The freedom of the will...

Front matter

THE

FREEDOM OF THE WILL

AS A BASIS OP

CHAPTER I, Trine division of faculties

Will defined and distinguished.

Mental operations denned.

Pre- and post-volitional action.

Agent wills, not the faculty.

CHAPTER H.

Freedom of the Will Defined. 23

Mechanical, voluntary, and volitional freedoms.

Three necessitarian definitions.

Law of Invariability.

The Issue.

Coaction or compulsion and necessitation.

Freedom not purely in ethicals.

Deed and guilt untransferable.

CHAPTER HI.

Volition not always preceded by Emotion 43

Doctrine of Locke, Mackintosh,

and Upham.

Seven opposing arguments.

CHAPTER IV.

Freedom of the Will Causationally presented 47

Cause, power, and necessity defined.

Necessity one in diverse relations.

Five errors regarding power.

Postulates and canons.

Certainty analyzed.

CHAPTER V.

Edwards's Synthesis of Definitions reviewed .

Four defects of his synthesis.

Assumes the point at start.

CHAPTER VI.

Conditions and Limitations of

Will's Free Action.

Cause and condition distinguished.

Conditions of volition — three.

Subjective and objective freedom.

Motive, cause, reason.

CHAPTER VH.

Choosing "as" — something.

Freedomistic and necessitarian phrases.

Choice as last dictate of understanding.

" Making up of mind."

Law and lawlessness.

CHAPTER VIII.

Schematism of Conscious Free Will 81

Sevenpoints of conscious Free Will .

The Issue and Argument:

THE CAUSATIONAL ARGUMENT.

CHAPTEE I.

The Necessitarian Paralogism 84 Eeal necessitarian causal assumption.

Attempts at proof— paralogisms.

The great paralogism.

CHAPTER II. Cause of Particular Volition. 88

I. What causes Will to act ?

II. Cause of particular volition.

III. Why not the counter volition ?

Causes, partial and complete.

Hobbes on sufficient cause.

Edwards on dependence upon

cause.

IV. What cause of diversity ?

Edwards on necessity of effect.

Leibnitz on " sufficient reason."

Chapter III

commensur ability of motives.

Volition as Greatest Good 145

Two classes — Commensurables and Incommensurables .

Prevalence not sole proof of Mechanical Causation.

CONTENTS.

Prevalence not sole proof of Intellective Causation.

Greatest apparent good not always prevalent.

Nor strongest desire.

Paralogism — strongest because prevalent.

Leibnitz on spontaneity.

"Making up of mind" terminally volitional.

CHAPTEE IV.

Motives no Neoessitative Cause of Volition 155

Necessitarian assumptions answered : X. Acting in accordance is being caused to act.

II. Motives are cay^es necessitating volition.

III. The argument by pseudo-synonyms.

IV. The argument from approximation.

V. Exemption from necessitation

is idiotic in action.

VI. The sum of contradictions.

CHAPTEE V.

Uniformities of Volition.

Volitions reliably uniform.

Four generic causes of uniformity :

1. Corporeal Nature.

2. Dispositions.

3. Standard Purposes.

4. Habits.

Formation of character:

1. Will, circumscribed within

thought-circle.

2. Action from antecedent char-

acter.

3. Character as sum of voli-

tions.

4. The statistical argument.

CHAPTEE VI.

Double Volition 177

"Will makes the motive."

Motive-object and choice-object.

Edwards on double volition.

CHAPTEE VH.

Activity no Passivity

. 179

Edwards's doctrine no agent not a

patient.

Agent uncaused to act.

Act depends on actor.

Choice not put forth by choice.

Act on account of motive not governed by motive.

CHAPTEE VIII.

Determination from Indetermination 182

Indifference is equilibrial will.

Edwards's four assumptions severally answered :

1. Indifference is stagnation.

2. Indifference — total not partial.

3. Volition produced by previous

act.

4. Indifference and action must

coexist.

CHAPTEE IX.

Choice between Equal Alternatives 190

Volitional act without motive.

Three necessitarian fallacies.

Volitional suspension.

Archbishop King's theory.

CHAPTEE X.

Equality of Divine Motives. 194

Argument from pure space and

time.

Edwards's four points :

I. C onfounding resemblance with

identity.

II. Eeduces time and space to

conditions of body.

III. Confounds qualities with bodies.

IV. False analogy between body and sound.

CHAPTEE XI.

Useless Modifications of Necessity 203

Question of Eesponsibility unaffected by, 1. The Source; 2.

The Mode ; 3. The Point ; or, 4. The Eesult.

I. Theory of Eesponsible Neces-

sitated Nature.

II. Of Eesponsible Necessitated Action.

III. That volition and freedom are one.

IV. Volition intrinsically necessary, but not causatively.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XII.

Invariable Sequences or Spontaneous Necessity. 214

Hume and Brown's Theory of Invariable Sequence.

I. Invariability including all

events volitional or not.

Five counter arguments.^ Kant's freedomisni examined.

II. Volitional invariability with counter power.

Seven counter arguments.

CHAPTER XIII.

Counter Choice a Prodigy. . 238 A crude freedomism.

Tends to Pelagianism.

CHAPTER XIV.

Volitional Powerlessness or 44 Moral Inability " 239

Volitional non-causality and obligation.

Three self-contradictions.

No "moral ability" no "natural ability."

CHAPTER XV.

44 Moral Ability " as treated by Edwards 244

Edwards's four points of moral inability.

His instances of moral inability.

The terms false and deceptive.

His two evasions: 1. That moral inability is no inability ; 2. That the term inability is solely postvolitional.

Natural ability a substitute for moral ability.

The latter causeless in absence of the former.

Sin can never be helped.

Edwards's triple error.

CHAPTER XVI.

44 Moral Ability" as Homilet-

ICALLY TREATED.

Want of act not want of power.

Three pulpit equivocations.

CHAPTER XVII.

44 Moral Inability" as expressed in Ordinary Phrase 261

Cannot for "Will-not.

Fallacious ground of moral inability.

True ground — law of contradiction.

Instances in common life and in Scripture.

CHAPTER I. Foreknowledge and Predestination 267

Prescience and Predestination distinct.

Prescience precedes decree.

44 Permissive decrees" contradicted by formula of foreordination.

Argument for precedence of predetermination.

Seven counter-points presented.

CHAPTER II. Reconciliation oe Free Agency and Foreknowledge 271

I, Foreknowledge of power in agent.

II. Denial of possibility of foreknowledge.

III. Of several possible volitions, one actual.

IV. The free totality foreknown.

V. Freeness not affected by fore-

knowledge.

VI. The free act foreknown as free.

Freedom exalts Man and dishonors God ? 322

Freedom an imperfection or perfection ?

Effect of freedom on man and God.

Unireedom degrades God.

God's dependence on the finite.

Freedom and merit in our justification.

CHAPTER IX. Responsibility of Obdtjrates and of Fallen Man 327

I. As to Obdurates — two questions :

1. Self-superinduction — its in-

culpatory power.

2. Intensity of temptation — its

excusatory power.

H. As to Fallen Race — three positions of Edwards.

Our replies. 11 Damned by grace."

CHAPTER X. The Free Appropriation of our Depraved Nature . . . 338

Julius Miiller's difficulties.

Childhood probational crisis.

Individual freedom and collective

Discriminations of guilt and guiltlessness.

Nature of our fallen inability.

CHAPTER XL Equation of Probational Advantages 343

Dr. Hill and historical reprobation.

Arminian statement of equation.

I. The Irresponsible Home Dispensation.

H. Heathendom.

Grades of reward and punishment.

1. Spirit of faith.

2. Purpose of right.

" Living up to their light."

Relation of missions to the subject.

Concluding statement of the argument.

CONTENTS.

Part Third. The Positive Argument Stated

CHAPTEE I.

The Argument from Consciousness 361

I. Consciousness.

Cognizant of operations alone?

Eeplies.

Freedom as a conscious quality.

Consciousness of object.

II. Self-Consciousness.

Direct view of self and its powers.

III. Sub-Consciousness.

Moral assumption of counter

power.

Four points in the assumption.

Intellective sub-consciousness of

the counter power.

CHAPTER II.

Argument from Possibility of Divine Command 369

Counter power a nothing? Consequences.

Edwards on command of necessitated Will.

His absurd mode of necessity.

Power to change inclination.

Coexistent mental operations.

CHAPTEE III.

Distinction between Automatic Excellence and Moral Desert 375

No automatic desert — in mechanical, animal, or spiritual natures.

Various instances and conclusions.

Three Corollaries — Machine, Fatalism, and Expedient Infliction.

CHAPTEE IV.

Created Moral Desert Impossible 389

Double offi.ce of law.

Freedom to good alone,to evil alone.

Edwards's fallacious replies to Dr.

John Taylor.

Edwards's three arguments answered.

CHAPTEE V.

The Maxim of Eesponsibility. 396

Opposite maxims.

Our maxim stated.

Intuitive validity of the axiom.

Self-superinduction only an apparent exception.

CHAPTEE VI.

Necessitarian Counter Maxim of Eesponsibility Considered 402

Necessitarian maxim, and pseudo- Arminian maxim.

I. Mistake of issue by Edwards.

II. Misstatement of Arminian view.

III. The true question and answer.

IV. Consequences of necessitarian maxim.

V. Edwards's self-contradiction.

CHAPTEE VII.

Edwards's direct Intuitional Proof of Necessitated Eesponsibility 408

"Vulgar notion of blameworthiness."

I. "Will — but not necessitated

Will" — is responsible.

II. Edwards's exclusion of " common sense."

III. Freedom where responsibility.

IV. Excuse from force of motive.

V. Edwards's test cases.

Kant's formula and Miiller's answer.

Eejoinder to Miiller.

CHAPTEE VIII.

Eesponsibility of Belief demonstrates Freedom of Will 415

Cahlmers on Belief and Will.

Makes both equally necessitated.

Therefore equally irresponsible.

Eegeneration according to Owen

and others.

Volition and intellection equally

necessitate.

CONTENTS.

Freedom from violation of necessity.

Volition free as a mathematical figure.

CHAPTEK IX.

Coaction and Necessitation. 423

Both, equally exclude power.

Both equally destroy responsibility.

Fallacious instance.

Instance by Chalmers examined.

CHAPTER X.

Argument from God's Non-authorship of Sin 427

Theory of non-prevention and ne-

cessitation.

I. Edwards maintains the former,

defends the latter.

Contrast between the two.

II. Edwards's Scripture argument.

III. Edwards on privative and positive causations.

IY. Edwards on "willing sin as sin."

V. Willing evil for good end.

VI. Intrinsic evil not transmutable.

Edwards's trilemma answered.

CHAPTER XI. Freedom the Condition of a possible Theodicy 436

An automatic Deitv, creature, and

system of volitions.

Automatism and desert.

Moral intuition of justice.

No divine government or man a

free agent.

INDEX OF AUTHORS MENTIONED.

Adams, Dr. N., 209.

Arminius, 268.

Baader, 340.

Bibliotheca Sacra, 21, 38, 79, 206,

221, 227, 228, 261.

Bledsoe, Professor, 121, 389, 434.

Bonar, Dr., 230.

Bramhall, Bishop, 25.

Brougham, Lord, 374.

Brown, Dr. T., 214.

Bushnell, Dr., 248.

Bitler, Bishop, 116,153.

Calvin, John, 421.

Clarke, Dr. Samuel, 78, 194, 202, 313. Coleridge, 15.

Cousin, 109.

Cunningham, Dr., 212.

Curcellseus, 344.

Edwards, Elder, passim.

Hamilton, Sir William, 105, 138,

365, 420.

Haven, Professor, 34, 36, 52, 8C.

Hemans, Mrs., 161.

Hickok, Professor, 200.

Hill, Dr., 327, 343.

Hitchcock, Dr., 206, 317.

Hobbes, 28, 31, 33, 95.

Hodge, Dr., 212, 419.

Horace, 149.

Hume, 108, 133, 214.

Hutcheson, 395.

Justin Martyr, 78.

INDEX OF AUTHORS MENTIONED.

Laurence, Professor, 27, 38, 79.

Lucretius, 108.

Lyall, Professor, 204, 212, 233.

Mackintosh, 44.

Mahan, President, 150.

Maine de Biran, 109.

Methodist Quarterly Review, 337.

Park, Professor, 221, 227.

Pascal 434

Reid, Dr., 56.

Shedd, Dr., 205.

South, Dr., 18.

Spinoza, 108.

Stuart, Dugald, 110, 420.

Tappan, Dr., 90.

Taylor, Isaac, 119.

Taylor, Dr. John, 132, 391.

Taylor, Dr. N. W., 204.

Upham, Professor, 44.

Voltaire, 30.

Wardlaw, Dr., 259.

Whichcote, 42, 322.

Zoroaster, 316.

EDITIONS QUOTED.

Edwards on the Will. Pp. 430. Andover, 1840. Younger Edwards. Vol. ii, pp. 518. Andover, 1842. Leibnitz, Erdman's. 8vo., pp. 808. Berlin, 1840. Princeton Theological Essays, (articles republished from the Princeton Review.) Vol. ii, pp. 705^ New York, (Wiley & Putnam,) 1846.

THE EEEEDOM OF THE WILL.

Chapter I. Will Isolated And Defined

In* the following treatise we assume as correct the ordinary generic classification of the operations Faculties of the human mind into Intellections, Sensibil- threefold - ities, and Volitions. The Intellect is that by which all things, material or immaterial, external or internal, moral or unethical, are cognized by the soul. The Sensibility is the capability of the mind of experiencing the feelings, namely, the emotions by which the mind is excited, or the desires by which it becomes appetent of objects. The Will is the volitional power by which alone the soul consciously becomes the intentional author of external action — external, that is, to the Will itself— whether of mind or body.

All the operations of the first two of these faculties, namely, Intellect and Sensibility, are univers- Necessity ^ ally felt, and acknowledged to be necessary and two first - absolutely caused. Present the object before the perceptive power, (the power being voluntarily or necessarily fixed,) and the object must be perceived as it presents itself. As when we place the object before a fixed mirror, the mirror forthwith presents the correspondent image, so when we place the object before the fixed intelligence, the intelligence forthwith presents the perception. We may withdraw either the object or the mind ; but when the two are brought into the proper juxtaposition the perception necessarily exists, just as it does exist. The Carthagenian, with his eyelids severed, could not but see the blazing orb of the sun to which his naked balls were forcibly exposed. Neither the sensorium nor the mind can vary or reject the sensation produced by the presentation. There are the absolute absence and non-existence of any alternative or contrary power either in the intellective or sensitive nature. No physical causation is more absolute than that which exists between the object and its mental results.

It is when penetrating more deeply we arrive at the Necessity Will — the mysterious seat of the volitional and the third, responsible power — that the difficulty and controversy arise. The necessitarian affirms that between the motive and volition there exists the same absolute causation as between the object and the perception; a causation equivalent, therefore, in absoluteness and necessity, with any instance of physical causation. As when you place an externality before the mind the idea arises, as when you place an object before a mirror the image necessarily arises, so when you present before the Will the motive, the volition as necessarily springs forth. Contrary power, varying power, alternative power, freedom, are wholly non-existent and even inconceivable. Now no causation, however physical or mechanical, can be more absolute than where the power of a diverse result is inconceivable. «

Denied by ^ ne freedomist, on the other hand, maintains freedomists. that in "Will— alone of all existences— there is an alternative power. Every species of existence has its own one and singular property. Matter alone has solidity; mind alone has intelligence; cause alone has efficiency, and Will alone of causes has an alternative or pluri-efficient power.- It is the existence or non-existence of this power in Will which constitutes the dispute between the necessitarian and the freedomist.

From what has been said above we might define Will to be that faculty of the mind in whose exer- Definition of cises there is not felt the element of necessity. wm * But this is a definition in which all parties might not agree.

The definition of Edwards, that Will is " the power to choose," is on his own principle manifestly defective. It has the objection which Edwards brings against another definition, namely, that it needs definition as much as the term to be defined. Choose is a word as obscure as Will. In fact, if the definition be true, then to choose is to will/ and the definition is no more than saying that the Will is the power to will, which is about the same as defining a thing by itself.

Nearer to an exact definition, yet not exact, is that of Coleridge, that " Will is that which originates action or state of being." It may, however, be truly said that all cause originates action or state of being, and some further limitation seems therefore necessary. We define Will to be that power of the soul by which it intentionally originates an act or state of being. Or more precisely, Will is the power of the soul Bypresent by which it is the conscious author of an in- wrlter - tentional act. And this definition furnishes a complete demonstration that the Will is a clearly different faculty from any other in the mind ; for it is always Peculiar dis distinguished and characterized by the inten- wul tion, and also, as we shall hereafter note, by motive. Volition, indeed, might be defined as that act of the mind which it performs with intention.

Edwards and the older necessitarians held volition to be the same as desire, or at least to be in- F fi C S ation en of eluded generically under it. This assumption ^• 1 e 1 I andde " would settle the question of necessity, inasmuch as it is by all conceded that desires are in nature necessary; while, on the other hand, modern concession of the difference of the two is no surrender of the necessity of Will.

How indiscriminately the various terms belonging to classification ^ e different faculties were used by elder neof terms. cessitarians may appear from the following words of Edwards : "Whatever names we call the act of the Will by — choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with — all may be reduced to this of choosing." Now, of the above terms, in order to a greater precision, we may say, 1. Approving, disapproving, coming to a conclusion and deciding, belong more properly to the intellective or moral faculty; 2. Liking, disliking, inclining, being averse, being pleased with or displeased with, to the sensitive nature; 3. Choosing, refusing, rejecting, determining, sometimes deciding, to the Will ; 4. Embracing, directing, commanding, and forbidding, to external acts.

Desire, be it ever so intense, never becomes volition, but by a distinct movement known to consciousness ; and no action can follow until volition arises. Desire is uneasy and stimulant ; Will is decisive, and brings all the mind to acquiescence. Yet volition, like desire, is appetency and preference ; it is a conscious free act of fixing a settlement upon its object, to which it brings the unity of the man.

Will may be distinguished from desire by the followwm distinct m S points: 1. Volition is consciously distinct from desire. ^ n na ^ ure from even the culminating desire. It is felt to be an act — a decisive movement — a putting forth of energy. It is a conscious projection, from interior power, of action upon its object. Desire is the flowing forth of appetency for an object; volition is the putting forth of action upon it. 2. Volition and desire differ in their objects. Desire is an appetency for some perceived agreeable quality or agreeable thing in its object. The object of the volition is the post-volitional voluntary act which it effectuates. 3. We can conceive a being full of coexisting and . contending desires and emotions, but without any power of volition, and so hemmed forever into a circle of passivities. 4. To volition, and not to any other mental operation, belong, as before said, intention and motive. This peculiarity alone would be sufficient to distinguish volition as a unique operation and Will as a special faculty. 5. There is no mental faculty which our consciousness so identifies with the self as the Will. When the Will governs the appetites or passions, we naturally say that the Man governs them ; when they govern the Will, we say the man is governed by them. 6. The Will is alone that power by which man becomes properly an agent in the world. It is the bridge over which he passes in his active power to produce effects, according to design, on objects around him. No matter how intense or powerful may be his other feelings or faculties, he could never execute any projects, shape any objects, or make any history which he could call intentionally his own, without the faculty of Will. 7. Upon Will alone primarily rests from above the weight of moral obligation. And surely if, of all possible events, volition alone can be the primary object of obligation, it ceases to be an arrogant or wonderful claim that in volition alone should exist the element of freedom. The necessitarian allows that in one respect at any rate the event volition is absolutely unique ; it is sole and singular among things ; the freedomist, consequently, only claims for that unique superstructure, responsibility, an equivalently unique basis, freedom. 8. It is a fact that, while among all thinkers there is a perfect unanimity in attributing necessity to all the other mental operations, there is, to say the least, a very extensive and perpetuated denial of necessity in the volition. The necessitarian is bound to account for both this unanimity and this dissent. Here, then, is a distinction permanent and extensive between desire and volition. The desire is a mental operation to which all thinkers with perfect unanimity ascribe necessity; the volitions are a mental operation in which all denier s of necessity affirm with an equal unanimity that freedom resides.

Inclination belongs to the feelings, and not so properly either to the intellect or the Will. From his perception of an object a man feels inclined to choose it. It is the feelings that incline, and the Will remains quiescent until the initiation of the choice. "A mere inclination to a thing," says Dr. South, "is not properly a willing of that thing."

The dispositions are the feelings viewed in relation to any particular object or volition. A man is said to be disposed to an object or act when his feelings are favorable to it ; indisposed when they are the reverse.

A choice is always a volition, but of a particular kind. It is, namely, a volition by which the agent appropriates to himself one of a class of objects or causes of action on account of some perceived comparative preferability in it. I choose, that is, appropriate to myself, one of a lot of apples, because I see it comparatively most eligible or preferable. I choose one of two roads at a fork because I see it comparably the preferable. I choose from among professions that which seems comparatively most eligible. I choose God, not I will God. I choose virtue, not I will virtue. Choice, then, is an appropriative comparative volition; usually, however, including also the external act. By it I will one of several things to be mine. To say that I will as I choose, is simply to say that one volition is as another volition. Definitions which make a choice not to be a volition are incorrect. In this treatise choice and volition are used interchangeably.

To please, as an intransitive, expresses a volition, and usually signifies to will authoritatively. So a deity or an autocrat pleases that a thing be thus or so, or he does as he pleases. That is, he does as he authoritatively wills, chooses, or determines.

To purpose is to will, to determine, predetermine, or resolve that something shall be willed or done at a future time. I now will or purpose to go to the city to-morrow. A purpose wills or predetermines now that perhaps an immense number of volitions shall take place. A volition thus comprehensive of many volitions, to which they more or less conform, may be called a Standard Purpose. This comprehensive purpose resolves the mind into a state of permanent determination. A man may act in view of one great life purpose.

The preference is a recognition by the intellect that a given object or course is, on some account, or upon the whole, rather to be chosen than, or held in some way superior to, another with which it is compared. When a man on some account intellectually prefers an object he generally has a feeling of inclination to choose it. Nevertheless there may be coexistent with this preference an opposing inclination on some other account, in favor of which the Will may decide. Opposite dispositions and desires may, and often do, coexist in the same mind. Different affections, operations, and forces may exist within the soul, and, at the same instant, fluctuate and struggle for mastery.* This agitation might last forever had man, as previously said, no faculty of Will. He would be like the troubled sea, that cannot rest. It is by volition that the faculties are brought to unity and settlement.

Nevertheless to the Will also belongs a preferential state. When a volition has resolved the Will into a settled purpose that at the proper time it will give a particular volition, or adopt a certain cause or object, then so long the Will permanently prefers that volition course or object to "a diverse.

The term indifference was often used by the old writers on the freedom of the Will in a technical sense. In ordinary language it now refers to the feelings as * See p. 373.

being wholly without inclination for or against an object. But as in the feelings there may be no inclination, so in the Will there may be no volition ; and until the "Will chooses or differentiates, there is an indifference, non-differentiation, or quiescence. Whatever may be the coexisting and struggling or fluctuating inclinations and preferences? the Will does not differentiate or cease to be indifferent until it volitionates, chooses, or wills.

Consequent upon the interior volitional act performed Distinction by the Will is the external voluntary act

between the n, -i i j_i -i i i • t j.'

volitional performed by the body, obeying and executing tary. the imperative volition. Yet it is not the

body and the limbs alone which obediently execute the determinations of the interior Self through the Will. The mind also in its operations, intellective and emotional, is more or less under the Will's control. To trace how complete this partial volitional control over body or mind is, is not our present purpose.

The intention of an act, volitional or voluntary, objectively, is the result had in view to be produced by the act. This result may be immediate, or more or less remote. Of the same act, the intentions may be stated with a great variety. Thus an archer draws his bow. His intention is the discharge of an arrow. That is, such is the immediate result imaged and intended in his mind. But, more remotely, his purpose is that the arrow pierce the body of a stag. Still further remote, there are other and other successive intentions; and it is difficult to ascertain, often, the ultimate intention of an act or volition. For the intention, near, remote, and ultimate, whether accomplished or not, the agent is responsible. For all the legitimately calculable consequences, the agent is responsible. How far even for any consequences of a deliberately wicked act an agent may be responsible is debatable ; since he who breaks law is fairly warned by his own reason that he indorses disorder, and so makes any disastrous consequence legitimate and responsible.

Suppose, however, that, without any culpable Unintention . want of care, the arrow of the archer, missing al act * its aim, is so deflected by some object as to hit and slay his prince. At once it is seen no responsibility for the result accrues. He is irresponsible just because this result was not intended; that is, framed in his conception as that which he, as a volitional agent, exerted his power to bring into existence. Though partially an effect by him caused, that result comes upon him as unconceivedly as a lightning flash darting across his path. For the conception unsanctioned by the volition, and for the result unconceived and unintended, yet accomplished, there is equally no responsibility.

As the intellect, the emotions, and desires conditionally precede the volition, so we may call these the 0rder of opprevolitional conditions. The act of body eratlons - or mind which follows as a consequent of the volition obeying its power and executing its requirements may therefore be called post-volitional; so that the position of the act of Will is with great precision identified. The willing act is adjectively called volitional; the consequent act of body or mind is called voluntary. When an athlete strikes a blow, his willing the blow is a volitional, and the physical motion of the arm which obeys and executes his volition is a voluntary act. So that we have the prevolitional, the volitional, and post-volitional or voluntary operations as the sum total of all human affections and activities.

The occasional confounding of the terms volitional and voluntary, and the transfer of the latter from the post-volitional act to the volition itself, is the source of some error and some unintentional sophisms. Thus Confilsion of Dr. Pond, in the Bibliotheca Sacra, says : " If ^^fun. we originate our own voluntary exercises we tary * must do it voluntarily or involuntarily. If we do it involuntarily, there is nothing gained certainly on the score of freedom. There can be no freedom or voluntariness in an involuntary act of origination more than there is in the beating of the heart. But if we originate our own voluntary exercises voluntarily, this is the same as saying that we originate one voluntary exercise by another, which runs into the same absurdity as before."

Solution of ^ tn * s we ma 7 f° r tne present reply, that as the fallacy. ^ e terms voluntary and involuntary are predicable only of the external actions in reference to the Will, the volitions are neither voluntary nor involuntary, but volitional. They are not intrinsically, as free, the product of a previous volition ; nor in that does their freedom consist. What their freedom does imply appears in the proper place by our definition.

The younger Edwards, in his remark on his father's " Improvements in Theology," has the expression, " such volitions being, by the very signification of the term itself, voluntary." A voluntary volition is impossible. So on the same page he uses the term spontaneity, not, evidently, as Webster defines it, to signify voluntariness, but as the abstract of volition, volitionality. Agent wins, When we say that the Will wills, we really

not the , i « i i ,> «n t •

faculty. mean that the entire soul, or sell, wills. It is the man who wills, and his Will is simply his power or being able to will. And the free Will is really the man free in willing. So it is the man, the soul, the self, that perceives, feels, and thinks. The faculties are not so many divisions of the soul itself, but rather so many classes of the soul's operations, and the soul viewed as capable of being the subject of them. And as in volition the whole soul is the Will, and in thinking the whole soul is the intellect, so it follows that the Will is intelligent, and the intelligence is volitional. When, therefore, we speak of Will, we speak not of a separate, blind, unintelligent agent, but of the whole intelligent soul engaged in and capable of volitional actions. It is in no way a separate substance or agent.

FEEEDOM OF THE WILL DEFINED. 23