Watson's theological institutes defended...

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^Ui\ITED:STATES OF AMERICA. J

WATSOS''S

THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTES

Preface

When we read in the Quarterly Review the article which finally moved us to write the following pages, we confidently expected to see replies from strong men occupying the position of watchmen upon the walls of our Zion ; but our expectations have been entirely disappointed ; for although nearly twelve months have passed away since its appearing, nothing has appeared save notices of approval, and some of these from men of high standing in our Church. These approving notices on the part of some, and entire silence on the part of all others, sufficiently indicate the prevalence of the sentiments therein contained, and to which we have felt it our duty to object. We are fully aware, too, that the teachings here opposed are far more congenial with the popular sentiment of the day, than are the teachings which we oppose to them. ISTor are we ignorant of the fact, that they are multitudinous who recognize no authority but reason^ and no God but nature^ which of

4: PEEFACE.

course, are defined to be anything, and everytliing, according to the whims of their worshippers. From this class it is not at all likely that our little performance will have many admirers ; though we still indulge the liope that it may be useful to some of them. Eyerything considered, we confess we are forcibly reminded of the well-known proverb, Athanasius contra mundum. But while the opposition in each case may be similar, the parties opposed are very difi*erent ; yet, even this does not discourage us when we remember that truth, " God hath chosen the weak things of this world to confound the things which are mighty." Resting here, and merely claiming credit for sincerity of belief and honesty of purpose, and simply desiring a candid criticism, we commit the following thoughts to the wide, wide world of mind, trusting that by the blessing of God, to whose care we commend them, they will battle successfully with error, and exert a salutary influence on that world of mind in all time to come.

To those with whom I have felt it iny duty to join issue, I have the kindest feeling, and cheerfully concede to them what I claim for myself, sincerity of belief and honesty of purpose.

In view of the variety and difficulty of the subjects discussed in the following x^^g^s, it would be folly to claim, or expect, that there is no mistake ; but whether the mistakes be many or few, we have as yet failed to

PREFACE. 5

discover them. To mere fault-finders we have nothing to say : they are a class of people of whom no one has a higKopinion, and their mere fanlt-finding is utterly unworthy of notice.

To those who are not acquainted with Watson's Theological Institutes, and who do not feel particularly interested in their defence, a few of the following pages may not be very interesting ; with this exception, however, the subjects discussed are so various and important that their discussion cannot fail to be interesting to all.

It is quite evident that most of the views opposed in the following pages are becomings increasingly popular ; and it is equally evident that they are utterly irreconcilable with those views hitherto denominated orthodox ; therefore, whichever side is right, the sooner the issue is joined the better. ,

We have already mentioned " Fleming's Yocabulary of Philosophy," and will here acknowledge our indebtedness to that excellent little volume, both for thoughts and definitions.

John Levington.

Saline, March 27, 1863.

WATSON'S THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTES AND THE BIBLE DEFENDED.

CHAPTEE I.

The first article in the Methodist Quarterly Meview for April, 1862, is entitled "Metaphysics of Watson's Institutes." This title would indicate that Watson's Metaphysics 07ily^ are involved in the discussion ; but this is not the case, for his theological teachings are deeply involved, as we shall soon see. It is not this article alone that moves us to write this defence ; certainly we would not make such an efibrt merely to refute the views of an individual. The teachings to which we object are, in the main, and claim to be, those of a certain school of philosophy, and are presented to us as some of the last and best discoveries of philosophical research. These views are, and always have been popular with the sceptical classes of society ; but of late, if we mistake not, they are becoming more and more popular amongst other and very different classes of society. These, and other facts which will be called forth in the course of our investigations, are not only sufficient to justify us in attempting this defence, but will, we trust, secure the deep attention of every lover of truth, on whatever side the truth may be supposed to lie, seeing

8 watson'^ theological institutes

we take the ground that the teachings which we oppose are at variance with Scripture and matter of fact, and that to a very serious extent, as we expect to show.

The author of the article under consideration, after some preliminary remarks, proceeds thus :

" That we may clearly apprehend the* philosophical views of Mr. Watson, and fairly estimate their influence on his theology, it will be necessary that we glance at the systems of philosophy which were prevalent and influential in his day. There are two schools of philosophy which may be said to have divided and given direction to the philosophic thought of the last century : the Sensational, or Empirical, and the Transcendental, or Rational, Their representatives respectively may be found in Locke and Kant : Locke at the head of the Sensational, Kant at the head of the Transcendental School."

After some remarks upon the prevailing and distinguishing tenets of those schools, which tenets will be no- * ticed in due time, our reviewer reaches his first conclusion thus : " So much being preniised, we have now no difiiculty in determining Mr. Watson's relations to the prevailing schools of philosophy. Unquestionably he attaches himself to the system of Locke ; he was a disciple of the Empirical School."

IS^ow we decidedly object to this mode of procedure ; we hold that Watson's Listitutes should be tried upon their own merits ; it is a review of " Watson's Metaphysics " that is undertaken, not the philosophic schools of his day. Moreover, it is doing Watson a gross injustice to represent him, in the entire absence of evidence, as being led by Locke, or by any other man or number of men ; and it is calculated even to prejudice the reviewer and his readers against Watson, at the very commencement of the investigation. The deep-thinking, lofty-minded, self-made Watson, is the last man that we should suspect of being ^ed, even by " the over-towering and all-pervading philosophy of Locke." So far from this, it seems quite evident that one special object of his mission was to rescue the great principles of religion out of the hands of bold, vain, speculative, and sceptical philosophers, a work for which he Avas admirably adapted, and in which he was gloriously successful. Nor is his work done ; we have strong confidence that his Institutes will do in this country and age what they did in his own. And so far was he from being led by Locke,^ that he joined issue with him on the subject of government, which that philosopher and his followers called " the social compact." This idea of the man whose " imperial name ruled supreme in the English Universities and schools of learning," Mr. Watson boldly pronounced " a pure fiction." He quotes this same philosopher approvingly in. the following instances, viz., as to his definition of moral good and evil ; as to the necessity of divine authority to enforce moral precepts ; and as to his statement that the bulk of mankind have neither leisure nor capacity for close, consecutive reasoning and demonstration. More than this we do no-t find that he quotes this great man at all. Why then is it asserted, " unquestionably he attaches himself to the system of Locke." He did with the teachmg of Locke just what he did with that of all other men : he indorsed what he thought was right, and rejected what he thought was wrong. Li proof of this we adduce a single fact just here. ■ Having examined the Institutes with reference to this very thing, we find, if we count right, that he quotes from as many as three hundred leading systems, schools, and individuals ; giving us their leading philosophical and theological views, or principles, and, at the 1* same time, rejecting or indorsing according as he approves or (Jisapproves ; and giving us his reasons for so doing. The systems, schools, and persons thus quoted, flourished ill different countries, and at different times, from the earliest period of history to his own times ; nor does he hesitate to dissent from those whom he esteemed and loved most, as will be seen by all who carefully read his " Institutes," " Expositions," and published sermons.

But having declared Watson to be " a sensationalist, a disciple of the empirical school," he is made accountable for the teachings of that school, and of every individual belonging to it ; hence it is quite an easy matter to make out a bill of charges. The appellation itself, too, will assist very much in making out such a bill. Empiric : Latin, empiricus / Greek, empeirikos^ that is, one who makes experiments ; a quack, who, being destitute of scientific skill, merely experimentizes. Hence this school, according to our reviewer (Review, p. 182), "Holds that all simple ideas existing in the human mind are the direct and only result of sensation, and that all our knowledge is derived from experience. Not only the matter of our ideas, but also their form / not merely the occasion of our ideas, but their cause is from without. The mind itself does not supply one element of truth. It has no standards of truth within itself. Nor does it, of itself, affirm any first principles, anyprimitive cognitions, judgments, or beliefs which are necessary to the attainment of truth. The human mind is an empty vessel, into which our sensations — a heterogeneous mixture — are poured from the external world, upon which the mind itself exerts no modifying influence, does not even give a color to the liquid, but simply retains it in memory until it shall crystallize into the classifications of science. Or, to employ the favorite figure of Locke himself, the mind is a ' tabula rasa,' a blank sheet of paper, void of all characters, and without any ideas, on which the external world, by a species of photography, writes itsown images, and those which bear a strong resemblance naturally blend so as to form species and genera, the highest generalization becoming the apex of all science.

Jfan, therefore, has 7io ideas of right and wrong, of duty, of o,ccoiintahility, of retribution, of immortality, or of God, except as derived from without. This school of philosophy landed, as indeed it must inevitably land, in pure materialism, and numbers among its disciples, or, more properly, its high priests, such writers as Hartley, Priestley, Combe, and Aug. Comte." Such was the school of which Watson was a disciple. Such were his fellow disciples and high priests, and such the tendency of the whole " that it landed, as indeed it must inevitably land, in pure materialism." The reviewer, however, very kindly apologizes for Watson thus : "It would ill become us to complain that Mr. Watson should have entertained these views. They were the prevailing opinions of his country and age. They were entertained by Locke, Ellis, Leland, Horsley, and other equally distinguished and honored names. Watson has, at least, this advantage — he stands amid illustrious men. Yet we can ill conceal our regrets. His design was noble and praiseworthy. He sought to prove the necessity of oral revelation, and vindicate for it the honor of furnishing all our knowledge of God, duty, and immortality ; but in thus attempting to build up a strong presumption in favor of revealed religion by rejecting the intuitions of the human mind, and casting doubt upon the veracity of our faculties, the foundations of all truth are loosened and unsettled ; yea, the very fundamental truths upon which we must plant our argument in demonstrating the truth of a revelation from God ; and the inquiring mind is cast afloat upon an open sea of doubt." Poor Watson ! lie meant well, but, alas ! by his teachings " the foundations of all truth are loosened and unsettled; yea, the very fundamental truths (I had supposed that these were included in all truth) ; and the inquiring mind is cast afloat upon an open sea of doubt." (P. 186.)

Now, on the part of the reviewer, this apology may be very kind, but we respectfully decline its acceptance ; not only because the charges are utterly untrue, and, consequently, the apology uncalled for, but because we consider it little, if anything, better than an insult. Mr. Watson is prejudged, condemned, and apologized for, even before his case is examined. A certain school and certain men are represented as holding certain views, which we do not here pause to pronounce right or wrong, and Watson and those men are declared to be disciples of this school, and empirics and sensationalists, whose principles are erroneous in the last degree, so much so that the whole "landed, as indeed it must inevitably land, in pure materiahsm." Thus Watson is placed in company with these men, simply, it would seem, that with them he may be condemned.

It is necessary just here, we think, to give some attention to appellations and terms^ in the use of which the reviewer is very faulty. He assumes, for instance, that the appellations sensationalist and empiric are interchangeable, as being of synonymous import. Hence the school to which he assumes Watson attaches himself, he denominates " the sensational or em]3irical," and is indifierent, consequently, as to which of the appellations he applies to Watson. He should know that these appellations are not synonymous and, consequently, not interchangeable. Empiricism is based on experience^ and sensationalism on sen^

ANB THE BIBLE DEFENDED. 13

sation alone : the latter is what Fichte calls " the dirt philosophy." "The empirical philosophers," says Bacon, " are like pismires, they only lay up and use their store. The rationalists are like the sjDiders, they spin all out of their own bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by his own virtue." How much Watson resembles the bee in the particulars here specified may be seen in the facts which we have already stated, and will be seen still more clearly in facts to be stated in the course of our investigations ; so that in these particulars, at least, Watson is one of those philosophers whom Bacon so much admired. Mr. C. is also at fault in using certain terms as though their meaning were fixed and agreed upon by philosophers generally, whereas this is very far from being the fact. Hence Mr. C. has no right to conclude Mr. W.'s views merely from his rejecting or indorsing those terms ; it is necessary to specify the sense in which he understands the terms indorsed or rejected, seeing different philosophers use them with different latitudes of meaning.

Intuition^ for instance, is a word which conveys different ideas, as used by different philosophers. As it is used by some, neither Locke nor Watson would object to it ; while they utterly reject it in the sense in which others use it. In his " Essay on the Human Understanding," Locke says : " Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other ; and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge." He gives other instances of what he thinks may be called the intuitive ; yet Mr. C. represents both Locke and Watson as denying all " intuitive beliefs." Taylor, in his " Elements of Thought,"

says : " What we know or comprehend, as soon as we perceive or attend to it, we are said to know by intuition / things which we know by intuition cannot be made more certain by arguments than they are at first. We know by intuition that all the parts of a thing together are equal to the whole of it. Axioms are propositions known by intuition.''''

" Intuition has been applied by Dr. Beattie and others, not only to the power by which we perceive the truth of the axioms of geometry, but to that by which we recognize the authority of the fundamental laws of belief, when we hear them enunciated in language. My only objection to this use of the word is, that it is a departure from common practice ; according to which, if I be not mistaken, the proper objects of intuition are propositions analogous to the axioms prefixed to Euclid's Elements. In some other respects this innovation might perhaps be regarded as an improvement on the very limited and imperfect vocabulary of which we are able to avail ourselves in our present discussion." (Stewart's " Elements.")

" Perception is singular, incomplex, and immediate, i. e., is intuition. When I see a star, or hear the tones of a harp, the perceptions are immediate, incomplex, and inttiitive. This is the good old logical meaning of the word i7ituition. In our philosophic Avritings, however, intuitive and intuition have come to be applied solely to propositions ; it is here extended to the first elements of perception, whence such propositions spring. Again, intuitio7i, m English, is restricted to perceptions a priori; but the established logical use and wont applies the word to every incomplex representation whatever ; and it is left for further and more dee]) inquiry to ascertain what intuitions arc founded on observation and experience, and what arise from ct priori sources." (Semple, " Introduction to Metaphys. of Ethics.") According to this philosopher there are " i?itiiitions " which " are founded on observation and experience," but it requires " further and more deep inquiry " to distinguish them and such as " arise from a priori sources."

*' Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual perception)," says Sir William Hamilton, "it has been employed to denote a kind of apprehension and a kind of judgments

" Intuition,^^ says Mansel, " is used in the extent of the German Anschauung, to include all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties ; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate is an i^idividual, thing, state, or act of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or titne."

Such are some of the definitions and explanations whi^h different philosophers give us of that thing called intuition, the meaning of which Mr. C. assumes to be fixed and agreed upon by the philosophers who use it, but with what reason the above quotations will show; and, what is not less marvellous, he is not only confident in the use of it himself, but is quite out of patience with Watson, because the views of that writer do not exactly quadrate with his own in reference to the use of a term to which philosophers attach so many shades of meaning. Ignoring all this, together with the fact that Locke himself specifies what he says may be called " intuitive knowledge," Mr. C. assures us that Mr. Watson teaches that " reason does not apprehend a priori, self-evident, necessary truth." What Mr. Watson teaches concerning reason we shall see in due time ; at present we shall only glance at the term innate.

leaving the other leading terms to be taken up in order as we shall proceed with our investigations.

Innate. " There is a great deal of difference," says Locke, " between an innate law and a law of nature ; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by the use and application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law^ or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of oiature, without the help of positive revelation."

The following from Dr. Reid seems to be quite in harmony with the above : " Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are some which nature seems both to have planted and reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, and which are necessary to the preservation of the individual, or the continuance of the kind. There are other powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture." When speaking of natural rights, the doctor uses imiate as synonymous with natural.

" Among modern philosophers it would be difficult to name any who held the doctrine in the form in which it has been attacked by Locke. In calling some of our ideas innate they seem merely to have used this word as synonymous with natural^ and applied it, as Hutcheson thinks the ancients did, to certain ideas which men, as human or rational beings, necessarily and universally entertain." (Fleming's "Vocabulary of Philosophy.")

" Though it appears not that Ave have any innate ideas or formed notions or principles laid in by nature, antecedently to the exercise of our senses or understanding ; yet it must be granted that we were born with the natural faculty whereby we actually discern the agreement or disagreement of some notions, so soon as we have the notions themselves, as, that we can or do think, that therefore we ourselves are ; that one and two make three, that gold is not silver, nor ice formally water ; that the whole is greater than its part, <fec., and if we should set ourselves to do it, we cannot deliberately and seriously doubt of its being so. This we may call intuitive knowledge^ or natural certainty wrought into our very make and constitution." (Oldfield, " Essay on Reason.")

The above quotations will suffice to show with what propriety Mr. C. uses these terms as though their meaning were fixed and agreed upon by philosophers. Of course the arguments and objections built upon such assumptions are futile and vain. The following are Mr. C.'s views of man's innate or intuitive powers, as given in the article under review; see pages 183, 184, 197, 205, and 206 :

" There are specific ./brms into which human thought must necessarily develop itself, just as a grain of wheat must necessarily develop itself into ' the blade, and the ear, and full corn in the ear,' or an acorn develop into the majestic oak." . . ^ . . " The human intelligence is configured and correlated to eternal principles of order, and right, and good, as they exist in the Infinite Intelligence. Man is the offspring and image of God. And when a principle or an act is apprehended by tlie understanding, the mind passes a judgment upon the relation of that principle or act to these laws of order and right and good."

" Man is so constituted by the great Architect' of

his mental being — God has imposed upon his intelligence such laws of thought as determine him to form the idea of

God, of right and wrong, of duty, and of accountability."

"As the vital and rudimental germ of the oak is

contained in the acorn — as it is quickened and excited to activity by the external conditions of moisture, light, and heat, and is fully developed under the fixed and determinative laws of vegetative life — so the germ of the idea of God is present in every human mind as the" intuitions of pure reason ; these intuitions are excited into energy by our experimental and historic knowledge of the facts and laws of the universe ; and these facts and intuitions are developed into scientific form by the necessary laws of the intellect." " On contemplating the acts of a voluntary agent we immediately apprehend them as having a moral quality. The mind intuitively apprehends them as right or wrong ^ and spontaneously approves or condemns them. This distinction in the moral quality of actions is felt to be independent of the mind which perceives it, and of any mutable condition of things. Good and evil, right and wrong are immutable. The distinction between them must be the same everywhere, at all times, and to all beings — to God, to angels, and to men. It is as impossible to conceive that there are intelligences to whom falsehood can appear a virtue and justice a vice, as that there are intelligences to whom two and two equal five, or to whom the properties of the triangle can be more or less than they are to us. Accompanying this perception of the immutable distinction between virtue and vice, we have the -consciousness of its being our duty to avoid the one and perform the other. We feel upon us an obligation which is imperative. We have also an abiding conviction that moral good is rewardable, and that vice merits punishment. And, finally, we have a conscious apprehension of a future retribution."

AKD THE BIBLE DEFENDED. 19

Let US try and condense this marvellous accumulation of marvellous assertions, that the whole may be seen at a glance.

The human mind is configured and correlated to eternal prUiciples of order i and rights and good as they exist i?i the Infirdte Mind, God has imposed upon the human mind such laws of thought as determine it to form the idea of God^ of right and lorong^ of duty and of accountability. The mind intuitively apprehends human actions as right or wrong ^ and spontaneously approves or condemns them. And all this is independent of the mind which perceives it^ and of any mutable condition of things. It is as impossible' to conceive that there are intelligences to whom falsehood can appear a virtue and justice a vice., as that'there are intelligences to whom two and two equal five. And these intuitions of pure reason are present in every human mind as the vital and rudimental germ of the oak is contained i7i the acorn. And as the latter is fully developed under the fixed and determinative laws of vegetative life^ so these intuitions of pure reason in every human mind are excited into energy by our experimental and historic knowledge of the facts and laws of the universe, and these facts and intuitions are developed into scientific form by the necessary laws of the intellect.

Here is a specimen of the transcendental.^ the innate^ the intuitive, or what you please to call it. And our reviewer " can ill conceal his regrets '^ that Mr. Watson did not thus believe and teach, instead of " degrading our reason, and casting doubt upon the veracity of our faculties," so that "the foundations of all truth are loosened and unsettled." In short, teaching so erroneous that it " landed, as indeed it must inevitably land, in pure materialism."

We beg to assure our brother that we are very farfrom being prepared to substitute the above, or anything like it, for the solid Scriptural teachings of Watson's Institutes, and we, too, " can ill conceal our regrets " that such a substitute should be offered. You may talk as loudly as you please about " the intuitions of pure reason," " the facts and laws of the universe," and " the necessary laws of the intellect," conibmedly and necessarily producing the knowledge and faith you speak of; and that as necessarily as the majestic oak is produced from the acorn, under the jBxed and determinative laws of vegetative life ; but to all such assertions, however loud and confident, the facts of experience and observation, the facts of history, both ancient and modern, and the teachings of the Bible, give this simple reply : It is not true ! It is also a fact, we claim, that the uniform tendency of fallen man is downward without the intervention of a supernatural power: and it too often happens that his course is still onward from bad to worse, notwithstanding that power is exerted with amazing energy. That such statements as those quoted above should be made in the face of these glaring facts, and so completely at variance with them, is truly marvellous. Moreover, if our knowledge and faith are matured into scientific form by fixed and determinative laws, as necessarily as the majestic oak is matured from the acorn by the same or similar laws ; if God has imposed upon the human intelligence such laws of thought as determine us to form the idea of God, of right and wrong, of duty and accountability ; if the human intelligence is configured and correlated to eternal princij^les of order, and right, and good as they exist in the Infinite Intelligence, the teachings of Watson and those of his reviewer are alike superfluous and useless ; seeing our knowledge and faith are inevitable results of inevitable causes, and, consequently, as destitute of virtue as the majestic oak, being produced by the same or similar laws. In short, if what the reviewer says be true, if the knowledge and faith specified be the inevitable results of inevitable causes, it will follow that the old saying is true after all, " Whatever is, is right ! " Or, if there is anything wrong, it is not in man any more than it is in the " majestic oak," seeing the growth of the one, and the knowledge and faith of the other, are alike the inevitable results of inevitable causes, which causes are " fixed and determinative laws."