Friedrich Eduard Beneke

Front matter

FRIEDRICH EDUJ1RD BENEKE

THE MAN AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY

CHAPTER II Life Activity at Berlin 26-37

I. Intellectual Development 26

(1) Formative Philosophical Influences 26

(2) Relation to Kant 28

(a) Critic of the Kantian Philosophy .... 28

(b) Pioneer of " the Movement back to Kant." 29 II. Life Effort and Literary Activity . . . # 31

( 1 ) Opposition to the Philosophical Tendencies of the

Times 31

(2) Lectures and Writings 33

III. Character 36

(vii)

viii CONTENTS

Part Ii-the Philosophy Chapter I

PAGE

Historical Basis and Theory of Knowledge 38-52

§ 1. General Introduction 38

I. Doctrines of Perception before Kant. 40

§ 2. Shortcomings of Earlier Doctrines ..... 40

II. The Kantian Theory 41

§ 3. General Character of the Problem 41

§ 4. Aim of the Kantian Philosophy 43

§ 5. The Kantian Theory Stated by Beneke ... 44 § 6. Kantian Distinction of Knowledge Independent

of Experience 45

§ 7. Beneke's Criticism of this Theory 47

§ 8. Resolution of the Inherent Contradiction of

the Kantian Theory 49

§ 9. Internal Sense Yields Knowledge of a Thing in

Itself 50

§ 10. Permanent Value of the Kantian Analysis . . 51

CHAPTER II

Beneke's System in General Outline 53—71

I. The Scope and Method of Psychology . , 53

§ 11. Starting Point of Empirical Psychology ... 53

§ 12. Subject Matter of Empirical Psychology ... 54

§ 13. Psychology as Distinguished from Outer Sciences 55

§ 14. The Method of Psychology 55

II. The Relation of Soul and Body .......... 55

§ 15. The Method of Natural Science is Not Materialism 55

§ 16. Opposition of Soul and Body One in and for

Consciousness 56

§ 17. Psychical and Corporeal Processes Likewise

Distinctions for Consciousness 57

§ 18. The Real Relation between Soul and Body . . 58

CONTENTS j x

PAGE

III. The Origin of Consciousness 60

§ 19. Meaning of "Origin of Consciousness." ... 60

§ 20. Metaphysical Method of Solution 60

§ 21. Psychological Method of Solution 62

§ 22. Source of the Notion that Self- Consciousness is

Materially Conditioned 64

IV. The Unity of Mind or Consciousness 65

§ 23. Beneke Compared with English and with German Thinkers 65

§ 24. The Soul as a Hierarchy of Faculties .... 66

§ 25. The Soul as a " Simple," or Abstract Unity . . 67

§ 26. The Soul as a Concrete Psychical Organism . 70

CHAPTER III Beneke's Empirical Psychology — Introduction .... 72-86

I. Psychology as a Natural Science 72

§ 28. Inner Experience the Immediate Object of

Psychology 72

§ 29. The Objective Method Dealing with the Inner

Experience of Others 73

§ 30. The Subjective Method Dealing with the Experience of One's Own Self 74

§ 31. Possibility of Applying the Method of the External Sciences to Inner Experience .... 74 II. General Natm'e of the Psychological Problem .... 76

§ 32. The Problem Stated 76

§ 33. Previous Attempts at Solution 76

§ 34. The Problem as Conceived by Beneke .... 81

III. Beneke's Doctrine of Traces 82

§ 35. Transition 82

§ 36. The Fact of Psychical Persistence and How

Known 82

§ 37. Nature of Unconscious Persistence 84

§ 38. The Philosophical Significance of Memory . 85 x CONTENTS

Chapter IV Page

The Psychology of Inner Experience 87-110

I. General Introduction 87

§ 39. Transition 87

§ 40. Knowledge both Product and Process .... 87 § 41. Changes to Consciousness and Changes in

Consciousness 88

II. Inner Experience : Origin of Individual Facts .... 89

§ 42. The Facts of Inner Experience 89

§ 43. The Origin and Growth of Ideas 89

(1) Memories. . . 90

(2) Concepts 91

(3) Judgments , 92

(4) Inferences 93

§ 44. First Fundamental Psychological Process . . 94

III. Inner Experience : A Continuous Process of Redistri-

bution 95

§ 46. Alteration in Inner Experience a Change in

Activity 95

§ 47. Beneke's Doctrine of " Movable Elements." . . 96 § 48. Immediately Active Inner Consciousness the

Resultant of a Dynamic Process 98

§ 49. Why Forms Immediately Present in Inner Consciousness become Inactive 100

§ 50. Second Fundamental Psychological Process . . 10 1

IV. Inner Experience : An Association of Ideas 101

A. — The Connections Between Ideas ". . 102

§ 52. Nature of the Problem 102

§ 53. Nature of the Union between Like Psychical

Forms 102

§ 54. Effect of Conscious Activity on the Inner Character of the Trace 103

§ 55. Effect of the Inner Character of the Trace on

Active Consciousness 105

CONTENTS XI

PAGE

§ 56. Laws of Quantitative Differences of Presentations 106

§ 5 7. Nature of the Union between Unlike Psychical

Forms 106

§ 58. Connections between Conscious Forms Strengthened by Repetition 108

B. — Direction Followed in the Transference of Conscious Activity 109

§ 59. Law of the Direction of Consciousness . . . 109

§ 60. The Law Applied to the Old Laws of Association. 109

CHAPTER V The Psychology of Outer Experience 111-120

I. Outer Experience : Origin and Growth of Percepts . . 11 1 § 62. Fundamental Characteristics of the Perceptive

Consciousness in

§ 63. The Origin of Sense-Perceptions 112

§ 64. Sense-Perceptions as Products of Subjective

and Objective Factors 113

§ 65. Nature and Meaning of "Original Sense-Impressions." 114

§ 66. Significance of Original Minimal Sensations as

Inevitable Hypotheses 115

§ 67. Beneke's Doctrine of Primary Powers .... 116

§ 68. Third Fundamental Psychological Process . . 117

II. Outer Experience : Objective Relations of Percepts . . 117

§ 70. Nature of the Problem 118

§ 71. Objective Relations Depend on Original Organic

Relations of the Primary Powers 118

§ 72. Objective and Subjective Connections Distinguished . 120 x ii CONTENTS

Chapter VI Page

Conclusions Relating to both Inner and Outer Conscious

Experience 1 21-139

I. The Character and Kinds of Active Consciousness . . 121 ' § 73. Character of Consciousness as Determined by

Methods of Excitation 121

§ 74. The Nature of Voluntary Action . 122

§ 75. Character of Consciousness as Determined by

Kinds of Primary Powers 123

§ 76. Immediate Consciousness as Determined by the

Relation of Power and Stimulant 124

§ 77. The Threefold Nature of Consciousness ... 125

II. The Span of Immediate Consciousness 126

§ 79. The Span of Inner Consciousness 126

§ 80. The Span of Outer Consciousness 128

§ Si. The Relation between Sleeping and Waking . 129 § 82. Why the Activity of Various Systems Monopolizes Immediate Consciousness 129

§83. Fourth Fundamental Psychological Process . . 131

III. The Nature and Meaning of Consciousness 132

A. — Consciousness as Presented Contents 132

§ 85. Consciousness Distinguished as Presented Contents 132

§ 86. Grades of Clearness of Presented Contents . . 133 § 87. " Unconsciousness" Distinguished as (1) Less

Clear, and as (2) Non-presented Contents. 134

B. — Consciousness as Presentative Process 136

§ 88. Consciousness Distinguished as Presentative

Activity 136

§ 89. Clear Consciousness as a Grade of Presentative

Activity 136

§ 90. Grades of Presentative Activity 138

§ 91. "Unconsciousness" Distinguished as Non-excitation 139

CONTENTS x iii

Chapter VII Page

Applied Psychology — Metaphysics 140-156

I. The Original Nature and Being of the Soul ..... 141 § 93. Psychological Summary of the Nature of the

§ 94. Unity of Consciousness Distinguished from

Unity of Being 142

§ 95. The Soul a Concrete Psychical Organism . . . 143

II. The Nature and Limits of Knowledge 144

§ 96. The Intuition of Self 144

§ 97. The Origin and Content of "Inner Sense." . 145

§ 98. The Soul the Only Being Known In Itself. . . 147

III. Knowledge of Beings Other than Self 148

§ 99. Fundamental Starting Point 148

§ 100. How Knowledge of the Existence of Other

Beings is Attained 148

§ 101. The Being of Other Men 150

§ 102. The Being of Material Things 151

§ 103. The External World, So Far as Concerns Our Fellow-Beings, Neither Unknown Nor Unknowable 152

IV. God and Immortality 153

§ 105. The Existence of God 153

§ 106. Immortality . 154

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

I. Brief Critical Estimate 157

II. Permanent Influence and Followers 161

III. Bibliography 164

Part I

THE MAN

CHAPTER I Early Life and Opening Career

The life of Friedrich Eduard Beneke naturally divides into two important periods. The first period includes the early life and career of Beneke up to the close of his sojourn at Gottingen, where after the interdiction of his early lectures at Berlin he found a welcome refuge. The second period begins with his return to Berlin, where the remainder of his long career was spent in active work at the great University. The present chapter is concerned with the first period.

I BOYHOOD AND EARLY EDUCATION Beneke had the privilege of spending his boyhood days under the kindly eyes of his parents at Berlin, where on February 17th, 1798, he was born. His father was a Commissioner of Justice and Attorney-General. His mother was the sister of a preacher named Wilmsen, well known as the writer of stories for young people. No particular facts relating to either father or mother seem extant, but of the uncle it is said that his stimulating nature was not without permanent influence on the later life of the young Beneke. In his early education Beneke had the advantage of the 281] 15 best schools at Berlin. So rapidly did he advance in his preparatory studies that by his twelfth year he was ready to enter the upper third class of the Friedrich Werner Gymnasium, then under the direction of Bernhardi. Here he showed earnest love of study and developed a marked interest in mathematics. His versatility, however, went much farther. It extended to metrical translations of the classical poets, as well as to the production of some original poetic flights. Both of these performances made him known among his associates as "the poet." During this period, too, he developed a keen interest in gymnastic exercises and outdoor sports. This resulted in a vigorousness of body that served him in good stead, when, in 1815, he left school to enlist as a volunteer in the German war of independence.

The war having ended, Beneke, at Easter, 18 16, began his university career with the study of theology at Halle. Here he came under the influence of the theologians Knapp and Gesenius. So successful was he in his theological studies that he twice gained a prize of honor. His interest at this time was to no small degree philosophical also, and this interest it was, perhaps, that brought him back the following year to Berlin. The young theologian then took his first examinations, and in order to qualify himself for practical work, became a hearer of the best pulpit orators in Berlin, among whom was Schleiermacher, whose church every Sunday was the assembling place of the most cultivated church-goers. It was while attending these discourses that the young theologian first became clearly conscious of his true mission. "That was," says Dr. Schmidt, "to open up anew path in the province of philosophy." 1 This insight into the nature of his mission was doubtless partly the result of Schleiermacher's stimulation, and partly the result of the searching conversations which Beneke was accustomed to hold with

1 Padagogisches Jahrbuch fur 1836, p. 8.

2 8 3 1 FRIEDRICH ED UARD BEN EKE j j

his brother, as the two wended their way to hear the great preacher. At any rate, this mission became at this time the resolution of his life, and the following two years were spent in active preparation for his work.

In the winter of 1820, Beneke began as privat docent, his first lectures at the University of Berlin. In his inaugural dissertation, De veris philosophies initiis, he struck the keynote of the " pioneer movement" which he contemplated. This new philosophical standpoint had indeed already been indicated in two small works, 2 previously published this year, but in the inaugural it was, as Dressier says, still " more clearly demonstrated." The new standpoint contended for in the three works mentioned, questioned most deeply the matter of philosophical method, and the prevailing theory of knowledge. As to the first point, in its declarations against the a priori method it was most emphatic, setting over against this method a purely empirical one, and holding that the fundamental basis for all knowledge must be experience — inner experience. This was directed in part against the Kantian a priori " forms" of knowledge, in part against the prevailing attempt to reach a knowledge of the absolute deductively. As to the second point, it criticised sharply the Kantian doctrine of the " internal sense," which regarded this form of experience as also phenomenal, and so as yielding no absolute knowledge of the Soul or Ego in itself. In opposition to this, it enunciated the important principle that in inner experience we gain absolute knowledge of a thing in itself, and that thing the soul. Or, to put it in the words of Falckenberg, who has most compactly and clearly summarized Beneke's position as set forth in these works :

2 Outlines of the Theory of Knowledge {Erkenntnisslehre nach dem Bewusstsein der reinen Vernunft in ihren Grundzilgen dargelegt, Jena, 1820 s ) .

Empirical Psychology as the Basis of all Knowlege {Erfahrungsseelenlehre ah Grundlage alles Wissens in ihren Hauptzilgen dargestellt, Berlin, 1820).

" The root and basis of all knowledge is experience ; metaphysics is itself an empirical science ; it is the last in the series of philosophical disciplines. Whoever begins with metaphysics, instead of ending with it, begins the house at the roof. The point of departure for all cognition is inner experience or self-observation ; hence the fundamental science is psychology, and all other branches of philosophy nothing but applied psychology. By the inner sense we perceive our ego as it really is, not merely as it appears to us ; the only object whose per se we immediately know is the soul ; in self-consciousness being and representation are one." 3

When it is remembered that the prevailing philosophy at Berlin at this time was that of Hegel, and that the influence of Fichte had by no means yet passed away, one is able to appreciate the Herculean task to which Beneke, nothing daunted, had set himself. But the young twenty-four-year-old privat docent soon found that his real difficulties were to come not from a fair and inherent conflict of thought with thought, in which truth would be given opportunity to prevail, but from personal and preconceived opposition, backed by the keen edge of governmental authority.

II INTERDICTION AND SOJOURN AT GOTTINGEN Early in the summer of 1822, Beneke's lectures at Berlin were brought to a sudden close. Notice was sent that during the comming summer semester his lectures must not be continued. Beneke was astounded. With a good deal of persistence, he sought again and again from the authorities some explanation of the interdiction, but in vain. Finally he appealed to the government. At last, to one of the many remonstrances made by him, he received from Minister Von

3 Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy (tr. by A. C. Armstrong, New York, 1893), p. 510.

285] FRIED RICH EDUARD BENEKE IOy

Altenstein, under date of March 5, 1822, a letter 4 in which it was stated that his recently published book, "Groundwork of the Physics of Morals," had caused some doubt as to his fitness to teach, and until some decision could be reached on this point, his lectures could not be received* Further, that the matter had been turned over to Chancellor Schultz, to whom he must apply for any further explanation. Many efforts were made to see Chancellor Schultz, but he was a hard man to get at. Finally, after a long delay, Beneke's uncle succeeded in getting a letter from him, dated July 15, 1822, in which he said that maturer investigation had only confirmed his originally hasty impression, viz. : that Minister Von Altenstein had sufficient reason to refuse Beneke's lectures. " Ina ccordance with my duty and conscience," he writes, " I cannot therefore propose anything else than that henceforth permission to deliver philosophical discourses at this place continue denied to Dr. Beneke." 5

One learns with a good deal of indignation of the efforts, official and personal, which were made to stifle the opposing thought of the promising young philosopher. There seems good reason for believing that these efforts were ultimately traceable to the influence of Hegel, whose overweening belief in the superiority of his own philosophical system had made him inimical even to the privilege of a hearing for an opposing thinker. While the ostensible cause for Beneke's exclusion from the University was his " Physics of Morals," and the formal objection to this was contained in the use of the term " Physics," back of this lay a far deeper reason, to which indeed this word "Physics" was the keynote. For Beneke had used the term as a sharp antithesis to " Metaphysics," meaning thereby to differentiate his own method

4 Given in the Pddagogisches Jahrbuch, 1856, pp. 9-10.

5 Pddagogisches Jahrbuch, 1 856, p. II. The letter is given in full.

20 FRIED RICH ED UARD BENEKE T 2 8 6

from the metaphysical one of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. As a matter of fact, it was Beneke's intelligent opposition to this method that the government, under the influence of Hegel, endeavored to crush.

Ueberweg goes no further, it is true, than to say that " Beneke pretended to have discovered that this interdict resulted from the representations made by Hegel to his friend, Minister von Altenstein, and that Hegel's object was to prevent the propagation and reception at the University of Berlin of any philosophy hostile to his own and akin to the doctrine of Schleiermacher and Fries." 6 Falckenberg, however, expressly concedes 7 that Hegel was "unfavorably disposed toward" Beneke, and there seems to have been good ground for Beneke's belief. For that the opposition to him did not originate with the government, but had its source within the University, appears evidenced by the fact that Minister Von Altenstein, in his first letter to Beneke, tried to shift at least the complete explanation of the whole matter upon the shoulders of the University authorities, to whom Beneke was referred for " further explanation." 8 More than that, at the time when Beneke first received notice that his lectures were prohibited, and sought out the authorities for some cause, " A person somewhat important at the time," says Dr. Schmidt, 9 "who was approached by Beneke's anxious relatives for advice and help in behalf of the young man, whose whole career seemed blighted by the exclusion, advised them in confidence that he should, howsoever sour it might be for him, teach the Hegelian philosophy for a few years for appearance sake, so that later, when his place

6 History of Philosophy (Jr. by Morris, New York, 1888), Vol. II, p. 283.

7 History of Modern Philosophy, p. 510.

8 For this letter in full see Padagogisches Jahrbuch, 1856, p. 10. 3 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

seemed assured, he might gradually bend around again to his own system." One is not surprised to find Dr. Schmidt adding that Beneke " rejected this proposition with scorn." For he was more bent on ultimate truth than on the propagation of any system as system, even his own.

That the real source of the opposition to his lecturing was Hegelian, Beneke finally, after many written remonstrances, succeeded in wringing from Minister von Altenstein himself. " The Minister himself," says Dr. Schmidt, " repeatedly explained to Beneke in person that : ' No single proposition of his philosophy had given offence, but the whole of it; a philosophy which did not deduce everything from the absolute, which did not explain everything in relation to the absolute, was in general no philosophy, and could not be tolerated as philosophy.'" 10 Beneke was unable to refrain from giving vent to his opposite convictions ; but his boldness in contradicting a philosophical doctrine supported by a Minister of State made matters only worse. 11

Not satisfied with prohibiting his lectures at Berlin, Von Altenstein, " irritated," says Ueberweg, " by the further steps on the part of Beneke, found means to force the Saxon government, which had designated him for a regular professorship of Philosophy, not to appoint to that position a privat docent, from whom, although politically unsuspected, in Prussia the Venia legendi had been withdrawn. 12 The full

10 Pddagogisches Jakrbuck, p 12.

11 It is a matter of historical interest to compare this governmental aid to the Hegelian system with the return service of that system to the Government. On this point the judgment of Schwegler is interesting. In his Handbook of the History of Philosophy (tr. by Stirling, Edinburgh), speaking of Hegel after his call to Berlin, he says (p. 322), "Here too, he acquired from his connexion with the Prussian bureaucracy, as well politcal influence for himself, as the credit for his system of a State -philosophy : not always to the advantage of the inner freedom 0/ his philosophy, or of its moral worth"

12 History, Vol. II, p. 283.

details of this persecution of Beneke are given by Dr. Schmidt in the biographical notice already referred to. It appears that the authorities at the University of Jena had already set their eyes on Beneke for a full professorship, and in November, 1822, wrote to Von Altenstein, asking whether a professorship in their University might be transferred to him. Beneke learned of the matter first in March, 1823. He then received a letter from General Superintendent Rohr, informing him of the affair, and saying that up to that time no answer had been received from the Minister.

The Saxon government had been forced to make this application to the government at Berlin, because of what Ueberweg calls the " forced interpretation" of " certain illiberal resolutions of the German Confederation." Ueberweg speaks as though this interpretation was made by Von Altenstein, although Dr. Schmidt says that it had been rendered to Rohr by " a person high in authority in Weimar." 13 This person had said to Rohr : " I should be very willing to help our Jena, and consequently Dr. Beneke ; only I do not see how this is possible, as long as the anathema in Berlin is not withdrawn, or at least is not mitigated to us by an explanation. The prohibition of a privat docent to teach is the same as the removal of an officially appointed professor. We must assume — this much one goverment owes to another — that the royal Prussian government has acted for a cause, and in a legitimate way. And now, there is the familiar resolution of the Diet, steadfast adherence to which His Royal Highness the Grand Duke imposed upon us as our duty from the moment when it was settled as a resolution and a law of the Confederation. As usually the last, here the first word decides: 'An excluded teacher may not be reinstated by another confederated state in any public institution of learning.' 'Ita lex scripta est' " There was therefore nothing for

n Pddagogisckes Jahrbuch^. 12.

the authorities at Jena to do but first get permission of Von Altenstein to bring Beneke to Weimar. But their letter containing this request that honorable Minister had seen fit to ignore.

Shortly after the receipt of Superintendent Rohr's letter, Beneke applied to Minister Von Altenstein for a testimonial showing that there was no accusation against him which prevented his taking a situation abroad. Von Altenstein replied promptly, but this is what he said : " In reply to your memorial of the 5th inst, I hereby inform you that, although I have found myself obliged to prohibit entirely the continuance of your philosophical lectures at the University of this place, partly because, in consequence of your writings becoming known to me, in general I was not able to have confidence in the maturity of your insight, a thing which should distinguish the teacher of a philosophical discipline, partly because in particular I was obliged to criticize in you an onesidedness of consideration, which could easily have influenced to their great disadvantage young men who were to be introduced to the study of philosophy by you, — still, in other respects, I have found not the least thing to object either against your conduct or your sentiments." 11

Of course such a " testimonial" not only absolutely prevented Beneke from getting the position at Jena, but tended to do him positive harm.

It is interesting to note, however, that this ministerial opinion was not shared at Jena. Von Altenstein had been so outspoken in his opinion that of course there was no alternative for the Saxon government; but Rohr, in a letter to Beneke, made very -plain the feeling of disappointment at Jena over the outcome of the negotiations. In this letter, dated September 16, he further said: " Had not the ministerial testimonial given to you expressly said your philoso-

14 Pddagogisches Jahrbuch, 1856, p. 13.

phy could easily influence to their detriment young students, one would perhaps easily have decided in your favor ; but such decided suspicions, necessarily, in consideration of the circumstances, caused the better private convictions of our Ministry, which were grounded on your writings, to remain silent." 15 I have italicised some of the last few words to emphasize how Beneke's thought, considered in itself, was regarded by others.

Since, in very consequence of this deliberate and resolute attempt to stifle his philosophy, Beneke desired only the more to continue as a University teacher, he finally, in the beginning of the year 1824, repaired to Gottingen, where he remained for three years. Here his system grew rapidly under his facile pen, and as a result of his activity during this period, 16 we have two of his best works, the " Psychological Sketches," {Psychologische Skizzen), 11 in two volumes, and the " Relation of Soul and Body" {Das Verh'dltniss von Seele und Leib) .

Dressier speaks in the highest praise of the Skizzen. He says : " These are no mere outlines of psychological science, but in them this knowledge is presented in complete detail, and one finds here a richness of psychological observation such as only a Beneke can supply. No nation has a like work which can bear comparison with it, and it is not too much to assert that in it we have the discovery of an entirely new world (the discovery of the inner world). What the feelings truly are, wherein they differ from the other activities of the soul, no one before Beneke's time was able to de-

lh Pddagogisches Jahrbuch, p. 14.

16 Before going to Gottingen, and while he was waiting for the removal of the dark cloud overhanging him, Beneke put forth two other works: "An Apology for my Groundwork of the Physics of Morals;" and "Contributions to a purely Psychological Theory of Psychological Pathology."

17 These two volumes were first published separately under different titles.

termine; further, how consciousness arises, changes and raises itself to higher forms, likewise was first proven agreeable to nature by him * * ." 18

Early in 1827 Beneke was given permission to resume his lectures at Berlin. " Whether," says Schmidt, " the latter (his system) had now gained authority alongside of others also in Berlin, or Beneke's significance itself had become more recognized, or one thought to make good to Beneke the neglect occasioned through misunderstanding — whatever it was, it happened that his earlier relations with the University of Berlin were restored, when, at Easter, 1827, he returned to Berlin, where his presence at that time was required by family circumstances." 19

Beneke's later life in Berlin will be considered in the next chapter.

18 Kurze Charakteristik der Sammtlichen Werke Beneke's, p. 294. Given as an appendix to the fourth edition of Beneke's lehrbuck, Berlin, 1877.

19 Padagogisches Jahrbuch, p. 15.

CHAPTER II Life Activity at Berlin

WITH his return to the University of Berlin in 1827, Beneke began a long active career, which lasted till his death in 1854. In treating of this period I shall speak of his intellectual development, of his life effort and literary activity, and finally, of his character.

I INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

I. Formative Philosophical Influence — It is a matter of interest both to inquire the nature of the intellectual equipment with which Beneke began his renewed career at Berlin and to indicate the lines of his philosophical development. The early writings of Beneke themselves bear ample testimony to the formative influences at work upon the promising young philosopher ; but, if it were needed, we have the personal testimony of Beneke himself. In later years some German critics, especially Drobisch, 1 savagely attacked the character of Beneke, claiming that he was little more than a Herbartian pure and simple ; that he had sought to give the appearance of originality to his system more through new terms than new ideas ; and that he had given himself a good deal of uncalled-for trouble in trying to differentiate himself from Herbart. Beneke, in a valuable comparison of his own psychology with that of Herbart, 2 took occasion in a histor-

1 See Die Neue Psychologie, pp. 76-77.

2 Ibid. Dritter Aufsatz : " Ueber das Verhaltniss meiner Psychologie zur Herbart 'schen" pp. 76-144.

26 [292 ical preliminary to answer the unfounded charge against both his character and his system.

So far as the influence of Herbart on Beneke is concerned, to see its lack one has only to recall the inherent character of his earliest three writings, to the fundamental principles of which Beneke, as he himself claimed, remained true throughout his whole career. These principles were indeed so opposed in method to that of Herbart that the " empiricism " of Beneke was in his early days the very ground of his being regarded a resolute opponent both of Herbart and of the speculative or metaphysical method for which he stood. It is true that Beneke later read with grateful appreciation Herbart's works, with some conclusions of which his own results in part coincided. But the germs of his developed system were already almost all clearly indicated in the works mentioned, and at the time of writing these Beneke knew little or nothing of Herbart's philosophy. On this point Beneke has left an interesting record. He says : " In the time of my real mental formation, in the time when my previously thoroughly fleeting and changing spirit began to assume a definitely fixed form and build up the fundamental tendencies which it afterwards for the most part followed throughout my whole life almost unchanged, Herbart was entirely unknown to me. I had made, in addition to the admirable English philosophers, German philosophical investigators, particularly Kant, Jacobi, Fries (at the suggestion of De Wette), Platner and Garve, the object of laborious study. The influence of all these, in my first three writings, in the ' Theory of Knowledge,' ' Empirical Psychology,' and 'Doctor's Dissertation,' is not to be mistaken ; of any influence of Herbart not a trace is found. * * * Of course there are to be found already in these incomplete youthful essays various traces of what the direction of my psychological investigations made common to me and to