The philosophy of Universalism ...

Preface

Philosophy treats of the causes and reasons of things, and it may be simple or profound. This little work is not intended for the learned student of philosophy, but for the people; and its object is to set forth some of the grounds and reasons for Universalism in a manner that shall meet the wants of the popular mind. The growing liberality of the age furnishes no evidence that the battle of Universalism has been fought, so that there is no longer need of effort in this direction. On the contrary, the masses of our people have not yet learned what Universalism is, much less do they understand the evidences in its favor. To give some light in this direction, and place it in a form so condensed and cheap that it should be accessible to all, has been the object in preparing and publishing these pages. The author is encouraged by the generous reception accorded to his former writings, to hope that this little work may obtain a wide circulation, and that it may do something toward spreading abroad that system of Divine truth to whose interests his life has thus far been devoted.

Chapter I. The Uni Vers A Lis M Of Reason

The distinguishing feature of Universalism, that indeed which gives the system its name, is the doctrine of the final salvation of the whole human family. This single doctrine, however, does not constitute the system of faith winch is known under the name of Universalism. It is the result of a system, which embraces all the means, methods and agencies by which that glorious end is achieved. Of course, it embraces much that is common to all versions of Christianity, and of which we do not intend to treat in this little work. We choose rather to confine ourselves mainly to that which is peculiar to Universalism, and explain briefly the reasons for it, not as against atheism or infidelity, but only as opposed to that form of Christianity which believes in God, Christ and immortality, and yet proclaims the endless reign of evil, and announces a destiny for different portions of our race diverse as a heaven of eternal joy, and a hell of endless torments. Whether Universalism, in this aspect of it, is true or false, is a mere question of destiny. Its assertion is, that good shall triumph over evil, and the final result of the Divine Government shall be, that all souls shall arrive at a state of holiness and consequent happiness. This is the destiny which God has prepared for all His earthly children. It does not say when this shall be consummated, nor does it pretend to decide what periods of discipline and suffering must elapse before this destiny is accomplished and

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realized. It only affirms that this shall be the final result. The question at issue is one that bears upon the highest interests of every human being, for it asks each individual man, What is your destiny, and what the destiny of the race to which you belong? If Universalism is true, the question is answered to the satisfaction and joy of the universe. If it is not true, no man can answer it satisfactorily, either for himself or others. Trusting that the vast importance of the question will commend it to the serious and candid attention of the reader, we proceed to its discussion as follows :

Universalism has in its favor the clearest decisions of sound reason.

Much has been said upon the subject of the office and province of reason in matters of religion, and there are two extremes into which the matter has been pushed. The first is that which calls upon men blindly and passively to submit their reason to authority; denies the right of private judgment, and claims that men have no business to follow reason in the things of religion, and insists that it is their duty to believe, without doubt, whatever the Church, as the oracle of truth, is pleased to teach by authority. The second is that which denounces all authority, makes skepticism the normal condition of the soul, and faith to be indulged only so far as it is forced upon us by the decisions of our own reason, and culminates in the establishment of an intuitional hierarchy, not less infallible than the Pope, thus proving that extremes do meet. The truth is probably somewhere between these extremes. There is, in religion, a sphere and a function for authority; and there is also a sphere and a w r ork for reason ; and there is not, necessarily, antagonism betw r een the two. Both are legitimate, and both necessary.

THE UNIVERSALIS! OF REASON.

Human reason is not omniscient, not infallible. Its survey is limited, and even in the field of its observation it is liable to be deceived by appearances, and to err in judgment ; and there are thousands of cases, not only in religion, but in the ordinary affairs of life, in which, by the very necessities of our being, we are compelled to walk by faith, because we can not walk by sight. Take the following illustration : A man goes a voyage at sea. He does not understand the working of a ship, and is not acquainted with the art and science of navigation. The necessities of the case require that he should trust the skill of the navigator, and believe what he himself does not know on his authority. He is not to set up his reason as opposed to science, and insist that the ship is in longitude 60° west, and latitude 40° north, when the master says it is in 65° by 35°. That would be crucifying faith, and deifying one's own reason without cause. He is bound, as a reasonable man, in this case, to confess his ignorance, and rely upon the authority of his commander and navigator. But this faith in authority is not to be blind and unreserved, nor is it to extend to all things. There are some things that the passenger knows as well as any man. He knows the polar star, and has gazed on it from childhood, as it has gleamed out from the nightsky. He knows it is in the north, and if in a clear night he should see that star shining out full and clear over the larboard beam, he would know that the course of the vessel was east. The captain and all his subordinates might insist never so positively that they were sailing due west, and he would not believe a word of it. Why? Simply because he has eyes as well as they, and he knows that the steadfast star, which has shone from the north through the ages, has not changed its position,

THE UNIVERSAL ISM OF REASON.

and gone over to the south, so as to be seen at the left when he faces the west. The captain may say to him, " Sir, what do you know of navigation ? You are a landsman, and I have circumnavigated the globe, and it is your duty to rely upon my authority, and believe what I tell you." Indeed, that he should most gladly do in some things, but not in all. And he might well reply : " When I see you take your observation and make your reckoning, and find the latitude and longitude to be thus and so, though I know not the process, yet I believe on your authority, even if I have no means of proving its correctness. Bat now the case is different; the subject is not one of which I am ignorant. I know the premises as well as you. The heavens are all clear, and there is no mistake. Full on the left beams that polar star, and I know our course is east, and if all the navigators in the world were to tell me w® were standing w^est, I would not believe a word of it."

Here we come to the precise distinction that should be noted between that which is above reason, and that which is contrary to reason. In the case of the latitude and longitude, the passenger was ignorant. He could not determine it. The problem was above him, and its solution inaccessible to his reason. It was necessary for him, in this case, to bow to authority, and believe on the authority of the navigator. But in the case of the course of the ship, he had all the means of judging. The question was fully within the province of his reason. The north star being over the left, the course of the ship was unmistakably east, and the assertion that they were sailing due west was not above reason, but positively contrary to it, and therefore not to be believed.

Take an illustration from the domain of theology:

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The creed says : u The Father is God ; the Son is God ; and the Holy Ghost is God. Each of these is a separate and distinct person, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God." It is granted that this is an incomprehensible mystery ; and it is claimed for it that being above reason, it must be received on authority; and we are not at liberty to submit it to the test of reason. We grant that if this doctrine be merely above reason, it may not be submitted to the testa of reason, except in so far as the validity of the authority on which it is announced is concerned. That is always an open question. But in point of fact the doctrine is not so much above reason as it is opposed to it. The statement that three are one, and one three, is simple enough in its terms. If we say, " the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God," and then ask the child in the Sunday school, how many Gods there are, he will say three, of course. And if we say, " Xo, my son, there is only one God," we do but contradict what we have just told him. It is not a mystery that we propound ; it is an absurdity. It is not something above reason, but a plain and palpable contradiction that we propose.

The sum of the whole matter, thus far, is, that reason is reliable in her legitimate sphere. Give her just premises, place her feet on the rock of eternal truth, and she will not lead us astray. What is above the grasp of reason may be received by faith, and believed on competent authority. What is contradictory of reason, is to be received never. When, therefore, Paul went to Corinth and reasoned in the synagogue every Sabbath, he appealed to a legitimate tribunal, and was able, no doubt, to show that Christianity was a reasonable religion.

THE UNIVERSALIS*! OF REASON.

It has already been stated that the question involved is simply a question of destiny, and that we did not intend to argue it as opposed to those who deny God and immortality, but only as against those who deny a happy and glorious destiny for all our race. There are certain fundamental truths held alike by all who claim the Christian name, and if we would learn what are the decisions of reason as to the matter of destiny, we must plant our feet on these solid landmarks, and thence take our departure, noting our courses and distances, that we may be always sure of our position.

" There is one God, who is the Creator, the Governor and the Preserver of the universe." This is the starting point in religion. Without this there is no religion. How far reason could go toward the discovery of this truth may be doubtful. We have long admired the masterly power with which the old Brahmins grappled this subject. They saw in the universe what every man who looks about him must see, a productive power at work, by which new forms of beings are constantly emerging from inactivity to life. This power they deified, and called Brahma, the creator. They saw, also, a tenacity of life, a tendency to hold on and preserve the life and the form received. This they deified, and called Vishnu, the preserver. They saw, also, a constant tendency to decay and to change, by which forms were not only destroyed, but were changed, and succeeded by others ; new life thus emerging from the ashes of the old ; and this power also they deified and called Siva, the destroyer, or transformer. Hence the Trimourti, or Trinity, of the Brahmins. Three gods, Brahma, Vishnu and Siva, but they did not violate reason by the assertion that these three were one; rather they said plainly these were three Gods. We can not

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say positively that it is possible for the unaided reason of man to push the process of thought further, and announce the creating, the preserving and transforming power, as the attributes of one and the same God ; for we know not that it has ever been done. But we do say, that when once revelation announces this truth, though it may soar above reason, it does not contradict it Rather does reason recognize and acquiesce in the judgment thus pronounced. Be this as it may, the existence of one God, the creator, preserver and upholder of the universe, is the fundamental truth of our holy religion, held sacred by all sects and all parties.

As to the attributes of God, there is a like unity of opinion. All agree that God is a being of infinite power, wisdom and goodness. No error can enter into His arrangements, no lack of goodness can mar His purposes, no failure can defeat Him. Take these simple ideas of God, about which there neither is nor can be any dispute among Christians, and see what they teach in reason, in regard to the subject of destiny.

The mere idea that God is one, is significant of destiny. Those who believe in many gods may be excused if they apportion our race among them, and assign to each god his share, and give to different portions of the race a destiny according to the character of the particular god to whom they are presumed to belong. But the believer in one God, who is the creator of all ; a God in whose image all were made, and who sustains the same vital and essential relations to all, ought to be able to perceive that the simplest dictate of reason is, " One God, one destiny," and that he violates reason when he announces destinies wide asunder as heaven and hell, as proceeding from one and the same God. He makes effects the most opposite proceed from the

THE UNIVERSALIS*! OF REASON.

same cause. He professes to find sweet waters and bitter flowing from the same fountain. He claims that grapes grow on thorns, and figs on thistles. He insists that out from the one fountain flows the streams of eternal life and death. The old Magi an s believed that the formula of the universe was one of perpetual conflict between light and darkness, good and evil ; but they had too much philosophy, and understood the principles of reason too well to trace these opposites to one and the same fountain. Accordingly, they said there were two gods, one good and one evil; and on this they founded their idea of a long and dreary, though not an absolutely eternal destiny of evil for some. Had they known that there was one only God, and He was good, every man of them would have pronounced the logical consequence — " One God, one destiny " — beyond all doubt. The truth is, the oracles of reason are unmistakable upon this point, and the utterance, "One God, one destiny," is so clear that all who proclaim diversity of destiny are compelled to multiply their gods. Modern orthodoxy, so called, is only a nominal exception to this rule. ISTo man would venture his reputation in pointing to heaven, with its songs of joy, on the one hand, and to hell, with its groans and curses, on the other, and affirming that both these were the outbirth of the same fountain ; that the same God reigned in the one as the other. Hence, to hide the deformity of the idea, Satan is in a manner deified, and to him is assigned the dominion of hell. The logical consistency is attempted to be preserved by placing the formula thus : a One God and one destiny for all His children; one devil and one destiny for all his children ; " for reason is shocked at the thought of making the children even of one and the sume devil diverse in destiny. How

THE UNIVERSALIS}! OF REASON.

IB much more ought it to be shocked at the thought of making the creatures of one God diverse in destiny! The idea of one destiny is necessarily involved in the idea of one God ; the two must stand or fall together. The nature of the destiny will be in accordance with the character of the God. If the God be evil, it is folly to expect a good destiny ; and if the God be good, it is nonsense to proclaim an evil destiny as coming from him. Take the acknowledged attributes of God, and let the voice of reason decide that question of destiny.

1. An infinitely good being must be presumed to propose the highest possible good of his creatures, as the ultimate of their destiny. There is no conceivable motive why such a being should create at all, except only that he might do good. The whole is greater than a part, and therefore the good of the whole is preferable to the good of the part. The good sought must be the highest good, or it can. not meet the demands of infinite goodness. If there is in destiny any possible, conceivable good higher or better for man than that which God

I has proposed, then He has preferred a lesser to a greater good, and His goodness is not infinite. If, therefore, God is infinite in Goodness, it is evident that He seeks the highest possible good of all His creatures, and that end He will reach if He can.

2. It is plain enough that a God of infinite wisdom could, if He were so disposed, devise a plan which, if carried into effect, would secure the highest good of all His creatures. Any error, any mistake involving a failure of the plan in any degree, would argue that the

\ wisdom which devised it was not infinite.

3. The third step in this reasoning is thus taken : Infinite power could execute the plan thus suggested by goodness and devised by wisdom; and the conclusion

THE UNIVERSALIS*! OF REASON.

is, that so certain as God is infinite in goodness, wisdom and power, so certain it is that this plan has been devised and will be executed, and thus the highest possible good is placed beyond all doubt as the destiny of the race. If it be not so, there can be but one of two reasons. It will be because God could not or would not do it. If we say He would not, we deny His infinite goodness ; if we say He could not, we deny His wisdom or power, or both. Choose your horn ! We do not pretend to any originality in this argument, except it may be in the mere mode of presentation. For more than thirty years we have been in the conflict between Universalism and its opposition. Times without number we have seen this argument employed, but unto this day we have not seen or heard a respectable attempt to refute it or show its fallacy.

We have thus stated the problem of destiny and its solution, as it stands connected with the character and the acknowledged attributes of God, and without reference to the means and agencies by which it is to be accomplished. In this last regard there are certain general principles on which Christians are well agreed, and these afford a basis on which reason can firmly stand and give her decisions with authority.

It is agreed that God has set up a moral and spiritual kingdom in the world, and that Jesus is the messenger whom God has sent on an errand of salvation to our race. The old prophets speak of Him as the " Shiloh to whom the gathering of the people shall be;" the ruler "whose dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth ; " and "of the increase of whose government and peace there shall be no end." He is the conqueror who " shall swallow up death in victory/' and by whom God shall wipe away

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IS tears from all faces.' 7 He announces Himself as the Christ, the Savior of the world ; " and of Him it is said, 11 He must reign until He hath put all enemies under His feet, and the last enemy, death, shall be destroyed, and God shall be all in all/'

Here, then, is a magnificent enterprise which towers above all others; and accepting this as the statement of truth, as it is in Christ, the question between Universalism and others becomes a mere question of the success, or the measure of success, that shall attend the efforts of the Savior for the salvation of the world ; and on this point it is that reason may be heard. It would seem that the mere statement of the question in this light is enough to carry with it the foregone conclusion to be assumed beyond all doubt or cavil, that the august and mighty power who has commenced this work, and ordained it in the hands of a faithful mediator, will carry it on to its completion, nor faint nor grow weary until the consummation shall coma. Success in the case is the first of all probabilities; failure the last of all possibilities. Yet, strange as it may appear, the world has ever been faithless and unbelieving, and the wise men in the church have claimed the right of assuming disaster and defeat, and a miserable failure as the probable result ; thus throwing the burden of proof upon those that assert success. But we venture to ask, by what rule do men thus claim to assume the foregone conclusion that the efforts of God in Christ for the salvation of the world shall prove a practical failure, except in the case of a remnant ? We insist that the presumption of reason is precisely in the opposite direction ; so that without argument in the premises, triumph and complete success is the first and highest probability, and the idea of failure is only to be admitted when

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demonstrated beyond all doubt. If a wise master-builder with all requisite skill and an abundance of means, undertakes to erect a splendid temple, we have no business to assume beforehand that the end will be defeat and failure. On the contrary, the skill of the man and the means that are in his hands, authorize us to anticipate success, and that beyond doubt. And so of the case in hand. Were a messenger to come to the readers of this work, and for the first time state the case to them, there would be no difference of opinion among them. Let him put the case thus : " We are in a world of ignorance, error, sin and death, where the tears often flow, and sorrows are many and severe. But I have good tidings for you. The great God does not intend this as our final state, but has set in order the means of our redemption. He has determined that He will remove the evil that is spread over all nations, and the face of the covering that is cast over all people, and reconcile the world unto Himself. He hath laid help upon one that is mighty, and commissioned Jesus as the agent of this work; and that He may carry it on to completion, hath endued Him with with 'all power in heaven and earth.' He has entered on this work. He has conconquered death and risen from the tomb, leading captivity captive, and henceforth lives forever in the presence of God. And now what think you of the result?" Success! — complete and triumphant success — would be the response of every one, and there would be no dissenting voice. The response would rise up spontaneously from the intuitions of reason, and struggle for utterance without the intervention of an argument or a syllogism. Even now, in spite of all creeds, beneath the crust of prejudice, and below the impenetrable mail of bigotry, down in the center of their souls, that response

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presses upon them and pleads for utterance ; and if they were to open their mouths to utter the thought that is uppermost in their minds, every one of them would say, "Success! success! to the Captain of our salvation, and to the work of God, is the only dictate of reason, and shame on the man that prophesies failure or defeat." If they consult polic}^, or creeds, or prejudices, instead of the teachings of reason, they may see difficulties and raise doubts. Some may be afraid that the doctrine is too good to be true ; others may imagine that man's agency, and sin, and unbelief, and death are insuperable difficulties in the way of the accomplishment of this great work. But if they consult reason, they will perceive that there can be no difficulties that God did not see, or that Christ did not understand from the beginning ; and in spite of them, all, the verdict of reason is success.

Chapter II

THE UNIVERSALIS*! OF NATURE.

It is not pretended that the doctrine of universal salvation, in the form in which it is now held, could have been originally evolved from the teachings of nature. But our position is, that once being annnounced, nature confirms it, and to the man thus furnished w r ith the key of knowledge, her utterances are clear and distinct, in favor of a common and glorious destiny for all our race.

There is an opinion extensively prevalent that wherever man has been left to the guidance of nature alone, he has arrived at the conclusion that the destiny of some will be happy, and that of others miserable. Such is not the fact. There is no doubt that the doctrine of endless misery, as the opposite of universal salvation, is of heathen origin, and was and is believed by those who know nothing of divine revelation. But the proof is overwhelming that instead of being evolved from nature by the sages of old, who taught the world in all the wisdom of man, it was invented by interested priests and rulers to hold the people in awe, and secure their own power over the ignorant masses of men.

The oldest philosophy known on earth is that of the Brahmins, of India, and it may be truly said that the authors of it were not children, but men of gigantic powers ; men from whom Pla to himself probably learned not a few of the deepest and most profound lessons of his philosophy. And these men, guided by the light 18

THE UNIVERSALIS*! OF NATURE.

of nature alone, did arrive at the idea of a common destiny for all that live. They taught, indeed, that the souls of men after death would go through a long and dismal round of transmigration, extending perhaps through millions of years ; but in some far distant astronomical epoch all souls should arrive at Brahm, and rest in the bosom of the Infinite, whence they came.

The next oldest system, probably, is that of the Magians, of Persia, though the Chinese claim priority for that of Confucius. No children were these Persian Magi, nor was Zoroaster, the chief among them, a whit behind the mightiest intellects of earth. And these men, guided by the light of nature, did teach that although the conflict between the light and darkness, the good and evil, should be long and dreary, yet, in the end, the light should prevail, and inferior gods and men should alike be subdued, and dwell forever with Ormuzd in peace. It is not true, therefore, that those who have followed the light of nature alone, have arrived at the conclusion of a destiny the opposite of that announced by Universalism. But it is true that those mighty minds who taught away back in the ages, and whose teachings this day hold sway over more than one-half of our entire race, did dimly seethe glory that was to come, and did announce in the end a common destiny for man, and that destiny not of woe but of peace and rest. But this is not the precise question in hand. We need not ask what lessons were learned from nature, and in the ages of the past, by men who knew nothing of revelation. We live in the light of the nineteenth century, with the results of the researches of ages in our hands, and the light of divine revelation all around us, and the question with which we have to do is, what does nature teach us, as interpreted by the

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