Memoir on the dangers and defences of New York city, addressed to the Hon. John B. Floyd, secretary of war

Front matter

M^

^ * MEMOIR

Ufl 23 ON

Chapter I

At the present moment the United. States present towards Great Britain and France an attitude which is parallel in many respects to that of Russia towards the same States in 1853.

The material wealth and integral power of both this country and Russia have rapidly increased to Ibrmidable dimensions.

The great extent of both countries, and their comparatively isolated geographical situation have been greatly relied on in each case as securities against foreign invasion, while both have seaports which have been left without adequate defences.

Russia, as well as ourselves, has a navy inferior in size to those of her rivals,, and here, indeed, the parallel is least to be insisted on, for our sailors and officers are the best in the world, as well the individual vessels of our fleet, while in both material and ' ' personnel ' ' the Russian navy is far inferior to the French or English, It may be added that while our immense commerce, which, according to tonnage, is the largest in the world, demands a large navy to protect it, that of Russia is small, and her navy is more designed as an aggressive force than to guard her merchantmen. But these points in which the parallel fails will be found to add additional strength to my argument, which^ drawn from the comparison, deduces from the policy pursued towards Russia in the eastern war of 1854-'56, the inference that a similar course will be adopted by either of, or both the allies in a future war with the United States.

That policy, of attacking the extremities of the State, and paralyzing them, in the hope of thereby weakening and disordering its vital parts, does not seem to have been premeditated at the outset of the war in question.

The weight and rapidity of the blows that were struck at Sevastopol, Odessa, Kertch, Kimburu, Bomarsund, and Sweaborg do not seem to have been anticipated by the allies, any more than by the Russians.

Whether the governments of France and England were not fully alive to the almost incredible power which they wielded, in their yet untried steam navies, or whether a grand invasion of Russia seemed most likely to bring the Czar to terms, or whether the first proposition to harass the enemy into a peace was overruled by commanders who saw a greater prospect of glory in magnificent combined land operations ; whatever^ in short, may be the reason for it, this seems highly probable ; that the policy pursued was the result of circumstances that took place subsequent to the declaration of war.*

This will seem less singular when it is considered that the eastern war is the first in which either side has placed its entire reliance in attempts to ravage and destroy all the military and naval power of the other, that could be reached by the guns of a fleet or b}' the operations of a land force, debarked from, and co-operating with a fleet.

All maritime expeditions prior to this war have been either vehicles of invasions of magnitude, directed against the capital of the State attacked, or they have had in view the conquest of some province or colony, or the capture of some valuable stronghold, or the ruin or possession of important naval establishments ; in all these cases there is this distinctive essential to be remarked, which is, that they were regarded as either designed to gain a certain definite advantage which was to be attained for itself, without regard to its bearing on the main results of the quarrel, or otherwise were of so serious a nature that the fate of the contest turned inevitably on the issue of one invasion.

The only exception to this is to be found in the American war of 181 2-' 14 when was organized the policy which is lately proved to be the safest and most effective that can be selected, and which indeed was at that time practiced with terrible effect.

It may be thought that the war referred to, and its incidents, form a sufiicient precedent to refer to in an American memoir ; but if I limited myself to it I would be obliged to discuss at length some arguments that might be brought against my conclusions.

It would probably be asserted that the events of 1814 have already received due consideration at the hands of officers fully competent to produce a suitable plan for the defence of the country ; or that it is unlikely that in the present enlightened age we should be subjected to a magnified repetition of the barbarous scenes of that war ; which objections I am in no need of meeting, by taking the more enlarged scope of argument which I adopt.

It may be objected also, that we constituted, in 1812, a second rate power, and that any arguments drawn from the harassing mode of warfare then pursued towards us, and from its distressing effects on the country, might be answered by this objection : that we are now grown to be one of the foremost nations of the earth, and that we are

« The main historical facts which support this view of the case are, the landing at Gallipoli, the construction of entrenchments there, and delay of the allies at this point while the Eussians were advancing to the Danube, likewise the protracted stay at Varna, during the period that the Turks were so hard pushed to maintain themselves on tlie line of the Danube, and in Silistria.

These delays were considered inexplicable at the time, and seem so still, unless we adopt the hypothesis that the allies were at first in hopes of meeting, on Turkish soil, the entire strength of Russia, and that on finding that Nicholas was disposed to preserve a defensive attitude, they counted, at least, on being firmly opposed at the frontier by an army, the beatmg of which would be a serious blow to the empire; this expectation was also deceived by the tactics of the Russians, who plainly intended to retire before the allies, and not gratify their hopes of delivering a decisive pitched battle.

Tlie vexation and disappointment of Marshal St. Amaud were excessive on hearing that the siege of Silistria was raised, and that the enemy was retrograding towards the Pruth.

It seems to be at this period that the expedition against Sevastopol was planned, as a means of occupying the army, and as the most important part of the project of ruining the ports, harbors, military depots, and navy of Russia.

beyond the reach of injury from the predatory and destructive system which once did us so much damage. But the system which Great Britain initiated in 1812 has heen found eflfective, thanks to the power of her steam navy, even against the colossal empire of Russia, and hence we may reasonably expect that, in a similar conjuncture of circumstances, it will be adopted without hesitation or delay by either of the Allied Powers with which in future the United States may be engaged.

This supposition is reduced to a certainty by the nature of the additions which are being made to the navies of the former States : the despatch gun-boats, the bomb vessels, the iron floating batteries, and the immense screw steamers, with capacity to transport thousands of troops, all indicate that the policy of 1814 and 1854 is now become a fixed idea with the governments of France and England, to be adopted whenever the occasion serves.

We shall furnish the occasion or grounds of quarrel the moment that we indicate a design to acquire Cuba, or to extend our support to Mexico or the Central American States ; then it will be said that, like Russia, we are growing too grasping and formidable, and must be checked and reduced again to a level that shall not endanger the balance of power.

But if our seaports are destined to receive the heaviest shocks from the armaments which were irresistible at Sevastopol and Bomarsund, at least we shall have the satisfaction of acting on the offensive in other quarters.

Our policy would doubtless be to invade Canada, for the third time, if England were our enemy, and Cuba, at any rate, besides ; for we are irresistibly drawn to the occupation of that island in time of war with any maritime power by all possible military reasons ; and such a course would be sufficiently justified by necessity, as, indeed^ have been the precedents of the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, of Malta in 1798, and that of the Danish fieet in 1807.

But if we are to follow this programme, which is surely more congenial to Americans than a passive resistance, however obstinate, and if our regular army and disciplined and enlisted volunteers are to be employed in aggressive campaigns, then it becomes absolutely necessary to organize a seacoast defence, by means of fortifications and militia, that will prevent the necessity of recalling our active armies from the frontier to resist a naval expedition.

The small size, numerically, of an army, will, in our next war, as in the last, occasion us to resort to privateering', except where our ships or squadrons meet with single vessels or fleets of not disproportionate size. We cannot, then, look to the navy for protection to our seacoast cities ; and^ indeed, if it were twenty times as large, it would be insufficient to guard so many points at once ; or even if that were possible, the task should not be assigned to the navy — it should rather be occupied in convoying transports with troops and ammunition to Cuba, or in fighting the enemy's ships and destroying his commerce in distant seas.

It cannot be for a moment supposed that we might rely on the generosity or humanity of the enemy to spare our cities from bombardment. The events of 1812-14 show that it is upon our own resources for defence that we must depend for security. The burning of the Capitol, the marauding expeditions of Admiral Cockburn in the Delaware and Chesapeake, and the expedition of Packenham against New Orleans^ where '■'■booty and beauty" was the watchword, as well as their Indian allies, with the massacres and scalpings which took place after the defeat of Winchester's army in January, 1813, show what is the nature of British warfare.

The following brief account of the atrocities committed along our sea coast during the war of 1812-14 can be confiimed by many of our citizens, as well as by reference to the histories of the war, of Thomas, Breckenridge, Ingersoll, and others.

In February, 1831, Admiral Cockburn appeared in the Chesapeake, which he laid under blockade, and then commenced a series of attacks against farm houses, gentlemen's seats, &c. These were robbed, the cattle carried off, killed or maimed, and the slaves armed against their masters, or sent off to the West Indies.

The first town attacked was Frenchtown, which was plundered by a detachment of 500 marines, who burnt some houses and vessels at the wharf.

In May, Havre de Grace, Fredericktown, and Georgetown, were visited similarly, and after being thoroughly plundered were partially burnt. During this month reinforcements brought up the strength of the fleet to 7 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, and some smaller vessels. On the 18th, the repulse of Craiiy island took place, and some circumstances were made the ground of excuse for the barbarous two days sacking of Hampton on the 25th. On this occasion murder and rape were added to the barbarities practiced at other points.

In July, Cock])urn, proceeding to North Carolina, treated Ocracoke and Portsmouth as lie had the other towns

In 1814 the downfall of Napoleon enabled Great Britain to turn more land forces against us, and her minister threatened to " chastise %s ivell arid to cripple the United States for Ji/ty year's to come."

This year, at the north, New York, New London, and Boston were blockaded, and Saybrook, Wareham, and Scituate, attacked. At each of these places houses, factories, and shipping were burnt. The repulse at Stonington saved that town from the execution of the British commander's threat of " reducing it to ashes."

In June, operations were resumed in the Chesapeake by the pillaging of Benedict, Marlboro', Kinsale, and Tocomoco.

In August, the British received reinforcements, and, landing at Benedict, marched upon Washington, gaining on the road the battle of Bladeusburg, (the details of this expedition are given at length in the chapter on Maritime Expeditions.) Having gained possession of our National Capital, these modern Vandals burnt the Senate House, the Kepresentative Hall, the Supreme Court room, the President's House, and, in a word, all the public buildings except the Patent Office, as well as some private ones.

This expedition likewise pillaged Alexandria, where the city was forced to deliver at the wharves all the merchandise in the storehouses and all the vessels in the vicinity.

Far from the atrocities of these campaigns being universally reprobated and disavowed in England, the spirit of the British seems to have warmed with approbation towards the commanders who executed them.

In an account of the expedition against Baltimore, written shortly after the war, by a British officer, the reason for the admiral's not persevering in the attempt against the city is stated to be, that, from

DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. \i

the distance, and want of conveyances, the hootij of the place could not be removed to the ships.

As the tone and arguments of the history in question were no doubt congenial to the temper of the British at the time it was published, and as I cannot express them as forcibly as I find them, I beg leave to insert the greater part of the author's conclusion. Comment upon it is unnecessary.

The recommendations of the author as to the policy to be pursued in a future war with America, are, in a word, to re-establish the system of 1814 on an immense scale.

" We have long been habituated to despise the Americans as an enemy unworthy of serious regard. * * * * Instead of 1,500, had 10,000 sailed from the Garonne under General Ross how differently might he have acted !"

"There would have been then no necessity for are-embarkation after the capture of Washington, and, consequently, no time given for the defence of Baltimore, but marching across the country he might have done to the one city what he did to the other. And it is thus only that a war with America can be successfully carried on. * * * America must be assaulted only on her coasts. Her harbors destroyed, her shipping burned, and her seaport towns laid waste, are the only evils she has reason to dread. *****

" To the plan proposed, of making desert the whole line of coast, it may be objected that by so doing we should distress individuals and not the government. But they who offer this objection forget the nature, both of the people whose cause they plead, and of the government under which they live.

" In a democratical government the voice of the people must at all times prevail. The members of the House of Representatives are the very persons who, from such proceedings, would suffer most severely, and we all know how far private suffering goes to influence a man's public opinions. *******

" By compelling the constituents to experience the real hardships and miseries of warfare, you will compel the representatives to a vote of peace. * * * Burn their houses, plunder their property, block up their harbors, and destroy their shipping in a few places, and before you have time to proceed to the rest you will be stopped by entreaties for peace."

These expeditions, it will be remembered, took place when England was engaged in a mortal struggle in another hemisphere, and, consequently, at a time when her power was not commensurate with her malice ; for this, and for another reason, we may look for still more convincing proofs of my presages of evil in our next war.

The maritime and military resources of England and France have developed wonderfully since 1815. Large fleets of screw steamships, of great tonnage and tremendous armaments ; flotillas of shot proof floating batteries, and transport vessels in any quantity, replace the sailing fleets of the last war.

The eastern war of 1 854-' 5 6 astonished the world by the display of a colossal maritime power which surprised even the people of the two nations which had been accumulating it without becoming conscious of its true extent ; and, by the way, it is certain that their present confidence of power is a strong incentive to the exercise of it.

In a former paper, on a kindred subject, I have given tabular statements of the naval and military forces displayed by the allies in the war referred to. Here, it is more to my purpose to give a comparative view of the strength of the expeditions simultaneously engaged in during that contest, and the distance from home at which they operated, and the same information with regard to the most celebrated expeditions of former times.

Chapter II, On Makitime Expeditions

Before a person can consider himself competent to form an opinion on a weighty military question, especially when probabilities and contingencies are involved, and if he is not enlightened by some personal experience relating to the matter, he must at least acquaint himself with all the precedents which history offers. In this way he will guard against running into extremes, and also will naturally be led to discuss the case in a plain and anti-theoretical manner.

For example : a man who has been at the pains of studying those parts of history which relate to invasions that have taken place across seas, will not believe that telegraphs and railroads protect this country from insult better than entrenchments or forts ; neither will he be inclined to trust our defence altogether to gunboats, or iron floating batteries ; nor will he fully acquiesce in the more orthodox opinion, that the stone castles which dot our coast, completely provide for our safety.

It does not require, indeed, any great research for a person who has noticed the events of the last ten years, to form some notion of the formidable nature of the naval expeditions that foreign powers can set on foot at the present day ; but it is necessary to estimate these also as compared with those of the last century, and still earlier times ; this comparative power should be considered, in order that the means of resistance may be proportioned accordingly.

Ten years ago we ourselves fitted out a maritime expedition that was almost unexampled for the brilliancy and completeness of its^ operations ; and the expeditions of the British and French to China, the Crimea, and the Baltic, are still fresh in every one's recollection.

But Americans are slow to reflect on the probabilities of similar armaments being turned against their own country ; and constantly dismiss the suggestion that such a contingency may arise, with the argument that we beat the British at New Orleans, and that we are better able to receive them now than in 1814. |

This blindness with regard to the actual situation of the country is attributable to the fact that we do not realize and appreciate the aggressive power that the steamship fleets of England and France possess.

It would seem that with nations, as with individuals, wisdom must be bought at the price of experience ; for, with the example of Russia before us, we remain apathetic in the matter of our coast defences.

Russia had, perhaps, a right to suppose Sevastopol too remote to need fortifications on the landward side of its port ; but it would be inexcusable heedlessness in us to fail to profit by the lesson that Nicholas received.

Notwithstanding the clearness of the case, however, it seems that there needs some foil or contrast, to set off vividly representations of it, which, alone, would fail of receiving an attentive and reflective examination.

In a word, I can think of no better way of enabling the reader to judge of the magnitude, concentrated strength, and celerity of the present style of naval military warfare, than by presenting him with a condensed summary of the most celebrated maritime expeditions ; since by reflecting on the means of national aggression developed in these, and on the causes which influenced their success, and by considering afterwards the mutations which these causes have undergone, especially within the present century, we will naturally come to conclusions that will be better founded and more certain than could result from inferences, however logical, drawn merely from the events that have passed within our own knowledge.

I need not say that officerg of personal experience, and whose judgment has been formed in the field, may dispense with the aid which is offered by the following historical sketch, but I hope that the latter will be found interesting at least, by this class of readers. It will be seen that I have excluded from this sketch the expeditions of Mahomedan nations ; these, though formidable and successful in many instances, such as the expeditions against Candia and Malta, have not been chronicled with much exactness as to numbers; and besides, there are perhaps more than enough to serve my purpose without them. As to the expeditions of ancient history, it would be pedantic to refer to them in this treatise.

It will be found, upon inquiring into the impediments and causes of failure of maritime expeditions, that they may be reduced to three heads :

Ist. The effect of winds- and weather on sailing fleets.

2d. The attacks of the fleets by those of the enemy.

3d. The fatal epidemic diseases of certain climates.

As to the first cause, it has always been the main difficulty of maritime expeditions ; and the chances of ill consequences from it have been more numerous in proportion to the distance from home at which the descent was to take place. From the time the transports weigh anchor at their point of departure till the conclusion of the expedition, we find the winds bafliing all the calculations of the commander-in-chief.

To guard against the contingencies consequent on the weather, and the inequality in the rates of sailing of the difierent ships of the flotilla, it has been usual to appoint a rendezvous, at which the latter are all to assemble, within a day or two days' sail of the point of landing. This measure of precaution, though indispensable, has not in €very case been successfully carried out. For example: Hoche's expedition, the Invincible Armada, and the projected Boulogne expedition, were all ruined by storms, which either wrecked or dispersed the fleets, and prevented any attempt at debarkation.

Where the objective point has been far distant, the provisioning of the troops, in view of possible detention from adverse winds, has been a serious difficulty.

In cases where the rendezvous has been effected according to the intention, sailing vessels have sometimes been prevented from venturing to lie oif the beach selected for debarkation by the danger of being wrecked upon it, in the event of certain winds springing up, and making it a lee-shore. Sometimes the debarkation has been interrupted or suspended, after having commenced, from this cause. The length of time which must elapse between the departure of a. fleet of sailing vessels and their arrival off of their destination is necessarily considerable, because the entire convoy must wait upon the slowest vessel in it, and the voyage is thus rendered much longer than the average time. This detention will of course give the enemy so much additional time to prepare for the defence of the point menaced, and will^ besides, increase the probabilities of meeting with bad weather.

The uncertainty of the weather has sometimes acted to prevent combinations, at a given time and place, of fleets which happened to be in distant parts, and which might be wanted to act in concert at a fixed time. In a word, the winds and weather, by their uncertainty, variableness, and violence, have always, previous to the invention of steam, been the grand cause of delay, disaster, and sometimes of failure to maritime expeditions ; they have, also, indirectly confined within a certain rather low limit the strength of these expeditions, since the difiiculties springing from them increase in a rapid ratio with the number of sailing vessels required.

But a consideration even of the few facts presented in the sketches of the Crimean and Bomarsund expeditions, will show that future undertakings of this nature will enjoy an immunity almost complete from difficulties and dangers arising from the winds and waves.

The immense size* which is now given to steamships will render the number of vessels necessary to carry an army very small, so that a rendezvous can be more readily arranged.

The enormous vessels that will hereafter be used, will also be perfectly safe from all the perils of the seas, and their power and speed will render them independent of wind and weather.

*The "Himalaya" steamship, which was used to carry troops to the Crimea, appears to have answered the purpose admirably, both as to speed and stowage of a great number of men ; and the success of this trial, with the demonstration furnished by the building of the " Great Eastern," that the same can be done on a still grander scale, will probably result in the construction of a few monster ships by the British and Freuch, for purposes of distant warfare ; indeed, the latter vessel, which can carry 10,000 troops with all their baggage, is to be purchased by Napoleon, for military purposes.

The British Parliament is now considering the proposition of a Liverpool ship-builder, to build six " Mastodonian steamships," to be used for the transportation of troops to distant possessions. Each of these is to be 30,000 tons burthen, and capable of steaming 500 miles a day ; they are to be wind-proof, water-proof, and fire-proof, thereby making the perils of the seas a moral impossibility.

The "Napoleon" (French) war steamship is a full-rigged ship with a screw-propeller. Her engine is 900 horse-power, and under steam alone her speed is 13i knots per hour.

The Napoleon was found capable of towing three ships at once, one of them a three-decker, at the rate of over five knots.

The " Great Eastern " steamship is capable of conveying 10,000 troops a distance as far from England to India, at the same time carrying 18,000 tons of coal and cargo.

Chapter III

SYNOPTICAL ACCOUNT OF MILITARY DESCENTS SINCE 1400 A. D.

Edward III. besieged Calais with 40,000 men, whom he conveyed in 800 vessels of all sizes.

(1414 to 1417.) Henry V. entered France with an army of 30,000 men, which were carried over in 1,500 boats and vessels, large and small.

Charles V. took Tunis with 30,000 men and a fleet of 500 vessels.

(15*78.) Sebastian of Portugal entered on his expedition to Morocco with 20,000 men.

The Invincible Armada of Philip II. of Spain, numbered 337 ships, and carried 11,000 sailors and 20,000 soldiers, with 2,630 brass guns; it is well known that a violent storm wrecked half the ships and caused to perish 13,000 men of this expedition.

(1630.) Gustavus Adolphus entered Germany with 15,000 or 18,000 men, conveyed thither by a fleet manned by 9,000 sailors.

(1660.) Louis XIV. sent an expedition against Ireland which numbered 73 ships-of-war, 29,000 sailors, 5,800 cannon, and 6,000 troops: (this fleet was beaten at the Hogue.)

In 1700 Charles XII. conceived and executed the descent upon Copenhagen, as a diversion which should save the Duchy of Holstein, belonging to his brother-in-law, and invaded by the King of Denmark. He had 20,000 soldiers, in transports, and a fleet which kept at a distance that of the enemy.

Charles' fleet anchored ofi" Humblebeck, three leagues from Copenhagen, and found the Danish army, with cavalry and artillery, drawn up, behind entrenchments, to contest the landing of the troops. The Swedes, however, entered their boats, carrying with them to the shore a great quantity of chevaux-de-frise, and other military implements in flat-bottomed boats, which had been brought for that purpose.

In this order the army approached the beach, the king himself leading the division of 500 grenadiers which formed the advance ; on nearing land and getting within wading depth, the whole army, at the example of Charles, threw themselves into the water, and charged the enemy under a violent fire of musketry and artillery ; the Danes were driven from their works with precipitation, and Charles, who received next day a reinforcement of 12^000 men, advancing towards the city^ made preparations to bombard it.

The Danish king, to save his capital, consented to evacuate Holstein and to pay a ransom of 400,000 rix-doUars ; thus this entire campaign, which was completely successful, terminated in six weeks.

In 1747 a British expedition was sent to capture the French fortress of Pondicherry ; it was commanded by Boscawen, and consisted of one ship of 74 guns, six of 60 and 64, five of 50, and five carrying from

14 to 40. After 31 days of open trenches, the besiegers were forced to abandon the enterprise.

In 1757 Lally's expedition sailed from Brest, to the East Indies, for the purpose of taking Fort St. David ; this fleet, which carried 1,100 troops, was reinforced at Mauritius by 11 sail, and on arriving at Pondicherry, by 1,000 European troops and a corps of Sepoys, bringing up the total force to 5,000 men, a half of whom were Europeans. This expedition was entirely successful, Fort St. David being taken and razed.

In 1775 Charles II. of Spain, sent an expedition to Algiers, commanded by Gen. O'Reilly and Admiral Castejon. The land forces numbered 19,200 picked troops, and were carried in 340 transports, protected by 44 ships of war, manned by 3,300 of the best sailors ; the artillery numbered 100 large cannons, and 4,000 mules were taken along for its use, and that of the army generally.