God and reason : lectures upon the primary truths of natural religion

Dedication

TO HIS EMINENCE

MOST AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

PEEF ACE.

Contents

PAGE

LECTURE FIRST.

LECTURE SECOND.

II. The Argument Prom The Physical Order

Thus far we have dw r elt for a moment upon the demonstration of the existence of God w 7 hich can be gathered from pure metaphysics. But there are other proofs which more directly and mani* festly address our reason, and which cannot be gainsaid. The Holy Ghost tells us that they who deny the being of God are without excuse, since this primary truth has been manifested to men : 4 'That which is known of God is manifest in them.

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For God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made : His eternal power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable." * "If any one shall say," declares the Holy Vatican Council, " that certain knowledge of the one true God cannot be attained by the natural light of reason through the things that are made, let him be anathema."

We proceed, then, to show how the tilings that are made manifest the eternal power and Divinity of God.

1. Iso one can deny the existence of the visible world, which we see and appreciate with our senses. But this visible world does not exist of itself, therefore it is produced or contingent. And if it be produced it must be produced by a Being which is not contingent, and therefore by God. The existence of the world proclaims thus the divinity of its Author. The parts of this argument are incontestable.

Wo one can say that this visible world exists of itself either as a whole or in its parts. If it existed of itself it would be a necessary being, including in itself actual existence. But this is

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not tlie case, since we easily conceive of the world as not existing, and we can conceive of many worlds similar to ours as simply possible. The idea of the world by no means implies its actual existence.

If the world were a necessary being it would be eternal and infinite ; but we know that the world is not infinite, since it is extended and composed of parts ; while the infinite is necessarily without extension or parts. The conception of an infinite with parts is an absurdity which the reason rejects. That which can be said of the whole is also to be said of all the parts. There is no such thing as an infinite number.

The infinite is also immutable, being once and for ever all that it is. But the world is capable of substantial changes and modifications. The essence of the world, as of a composed substance, is constituted by a certain composition and union of parts ; but this composition, as we know by experience, can be dissolved in its single parts, and the union once existing can be broken and a new composition can be substituted.

There is no body which cannot in different ways be changed or modified, and the whole world, or the whole collection of bodies, is subject to new and varying modifications from the successive

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modes and motions of the single bodies which compose it. The world, therefore, is mutable and not a necessary eternal existence. But if the world be not a necessary being, it is contingent, and there is no conceivable medium between a necessary and a contingent being. If ifc be not the one, it is the other.

The existence of the world demands, therefore, an efficient cause for its being, and no such cause can be found, save a necessary Existence, which is God. A being produced must be produced by another being, and whatever series be supposed we must come at last to a being unproduced, existing of itself, or necessary. Thus says Leibnitz: u If there be no necessary being, no being is possible.'' "Let there be a single moment," says Bossuet, " when there is nothing, then nothing will be eternally. Thus nothing will be for ever all truth, and there will be no truth but nothingness ; which is both absurd and contradictory." Since, then, there is something existing to-day, it is manifest that something has always existed ; otherwise we must conclude that the things which exist have come from nothing, having absolutely no cause for their existence, which is a pure contradiction in terms. For if we say that a thing is produced, and at the same time say that there is no cause of its production, we really say that it is at the same

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time produced and not produced. Everything that exists must have a cause of its existence, a reason or foundation on which its existence rests. For it must exist either in virtue of a necessity of its nature, in which case it is eternal ; or by the power of some other being, which must then have existed before it, at least in priority of nature, as the cause is conceived before the effect.*

This argument is simple and unanswerable. It is not supposed that there is any proportion of being between God and things produced. There could not be between a finite and an Infinite. Neither does the existence of the finite flow necessarily from the Infinite, as if the Necessary Being were forced to produce existences out of Himself. But as there is no effect without a cause, there must be an independent and Infinite, by whose power and will all other things exist.

St. Thomas thus argues: "We find in sensible things an order of efficient causes. It is not possible that anything should be the efficient cause of itself, for then it would be before itself, which is a contradiction. There cannot be an infinite series of efficient causes, and so there must be a first efficient cause existing of itself, which is God." f

* Clarke, " Existence of God," I. Cap. II. fSt. Thomas, "Summa," Pars I. A. I. Quaes. 3.

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The same demonstration can be shown from the motion of matter. Thus we give the words of St. Thomas : " It is certain, as our senses testify, that matter is in motion. We know that there are some things in motion. But everything which is moved is moved by another. It cannot move itself, nor pass from possibility to the actual, without another agent." Matter in motion must have an efficient cause which produced this motion, since motion is not essential to matter, which of itself is inert.

u Ia causes of motion or modification we cannot proceed to the supposition of an infinite series, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore there must be a prime cause of motion, which cause is moved by no being, and which is therefore Self-existent, or God." % If anything be evident, it is that the first cause of movement is not in nature, and that the laws of nature come from a Superior Will which moves and directs the universe. u Is it not clear," says Rousseau, " that if motion were essential to matter it would be inseparable from it, it would be always in the same degree, always the same in every portion of matter? It would be incommunicable ; it could neither be increased nor di-

*Ibid.

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minished, and we could not conceive of matter in a state of repose ? The idea of motion is nothing else than that of passing from one place to another. There is no movement without some direction, for a thing cannot be moved at the same time in different directions. How, then, can matter move itself necessarily ? Has all matter in mass an uniform movement, or has each atom its own proper movement? In the first case the entire universe would form a solid and indivisible mass. In the second it would be a thin and incoherent fluid, without any possibility of the union of its atoms. In what direction would be the common movement of all matter ? If every molecule of matter had its particular direction, what would be the cause of all these directions and differences? To give to matter a movement in the abstract is to utter words which mean nothing ; and to give it a determined movement is to suppose a cause which determines it." All the modifications or phenomena of nature furnish the same demonstration. How can one explain the successive reproduction of living beings, without admitting a first Being who has always existed, and who is the principle of all the others? To suppose an infinite progress of causes and generations is to suppose a manifest absurdity.

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As well might one speak of a chain which should remain suspended, because each ring is held by the one preceding it, without any first ring which holds all the others.

2. .Another physical demonstration is drawn from the order of the world, which demands an intelligent Cause.

There exists in this world a wonderful order, which is the admiration of every intelligence. The various things of which the world is composed have each its place, and all are so disposed that they may obtain their effect or end. Who can deny this self-evident truth who has studied nature in any of its parts, in any grade of being, from the wonders of material existence to that of animal or intelligent life? The courses of the planets in their orbits, the marches of the stars in their fixed revolutions, the changes of the seasons, and the elements, all show a divine harmony, as things seemingly opposed proceed with regularity to one unvarying end. It cannot be said that these laws of nature which we discern are the fruit of chance, for chance is notliing in itself, and cannot be the cause of anything, much less of regular motions to a fixed and admirable end.

Look also at the individual being* which the

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visible world presents to ns. Consider the wonderful structure of the human body, where in order so many parts concur to one end ; where disorder is disease or death. Examine the marvels of the human eye, which by far surpasses the highest mechanism of art. See the endless wonders of animal or insect life, daily opening to the student of nature new exhibitions of marvellous design. Behold how from the dying seed the plant buds forth, and the tree arises with its leaves and flowers and fruit. Remark how all that lives possesses the power to reproduce itself, as "the earth brings forth the green herb, and such as yieldeth seed according to its kind, and the tree that beareth fruit, having seed, each one according to its kind." * Even they who deny God, and seek to deify nature, are forced to admit this wonderful order which the world presents, this admirable disposition of means to an end.

But this order so manifest in nature involves the necessity of an intelligent agent as its cause. Everything in order proclaims the author of this harmony to be supremely intelligent.

Anything is said to be in order in proportion as it tends to an end, and we cannot conceive of order without such an end. But the idea of an

* Genesis i. 12.

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end for wliicli anything is, necessarily supposes an intelligent being who sees and wills tins end. This evident conclusion we draw from all things We behold, whose construction proves design and demonstrates the intelligence of the maker. The works of art declare the design of the artificer. What unintelligent agent is capable of a work which implies an end ?

Many of the existences which this world displays are irrational and by nature indifferent to any order ; yet do they move with unerring regularity to their end, and so display the skill of their Maker and proclaim His magnificent design. 4 4 The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of His hands. Day to day uttereth speech, and night to night showeth knowledge/' *

But this intelligent agent from whose mind proceeds the order of the universe must be an infinite Being. Xo less an intelligence would be the sufficient reason for the harmony of things produced. AVe cannot conceive of a finite mind which shall be adequate to this superhuman design and knowledge.

Moreover, He who orders the things of earth to their end cannot be in the order which He pro- * Psalm xviii. 1, 2.

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duces, as one of the things ordered; else He would be only one of the things produced, and Himself moving by a law proceeding from some other intelligence. He could not be Himself depending upon an efficient cause, else He would not be the cause of the order of nature.

But if He be independent He must exist of His own nature and therefore be infinite. To be independent is to be infinite, as to be dependent is to be finite. And independence, as it involves infinity, involves also all perfection and all reality. There can be no other way of reaching the adequate cause of the marvellous order of things contingent.

St. Thomas draws the same argument in another way: " The things of nature are what they are in different degrees. In goodness, in truth, in nobility, there are degrees of greater or less. But they are greater or less in proportion as they approach that which is best. There is, then, a being which is most true, the. best and the noblest, and therefore the greatest. There is a Being who is to all things in their differing ranks the cause of being and of goodness and of every perfection. There is an intelligent agent by whom all natural things are ordered to their end; and this Being is God." *

To this purpose are the inspired words of Holy * St. Thomas, " Suinma," I. 2, § 3.

Scripture: " All men are vain in whom there is not the knowledge of God ; and who by these good things that are seen could not understand Him that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman. But have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be the gods that rule the world. With whose beauty if they being delighted took them to be gods, let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they ; for the first author of beauty made all these things. Or if they admired their power and their effects, let them understand by them that He that made them is mightier than they. For by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby." *

"When we inquire whether there is a first Cause of this universe, the imperfection and limitation of creatures appeal to the human reason ; when we inquire into the nature of this existing cause, the beauty, order, and magnificence of creatures are proposed to us ; and both considerations together form an integral . demonstration of the existence of God/' f

* Wisdom xiii. 1-5. f Franzelin, " De Deo Uno," § 2.

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IIL

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE MORAL ORDER.

The demonstration in this order of reasoning is not only incontestable in itself, but tends to confirm the arguments already advanced.

1. There is an unanimous consent of all mankind in the belief in the existence of God ; but such a consent could not be if there were no God, therefore from this source we have a certain argument.

If we go back to the most ancient nations we have evidence of this universal belief in the existence of the Supreme Being. We have only to consult the authors most worthy of credence, such as Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, and Zeno. Plato urges, among the proofs of the existence of the Deity, this admitted consent of all peoples. Cicero declares that "there is no one so inhuman that the idea of the deity has not imbued his mind. Among so many species there is no animal besides man that has any idea of God. And yet among men there is no tribe so wild or savage that it has no idea of the existence of God, even though it may be ignorant of His nature." *

* " De Nat ura Deorum," Cap. XVI. " De Legibus," L. I.

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"Go through the world," says Plutarch; "you can find cities without walls, without letters, laws, or houses ; you will find none without temples to the gods, none which do not offer prayer or sacrifice to obtain good or avert evil." *

Among ancient historians there are none who do not speak of the religion of those whose history they write, who are not unanimous in the testimony to the belief in God's existence.

Everywhere there are temples and altars erected, festal days of solemnity, priests and sacred rites. There is the testimony of such monuments even where history has not survived the ruins of time. If this be true of the most ancient tribes of which we have knowledge, and of the days of heath enism, it is much more true of recent times and modem nations, in regard to which there can be no question.

Thus St. Paul declares to the Athenians that the knowledge of God had come to all nations in such way as to render them inexcusable if they did not know Him: "God, who made the world and. all things therein, hath made of one nil « mankind to dwell upon the whole face of the earth, that they should seek Him, if happily they may feel after Him and find Him, although He be

* " Contra Coloten. Epic."

not far from every one of us. For in Him we live and move and are ; as some also of your own poets have said, For we are also His offspring." *

"The holy apostle," says Franzelin, " indicates that primary and obscure knowledge which the Fathers not improperly speak of as implanted in our nature, by which man is impelled to seek more diligently to know the Author of his own being and the maker of the world." He also teaches that the divine providence has so ordered all the facts of our race that we may be impelled to cultivate this primitive idea or conception to the better knowledge of the Supreme Cause of all : " Hence it appears how the idea of some divinity is common to all the nations of the world, and never can be eradicated from the mind, even though there be a perversion of the true notion of God. The most ancient doctors, Tertullian, Minutius Felix, Cyprian, Arnobius, have appealed to the most simple and uncultivated mind for testimony to the existence of God 3 for by nature many things are suggested as if from a common knowledge by which the Creator has been pleased to endow the human soul. " f

Now, this consent so universal among the various tribes of men is a sure proof of God's existence.

* Acts xvii. 24-23. \ " De Deo Uno," Thesis II.

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For this belief, as it is common to all, must have a common cause ; and there is no cause common to all except the human reason, which in some manner perceives this truth. Such a perception of the human mind could not be false, else reason would not be reason, and universal scepticism, which destroys reason, would be the result.* And surely no other cause can be found why men w T ho differ so much in all things else should agree in asserting the existence of a Deity, especially when this belief is opposed to the indulgence of passion, and calls men to the sense of their accountability to a higher power. This is the one belief which, under different forms more or less pure, has held the whole human race, and which no effort of falsehood, nor argument of infidelity has been able to eradicate. There can be no reason for this, except the existence of the light of this primary truth which shines upon every intelligence. If all ages and all nations have proclaimed the being of God, it is in obedience to the truth which commands assent, and which alone could obtain the universal consent of the reason. Dogmatic atheism contradicts the intelligence, involves absurdities in its terms, and never has been able to impose its belief upon a people or nation.

*Rothennue, ' « Inst. Phil.," Pars III. Cap. III.

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"God is here below," says Lacordaire, " the most popular of beings, while pantheism is a purely scientific system. In the open fields, resting upon bis implement of toil, the laborer lifts up his eyes towards heaven, and he names God to his children, by an impulse as simple as his own soul. The poor call upon Him, the dying invoke his name, the wicked fear Him, the good bless Him, kings give Him their crowns to wear, armies place Him at the head of their battalions, victory renders thanksgiving to Him, defeat seeks help from Him, nations arm themselves with Him against their tyrants ; there is neither place nor time, nor circumstance nor sentiment, in which God does not appear and is not named. Even love itself, so sure of its own charm, so confident in its own immortality, dares not to ignore Him, and comes before His altars to beg from Him the confirmation of the promises to which it has so often sworn. Truth has an eternal accomplice in God. His is the name which all nations have adored, to which they have built temples, consecrated priests, offered prayers ; it is the highest name, the most holy, the most efficient, the most popular name which the lips of man have received the grace to utter." *

2. A second demonstration may be given from the

* " Conferences on God," p, 22.

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existence of the universal moral law which is written upon the hearts and consciences of men. This law approves what is good and forbids what is evil ; distinguishes between right and wrong, and recognizes the justice of rewards and punishment ; but such a law proves the existence of a supreme legislator, the divine Being who alone can impose n universal law, or implant its principles in the hearts of men.

The existence of such a law appears from the testimony of the individual conscience. There is no one so low in the order of intellectual or moral life that he does not perceive the difference between what to him appears right and that which he recognizes as wrong. If he sin against this sense which is in him, and which he cannot ignore, his conscience at once reproaches him with the conviction of guilt.

There is no nation which does not distinguish between good and bad actions, and which does not frame laws to protect the good and punish the evil. Every one admits the justice of such laws, and no argument is necessary to establish their necessity or propriety. Society could not exist without such provision for its own safety, or the maintenance of the rights of the individual, and the protection of the whole body against the lawlessness of human

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passion. There would be no bond to the community of nations without the sanctions of such a law. It is not necessary that the convictions of right or wrong should be the same in every people ; nor does it militate against our argument that in some things there be error or difference of sentiment. The idea of good and evil, of justice and injustice, exists everywhere, and is inseparable from the human mind. Otherwise man would be as an animal, without conscience, and only recognizing the obligations of brute force.

The apostle St. Paul refers to this natural law when he declares that "when the gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, these having not the law, are a law to themselves ; who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another.' 5 * This is the "manifestation of the moral law to the natural reason, since, without any positive revelation, they understand the difference between good and evil by the light of reason and the obligation to do the one and avoid the other.'' "This is the law written in their hearts or intellects, the writing whose proximate principle is the rational nature,

♦Romans ii. 14, 15

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and not the letter of any revealed law." " Moreover, he who by the light of reason understands the obligation to do good and avoid moral evil, understands also that this obligation binds every rational creature, and is existing always, everywhere, and under every possible hypothesis. It is also well understood that there are no circumstances in which the strictest obligation to avoid moral evil does not bind every rational creature ; while it is also admitted that there may be acts which, in some circumstances evil, are in others not evil, since, materially the same, they may be different in the moral order from the diversity of conditions." "This knowledge of a law absolutely obliging is formally included in the knowledge itself of good and evil. Moreover, St. Paul plainly teaches that this knowledge, by reason of a moral law, so absolutely obliges men that the conscience commends certain actions as good and condemns others as evil, with an approbation or condemnation which will stand even on the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." *

But the existence of such . a universal law demonstrates the existence of a supreme Lawgiver, who can be none other than the great First Cause.

*Franzelin, « De Deo Uno," Thesis III.

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A law universal and absolute, binding all classes and conditions of men, cannot have its force from the human wills which it restrains, and which, left to themselves, would diner indefinitely as passion might lead them. There is no one human lawgiver who has jurisdiction over all consciences, to whom all tribes owe obedience. This law must come from One who is above all legislators, who has supreme dominion over men, No one else could bind the universal conscience. But such a supreme lawgiver is God.

Again, this law does not come from men ; for if such a supposition were possible, the same power which establishes a law could also abrogate it, change or modify it. Yet such modification or abrogation of the universal law of right and wrong is impossible ; therefore men were not and could not have been its author.

" Neither can reason of itself alone promulgate such a law. Reason does not make an action to be good or evil. It only perceives that it is such ; so that if the action were not intrinsically good or bad, reason could perceive no moral quality in it, and would look upon it as indifferent, as is the case in circumstances where no moral judgment appears. The most that reason can do is to produce the sense of an obligation which is specu-

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lative only, and not practical with power to bind the conscience." *

There is no answer to this argument, for there is no one who can thus impose a sense of morality upon the universal conscience but He wiio is the light o£ the reason, sovereign truth, and infallible justice, the creator of all intelligences, and the fountain of all law. To say that there is no God is to deny the existence of all morality, and to abolish the distinction between right and wrong.

u In the knowledge of a moral law absolutely binding men," says Franzelin, "is included at least a confused knowledge of God as the Supreme principle and end. For the ultimate reason of this absolute obligation which man naturally recognizes cannot be the dignity itself of human nature, as the followers of Kant would say ; since man, by the knowledge of his absolute obligation, does not see his own dignity which commands him, but his dependence upon a superior power w T hich he is bound to obey. And as he perceives this moral obligation to which every rational creature is subject, by this very fact he beholds the existence of a Superior in whose dominion over all creatures this obligation is founded, and at least obscurely recognizes Him as the Supreme Lord to * Rothenflue, "Inst, Phil.," Pars III. Cap. III.

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whom he owes absolute obedience. So the apostle declares that the heathen, by the same light of reason by which from the physical order the invisible things of God are known, also know the moral order to be the law of God absolutely obliging them. Hence they are convicted of sin, because when they know the law of God that they who do such things are worthy of death, they not only do them, but also consent to those who do them." * ' ' They are inexcusable, because that when they know God they have not glorified Him as God, or given thanks ; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise, they became fools." f "Thus from the consideration of the natural reason disposed to the true and the good, and from the consideration of human society, is easily understood the necessary existence of the moral order, the existence of the ultimate end or the enjoyment of the true and the good, the necessity of rights and duties, since such are the essential teachings of reason, which cannot deny them, without contradiction. And these essential truths whose necessity and existence are well understood, could have no foundation, unless there were a Supreme Good, a holy and just lawgiver, and a sovereign