member of thy tribe,- — so conscience speaks, without grounds and conditions ; to do so is bad : that is a self-evident truth, just like the truth that fire burns, and bread satisfies hunger.