Man and the Bible in the light of reason ...

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Introduction

John Fiske, in his preface to ^^The Destiny of Man/^ says : ^*In dealing with the unknown, it is well to take one^s start a long way within the limits of the known/^ This is right. In every unsolved problem there is always an unknown something which we seek to know ; and, in order to find this out, we must begin with principles and things we know, and, step by step, reach a conclusion legitimately drawn from the known premises. This method should always be followed in seeking truth in any field of thought, that is, if we would be clear. In this treatise this is our method ; and we trust, as we advance, light, from every quarter, may pour in upon us in such fullness of splendor as to leave little, if any, doubt upon the main points, at least, of the great problems we have in hand. In our Introduction we must deal with some preliminaries which are of importance, as they are the starting points in our course. Let the reader mark these carefully.

INTRODUCTION.

MAN EXISTS.

That this is true no one can doubt except he be an Idealist of the most extreme views ; and^ even then, to be consistent^ he must doubt, and then give the lie to his own consciousness on the whole subject of his doubts. Cogito, ergo sum — I think, therefore I am — says Descartes. ^^By which/' Sir William Hamilton says, "we are to understand that the fact of our existence is given in the fact of our consciousness. '^

II. Man Has Reason

To undertake any proof of this proposition would be as foolish as for one to attempt, by argument, to prove his own existence to another who holds him by the hand and looks him in the face. Whatever may be said or claimed for the lower animals, on this point, certainly we are not in error when we assert that man has reason. It is sometimes said, and said as if designed to rebut the claim that man has reason, ^^that the lower animals have reason.^^ Allowing this to be true, it does not invalidate our claim for man. Again it is said, ^^tbat some men are raised very little, if any, above the brute in rational process. ^^ This we grant to be the case with idiots and some barbarians. But this does not militate against our claim that man has reason. That some men are born blind, while others lose their sight, does not prove the race to be without eyes. All we claim here is, man has reason. Not that other beings may not have reason also. However, we think, there is a vast difference between reason in man and the so-called reason in the lower animals ; and that the difference is in kind, not, as some say, simply in degree. But more of this further on.

III. Man Has A Peculiar Capacity For Enjoying And Suffering

He can enjoy and suffer as no other being on earth. This is one of the most familiar facts in his experience. Ijife, with him, is a strange mixture of good and evil, and he has the capacity for apprehending both. Sometimes he is borne heavenward on a flood-tide of joy ; again he is overwhelmed with the billows of sorrow. Circumstances over which he has little or no control often expose him to incalculable evils on the one hand, while on the other hand, he finds much to enjoy. For both of these he has the keenest sense of susceptibility. Flowers bloom in beauty by his pathway for his pleasure, but beneath are thorns and thistles to admonish him to be careful where he treads. Images of evil terrify him. Death preys «upon him. He tries to look into the future, but the door is shut; at least, it is no more than slightly ajar. He is often amazed at what he feels, sees, and hears. His sense of responsibility sometimes makes him tremble. Sometimes his cup of joy fills up, and even overflows, and he drinks as a thirsty man of what he fancies may be a perennial fountain of bliss ; but, alas ! sooner or later he finds that his cup is not unfailing nor unmixed. There are dregs at the bottom, and he turns away disappointed and filled with disgust.

ly.

FOUR GREAT QUESTIONS.

What is he ? Whence came he ? Why came he ? and whither is he going? These are questions of the deepest interest to man ; or should be. These are questions which stare him in the face at every

INTROUUOTION. 9

turn in his pathway through life. It is useless to try to express the importance of these questions, especially the fourth. '^ Know thyself/' said Solon, one of the wise Greeks; and, certainly, nothing could be more important to man. ^^ The proper study of mankind is man.'' — Pope,

V. Tkuth And Errok

There is such a thing as truth. This we cannot doubt. Circumstanced as we are here, amidst so many conflicting opinions on almost every subject, we may ask: '^ What is truth?" but we cannot doubt its existence. We intuitively perceive the necessary existence of truth. But, as surely as truth exists, so surely may error exist also. The existence of the one implies the existence of the other, at least as a possibility. These have been at eternal war with each other, and still the battle rages. However, though the battle be sharp and long, the end is certain. Error must give place to truth even as darkness gives place to light. Truth must be established. W^e think this may be maintained on the principle of the survival of the iittest. Then, if we would not be found arrayed on the side of a doomed cause^ let us be sure to espouse the cause of truth.

VI. The Object Of Tpiis Treatise

The object of this treatise, m generaly is the discovery and establishment of the truth on all the great matters with which we have to deal in this book. Not the sustaining of som^ pet theory at truth^s expense. But if truth is discovered and established, prejudice, by both writer and reader, must be laid aside. If former theories have to be given up by reason of new light, so let it be. The noblest thing man can do is to stand by the truth. The love of truth is one of the noblest virtues; but indifference to the truth is one of the basest crimes. It is mean and low, and is promotive of disgrace and misery. Prejudice is one of the great enemies of truth; and he who writes, as well as he who reads, under its influence, may be said to enter the field armed for the defence of error. Then let all lay aside all prejudice and seek the truth,, embrace the truth, and stand by the truth.

Here arises the question, how is truth to be established? This question has reference to means. We answer : It must be done by the cultivation and conviction of the head and the heart. Not by cxdtivation alone. Not by cultivation and conviction of the head only; but by cultivation and conviction of both head and heart. It is not enough that we see the truth. We must be in love with it. Ignorance is a parent of error, but not always the only parent. Indifference to the truth is also a parent of error, older and meaner than the other. These two conjoined have almost filled the world with darkness and misery. We may think we can stop the breed by slaying ignorance, through the cultivation of the head — culturism — but the other, like a loathsome polyp, will continue to bring forth sons and daughters by self-propagation. Truth will never be established in the universal mind until indifference to the truth is eradicated from the universal heart.

The object of this treatise, in particular , is to discuss :

1. The Nature of Man— What He Is, This is done in the first four chapters.

2. The Origin of Man— Whence He Came, This is done in the fifth chapter.

3. TheFinal Cause in Man's Existence Here — Why He Came, This is done in the sixth chapter.

4. The Destiny of Man — Whither He Is Going. This is done in the seventh chapter under the heading: The Future Existence of Man.

5. The question, Does Man Need a Supernatural Revelation? is discussed in chapter VIII.

6. The question, Has a Supernatural Revelation Reen Given to Man ? This is discussed in chapter IX, under the heading : Origin of the Rible.

7. The question, Is the Rible of Divine Origin? is discussed in chapter X.

8. The question, Is the Rible, in its History, Doctrine, Teachings, Claims, or Anything Else, Out of Harmony with Any Known Truth, Scientific, Historic, or Otherwise? is discussed in chapter XI.

9. The question, Is Rible Religion the Religion of the True Philosophy? is discussed in chapter XII.

10. The question. Does Christianity Suffer in a Rigid Contrast with the Claims and Teachings of What Is Called Infidelity? is discussed in chapter XIII.

11. Heaven and Hell and Man^s Eternal Destiny are discussed in chapter XIV.

Then we will conclude this volume with the promise to the reader that, if spared and blessed with ability, we will return, at some time in the future, and discuss some other great questions in which all men should be interested, if he or she will give us audience. The above synopsis of the matters to be discussed in this volume is given in lieu of a Table of Contents. The reader will understand.

VII. The Province Of Reason

Reason is to be man's guide in the investigation of every subject, and the solution of every problem. Whatever comes to him, from any source, demanding his attention or claiming his assent, must be brought to its light for judgment; and nothing, which is contrary to his reason, properly cultivated and properly exereised, may be received by him as true and worthy of his confidence. He who denies this reduces man to the level of a brute, to be led by a line in the hand of another. But let no one mistake us here. This is not erecting an altar with a view to sacrificing to reason- It is reason simply pointing the way to the altar whereon man ought to sacrifice. " Man's place in Nature'' is not the only question on which men are

14 INTEODUCTION.

divided in opinion. Reason's place in man is a question which has split the world ! Those who contend that reason, in man, is everything — for such there are — fail to see that it is the offspring of another and greater Reason which it may and does reveal ; while those who contend that reason, in man, is nothing — and there are such — are guilty of the ridiculous position that it is unreasonable in man to be guided by his reason ! We think it is time for us to quit this foolishness and keep our faces toward the sun if our eyes can bear the light. ^' But, does not this view make reason the measure of belief ?'' We answer, no, by no means. This would be a great mistake. Reason cannot be the measure of belief, using the word measure in the sense of understand or comprehend. We are under the necessity of believing many things which reason cannot measure. It is not necessary to understand or comprehend, perfectly, everything before we consent to believe it. Many things are incomprehensible that are not unreasonable — above reason in this sense but not contrary to it. If we were not allowed to believe anything except that which we could perfectly comprehend, we should believe very little.

Again, some one objects, ^^Reason is not a safe guide^ since it teaches differently in different persons. ^^ This objection amounts to very little. Scarcely any two persons see exactly alike, and yet, they must be guided by their eyes. The difference in the teachings of reason is generally, if not always, owing to ignorance or prejudice. Let these be removed, and reason is a safe guide. We do not mean by this, that it is capable of teaching us everything we ought to know, but we do mean that it is a safe guide in all matters coming within its province. At any rate, it is our only guide in all such matters. Then let reason speak out and let its voice be heard. Let us be sure that we do not turn the light which is within us into darkness.

MAN AND THE BIBLE IN THE LIGHT OF REASON.

Chapter I. Man Is A Free Moral Being

The first subject claiming our attention under this proposition is the moral nature of man. The discussion of this part first will the better prepare us for the discussion of the matter of his liberty. Befiides, this is the natural order. Then^

I. Man is a moral being. He has the knowledge of right and wrong, of good and evil ; and feels that he is under obligation to perform the right and avoid the wrong. Yea, further, conscience, a term used to indicate a power or capacity of his rational nature, or the law of right and wrong within his mind, approves the right in his conduct and condemns the wrong of which he is guilty. This appears,

1. From the teachings of Consciousness. Let no one confound Consciousness with Conscience. These are distinct terms, and mean very different things. Consciousness is not easily defined. Sir William Hamilton says it is indefinable. " This act/^ he says^ ^^ is of the most elementary character; it is the condition of all knowledge ; I cannot^ therefore, define it to you; but^ as you are all familiar with the thing, it is easy to enable you to connect the thing with the word. I know, I desire, I feel. What is it that is common to all these ? Knotving and desiring and feeling are not the same, and may be distinguished ; but they all agree in one fundamental condition. Can I know without knowing that I know ? Can I desire without knowing that I desire ? Can I feel without knowing that I feel ? This is impossible. Now this knowing that I know or desire or feel — this common condition of self-knowledge — is precisely what is denominated Consciousness.^^ — Metaphysics, p. 110. This enables us to understand the diflFerence between Conscience and Consciousness, and reveals the office of each mediately or immediately. Consciousness reveals the operations of Conscience, and makes us aware of its approval of the right and condemnation of the wrong, whether committed by us or some one else.

With respect to the moral nature of man. Haven says : " We are conscious of the operation of this principle in ourselves, whenever we contemplate our own conduct^ or that of others. We find ourselves, involuntarily, and as by instinct, pronouncing this act to be right ; that, wrong. We recognize the obligation to do, or to have done, otherwise. We approve or condemn. We are sustained by the calm sense of that self-approval, or cast down by the fearful strength and bitterness of that remorse. ^^ — Mental Philosophy, p. 314.

All that is necessary for any one to verify this statement is to take an account of the operations of his own mind. Nor is it possible for a man to be deceived as to the fact of his own moral nature. He may find himself puzzled as to the moral character of a given act, but as long as he has reason he will have no difficulty in seeing himself a moral being. Conscience is an indestructible element in his nature. So is Consciousness. Both, under certain conditions, may be suspended in their operations for a time, but never annihilated unless man himself may be annihilated.

Now, as Consciousness furnishes us with the fact of our own distinction of right and wrong, so it reveals to all around us a certain knowledge of their own moral nature. This we know by our intercourse with them. We observe it in their conduct. We find them making, in the main^ at least^ the same distinctions we make; and this, too, independent of any creed or profession. This leads to the conclusion that man is a moral being. But we cannot be satisfied on this subject with observations confined to a field so narrow as the circle of one^s own acquaintance. Indeed, we ought not to be, since, in this case, our conclusion would be broader than our premises, which is unlawful. We want to know if it is so with all men. This information is given to us,

2. In the testimony of History. The history of all nations proves that man is a moral being ; that the moral idea is coextensive with the race. It, according to our best authors^ gives no account which may be relied on of any tribe or nation entirely devoid of the moral idea; and no exception to this rule will avail to disprove the moral nature of man, unless it wdll avail to disprove his rational nature. Every nation having any literature has its works on morals and its language expressive of moral ideas. Every nation or tribe which has any law for its government, to the violation of which a penalty is attached, has the idea of right and wrong. This has been so in all the past ; it is so at present. Some one has said: ^^Man cannot be educated above this idea^ nor degraded entirely below it^ if only reason remain. Of course, the more cultivated and refined a people are, the more prominent will be the moral idea. On the other hand, it sinks from view in proportion as reason is weakened, on account of degradation. ^^ As long as man is a rational being he must be a moral being, since the moral nature has its root in the rational nature. These are inseparable. On this account we say, when reason is dethroned responsibility ceases.

Here Ave must notice one thing, not necessarily involved in or deducible from the heading of this chapter, and yet closely related to it, and that ought to be considered in connection with it, viz. : The origin of the moral idea. However, it will not be necessary to say much on this subject. There are several theories. Some have traced it to education ; some to legal enactment; some to association of ideas; some to sympathy ; and others, to a special faculty. For our purpose, here, its origin is not a matter of so much importance as its existence, which, as we have seen, is sure. We may say, however, in a work not specially devoted to the discussion of questions of Ethics, that the moral idea is, unquestionably, natural to man. It is an inseparable characteristic, and is one of the distinctive differences between him and the lower animals. " Not innate, perhaps, but connate.^^ At least it must be so as to the capacity for the distinction between right and wrong. If this w^re not so he never could have the idea. As some one has well said: ^^The notion of right and wrong is an original and indestructible part or consequence of man^s rational constitution.^^ It is true that much may be done by education; not by way of giving the capacity which is, undoubtedly, natural, but by way of improving the perceptive power for the distinction. Haven says: ^^Observation proves that the capacity always exists in man previous to any effort put forth for its development.^^ In order to verify this, let any one try the experiment on a common animal, and see if the idea of right and wrong, as such, can be imparted. This has often been tried and as often failed. True, some have claimed that it has been done, but without any real ground. The master teaches his dog certain tricks, certain duties we call them, not meaning moral duties of course, but such as to flush the birds^ or ''down ^^ at the right time^ and whips him if he fails to obey. The dog soon learns by association^ that he is to be punished if he disobeys, and when he does disobey, he manifests fear, or what some call shame. At once the conclusion of some wouldbe philosopher, in this department, is that the dog is a moral being, all he needs is a chance, when the truth is the animal has no more idea of right and wrong, as moral conceptions, than he has of the deepest problems of mathematics. The case is different with man. He has the capacity for receiving and imparting the moral idea, which shows that the capacity is natural with him. If this were not so, how could he have the moral conception ? To suppose the idea imported through any other than the natural channel, is an absurdity, since it involves the thought of receiving and imparting without the capacity to receive and impart.

On the other theories of the origin of the moral idea, it is useless to say much. Association and sympathy have their necessary functions in the mind, but it is no part of their office to originate the moral idea. In fact, they cannot do this, and the very suggestion

24 THE NATUKE OF MAN.

is contrary to the common-sense of mankind. Just as well say that reason owes its origin to these^ and then flee from a greater difficulty^ in sight ; which is : Why is it that these faculties and moral ideas, peculiar to man, have not originated, in like manner, with other orders of animals ?

Hobbes traced the moral idea to civil enactments. But it would have done just as well to have traced it to Socrates. Haven says: ^^The special faculty theory has more plausibility than any of these, but is altogether useless. ^^ So we say. The truth is, man is a moral being in his very constitution, while no other being on earth is such. The capacity for the moral idea is a part of him. His reason reveals to him the distinction of right and wrong.

II. Man IS free to do right or wrong. This subject has been the fruitful source of much discussion in the past, and men are still divided in their views about it; though, we think, the difference is more upon the nature of man's liberty than ih^fact. We shall have little to say upon the nature, except incidentally. The/ac^ is what we want to establish. That man is free to choose the right and reject the wrong is proved:

1. From observation upon the conduct of men.

THE NATUEE OF MAN. 25

We see men constantly exercising this liberty^ in different matters in life. A man chooses one occupation in preference to another ; one place of abode in preference to another; one article of food in preference to another; one course of conduct in preference to another ; and so on. This he does without any appearance of constraint or restraint except that which is in harmony with the most perfect freedom. It is true w^e sometimes say man is forced by circumstances to adopt a certain course, or choose a certain thing, but we do not, necessarily, mean by this that his liberty is entirely gone. Of two things or two courses, he may be compelled to accept that which he does not prefer, if he accept at all; but usually he is at liberty not to accept that which he does not prefer, which maintains his perfect freedom. A man may be forced to take a certain remedy, or submit to a surgical operation, or lose his life. He is shut up to the one alternative, but his liberty is not taken away. He is free. If he take the remedy, or submit to the surgical operation, either one, is he, perforce, constrained ? Is he not free ? Here the objector says: '^But there is something in every case which determines the choice. ^^ We grant this, but deny that the something com/pels the choice.

Once more: A certain man is tempted to steal hi& neighbor's horse. He thinks of the law^ of the disgrace if he should be caught, but the desire for gain prevails, and he commits the deed. Will any one say he was compelled? Surely he might have acted differently. It is true in moral questions men will act,, in the main, according to their natures, but observation proves that they are not under any necessity. They are free. In regard to moral conduct, men generally act out their natures. Behind will and desire there lies a secret nature, which is the spring of a man's conduct in morals, and which gives color to all his practices, though it does not interfere with hi& liberty.

2. The consent of mankind. — There are those who hold, theoretically, to the doctrine of necessity, but^ as we believe, practically, to the doctrine of man's freedom. We cannot, therefore, assert that men^ universally, in theory, consent to the doctrine of man's liberty of choice, but practically this consent is universal. It is, as far as investigation has been able to determine, expressed in the language of all nations. It is expressed in the philosophy and literature of every people possessing these characteristics of civili-

THE NATUEE OF MAN. 27

zation. It crops out in their theories of government and politics. In short, it is to be met with everywhere in our intercourse with our fellow-meil.

e3. The testimony of Consciousness. — If man is conscious of anything, he certainly is conscious of liberty to choose or refuse in most of the affairs of life. We are as sure of this as we are of our own existence. We are conscious of the power of self-determination. We know we are not forced from without to choose the way or thing we do choose in every instance of choice. " But/^ says one, ^^are we not under necessity in some things?^^ We answer, Yes: in many things. We are under necessity of temporal death. We must die. This is inevitable. Our liberty of choice in most matters has no power to avert temporal death. Man may hasten death by voluntary act, — by exposure or by suicide, for instance, — but he is not at liberty to flee or escape when death comes as a necessary vconsequence. Man is also under the necessity of taking some sort of nourishment in order to prolong his life. In this he has no choice. But he may choose to starve himself to death, in which case the ground of choice is shifted. The opinion that man cannot die till his time comes is a mischievous opinion as generally

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understood. It is the doctrine of Fatality or Necessity. Many suicides are rather excused on this ground.

Much has been written and spoken on the doctrine of Free Will. We are not on this doctrine. We are on the doctrine of man^s liberty and his ability of self-determination. Whether man^s will, independent of his desires and nature, is free^ is altogether a different question^ and one with which we have nothing to do in this treatise. We are opposing here the doctrine of necessity as against man^s liberty: — a doctrine almost universal among the materialists of this day. We have a notable example given in " Boston Monday Lectures/^ on Conscience, by Joseph Cook^ p. 105. This is the doctrine of necessity pushed to its ultimatum. This is not a new doctrine. It is ^s old as philosophy itself, and is fraught with great mischief. Its aim is to relieve man of personal responsibility for his conduct^ but this cannot obtain^ Man is free^ whatever may be the consequences.

Chapter II. Man Is A Confiding, Eeligious Being

In the beginning of this chapter the religious nature of man claims our attention. He is a religious being. It is not possible to make any assertion with respect to him which is truer than this. View him where you will, when you will, under whatever circumstances situated, he is essentially religious. The French philosopher, Auguste Comte, tried to disprove this; and, for a time, thought he had succeeded, but later there was a reaction in his mind, and he had to confess that man must have a religion. Mr. Herbert Spencer says the religious idea is inseparable from man ; that he cannot dismiss the thought if he would. See the first chapter of his '' First Principles.^^

^^ There is in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in which he is conditioned, something which leads him to recognize and worship a superior being. What that something is is not important in our present inquiry. Whether it be a constitutional instinct, inwrought by the Maker ; whether it be a deduction of universal reason, inferring a first cause from the

30 THE NATUKE OF MAN.

tilings that are made; whether it be the eflFect of tradition^ descending from the first worshipers, through all the tribes of the human family; whether any or all of these be the cause, the fact is the same. Man is a religious being. He will worship.

^^In view of this propension of human nature, philosophers, in seeking a generic appellation for man, have denominated him the religious animal. The characteristic is true of him in whatever part of the world he may be found, and in whatever condition; and it has been true of him in all ages of which we have any record, either fabulous or authentic.