Disquisition on faith ...

Front matter

ON

FAITH.

By Paul Brown.

Introduction

AMONG all the facts and contingences that are incidental to the human intelligence, there is no one circumstance that has excited so much concern, given rise to such a variety of questions, occasioned so many disputes, and been the cause of such memorable commotions in the several communities of the world in every age of the history of mankind, as that particular one which marks the acceptance or rejection of a proposition stated to the understanding of man, affirming or denying something ; wherein men are said to believe or disbelieve, allow or disallow, acquiesce in or discard, what, though the certainty of it is confest to be unknown, they yet entertain in some set way in their speculations, upon which it has such or such a degree of efficiency and weight of influence, according to the estimate they, upon several occasions, are moved to give it.

There is a peculiarity in this thing, that, either from an uncommon subtilty or evanescence, or else from its exquisite lines of resemblance it being fitted to dazzle and mislead by presenting uncertain and confused discriminations, it so falls out that men are very unsettled and discordant respecting its nature, of which they are liable to conceive wrongly and variously, and are indeed so much deluded about it, that there are thousands of different inferences from it when, on various occasions, a notion of such sort has been assumed as a maxim ; and there are tons of literary matter now abroad, whose whole worth, signiiicancy, and even intelligibleness, rests merely upon some hasty, fantastical, false, and untenable notion of the nature of that thing which is called belief.

It is, therefore, wwth while to search out the true powers of the set of words we employ to signify this sort of notions, what is or can be, meant by them, and endeavour to find the precise bounds of what we are capable of determinately comprehending, of this kind ; and of rej:>resenting so discriminately that different persons can coincide in the conception. This is the principal scope of the present undertaking. This inquiry is rather philological than physical. It is not an investigation of the nature of substances ; the scope is not to develope any new property of substantial existence, not hitherto recognized, nor to prove such existence : but is concerned altogether with the propriety of the application of signs and of the forming of complex notions or ideas to be denoted by certain general words which, though very generally used, are not of wry clear, conspicuous, and decided import, as seen in different discourses and heard from the mouths of the commonalty. For there is no question whether there is such a condition of the human mind as that which it is in at the moment when, a proposition being stated to it, it perceives more or less fully and determinately the ideas which the words contained in that proposition stand for, and embraces or rejects it : but in regard to that arbitrary action of the mind of man by w T hich is determined the extent of certain select combinations of particular or elementary ideas, that are to be denoted by certain general terms, there may be a question how many particulars, and of what sort, are included in that which was originally, and is now most generally limited, to he denoted by the word assent, or the word faith. There may arise, also, several particular questions about these things.

People of a certain class define faith in a way that may be deemed anomalous, though extensively received without examination. They include in their definition the idea of voluntary exertion ; and go to persuade people they have at their option to believe or disbelieve. If when men first took into their heads to form or make out a complex notion and attach it to some certain word by which they consented in the design to have it uniformly denoted, such as a word answering or equivalent to our English word faith, belief, or assent, (which is a thing that would be found signally useful in the purposes of their intercourse, where there were frequent occasion to bring up such or such notices, in the process of their dealings or investigations,) they included in it the idea of voluntary exertion, and determined some degree of this sort of movement, such, at least, as incipient volition, should make an essential part of that notion — as if they should have said, the perception of the terms of a proposition, and a desire that it be received as true, and that the avoucher of the doctrine prosper and succeed well in the design of propagating it, shall constitute what shall be meant and purported by this word — and he, therefore, that has a proposition or contexture of propositions presented clearly to his understanding, and he sincerely wishes that it were true, and wishes well to the party who delivers it, has then what is called faith — he believes that proposition or contexture of propositions — he is a believer to all intents and purposes of the significancy of this word; then, allowing no thorough change of the language having come about, the word retained its office in general customary use — it would be very proper to use the word in that sense now. This would be the propriety of its signification.

But whether any one who is not a partizan, or accessary to the views of a party, uses it in such a sense, and whether there are not multitudes of seriously studious persons who' apply it to a quite different use, and wholly exclude from their idea of its meaning all notice of voluntary action, considering it a circumstance utterly removed from volition, are questions that with great confidence may be brought up, upon the occasion of diversifying this significancy ; the way of settling w T hich, will give rise to one or two others ; such as, for instance, what is the meaning of an insincere profession of faith, in the case when a person declares, with all the marks of sincerity, that such or such a statement (having been made to him) may prove true, wishes well to the person who avouches it, desires others will receive it ; and at the same time, with no less indication of sincerity, declares he hisself cannot believe it, has doubts of it, and has not faith ? What can be the meaning of insincere, when, in such a case as this, a man is accused of insincerity of profession in regard to belief — of not believing what he does believe, or believing to be not true what in his heart he actually believes to be true ?

Besides investigating the nature of faith, we shall have occasion to reflect on the influence several ways of handling this idea have had on the affairs of human society : for if one man has esteemed faith a voluntary act and a duty, another a necessary act, and another no act at all ; and if of those who have taken it to be voluntary, one has entertained a direct contrary belief to that of another, there has been fighting between people on account of this very thing ; and different persons have fought and several have been killed, on account of some secret belief one has suspected to be in another.

It is of important use, then, to determine the proper estimate of this thing ; and consider what connexions give it its weight and moment. For, whereas the belief of some propositions has great consequence in our thoughts and lives ; others yet are trivial, and whether we believe them or not, is indifferent. It will make a part of the business of the following discourse to canvass several questions concerning the influence and uses of faith, and the effects of different ways of defining it, as well as those which concern its nature.

Some other considerations about faith, may be worthy of our attention, in their due places — such as the phenomena of its effects in its connection with particular sorts of objects, or in certain instances of it.

Let the reader bear in mind, if we can ascertain and determine what shall be meant by the word faith, we can readily discover how far we are capable of that thing which we call by that name; and also learn what are its proper objects.

CHAPTER II. Of Faith in general

t ? HEN the understanding of man is presented with a proposition setting forth the existence of things whereof it has no experience, it immediately exercises an act or emotion with respect to that proposition, wherein it acquiesces in that proposition or does not acquiesce in it. This acquiescence or not acquiescence, is only a particular entertainment the mind gives that proposition at once. But the act of the understanding, (if such it is to be called,) wherein its acquiescence or not acquiescence is implied, is called assent or dissent. Although the effect exhibited by the understanding's notice of a proposition is represented by a word that is expressive of a free volunta- 1* ry action ; yet it is no more than an act of necessity. The act of acquiescence in a proposition, called assenting to it,- or of its rejection of it, is a necessary act. The mind is passive in respect to the effect a proposition thus proposed to its view, produces in it : and although we say the understanding performs an act in regard to such proposition, yet, more strictly perhaps to speak, it only receives an imjiression from it, and a certain change in its train of thought ; which, in the way, produces some emotions either slight or energetic, pleasant or unpleasant. If the proposition excites assent, the operation it brings about has greater energy in it than when it does not produce assent : for in this latter case, the mind barely does not view it as a veritable one, and perceives that it does not agree w r ith what it has experienced and known : wherefore it is not likely to produce much emotion of any kind. Whereas, if acquiescence follows the presentment, it receives an accession to its opinions, which may influence, more or less, the voluntary thoughts and motions of the persons to whom such proposition is exhibited. The emotion itself is governed by the nature of the proposition. If it be a pleasing report, and is believed, it produces joy and complacency. If an unpleasant one, and is believed, it produces the contrary emotions. A proposition is a contexture of signs, determinately representing several ideas experienced by the relater and the hearer, and affirming or denying certain things to exist or to have existed : and a proposition being presented to the understanding, implies that the understanding to wdiich it is presented, has previous knowledge of the import of those signs. For if the proposition consist of any thing more than mere sounds, it cannot be said to be presented to the understanding, unless the understanding perceives it : that is, perceives some determinate ideas, by virtue of something designed to represent them. This I speak after the manner of the world, on the principle that propositions are conveyed by articulate sounds.

Thus, in this particular condition, that of a proposition coming within the notice of the understanding,— with respect to any exertion or operation in reference to that proposition, we are all necessary agents. When a proposition is presented to the understanding, it acquiesces in it or does not acquiesce in it. At the instant a proposition is perceived and apprehended by it, it must of necessity either assent to or dissent from it. When I am told that a vessel has at a certain time sunk, sixty miles at sea, I can no more avoid either believing or disbelieving it than, when my eyes are open, I can avoid seeing the rays of the lamp that is actually before me. Admit I believe it : yet, after further inquiry concerning the thing, I may have attained such discoveries of the grounds that this proposition rests upon, as make so complete a revolution in my views, that I can no more avoid disbelieving it. Or, on the contrary, my discoveries may be such as to confirm and make my belief stronger, and approach nearer to perfect assurance. Signs are of two sorts :

First— Sufch as we use to denote ideas that we have in our minds, to other intelligent creatures who can have no actual aspection of them : such as

1. Articulate sounds, called words ;

2. Characters and marks impressed on sensible surfaces, which are mostly called words, being the immediate signs of words : though what are called hieroglyphics have formerly been much in use for this purpose, and some nations make use of them at this day. In these the colour is sometimes made to signify something. These are emblematical representatives of the things to which we refer, and each has the power of signifying an intire idea ; whereas it often requires several words ;

3. Those artful turns and changes in movement, we employ to signify ideas, without any sounds or characters, commonly called gesture or action, in oratory ; but they are used where sounds could do no execution at all, as in conversing w T ith deaf people. All these are called signs of ideas. But those which are far most common and extensively used, are words, either spoken, or represented to the eye.

Secondly — Ideas are called signs : i. e. signs of things really existing, separate from, and independent on the mind. So a proposition may be either verbal or mental. It may be delivered to me by another, through the instrumentality of words, either orally or by written or impressed tokens of them on paper, so that I shall receive the first notices of it from my ear or eye ; or it may be suggested to me by any of my trains of thought, either those of imagination, memory, or volition ; in this latter case, it is a purely mental proposition. And when one distinctly perceives any number of determinate ideas representing the existence of things without — sufficient to predicate one thing of another, and that seem fit to be joined or disjoined, and that therefore are joined or disjoined, then is a proposition presented to his understanding. The result is a necessary effect, which, by whatever name it is commonly called, is the designed object of our meditation at this time.

It will scarce be denied, that some consequence does follow, and some impression is made on the mind, which is some change either temporary or lasting, small or great, that takes place in the operations that are going on there : and, for a general name, it may aptly enough be called acquiescence or not acquiescense ; assent or dissent. By other words, this effect produced in the understanding of mankind by the presentment of a proposition, is called belief or disbelief. Sometimes belief is called faith ; which can primarily mean nothing but assent, though in process of usage, something else is tacked to that idea, y. g. some moral quality or incident, as confidence, patience, or something else ; and faith is made to signify a compounded idea of various sorts of things, or else used sometimes to signify one idea and sometimes another.

This is the way we are apt to talk of assent or faith, or rather of that state of mind, whatever it is made up of, or is most distinguished by, which follows the notice of an assertion, either express or tacit ; when, led by the clue of our natural light and use of our faculties according to common reasoning, we would talk impartially. But whether this thing I have been mentioning, be precisely that which the bulk of those who speak of the subject constantly and unitedly signify by any of these words — faith, assent, belief, disbelief, or the like — is a question not easy to answer, because many words are vaguely applied. Yet, if I choose to use one of these words for the signifying of this idea, and I give notice of my intention, I suppose I have a right to do so.

There is a question whether faith is an operation or not : whether it can correctly be called an act, even excluding the idea of voluntary effort. Action may precede and follow ; but whether, in itself, faith has any glimpse of action of any sort, or not, is a question. Although we are apt to suppose faith to be an operation, it is rather a varied condition, posture, conditional attitude, of the mind, made up of relation to other things, wherein is a reference to a definite proposition, and to the previous condition of the mind, wherefrom it is shifted. With respect to the proposition, it acquiesces in it and entertains it with a view of the likeliness of the asserted habitude of its terms or parts : and with respect to the other, it has not the same view of the contrary proposition, but sees it with a different degree of probability than it had in view before. It is a circumstance that is inseparably attendant on the perception of a preponderance or a balance of probabiliifi This is all that this accident of mind consists in, whether we call it assent or acquiescence. We say it is grounded on probability : which it is no otherwise than as the idea or view or discovery of the appearance of a certain measure or degree of probability ; or, that appearance cannot be, but that this instantaneously ensues. I say varied condition, for these reasons ;

1. There is a necessary change supervening to our intellectual affairs immediately consequent to a new proposition being disclosed to view, and thus the condition of the mind is varied from what it was. 2. There are several degrees of stability and determinateness to our entertainment of a proposition with acceptance, from which we are liable to waver more or less — and the view of it is generally liable to be varied by successive discoveries.

The word faith has had various meanings, and has now at this day. Sometimes it denotes veracity, sometimes trustiness, sometimes fidelity and constancy in the serving of one's interest to whom there is an attachment or engagement. But I think the word more frequently is applied to the idea of credence given to propositions concerning things very remote from our exploration. Sometimes hope is joined to belief to make up an idea that is to be signified by this word. — But what I call faith, is the condition of mind in which it assents to a proposition : in describing which condition, several particular incidents are to be noted. Here I use faith as a general term, comprehending all degrees and varieties of favourable and complacent entertainment of a proposition fairly understood : for when a proposition is not understood, it does not seem to be exhibited and proposed to the understanding at all. Whether the proposition comes from heaven or earth, by means of words written or spoken ; through the senses ; or from the thoughts of a man's own heart ; and whatever the proposition be, whether of things remote or near, past, present, or future, visible or invisible ; a certain effect follows the recognition of it in his consciousness, and this effect, if it be not knowledge, is constituted of certain relations or habitudes of things perceived or supposed, whereupon if the mind acquiesce in or accept the proposition to the rejection of the contradictory one, or does not acquiesce in or accept the contradictory one to the rejection of this, — this posture of mind in reference to the given proposition, I call faith.

That complex notion to which I assign this word faith, as an abstract term, is made up out of the following constituent ideas :

1. The perception of a proposition stated for acceptance.

2. The perception or idea of the exact contrary proposition.

3. The peculiar relation existing between the prevailing notices of the mind resulting from its usual experience, and one of these propositions.

4. Peculiar relation between the same subject and the other proposition ; which is the same as the relalation of the other proposition to the state of the mind immediately previous to a perception of it. — For the relation of a proposition to the state of mind from ivhich it is changed by the introduction of this proposition, must be one and the same thing w r ith a relation of the contradictory proposition to the state of the mind to ivhich it is changed by introduction of this proposition.

These constitute what I denote by the word faith.

The parts of a proposition are called terms. They are signs. They consist of ideas or words, or both. If the proposition is verbal, i. e. stated by words, a word is called a term inclusive of w r hat it represents. If without words, the terms are ideas only. The terms of a proposition are the principal parts of it : — as the thing of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and the thing affirmed or denied of it, are called terms. One is called the subject ; the other the predicate. That which has any thing affirmed or denied of it, is the subject 5 and that which is affirmed or denied of it, is the predicate. For example — God is love. God is the subject, and love is the predicate : because the idea we denote by the word love, is affirmatively predicated of that we denote by the word God : for they are but ideas by which one is affirmed of another, and it means only that the idea of love is contained in the idea of God. Not that it is a trifling proposition importing that, of two words one idea may be signified by either, they being of the same meaning, — such as rouge is red, Dick is Richard, &c. but that the idea of God is a complex idea representing a real being which has several properties, and the quality or affection named love, makes a part of it. This is more perspicuously explicable when adjective-words are employed in affirmations. When one idea is affirmed of another, one of them must be a complex idea, and the other, if it be complex, must be less in its extent. But when one is denied of the other, they may be both simple ideas : as white is not red.

To form a proposition, signs must be joined or disjoined. The terms must be joined or disjoined ; the other signs are used instrumentally in this purpose. This is affirming or denying. By joining we affirm, and by disjoining we deny. And when signs joined or disjoined are stipulated to a rational mind, in affirmation or negation, as fit objects to be accepted or rejected, either acceptance or not acceptance instantaneously follows. If the stipulation be accepted, and admitted with satisfaction, the mind's acquiescing in it, I call faith, of some degree. If this takes place, it is because, what ? — because the mind has a view of a likeliness to agree — i. e. what arc so proposed, to agree or disagree as stated ; and likewise in conformity to the like agreement or disagreement in the reality of things existing, if the proposition relate to things without. Likeliness to agree or disagree, or likeliness to be true, is satisfactorily assuming things to agree or disagree, when their agreement or disagreement is not perceived, either intuitively or traced through intervening connexions which gradually show it with certainty, but though it cannot be perperceived at all, is presumed to be in the original realities these ideas represent : and therefore these are accepted as agreeing or disagreeing in the manner they are joined or disjoined, though apparently they do not perfectly. No matter whether this joining or disjoining is done by a separate person who relates me something to be believed, or by myself. I can make a proposition to myself. I immediately admit it, or do not. I admit that it may be true, and therefore give it some degree of assent ; or else I totally reject it and deny it ; and adhere with a strong degree of assent to the contrary side of the question. There is a perception of a proposition and a simultaneous cognition of certain relations it has in a separate reference to other things distinct from itself, — as, to the train of our usual experience ;— -a relation, also, to the previous posture of the mind and to another proposition : these perceptions and different relations, being crouded into a moment of time, constitute the general phenomena of the condition of mind we are discoursing of. If these relations be such as indicate agreement to the reality of things, they are a strong foundation of faith, which thereupon is firmly established.

Such is the sort of notion I use this word to indicate : that is to say, as a general or abstract term signifying something whereof may be degrees and varie*- ties. This appears to me to be what takes place in our intellectual concerns, when, a statement of something whereof we have not certain knowledge and perhaps cannot attain, coming to view, we are said to credit, believe, or presume it to be proper and real rather than inconsistent, absurd, fallacious, or fantastical. 2

The word faith is supposed to come originally from i Greek word signifying to persuade. That which, in the Latin language, answers to this word faith, is Jides. The French use the word foi for a similar purpose. The Italian language has it fede ; and the Spanish fe.

But whether either of these words as used by these different nations, signified precisely the same idea that I signify by the word faith, or as any class of men have ever signified by it, is a thing not to be proved by translators.

When we indubiously perceive the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, we have knowledge : and that, whether we perceive this, by intuition, directly ; _or by the agreement or disagreement of ideas which intervene between such ones as cannot be immediately compared together : in one case it is called intuitive knowledge ; and in the other demonstrative knowledge. In these cases we have certainty. We clearly perceive the agreement or disagreement, either mediately or immediately. This is superior to faith. Where we have knowledge we have no need of faith : but when we have no knowledge we have nothing better than faith for our guide. Where we have not this clear perception of agreement or disagreement, but only take it to be, without experiencing it, we have only faith. An idea may be fantastical or real : that is, it may have a pattern in nature or it may not. Thus, the idea of a goose is a real idea ; but the idea of a centaur is a fantastical idea. There is a question in cases of ideas joined in proposition, when they agree satisfactorily, whether they agree according to the agreeing of the things they represent. If they represent nothing, this reference is futile : for although there is no inconsistency in saying a centaur is covered with red hair, and these two terms will agree very well in our ideas, yet,— where is any thing experienced in nature to which to refer them, as a stan'dard to determine whether their agreement is such as that of things which they represent ?

Words are indifferent to any ideas. Men may accustom themselves to join almost any ideas ; and scarcely any, when they are inured to connect them without examination, will appear incongruous. But we look beyond, to what we have experienced in nature, independent of this or that statement, compatible with the truth of it. When it is said, paper is not parchment, I clearly see the disagreement of the terms : I have knowledge : absolute and real knowledge : for, having experienced the reality of what is declared, I know it to be a fact that it is so in nature : that they are two distinct species of substance, of which one does not comprehend the other. The same may be said of the proposition, a triangle is not a colour. Here, likewise, I have certain knowledge and immediate perception of the disagreement. — This is a proposition that conveys knowledge, also. But if I am told a rattlesnake bit my dog as he was hunting in a wood a mile distant out of my view, I certainly have no knowledge of the reality of this agreement of the ideas joined ; — I can have nothing but faith. This is a proper object of faith. Immediately I assent to it or disbelieve it. If I receive the proposition as true, I do so because I conceive of a likeliness that the stated apposition and agreement is conformable to the existing fact ; and, therefore, presume it to be so. This is evidence. Likeliness to be true, is evidence. It depends principally on conformity to our customary experience. A person must place his assent or faith according to the evidence present to hLs conception. The preponderance of evidence carries with it the concession of credence. What appears evident to me to-day, may not appear so to-morrow ; insomuch that the very contrary may appear most evident. On the other hand, what appears not evident to me to-day, may to-morrow appear very evident, and the contrarv be whollv denied.