Evolution and the need of atonement

Front matter

Class.

Book l- M ^

EVOLUTION

Preface

IN writing this book I have only considered one aspect of the Atonement. Even so, I am conscious how incomplete, how rough and ill-composed, it will appear. It was thought out and written in the odd hours of a busy life, often with long intervals, and I fear it bears marked traces of this genesis. But it will be justified if in any way the thought outlined is of use to a few who, trusting in Jesus Christ, with a faith born of experience, yet feel deeply the difficulty of aligning the central tenet of the Christian Faith with their rational conviction that the evolution of animal life has always been from the imperfect towards the perfect, and not vice versa ; who find it hard to face the question : — If sin is but inherited imperfection, how can we believe that man was ever wholly alienated from God because of sin ?

The Atonement must always be beyond the understanding of finite minds. Any standpoint from which it is regarded may be, for the time and people, right and true ; but we must never forget that the standpoint changes.

The consideration of the Atonement from the standpoint of an Absolute Ethic, and above all from that of Personality, has given, one might almost say, a new revelation. And so too, I believe, will a thorough examination from the standpoint of Evolution. If viii Preface

what I have written can serve in any degree as the Prolegomena to such studies I shall have achieved the utmost I have dared to hope.

It will be observed that much use has been made of the great and suggestive work of M. Bergson in the region of the Philosophy of Evolution. Yet much that appears to be plagiarism is really parallelism. The substance of Chapter I was written in the summer of 1908, and published in The Interpreter for July 1910 under the title, " The Biological Argument for Theism." Much of the argument of this chapter, and especially the conclusions that a " divine unrest " must underlie the evolutionary process, and that the creature is always striving to attain greater freedom, while itself creating fresh conditions for itself and others, is almost identical with that developed in U Evolution Criatrice. These conclusions were, however, arrived at quite independently : I knew nothing of M. Bergsons work till some time after this article was published, and the outline of the rest of the book roughly jotted down. But those who know M. Bergson's writings will realise what an enormous stimulus they gave to my rather inchoate thought, and how great a debt I owe to him in their final shaping. Mine was the rough, almost grotesque sketch of the untrained hand : his the strong, sure work of the master. It seemed worth while to refer to this, simply because two people, faced with the same problem at about the same time, reached the same

Preface ix

conclusions in several matters. Certainly, to find that another had travelled the same road, gave to myself great encouragement to go forward in my further journeyings.

Acknowledgement is due to the Rev. Hewlett Johnson, editor of The Interpreter, for his kindness in allowing me to make use of my article on " The Biological Argument for Theism." As I have already stated, this article forms the basis of Chapter I.

Finally, I would say that whatever of good may be found in this book has root in the influence of three people.

To my cousin, Margaret Benson, who taught me to think, and to care to think, my debt is lifelong.

To the teaching and guidance of my friend, Canon V. F. Storr, I am indebted for much of such knowledge of philosophy and theology as I possess : to his companionship and encouragement I owe even more.

To the advice and critical judgment of my wife, with wiiom every chapter has been read and re-read, the elimination of many obscurities is due. Without her constant help the errors of omission and commission would have been far more numerous than they now are.

To these three I dedicate this book.

S. A. McD.

WlNTON,

August 1912.

a 5

Preface To The Second Edition

THE favourable judgment which has been passed upon the first edition of this book emboldens me to believe that it has been, and may still be, useful to some who are oppressed more with the difficulties of their faith than with doubts as to its basis in reality. To such it is addressed ; not as an apologetic, but as a restatement of certain fundamental doctrines of Christianity from that point of view which the spirit of the age forces upon us ; not as a full and methodical treatise, but as a chain of reasoning which may be used to bind together further thoughts which are hinted at and suggested rather than elaborated. For each man must face his own problems himself ; and the problems of no two men are quite alike.

Such criticisms as have been levelled at the book point rather to sins of omission than of commission ; but in many instances the omissions were intentional, fuller treatment being foreign to the scheme I had in mind. Several of the suggestions that have been made to me, both by Reviewers, and by private correspondents, often personally unknown to me, have proved helpful and stimulating. To those who tendered them I offer my sincere thanks. I am particularly grateful

Preface to the Second Edition xi

to those Reviewers through whom I have been led to study Dr Denney's books. Though Chapter v was never meant to be more than a bare outline, the omission of any mention of Dr Denney's work was a grave mistake, which I have partly remedied in the present edition.

Criticism has been made of the absence of any analysis of the New Testament doctrine in regard to the Atonement. But this analysis has already been made by many far abler and more competent for the task than the present writer, and it would be sheer presumption on his part to attempt to add to what has been said by them. The task I set before myself was a far lighter one ; namely, to analyse very briefly the conclusions of scholars, and to use their results, themselves based on the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, to supply a clue to the relation between Sin and Atonement.

It may perhaps be well to mention that the statement, objected to as " unpardonably incorrect" by one Reviewer, that in the systems of certain of the Reformers " man's acceptance of Christ is based on terror," occurs in a passage which is quoted, though not verbatim, from Oxenham's Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement, p. 232 (3rd edition). The view is therefore not my own, though I believe it to be substantially true, as indeed McLeod Campbell affirms.

I trust that I have profited by certain criticisms of xii Preface to the Second Edition

minor points. In several cases I have tried to remove the obscurities and overstatements against which they were directed.

With one exception, no considerable changes have been made in this edition ; but a small amount of fresh matter has been added where it seemed that the text was open to misconception or required amplification ; and a considerable section has been added to the discussion of original sin. As formulated in the first edition, the conclusion reached in regard to this matter was open to serious objection, though the fact, and the reason for it, has escaped the notice of critics. I trust, however, that the fuller consideration of the matter given on pp. 144-151 will meet a difficulty which must appeal with special force to the mind of a biologist.

The problem of pain has also received somewhat fuller treatment.

No attempt has been made to supplement the book by a more detailed discussion of the bearing of the theory on personality and on the spiritual life. It seemed better to reserve this in the hope of offering some suggestions on these matters at a future date.

The one considerable change alluded to above is in regard to the treatment of the Atonement itself. The subject-matter of the book was originally intended to be covered by the title " Evolution and the need of Atonement." But reflection and criticism have shown

Preface to the Second Edition xiii

that a somewhat fuller consideration of the theory of the Atonement was needed, in order to give greater completeness and continuity. The link between the earlier and later parts of the book was too slender. Therefore, with much hesitation and unwillingness, I have inserted in the last chapter a brief outline of the thought which seems to me to strengthen that link. I trust, however, that it will be clearly understood that no attempt has been made to give a theory of the Atonement that is complete in itself, even so far as completeness is possible to our limited understanding. Only that aspect which is brought into prominence by the theory of sin elaborated in the earlier chapters has been treated, and that in the briefest manner possible.

S. A. McD.

WlNTON,

November 1913

Contents

PAGE

Introductory note by Bishop Ryle .... v

Preface vii

Preface to Second Edition x

Introduction xix

CHAPTER I Environment and Evolution

Essential factors in evolution :

(n) Heredity 3

(m) Overcrowding ........ 3

(iv) Impossibility of retrogression ..... 4

Design and teleology 5

Evolution as adaptation. Definition of environment 6

Environment and equilibrium .... 7

Main and side lines of evolution .... 8

The environment- sum ...... 9

Effect of changed environment on an organism . 11

Limitation and progress 12

Evolution as progressive adaptation. Discontinuous

variations 13

The threshold of spiritual phenomena . . . 15 The necessity of postulating a factor in the total

environment, of the nature of spirit . . . 16

The biological argument for Theism . . . 19

Teleology and chance 20

Note on Chapter I 21

Contents xv

CHAPTER II The Basis of Evolution

page

Questions to be considered 23

(i) The nature of evolution.

Huxley's indictment of the world-process as anti-moral 24

Solution of the Buddhists and Stoics : renunciation . 25 Solution of Huxley : to side with ethical process . 25 Solution of Nietzsche : to side with cosmic process 26 Fundamental fallacy in Huxley's antithesis between

ethical and cosmic processes .... 27

The two opposing principles are the degradation of energy, or Katabolism — the principle ruling the inanimate world ....... 29

And Anabolism — the principle whereby the living

organism stores up energy 30

Anabolism is victorious in the race, though Katabolism triumphs over the individual ... 32 (n) The cause of evolution.

The vital impulse ....... 34

(m) Consciousness and self -consciousness.

The struggle of consciousness towards expression . 36 Continuity between adaptation and the highest examples of mechanical skill in man .... 38

Consciousness and the vital impulse ... 38

CHAPTER III Evolution and Freedom

(iv) Creation wrought by the creature in its evolution.

(v) Freewill as a product of progress.

Freedom in response to a determinate environment . 42 Creative evolution 46 xvi Contents

PAOl

Continuity of unconscious adaptation and conscious

tool- making more fully considered ... 48

Predicable and non-predicable factors ... 52

Review of argument ...... 54

The demands of personality 66

(vi) Sin in relation to the evolutionary process.

The death of the individual and of the race contrasted 58 Man alone has the power of voluntary progress : is

sin failure to exercise this power ? 61

CHAPTER IV The Origin Of Sin

The theory of Tennant 88

Objections to this theory 64

Progress through ideals . . . . . <>7

Primitive belief 71

Continuity in the cosmos : in this lies the answer to

some objections to Tennant's theory . . . 73 Sin as misuse of experience, cheeking the growth of

spiritual freedom ....... 74

Personality and im mortality 79

CHAPTER V A Summary of Christian Thought on the Atonement

The biological survey 83

Irenaeus and Origen 86

Erigena 88

The Schoolmen : Anselm, Aquinas, Duns Scotus . 89 The Reformers : Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, Beza,

Zwingli 91

The Moderns : Wilberforce 94

Contents xvii

PAGE

Dale 95

McLeod Campbell, Essayists 97

Bethune-Baker 101

Moberly 103

Askwith Ill

The theological survey . . . . . .112

Ethical and personal bases for a theory of the Atonement 114

CHAPTER VI The Consequences of Sin

True evidence of teleology is found in the emergence

of freedom in living matter . . . . .120

The race and the individual 124

The consequences of sin 129

Consciousness and the vital impulse . . .134

Fundamentals of Atonement 138

The effect of individual sin on the race . . .140 Suggestions towards a biological theory of Original

CHAPTEB VII

The Atonement

Continuity demanded 152

God must free man from the consequences of his sin ;

man must set his will in line with the will of God 155 The solution must be sought in the spiritual plane . 155 Pain the condition of progress . . . .158 xviii Contents

PAGE

Creation as a Kenosis of the Godhead . . ,163

The Incarnation and Passion as a second Kenosis. 165 Union with God through union with the Perfect

Manhood of Christ, transcending time. . . 168

Pluralism resolved in union 172

Atonement for the Race 174

The fundamental altruism of the world-process 175

The perpetual renewal of the Atonement . . 177

Conclusion 181

Introduction

As the title indicates, the main object of this book is not to offer a new theory of the Atonement. Rather it is intended to show that when the origin and history of man are studied from the scientific, and especially the biological side, the spiritual life, its partial failure, and the need for Atonement, far from receding into vagueness and unreality, are thrown into strong relief.

Thus, the biological argument for the existence of God ; the underlying essential principle of the evolutionary process; the aim of the whole process — increasing freedom ; the beginnings and biological nature of sin ; the individual, self-conscious person ; the theological nature of sin ; the need of atonement, from the standpoints of theology and of biology ; are developed as a coherent, logical sequence. I believe that such a method of treatment is not merely permissible ; it has great reality and cogency, and, fully developed, would prove a valuable contribution to thought. In the last chapter certain points in regard to the Atonement are examined in the light of what has gone xx Introduction

before, and various suggestions are put forward in regard to their meaning and importance. Thus the book falls into two parts.

The first, and by far the longer, forms, I venture to believe, a logical chain of reasoning, leading to a definite conclusion — that when man's story is viewed in its biological aspect, the necessity of the Atonement emerges very clearly.

The second is far more tentative and suggestive. In it certain aspects of the Atonement wrought by Jesus Christ are considered briefly in relation to the argument developed in the previous chapters.

Two other points demand mention.

No attempt has been made to deal with the philosophical problem of Freewill. The existence of freedom in man has been assumed ; indeed the increase of freedom is argued to be the raison </'<tre of physical evolution. The nature of Personality also has not received any adequate consideration. Many works are devoted to the consideration of these matters ; the discussion of them would have been impossible within our limits, besides being hardly pertinent.

Chapter I Environment And Evolution

The biological conception we call evolution rests on the assumption, whose truth is attested by a vast amount of evidence, that organisms vary, and that those variations which tend towards the more perfect adaptation of the organism to its environment have the best chance of being perpetuated.

The four essential factors are variability, heredity, overcrowding, tending to the elimination of those organisms less suited than their kin to cope with their environment, and lastly the apparent impossibility of retrogression. That very many other factors have played a more or less important part in the evolution of the animal and plant world as we see it to-day is true. But for our present purpose we may confine ourselves to those we have mentioned.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary that we should examine carefully what exact meaning we propose to assign to the factors we have selected.

(I) Apart from any philosophical exactitude, it is quite clear to all of us that no two living organisms, plant or animal, are quite alike. We may isolate a

2 Variation

small group, all sprung from the same parents, and we shall still find differences ; not perhaps any very striking ones, though this is by no means necessarily so, but at any rate peculiarities quite marked enough for us to differentiate individual from individual. We may go still further and examine individuals all produced at one birth, and still we find differences.

Some of these differences will no doubt be due to the diverse conditions under which the individuals live : we may plant two nasturtium seeds one against a north wall, the other against a south wall, and we shall find that the first becomes " leggy," climbs higher and higher seeking the sun, and produces few flowers and little fruit until it reaches the top of the wall, while the other develops flowers and fruit all up its stem ; it is not with such differences we are concerned. The cause of them is obvious and superficial ; they are acquired characters, and we shall leave them out of consideration at present. But the others are far more deep-seated ; there seems to be no reason for them, and they have properties which differentiate them enormously in degree, if not fundamentally in kind, from acquired characters. Their cause is biologically unexplained, from the nature of the case biologically inexplicable ; " it is a datum in the world of life 1 ." They are due to something in the organism itself, and the property of producing them is inherent

1 Cf. J. Arthur Thomson, Heredity, p. 100.

Heredity and the Struggle for Existence 3

in all living matter. The direction of the variation of a group of individuals may possibly be determined to some extent by the surroundings of the parent organism, but there is certainly no immediate connection between the characters acquired by the parent and the variations appearing in the offspring. Of course as a rule 1 they are slight, and would appear trivial to a superficial observer, but none the less they lie at the bottom of all evolution.

(II) Now the characteristic property of these deep-seated differences, or variations properly so called, is that they are hereditarily transmissible. It is in this that they differ absolutely in kind, or at any rate so enormously in degree that for our purposes we may assume that the difference is in kind, from the acquired differences we have mentioned. It is not necessary or desirable to discuss the details of their transmission here : we are not concerned with biological controversies ; the fact that on the whole these true variations tend to be transmitted to the offspring if both parents possess them, often if they are possessed only by one parent, is all that concerns us.

(III) But the total number of organisms, whether animal or plant, that comes into the world is inconceivably greater than the number that can eventually survive. A single turbot lays about nine million eggs a year. A white-ant queen lays 80,000 eggs a day.

1 Not always, as will be explained later.

1—2

4 Natural Selection — Retrogression

And so there comes about a struggle for existence leading to the elimination of the less fit. On the whole those that survive will be those that are in some way better fitted to cope with their environment than their fellows.

(IV) But suppose that some unforeseen change of conditions makes the line of development entered upon by an organism unsuitable ? Could not an exactly opposite process take place, and the organism pass through the stages it has already traversed, in the reverse order, changing from the more complex to the simpler, till it reaches its starting point once again and is free to evolve in a more suitable manner? This would only be a kind of inverse selection, the less unfit organisms having the better chance of survival, and at fir^t sight the process seems natural enough. But it does not occur, to any appreciable extent at all events 1 ; more, it could not occur except sporadically for two reasons, as we shall see later. This is what we mean by the impossibility of retrogression, of a reversal of the order of evolution. It must not be confused with the familiar phenomenon of the atrophic degeneration of organs not used, an elementary example of which

1 The question of the existence of what are called " retrogromutations " is not taken into consideration here. Biologists will realise that it does not affect the broad aspect of evolution, and so is of no importance to the matter in hand. For details of retrogressive mutations see Lock, Recent progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution, and The Mutation Theory, by H. de Vries.

The Argument from Design 5

is seen in the wings of the farm-yard duck, and an advanced stage of the same in the kiwi and kakapo of New Zealand and in the ostrich. Here the gradual reduction to vestiges is due simply to the combined action of lack of use leading to atrophy, and of intercrossing with absence of selection — what Weismann called panmixia.

Thus the earliest form of the Design-Argument, which found evidence of direct mechanical contrivance in every form of adaptation to the conditions of existence, has passed away with the growth of an understanding that such adaptation must necessarily be found on every side in a world where the only chance of survival lay in responsiveness to environmental conditions.

It has been superseded by the doctrine that the

existence of progress implies an end ; that the very idea

of development is purposive, teleological, or it would

be indeterminate, tending to no goal 1 ; that design, in

the sense of purpose, is to be seen in each stage of

development, in that each stage is a step towards an

end ; that the value of the stages is to be sought, at all

events mainly, in their final interpretation. But if one

may be permitted to use that very dangerous weapon,

1 In this chapter the word indeterminate is used in the sense of vague, purposeless, almost chaotic. It is necessary to note this, as in a later chapter it is used, following M. Bergson, in the sense of free, not fore-ordained.

6 Adaptation

William Occam's razor, does not this doctrine contain something " praeter necessitatem " ! Would a development not externally directed necessarily be indeterminate ? And if not, shall we not have to look yet deeper before we can postulate Design even in the modified form of teleology ?

Evolution is adaptation to environment. Why then should it be progressive and continuous ? Why should not each set of organisms reach a dead-level of comparative perfection ? The question could only arise from an imperfect conception of the term environment. Let us examine what we mean by it.

In its broadest sense the word connotes all factors which can influence the organism., however remotely only in its present stage, but in all future stages.

Thus it becomes clear that each adaptation which brings, let us say, a more perfect method of locomotion must bring the organism into relation with a whole series of fresh conditions, still part of its environment, which will in their turn require thousands of generations before perfect adaptation is reached. But we must go further than this. By its own changes the organism creates fresh conditions for itself and for other organisms. One can conceive that the evolution of the Greenland whale introduced very considerable additions into the environment of the jelly-fish and pteropods it feeds upon. Thus what one may call the environment-sum is never completed while development is

Equilibrium 7

progressing. Each organism creates as it evolves, creates a new environment for itself and for others. To this also we shall have to return later.

Evolution now presents itself to us under a somewhat different aspect as the continual effort of the organism to reach equilibrium with its environment.

If it be true however that each minutest adaptation brings the organism into relation, to a greater or less degree, with a fresh series of environmental conditions, it must take ages for any organism to reach a complete equilibrium with a complex environment, and if the environment were itself increased, as we have seen is the case, complete equilibrium would never be reached ; the organism would always be approaching perfection, but would never attain it. The curve of progress would be asymptotic. But positions of stable equilibrium might be reached without this complete equilibrium, i.e. without complete adaptation to the whole environment, for an equilibrium-position will be reached when further adaptation along the particular line of development would be disadvantageous. And these equilibrium-positions need not necessarily mean identity of organisation in the various organisms. For suppose two variations to occur at one given stage, neither being disadvantageous to the organism at that stage. Obviously each brings its possessor into fresh relations which will differ to a greater or less extent. This will necessarily lead to two divergent lines of

8 Main and Side Lines

development — lines diverging without any possibility of ultimate approach, since approach would imply a less perfect adaptation to the then environment of the organism for the sake of an ultimate adaptation to a fuller and somewhat different environment ; would imply retrogression ; would imply a process involving a strange teleology indeed !

This explains the existence of side-lines of development, and involves too the possibility at least of a direct line of progress towards an absolutely complete adaptation, even if that can never be quite achieved. We must not forget however that each stage of development imposes fresh limitations, as well as supplies a fresh horizon for the organism. Thus for a given organism at a given moment there is a definite total environment, or set of conditions which can then, or may possibly in the future be able to, affect it ; but each stage of progress, while introducing fresh conditions in the present, also reduces, perhaps to a very great extent, the number of possible conditions before included in its total environment which might affect it in the future, for there is no going back. For instance, when certain fishes began to take more and more to the land, they were gradually exempted from all the conditions of the sea-life which before had been a large part of their total environment 1 . To put it simply,

1 What can we say, then, of a land-organism which once more betakes itself to the sea ? Let us take for example the whale. It can in Evolution 9

each stage of development circumscribes the future possibilities. It is clear from what has been said that the variation possibilities for an organism at any given stage are limited, and at each stage fresh limitations are imposed ; so that although its actual environment, or acting-environment, ma) 7 be increasing, yet its total environment, or the sum of all the conditions that can act on it now or in the future and make it evolve further, is becoming less. True, each organism creates as it varies and so makes for itself and for other organisms fresh conditions ; but as time goes on more and more organisms being off the main line of evolution reach, or at least approach, an equilibrium position, and consequently the increase of these secondarilycreated environmental conditions becomes progressively less.

Thus for a given organism at a given moment there may be a definite total environment, differing from the total environment of another organism, probably of every other organism, while yet one may speak of an ultimate " environment-sum " that comprehends all conditions. This " environment-sum" must include the " total environments " of all organisms, or their lowest

never return to true gills and fins of the same nature as, or as zoologists would say, homologous with, those of a fish. At best it can but develop similar or analogous organs, and it will be so far behind the fish in adaptation to marine conditions that its efforts may be regarded as hopeless : it has tried to turn back, failed, and is eventually added to nature's flotsam and jetsam, being incapable of further progress.

10 The Environment-Sum

common multiple one might almost say, but it may include another term whose magnitude cannot be determined, and which cannot be recognised since it has not yet begun to influence any organism. And, as we shall see, this is of very great importance. Expressed algebraically, S € ■ a e f &,, 4 c, , + . . . + x e . But we have neglected to take into account that environment which is constantly being created by each organism. And here we are landed in a difficulty. Up to a certain point what is created is a function of the total environment of the organism, and we could complete our formula by adding J (a,) +f (fc<>), etc. But there are functions not only unknown but unknowable, and here in reality our argument breaks down. This break is of the utmost importance, in its bearing on the matters we have to consider in a later chapter, for in it lies freedom. For the present however we may disregard it, and assume that our formula is complete.