Bulgaria self-revealed

Contents

CHAP.

Preface

I. Errors and Illusions II. Why the Bulgars went to War

III. To Annihilate Serbia .

IV. The Bulgars against the Union of the Yugo

Slavs ....

V. The Bulgarian Peace .

VI. Always with Austria-Hungary VII. Bulgars and Hungarians VIII. Bulgars and Germans .

IX. The Germanisation of Bulgaria X. The Bulgars in " Mittel-Europa "

XI. The Bulgars against the Russians XII. The Bulgars and New Russia

XIII. Bulgars and Slavs

XIV. Bulgaria against the Quadruple Entente XV. The Bulgarian Balkan Policy

XVI. Political Life in Bulgaria .

XVII. The Ten Bulgarian Political Parties XVIII. The Failure of Theories

XIX. Ferdinand of Coburg .

XX. Bulgarian Megalomania

XXI. Bulgarian Chauvinism .

XXII. Brutality and Baseness

XXIII. A Peculiar Mentality .

XXIV. In Derogation^of all Rules and Convention Appendix

PAGES

ix

i

257 277

NOTES

1. The author begs to tender Ids thanks to friends who have aided him in researches lor documents as in the translation of the texts, and whose modesty is content with anonymous collaboration.

2. All quotations have been translated literally, sometimes even word for word, the author preferring to sacrifice style to the most precise possible rendering of the Bulgarian expressions and tone.

3. The greater part of the quotations are from Bulgarian journals :

(a) Semi-official (officieux) Journals :

L'Echo de Bulgarie (in French), organ of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and of the Court.

Narodni Prava (The Rights of the People), organ of the

Liberal Party, whose leader is the President of the

Council, Radoslavoff.

(b) Independent Journals, more or less Governmental : Dn'evnih (The Journal).

Ouivo (The Morning).

Zaria (The Dawn).

Kambana (The Bell), the most Germanophil of Bulgarian

newspapers.

Balkanska Poclita (The Courier of the Balkans).

(c) Opposition Journals :

Mir (The World), organ of GueshofFs party, the Popular Party (National). .

Preporetz (The Flag), organ of Malinoff' s party, the Democratic.

Narod (The People), organ of the Broad Socialists (reformists) .

Rabotnitcheski Veslnik (Workmen's Journal), organ of the Narrow Socialists (doctrinaires or extremists).

Certain quotations are from German, Austrian, Hungarian, Turkish, and other journals. All journals are designated by their original names.

4. The author has been careful to give to all localities the geographical name they bear in the countries wherein they are situated. He has adopted the phonetic system of orthography. His state of health having hindered him from personally superintending the printing of the volume, he begs the reader to excuse such oversights as may have remained uncorrected.

5. Dates are given according to the New Style (Gregorian). For the Bulgarian journals issued before its adoption in Bulgaria (April 1 st, 1916) the dates are adapted to the new calendar.

PREFACE

Thanks to M. Victor Kuhne there are no longer any grounds for anyone taking up the cudgels on behalf of Bulgaria. Prior to the autumn of 1914 those not fully informed might still have been uncertain as to the character of Bulgarian aims. Hostilities between Turkey and the Allies once begun, however, it was inevitable that any such hesitation should disappear in view of the Sofia Cabinet's refusal to oppose, for the sake of a dazzlingly rich bribe, its former oppressors. It was evident, in short , to every shrewd observer, that if the Czar Ferdinand and his Ministers were unwilling to seize the opportunity of recapturing Adrianople and the Enos-Midia line, it was because they had already, directly or indirectly, made a bargain with the Turks, which is to say, with Germany. It was hardly necessary to see and handle the papers recording the agreement in order to be convinced of this. From the moment that the Bulgars declined the Thracian capital, at the siege of which they fought tooth and nail during the winter of 1912-1913, it was certain that they had found otherwhere a guarantee for the enjoyment of something more vastly coveted and nearer to their heart's desire. This otherwhere was, before all else, Serbia, that is to say, the Ally of the Triple Entente. Everything alike proclaimed it, words and acts ; the words of the newspapers of Sofia, which demanded the immediate occupation of Macedonia, the acts of the " comitajis," who, using Bulgarian territory as a base for their viii • PREFACE

operations, launched out on raids and pillaging of Serbian territory.

The diplomatists of the Triple Entente were blind and deaf. Infatuated by the prospect of restoring the Balkan League of 1912, they looked on Bulgaria as a future ally. They did all in their power, first of all, to win over the King, and thereafter to influence the King through his people. Both attempts were doomed to failure. King and people, after mature reflection, chose to throw in their lot with the Austro-German plan. Westerners were loth to believe it, since it was imagined that the country set free by Russia in 1876-1878 still cherished some filial regards towards her liberator. This was a childish conclusion to draw, and showed that those who held it had no grasp whatever of political psychology. In point of fact, nearly all Bulgarian politicians had anti-Russian aims. In this respect there was but one thing differentiating them. Some openly advocated reliance on Austria-Hungary for support against Serbia, in order both to ensure the expansion of Macedonia and to prevent the hemming in of the young kingdom which must result from the Russian occupation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Others would first of all have sought Russia's aid against Turkey, in order to be thereafter in a better position for bringing the Serbs and the Greeks to heel. The unlimited forbearance shown by the Russiar^ towards the men of Sofia, and the ill-humour of their dealings with the Serbs and the Greeks, were a couple of mad blunders. The Byzantine mirage haunted the minds of the Imperialists, both of the Right and of the Left. The events of to-day show how artificial were the " mystic " aspirations towards Constantinople, which MM. Sazonov and Miliukoff declared to be irresistible.

One of the chief merits of M. Kuhne's book is in laying bare the fundamental error of the Miliukoff party in this

PREFACE

IX matter. This party was held in high esteem by the very few in France and England who denounced the danger of Bulgaria's political aims. It reproached these aims with compromising the bond between the Allies and Bulgaria, while encouraging the resistance of Serbia and Greece to the territorial concessions in Macedonia. Now, it is this very party, it is MM. Sazonov and Miliukoff themselves, who have the most contiibuted to Bulgaria's unfriendly attitude, by their conduct of negotiations in 1915, in setting forth the claims, the rights of Russia over Constantinople and the Straits. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the numerous quotations given by M. Kuhne. For M. Kuhne has not written a controversial work. He has merely put together a packetful of Bulgarian cuttings. He tells us what the best-qualified Bulgarians have themselves said ; he gives us a peep at what they have themselves written. He neither argues, nor qualifies, nor judges. It is MM. Radoslavoff, Tontcheff, Ghenadieff, Malinoff, Daneff who do that for us ; it is Generalissimo Jekoff ; it is the representatives of Ferdinand abroad, and the organs of his government. It is even the Socialists, whom we fondly regarded as the ii reconcilable adversaries of King Ferdinand. Here, for example, is what the deputy Blagoieff, leader of the Orthodox Socialists, writes :

" Domination of Constantinople and the Straits involves with it domination of Bulgaria. . . . There are, none the less, certain parties in Bulgaria who are convinced that if Russian policy has been unfriendly to Bulgaria, it was merely because it was controlled by reactionaries such as Sazonov. They believed that this policy would cease to be dangerous if Professor Miliukoff, the well-known friend of the Bulgars and the leader of the Russian Liberals, took over the reins of office. These notions have recently been exploded in the Mir and the Preporeiz. Such an idealistic theory is as dangerous as it is .baseless. A Liberal and middle-class Russia, with Miliukoff at the helm, is even a greater menace to the Balkans and to Bulgaria than a reactionary Russia."

x PREFACE

On April nth, 1916, the Narodni Prava, M. Radoslavoffs press organ, commented as follows on M. MiliukofFs speech before the Duma on March 24th preceding :

" The pious wishes of Miliukoff in regard to reparation for the injustices suffered by Bulgaria remain merely hollow phrases which will never cause a break in the mainspring of Russia's Balkan policy, which is to reach, through Roumania and Bulgaria, to the Dardanelles and the iEgean Sea. Miliukoff himself, did he hold the reins of Russian policy, would ride rough-shod over Bulgaria, so that Russia might reach to that open sea for which Miliukoff clamours as loudly as any of them. The only difference is, perhaps, that Miliukoff would go to work more warily. He would taunt Bulgaria with having annexed Macedonia, so that he might lay hands on Constantinople ; and afterwards, by the force of natural evolution whereby the stronger batten upon the weak, Miliukoff would find it quite right that Russia should in turn lay hold of Bulgaria and Macedonia."

It is fear of Russia which has reconciled Bulgaria to Turkey. At Sofia, since the failure of the Tchataldja coup in 1912, they have wanted the Turks to remain at Constantinople. The moment they found they could not get there themselves, they wanted no one else to do so. In the liberator of 1878 they do not recognise a fiiend ; they see only a protector who aims at becoming master. Now, they are not willing to serve as a tool. They desire to become masters on their own account. They want to lord it over the Balkans. Russian diplomacy hab been completely hoodwinked. To gain her object she ought to have held Bulgaria in check along with Serbia, Roumania, and Greece. Instead of which she has bent her energies to thwarting these three latter powers. As to Miliukoff s party, they imagined that they would divert Bulgaria from the sea of Marmora by delivering Macedonia into her maw. The more sensible they were of uneasiness at Sofia in regard to the Straits, the more pressure they brought to bear on Serbia and Greece in order to urge on

PREFACE

XI these two powers to greater sacrifices. In what is now befalling them a father of the Church would discern the hand of Providence.

The mistake of the Allies in regard to the Russian expedition in Dobrudja arises from the same misconception. In contriving Roumania's intervention in the summer of 1916 the Allies believed that the arrival of some thousands of Russian soldiers in the Dobrudja would induce the Bulgarian soldiery to make common cause with them, and set them marching shoulder to shoulder to a chorus of Slavic hymns. It was a fantastic delusion. We now know what sort of welcome the Russians got from the Bulgarians ! M. Radoslavoff put the case to the American Colonel Emerson quite bluntly. " If Russia/' he said in substance, " should succeed in reaching Constantinople across the Dobrudja, we should have to resign ourselves to becoming either an entirely Russian region, or else a buffer state. An independent Bulgaria will never consent to the seizure of Constantinople by the Russians."

But it is not merely the question of Constantinople which divides Bulgaria from the Allies, it is the Serbian question, the Jugo-Slav question, the Balkan question, the European question. M. Kuhne brings to bear the most overwhelming testimony on all this. Diplomatists and military men, politicians and journalists are at one in proclaiming the common interests that bind Bulgaria to the Central Empires. The Bulgarians contemptuously disclaim the Slav kinship which is attributed to them. They claim to be of Turanian stock. They regard themselves as blood-brothers of the Magyars. In a toast at Budapesth, M. Momtchiloft cried, " The Bulgars would die to the last man rather than renounce the closeness of their neighbourhood to Hungary." The Az Ujsag, Count Tisza's . press organ, affirms, " The Hamburg-Bagdad railway will weld together the Turanian peoples in a xii PREFACE

geographical unity." At a lecture given in the Palace of the Reichstag at Berlin, Professor Panoff explained that the Bulgar was not of Slavic race, since the Slav was lost in the pursuit of fantastic ideas, whereas the Bulgar gave all his mind to grasping the reality of affairs. He defined the matter thus : " The Bulgars are descended from the Huns ; the Hungarians and the Finns are their European co-nationals." The Alkotmany concludes : " By its marvellous grasp of reality, which clearly marks it off from the passionate fantasy of the Serbian people, this race of Finno- Tartar nomads, thrown back from the Volga to the slopes of the Black Sea, has chosen the means of carving out a way to independence and hegemony in the Balkans."

This realism, on all fours with that of Prussia, has, like Bismarck's, only succeeded thanks to the blindness of those States which have been called to suffer it. Its " marvellousness " will cease soon enough if we draw inspiration from the edifying avowals here collected by M. Victor Kuhne. A >,

AUGUSTE GaUVAIN.

Chapter I

Only under the repeated shock of deceptions dearly paid for are the bubble illusions which the Quadruple Entente cherished in regard to Bulgaria blown into air. The cynical confession of the Bulgarians themselves, whose mischievous bent could never resist the pleasure of jeering at those whom they had hoodwinked, render these deceptions the more glaring.

Already in the months of August and September, 19 15, the Germanophil press of Sofia took a pleasure in proving how persistent were the hopes that the Entente placed on Bulgaria, despite the conclusion of a Bulgarian loan in Germany and notwithstanding the arrival of German officers at Sofia. The Kambana could not finish off a single leader without a cynical laugh at the simple credulity of the Russians, the French, and the English ; the official Narodni Prava took good care to print not a single word which might brighten the outlook for the Entente. The Mir, the Preporetz, the Bulgaria, along with sundry opposition journals of minor importance, made a show, certainly, of their reliance on the Entente ; but the means they employed for getting others to share their ideas and follow them out were the most ridiculous and ineffectual. Lacking the courage of its opinion, or, perhaps, falling short of sufficient conviction to act, the opposition was constantly intimidated by the Macedonian infatuation of the Governmental newspapers ; it outbid its rivals in jingoistic tubthumping, and merely made still more exacting demands on Serbia and the Quadruple Entente. The only form under which the Gueshoff, Malinoff and Daneff parties could pluck up enough courage to advocate an agreement with the Entente was a compromise soothing to the patriotic swelled head of the Bulgarians. The only effect of this concession was to render Radoslavoff implacable. Elsewhere in the very opposition journals which ventured from time to time a diffident article in support of the Entente, there would appear, at the bidding of the Press Bureau of Sofia, any number of communiques running down the Entente aims, which these newspapers claimed to be defending. Especially during the last three months preceding the Bulgarian attack, the Press Bureau bombarded the newspapers with communiques about " the reign of terror in Macedonia," quoting names, dates and facts, all invented along with the documents to ftvove them. It was stated that such and such a person had fallen to the Serbian knife or met with a horrible death in a Serbian prison. It was in vain that Serbia showed by the most unanswerable evidence that the alleged crimes were either utterly fictitious or had taken place under bygone Turkish rule, and that the Bulgarians had merely post-dated them by a few years, in order that they might accuse the poor Serbians whose disclaimers were drowned in the hubbub set up at Sofia. In spite of the denials, the object had been achieved. In exciting hatred against the Serbs, the Bulgarian Press Bureau succeeded in thwarting the conciliatory action of the Entente.

" Down with Serbia ! " was the universal slogan. So popular did hatred of the neighbouring kingdom become, that it served as the strongest of pleas for the accused in political trials. In a country of primitive types, such as Bulgaria is, mistrust and mutual recrimination, political intrigue and appeal to mob passion are matters of daily occurrence in public life. The members of a cabinet, when dismissed by the King, pass almost always to the dock as prisoners sent for trial. The three sections of the Liberal party had done their utmost to see that the courts should condemn as high treason the advocacy and pursuit of any policy favourable to Russia and Serbia — such a policy as had brought about disaster in 1913. And yet it should be remembered that the accusers comprised the same men as had then led Bulgaria on to catastrophe. A year later Radoslavoff, Tontcheff and Petkoff had brought to book, on a charge of high treason, their colleague Ghenadieff, leader of the Stamboulovists, in the Declosieres affair. In order to clear himself of any shadow of suspicion on the score of his patriotism, this former upholder of the Entente, now converted, could hit on nothing better than an attack on Serbia, while avowing himself an apologist of the Quadruple Entente. But this alone was enough to earn his acquittal.

When the moment came for striking the long-premeditated blow, the cabinet of Radoslavofr held within its grasp everything that stands for public opinion in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government could therefore permit itself the audacity of shamming ignorance of any evidence as to the real state of things, and notwithstanding Serbia's submission to cruel sacrifices of which the answer to the Quadruple Entente gave proof, Radoslavoff had the effrontery to maintain that no compromise was possible, since Serbia refused to yield to Entente pressure. This impudent assertion was also repeated by King Ferdinand in the manifesto to his people announcing war. The impudence of the impostors on the one hand, and the timidity of the defenders of the truth on the other, combined with the lack of conviction and sincerity which branded all alike, set up an atmosphere of hypocrisy and equivocation. Everybody grew more and more passive under the whip-hand of audacity.

Bulgarian claims grew with their chances of being granted.. They began by demanding territory from Serbia . Finding that Serbia would end by conceding the demand,, the Bulgarians thereupon imposed a more onerous condition, viz., its occupation forthwith. It was the opposition which launched a whole-hearted propaganda urging the necessity of an effectual guarantee in a preliminary and immediate occupation by the allied armies. The government merely made its claim more grasping, by insisting on an immediate occupation of the territory in question by the Bulgarian army. They dared to maintain that the Entente would not deal firmly enough with Serbia, and that even the occupation of the territory by the armies of the Entente would not of itself provide sufficient guarantee of its being ceded to Bulgaria. As to the Entente and Serbia, how were they to be indemnified against the consequences of their yielding to Bulgaria's terms ? Did they take into full account what was implied by the occupation of Serbia's only remaining free outlet by an army raised on a German subsidy, equipped by Germany, and under the dominance of German officers ?

It is obvious that if the promises of the four Great Powers were merely put forward as a bait, poor little Bulgaria would have found it impossible to secure an adequate guarantee even by the immediate occupation of Macedonia — supposing the Entente to be victorious. But Bulgaria never for one moment believed in a win for the Allies. Hence, feeling sure that the Central Powers were to win, she wanted to be on the right side when the time should come for asking her help in adding her weight to pin down the Entente when the time came for counting it out. She thus laid all her plans to insure at a minimum cost the acquisition of the spoil she coveted.

It was as plain as possible to everybody that in everincreasing claims, in asserting that " the legitimate aspirations of Bulgaria are not satisfied," King Ferdinand had not in view, in the least, their realisation with the help of the Entente. But what was obvious to everybody else seemed hidden from the accredited diplomatists at Sofia, who did not grasp the situation, and failed to realise how much the opposition itself, though professedly favouring the Entente, by its very compliance, served only to give greater force to the current which swept Bulgaria into the war.

The persistence of' these illusions, which linger on in some minds even to this day, induced the press organ of Gueshoff — representing the same opposition group on whom so many hopes were centred in the autumn of 1915 — to express its astonishment at the obstinate naivete of the Entente. Some months after Bulgaria's entry into the war, the Mir of March 23rd, 1916, wrote as follows :

" Entente statesmen believed that the Bulgarian people would find it difficult to range themselves in arms beside Germany and Turkey, with whom they were but yesterday at war. They were convinced that the worst to be expected of Bulgaria was that she would remain neutral until the conclusion of hostilities. That is why they did their utmost to induce the Serbians and the Greeks to give up to Bulgaria what they had taken from her, and that they set themselves to win over Bulgaria to their side. When Bulgaria announced her mobilisation, it was sincerely believed in Entente circles that there would be a revolution in the country. Even to-day there are some who still labour under this delusion. Their newspapers still talk of riots and rebellions. They are talking about them at this yery moment when the men on leave are returning to the front with eagerness and enthusiasm. The Entente paid too dearly for its mistake, since it is Bulgarian intervention which brought about the downfall of the Serbian Army and opened up for Germany its route to the East."

A month earlier, the Echo de Bulgarie, in its issue of February nth (in an article entitled " The Campaign of Lies "), expressed still more clearly the same idea :

" Bulgaria herself bears a good share of the expenses of this amusing campaign ; she continues to attract the lively interest of her adversaries, and with gdod reason. Her intervention in the war, on account of the important and fortunate results which it has brought about, has completely upset the calculations of the Entente diplomatists ; to speak quite to the point, it must be said that she has cruelly disappointed their bland and self-righteous lack of foresight, and that it is an offence which the Entente embassies, full of self-important people, will not find it easy to forgive."

On the same day (February nth) the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency published in the Neue Freie Presse a denial in regard to a statement made by the Agence Havas as to the ill-feeling of the Bulgarian populace towards the Germans. The denial concluded thus :

" All statements to this effect can only be received by the Bulgarians with the noisiest hilarity It is amusing for them to observe the pig-headedness of the Sntente press in persisting to spread news, entirely concocted, in regard to Bulgaria and her attitude to her allies."

The Bulgarian press elsewhere gave unfailing contradiction to the statements circulated by the Entente press as to the state of feeling in Bulgaria. The Narodni Prava of January 17th, 1916, commenting on the news published in the Novoie Vremia and the Rietch regarding the Nevrokop risings and the so-called unrest among the intellectual democracy in Bulgaria, said :

" Derided Russian opinion will one day learn the truth, and will certainly not leave unpunished those who are to blame for the terrible defeats suffered right from the beginning of the war d'own to the present moment, and who still persist in feeding it on baseless and fantastic hopes."

The Dnevnik of January 26th, 19 16, entered its protest against the statements of the Daily Telegraph regarding the ill-will said to exist between King Ferdinand and his middle-class subjects, and against those made current in the Daily News regarding the supposed grudges which the

B

Bulgarians nourished against their allies, and the reported mutiny among the officers of the 18th regiment. It asserted that " the interview between Wilhelm and Ferdinand at Nish is a demonstration not merely of the cordial understanding which exists between Bulgaria and Germany, but also of the determination and the enthusiasm which binds King Ferdinand to his nation in arms. ..." " All this false news is circulated," writes the Mir of January 26th, 1916, " to order, and is paid for by the Entente. Its only effect will be to intensify the hatred of our brave soldiers for the enemies of their country."

* *

*

In spite of having been bluntly denied by hard facts no less than by articles in the Bulgarian press, these delusions still thrive in certain quarters. From time to time, instead of dying out, they take on a new lease of life. They showed renewed vigour, especially at the moment of Roumania's intervention, which synchronised with the announcement of more energetic action at Salonica. But these delusive hopes promptly faded out when once Roumania was involved.

The statement which M. Keremektchieff made to the Berne newspaper Der Bund (September 8th, 1916) is highly instinctive from this point of view. The Bulgarian charge d'affaires at Berne declared openly as follows :

" The Entente were hoping to impose on Bulgaria a separate peace, which would undoubtedly have had a decisive effect in determining peace terms with the Central Powers. That explains why they were prepared to offer us so valuable a prize, consisting (as I am informed on the most reliable authority) of the Enos-Midia-Cavalla frontier, the ceding of Greco-Serbian Macedonia, and the Dobrudja, taken from us in 1913. . . . The link uniting the Central Powers to the East having once been snapped, the Entente would have held the winning hand in the rubber. ... It is here that the Entente was completely out in its reckoning. The whole of its Balkan policy, moreover, seethes with blunders and miscalculations. The Entente had completely lost sight of the fact that Bulgaria was fighting, not for a temporary advantage, but for the full realisation of her national ambition. If Bulgaria cannot now, once and for all time, thrust aside her hereditary enemies, her loft}. 7 aims will be brought to nothing, and she will let slip the flood which would have borne her onward to the haven of her ambition. The Entente forgot that Bulgaria's choice lay between triumph or death.

What should we gain by a separate peace ? The niaintenance of Roumanian imperialism, of Serbian jingoism, the sinister neighbourhood of two powerful enemies, and the extinction of our prestige. We should thus be baulked of the v/hole fruit of our struggles, which would have to be buried with all our hopes. Bulgaria is not treacherous, and she sees somewhat farther than her nose. Her fate is tightly bound up with that of the Central Powers."

This declaration made by one holding rank among Bulgarian diplomatists provides an apt illustration of Bulgarian mentality. What inordinate ambition ! Even on the amazing assumption of the grant of Serbo-Greek Macedonia, of the Dobrudja, and almost the whole of Thrace, she will still be dissatisfied ; on the contrary, she will deem herself to have been cheated out of the " whole fruit of her struggles " ; she will consider that she must " bury all her hopes," and suffer " the extinction of her prestige " ! What then does she want ? What does she regard as the whole of these fruits, of these hopes, of this prestige ? Obviously the swallowing up of two-thirds of Serbian territory, the expectation that Serbia, having been put out of action, will cease to exist as an independent state, and that Bulgaria will thereupon be able to hold undisputed sway over the Balkan peninsula.

Professor Paul Miliukoff, a Bulgarophil of long standing and chief of the Russian Cadets, is one of those who refused to be influenced by the logic of events. Moreover Miliukoff personally was not at fault. His is a very complicated case. For its proper understanding two elements in it must first be recognised : the personal factor, and following thereon a misunderstanding between him and those who modelled their ideas on his. Miliukoff's sympathy for Bulgaria is strong and sincere. He is as much attached to her as to his own country. He loves it as a man will love the land to which he has devoted all his energy throughout a long term of years, during that period of life when he is most active, most fertile, and most impressionable. Miliukoff is attached to Bulgaria by intimate personal memories, and equally by a feeling of gratitude for the kind reception and protection he found there during the period of his exile when the ways of life were for him most hard.

A man of action, imbued with democratic ideas, Miliukoff found in this new sphere a promising field for his activity.

Touched by the sight of a country which had been the cause of so many emotions to the Russians of his generation, and of which the soil was sodden with Russian blood, he conceived a passionate attachment for young Bulgaria hardly yet free, and full of the fever of growth, whose savage strength, though ill-curbed, opened up so vast a field for all his hopes.