A history of the Sepoy War in India 1857-1858

Chapter I. The Conquest Of The Punjab And Pegu

FAOZ

The Administration of Lord Dalhousie — His Tarewell Minute — Ueirospect of the First Sikh War— Tiie Military Occupation of the Punjab— Tiie Council of Regency— The Second Sikh War— The Annexation of the Punjab — Its Administration under tlie Lawrences — The Conquest of Pegu 1

CHAPTER II. THE "right OE lapse."

The Administration of Lord Dalhousie — Adoption — The *' Right of Lapse" — Sattarah — Nagpore — Jhansi — Kerowlee — The Carnatic — Tanjore — Tiie Case of the Peishwah — DundooPunt, Nana Sahib — Sumbhulnore 69

Chapter III. The Annexation Of Oude

The Annexation of Oude — Early History of the Province — The Treaty of 1801^-Effects of the Double Government— Creation of tlie Kingship — Progress of Misrule — Repeated Warnings — The Unratified Treaty — Colonel Sleeman's Reports — Lord Dalhousie's Minute — Yiews of the Court of Directors — Sir James Outram Piesident — Annexation proclaimed 112

VI CONTENTS.

Chapter IV

mOGKESS OF ENGLISHISM.

Destruction of the Native Aristocracy — Retrospect of Eeveniie Administration — The Settlement of the North-West Provinces — The Ousting of the Talookhdars — Resumption Operations — The Inam Commission — Decay of Priestly Power — Social Reforms — Moral and Material Progress 153

Chapter I. Ea.rly History Of The Native Army

The Sepoy Army of the Company — Its Rise and Progress — TliePirst Mutiny in Bengal— Deteriorating Influences — Degradation of the Native Officer — The Reorganisation of 1796 — Progress of Innovation — The Mutiny of Yellore — Later Signs of Disaffection — Causes of the Mutiny 201

CHAPTER IL

DETERIORATING INFLUENCES.

Subsidence of Alarm— The Soldier in England and in India — The Sepoy and his Officer — Deteriorating Influences — The Drainage of the Staff — Progress of Centralisation — The Reorganisation of 1824 — The Barrackpore Mutiny— The Half-Batta Order— Abolition of Corporal Punishment . .252

Chapter III. The Sindh Mutinies

The War in Afghanistan — Pernicious Effects of Defeat— The Annexation of Scinde — Results of Extension of Empire — The Indus Allowances — Mutiny of the Thirty-fourth Regiment — Embarrassments of Government — The March of the Sixty-fourth — Mutiny at Shikarpore — Disaffection in the Madras Army .... 274

CONTENTS. Vli

Chapter IV. The Punjab Mutinies

Page

The War on the Sutlej — Tlie Patna Conspiracy — Attempt to Corrupt the Sepoys at Dinapore — The Occupation of the Punjab — Annexation and its Effects — Reduction of the Sepoy's Pay — The Mutinies at Rawul Pindee and Govindghur — Lord Dallionsie and Sir Charles Napier 303

Chapter V. Discipline Of The Bengal Army

Character of the Bengal Sepoy — Conflicting Opinions— Caste-^The Seniority System — The Officering of the Army — Regular and Irregular Regiments — Want of Europeans — The Crimean War — Indian Public Opinion — Summary of Deteriorating Influences . • 324

Book Iii.— The Outbreak Of The Mutiny. Chapter I. Loud Canning And His Council

Departure of Lord Dalhousie — His Character— The Question of Succession — Arrival of Lord Canning — His Early Career— Commencement of his Administration — His Fellow-Councillors — General Low — Mr. Dorin — Mr. Grant— Mr. Barnes Peacock — The Commander-in-Chief 353

CHAPTER II.

THE OUDE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PERSIAN WAR.

Lord Canning's Eirst Year— The Oude Commission— Waj id AH and the Embassy to England — The Persian War — The Question of Command— James Outram — Central-Asian Policy — Dost Mahomed — John Lawrence and Herbert Edwardes at Peshawur — Henry Lawrence in Lucknow ... 39 5

Vlll CONTENTS.

CHAPTER III.

TH2 RISING OF THE STORM.

PAGB

Lord Canning and tlie Army — The Call for " More Officers" — Dread of the Black "Water — The General Service Enlistment Act — Anxieties and Alarms — Missionary Efforts— Proselytising Officers — Political Inquietudes — The Prophecy of Fifty-seven . . . .455

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST MUTINY.

The new Rifled Musket— The Story of the Greased Cartridges — Dum-Dum and Barrackpore — Excitement in the Native Regiments — Events at Berhampore— Mutjnv of th** "^J'neteenth Regiment — Conduct of Colonel MitcijeJ . . . • • . .487

CHAPTER V.

PROGRESS OF MUTINY.

Causes of delayed Action — The Government and tlie Departments — Investigation of the Cartridge Question — Progress of Disaffection at, Jbarrackpore — The Story of Mungul Pandy — Mutiny ot tne Thirty-fourth — Disbandment of the Nineteenth . . . .510

Chapter VI. Excitement In Upper India

Progress of Alarm — The Panic at Umballah — General Anson and the Rifle Depots — Incendiary Eires — General Barnard — Events at Meerut — The Bone-dust Elour — The Story of the Chupatties — Intrigues of the Nana Sahib 548

Chapter VII. Bursting Of The Storm

The Montli of May — General Survey of Affairs — State of Feeling at the Rifle Depots — The Rising Storm in Oude — The Revolt at Meerut — The Seizure of Delhi — Measures of Lord Canning — The Call for Succours 581

FKEFAOE-

It was not without mucli hesitation that I undertook to write this narrative of the events, which have imparted so painful a celebrity to the years 1857-58, and left behind them such terrible remembrances. Publicly and privately I had been frequently urged to do so, before I could consent to take upon myself a responsibility, which could not sit lightly on any one capable of appreciating the magnitude of the events themselves and of the many grave questions which they suggested. If, indeed, it had not been that, in course of time, I found, either actually in my hands or within my reach, materials of history such as it was at least improbable that any other writer could obtain, I should not have ventured upon so difficult a task. But having many important collections of papers in my possession, and having received promises of further assistance from surviving actors in the scenes to be described, I felt that, though many might write a better history of the Sepoy War, no one could write a more truthful one.

X PKEFACE.

So, relying on these external advantages to compensate all inherent deficiencies, I commenced what I knew must be a labour of years, but what I felt would be also a labour of love. My materials were too ample to be otherwise than most sparingly displayed. The prodigal citation of authorities has its advantages ; but it encumbers the text, it impedes the narrative, and swells to inordinate dimensions the record of historical events. On a former occasion, when I laid before the public an account of a series of important transactions, mainly derived from original documents, public and private, I quoted those documents freely both in the text and in the notes. As I was at that time wholly unknown to the public, it was necessary that I should cite chapter and verse to obtain credence for my statements. There was no ostensible reason why I should have known more about those transactions than any other writer (for it was merely the accident of private friendships and associations that placed such profuse materials in my possession), and it seemed to be imperative upon me therefore to produce my cr© dentials. But, believing that this necessity no longer exists, I have in the present work abstained from adducing my authorities, for the mere purpose of substantiating my statements. I have quoted the voluminous correspondence in my possession only where there is some dramatic force and propriety in the words cited, or when they appear calculated, without impeding the narrative, to give colour and vitality to the story.

And here I may observe that, as on former occasions, the historical materials which I have moulded into this narrative are rather of a private than of a public character. I have made but little use

PREFACE. XI

of recorded official documents. I do not mean that access to such documents has not been extremely serviceable to me; but that it has rather afforded the means of verifying or correcting statements received from other sources than it has supplied me with original materials. So far as respects the accumulation of facts, this History would have differed but slightly from what it is, if I had never passed the door of a public office ; and, generally, the same may be said of the opinions which I have expressed. Those opinions, whether sound or unsound, are entirely my own personal opinions — opinions in many instances formed long ago, and confirmed by later events and more mature consideration. No one but myself is responsible for them ; no one else is in any way identified with them. In the wide range of inquiry embraced by the consideration of the manifold causes of the great convulsion of 1857, almost every grave question of Indian government and administration presses forward, with more or less importunity, for notice. Where, on many points, opinions widely differ, and the policy, which is the practical expression of them, takes various shapes, it is a necessity that the writer of cotemporary history, in the exercise of independent thought, should find himself dissenting from the doctrines and disapproving the actions of some authorities, living and dead, who are worthy of all admiration and respect. It is fortunate, when, as in the present instance, this difference of opinion involves no diminution of esteem, and the historian can discern worthy motives, and benevolent designs, and generous strivings after good, in those whose ways he may think erroneous and whose course of action he may deem unwise.

Xll PREFACE.

Indeed, the errors of which I have freely spokeit were, for the most part, strivings after good. It was in the over-eager pursuit of Humanity and Civilisation that Indian statesmen of the neAv school were betrayed into the excesses which have been so grievously visited upon the nation. The story of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 is, perhaps, the most signal illustration of our great national character ever yet recorded in the annals of our country. It was the vehement self assertion of the Englishman that produced this conflagration ; it was the same vehement self-assertion that enabled him, by God's blessing, to trample it out. It was a noble egotism, mighty alike in doing and in suffering, and it showed itself grandly capable of steadfastly confronting the dangers which it had brought down upon itself. If I have any predominant theory it is this : Because we were too English the great crisis arose ; but it was only because we were English that, when it arose, it did not utterly overwhelm us.

It is my endeavour, also, to show how much both of the dangers which threatened British dominion in the East, and of the success with which they were encountered, is assignable to the individual characters of a few eminent men. With this object I have sought to bring the reader face to face with the principal actors in the events of the Sepoy War, and to take a personal interest in them. If it be true that the best history is that which most nearly resembles a bundle of biographies, it is especially true w^hen said with reference to Indian history ; for nowhere do the characters of individual Englishmen impress themselves with a more vital reality upon the annals of the country in which they live ; nowhere are there such great opportunities of independent action ; nowhere

PREFACE. Xiii

are developed such capacities for evil or for good, as in our great Anglo-Indian Empire. If, then, in such a work as this, the biographical element were not prominently represented — if the individualities of such men as Dalhousie and Canning, as Henry and John Lawrence, as James Outram, as John Nicholson, and Herbert Edwardes, were not duly illustrated, there would be not only a cold and colourless, but also an unfaithful, picture of the origin and progress of the War. But it is to be remarked that, in proportion as the individuality of the English leaders is distinct and strongly marked, that of the chiefs of the insurrectionary movement is faint and undecided. In the fact of this contrast we see the whole history of the success which, by God's providence, crowned the eiForts of our countrymen. If the individual energies of the leaders of the revolt had been commensurate with the power of the masses, we might have failed to extinguish such a conflagration. But the whole tendency of the English system had been to crush out those energies :, «o again, I say, we found in the very circumstances which had excited the rebellion the very elements of our success in suppressing it. Over the Indian Dead Level which that system had created, the English heroes marched triumphantly to victory.

In conclusion, I have only to express my obhgations to those who have enabled me to write this History by supplying me with the materials of which it is composed. To the executors of the late Lord Canning, who placed in my hands the private and demi-official correspondence of the deceased &ti*.t<^sman, extending over the whole term of his Indian administration, I am especially indebted. To Sir John Lawrence and Sir Herbert Edwardes, who have

XIV PREFACE.

furnished me with the most valuable materials for my narrative of the rising in the Punjab and the measures taken in that province for the re-capture of Delhi ; to the family of the late Colonel Baird Smith, for many interesting papers illustrative of the operations of the great siege ; to Sir James Outram, who gave me before his death his correspondence relating to the brilliant operations in Oude ; to Sir Robert Hamilton, for much valuable matter in elucidation of the history of the Central Indian Campaign ; and to Mr. E. A. Reade, whose comprehensive knowledge of the progress of events in the North-Western Provinces has been of material service to me, my warmest acknowledgments are due. But to no one am I more indebted than to Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India, who has permitted me to consult the official records of his Department — a privilege which has enabled me to make much better use of the more private materials in my possession. No one, however, can know better or feel more strongly than myself, that much matter of interest contained in the multitudinous papers before me is unrepresented in my narrative. But such omissions are the necessities of a history so full of incident as this. If I had yielded h} tlie temptation to use urj illustrative materials more freely, I should have expanded this work beyond all acceptable liinits,

London, October, IS 64.

. . , For to think that an handful of people can, vmn the

GREATEST COURAGE AND POLICY IN THE WORLD, EMBRACE TOO LARGE EX- TENT OF DOMINION, IT MAY HOLD FOR A TIME, BUT IT WILL FAIL SUDDENLY.

— Bacon.

... As FOR MERCENARY FORCES (WHICH IS THE HELP IN THIS CASE), ALL EXAMPLES SHOW THAT, WHATSOEVER ESTATE, OR PRINCE, DOTH REST UPON THEM, HE MAY SPREAD HIS FEATHERS FOR A TIME, BUT HE WILL MEW THEM SOON AFTER. — BaCOn.

If THERE BE FUEL PREPARED, IT IS HARD TO TELL WHENCE THE SPARK SHALL COME THAT SHALL SET IT ON FIRE. ThE MATTER OF SEDITIONS IS OF TWO KINDS, MUCH POVERTY AND MUCH DISCONTENTMENT. It IS CERTAIN, SO MANY OVERTHROWN ESTATES, SO MANY VOTES FOR TROUBLES. . . . ThE CAUSES AND MOTIVES FOR SEDITION ARE, INNOVATIONS IN RELIGION, TAXES, ALTERATION OF LAWS AND CUSTOMS, BREAKING OF PRIVILEGES, GENERAL OPPRESSION, ADVANCEMENT OF UNWORTHY PERSONS, STRANGERS, DEATHS, DISBANDED SOLDIERS, FACTIONS GROWN DESPERATE ; AND WHATSOEVER IN OFFENDING PEOPLE JOINETH AND KNITTETH THEM IN A COMMON CAUSE.—

Bacon.

mSTORY OF THE SEPOY WAR.