Hannover and Prussia, 1795-1803; a study in neutrality ...

Front matter

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Preface

A PASSING remark in one of Professor Hans Delbrtick's lectures on the revolutionary and Napoleonic era called my attention to the peculiar complications which resulted from the union of England and Hanover during the eighteenth century. The interest then aroused was at first turned most naturally toward the subject of the mutual influence which the two members of the Personal Union might be supposed to have exercised upon each other, and particularly to the question of Hanover's influence, cultural and political, upon the English dominions of its elector.

Thus it was that I entered upon a study of Hanoverian history after 1795 with the hope that the relations between the Electorate and England would give the investigation a wider outlook and deeper interest than that ofifered by the history of other minor German states in the period. The title and table of contents of this monograph will readily show how definitely I was obliged to abandon my expectation of seeing England come to the fore in a study of Hanoverian history in the years after the treaty of Basel. The study has, I hope, not the less breadth and interest, but these arise not from the relation of Hanover with England, but from the complete dominance of Prussia in Hanoverian politics, a dominance so complete that one can hardly speak of an independent Hanoverian policy in these years. The following 445] 7

8 PREFACE [446

pages show primarily two things which my preliminary study of printed works had only suggested as possibilities. First, how and why the standpoint of Prussian interests furnishes the proper interpretation for Hanoverian history in the years between 1795 and 1803. It shows, secondly, and I think with equal conclusiveness, that Hanoverian history is the key to many things in Prussian policy in the same period, inasmuch as it is the history of the most important of those north German states whose geographical situation made their fate of supreme moment to Prussia.

In its title, then, and in the topics it treats, the following study is a result of the historical situation which the archival sources revealed; for the results here presented are based almost wholly on archival material, some of it published, but by far the greater part examined in the original manuscript copies. The material I have used was gathered during two summers spent in the archives of Hanover, Berlin, London and Dresden. These gleanings I have supplemented by the documents in volumes VIII. and XXIX. of the Publicationen aus de7t kbniglichen preussischeii Archiven (these two vol^ umes edited by Dr. Paul Bailleu) and by the Papiers de Barthklemy, published by the French Foreign Office under the editorship of M. Kaulek. The works of Malmesbury, Massenbach, Ranke, Hiiffer, Ulmann, Vivenot, Ompteda, Martens, Bailleu, Wohlwill and many others, to whom the footnotes give due credit, have supplied, in whole or in part, documents otherwise inaccessible. I have referred carefully to all sources, printed or manuscript, and in the case of the latter I have often printed such excerpts as would enable the reader to test for himself the statements made in the text. Though obliged to use many different libraries, I

PREFACE have endeavored to obtain uniformity in the references to works having different editions.

I can not refrain from expressing the modest hope that this monograph will help in a small way to call attention to a field of Prussian history which deserves, and will repay, more study than it has hitherto received. Prussian historians, after the style of Treitschke, have too often condemned the period of neutrality as one of unrelieved weakness and disgrace. Thus having wiped out what their modern and somewhat intense nationalism leads them to consider as one of the dark pages in Prussian history, they hasten on from the reign of Frederick the Great to the reforms of Stein, Hardenberg and Scharnhorst and the more glorious years of the Wars for Liberation. Throughout the preparation of this study the writer has felt the need of an unprejudiced history of the reign of Frederick William II. and of the earlier years of his son's reign. Men like Hertzberg, Haugwitz, Hardenberg and the Duke of Brunswick would repay, in a lesser degree, perhaps, such treatment as Professor Lehmann has given Scharnhorst and Stein, and there is a place for briefer but equall}^ conscientious studies of such men as Lombard, Struensee and von Dohm. Such investigations might help to give us that profounder knowledge of the political, military and social conditions in unreformed Prussia after Frederick the Great — the critical period in Prussia's history — without which we cannot understand the era of reform or the Greater Prussia of the nineteenth century.

In the preparation of this study I have been placed under obligations to many helpful friends and acquaintances. The collection of the material for it was made possible by the unfailing courtesy of those Prussian scholars into whose hands has been committed the keep-

10 PREFACE

ing- of the state's archives. Drs. Doebner and Fink, in Hanover, and Drs. Bailleu, Loewe and Keller, in Berlin, have given me every assistance in examining and transcribing the documents in their charge. To Dr. Paul Bailleu I arn further indebted, not only for his own publications in this field, but also for his kindness in reading and criticizing my chapters on the Prussian occupation of Hanover in 1801. Through the liberality of the English Foreign Office, and the kindness of the gentlemen in charge of the Public Record Ofhce and of the manuscript room of the British Museum, those two invaluable collections were freely opened to me. In the preparation and printing of the following chapters, I have received the aid of two young American scholars whom I would name with gratitude, Dr. Charles G. Osgood, instructor in English in Yale University, and Dr. James T. Shotwell, instructor in history in Columbia University. To others whom I may not name I feel I owe much for assistance freely given. But more than to all others my thanks are due to Professor William M. Sloane, whose kindly criticism and encouragement have enabled me to present this study in its present form.

The calendar reminds me that by a happ}^ chance I am enabled to conclude this preface on the centennial anniversary of the surrender of the Hanoverians to the French, the event which closes the period covered by this study.

Guy Stanton Ford.

Bristol, Wisconsin, July 5, 1903.

CHAPTER I Introduction PAGE

The theme and its derived importance 21

Epochal character of the years 1714-1715 . , . . . , , 21

Why Hanover's history after that date is more than Hanoverian

in its import . . . , 22

Prussia involved by its geographical situation . . : , , 22

Reason why Prussia is interested in Hanover 23

Instances of Prussia's interest in Hanover before 1795 25

Hanover and Prussia and ''the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756" . 25

Frederick the Great and Hanover in 1778 27

And at the organization of the Fiirstenbund 27

The period 1795 to 1803 a further manifestation of this inevitable

interest 28

The period of neutrality in outline : its main features and the problems considered in this monograph 28

Preliminary view of Hanover at the close of the eighteenth century, 32

Its area, population, and strategic position ............ 32

Its connection with England: origin of the Personal Union , . -^2^

How the Union was regulated; provisions of the Act of Settlement. 34

The ministerial regency in Hanover .....,..., 35

The Hanoverian minister in London — His importance exaggerated, 36

An estimate of the Personal Union . zi

Degree of separation between Hanoverian and English interests x: 38 Dominance of the aristocracy in Hanover — Lack of vigor and need

of reform 39

The power of the irresponsible bureaucrats , . 40

The results of the system. . . ............... 40

Some of the leading names of the period ....,..,.,.., 41

Wilhelm Augustus Rudlofif, Geheimersecretar, as a typical bureaucrat 42

Why able men left Hanover , . , « 43

PAGE

Prussia draws Stein, Hardenberg and Scharnhorst away from

Hanover 44

Revolutionary days and sentiment in Hanover 45

Von Berlepsch and the declarations of " the Calenberg nation " . 46

Was Hanover a revolutionary tinder-box ? 47

Hanover's part in the wars against France 47

The disastrous campaign of 1794 leaves the Electorate exposed . • 48

What can save it from a French invasion ? 48

Appendix A

List of members of the Hanoverian Regency, 1795-1803, and ambassadors at foreign courts in the same period 49

Appendix B

Letter of Simon Woronzow on the separation of interests and

policies between Hanover and Great Britain 50

CHAPTER n

The Treaty of Basel and the Beginnings of Prussian

Neutrality

Relative position and influence of Hanover 53

Why the history of a Prussian treaty is introduced 53

Review of Prussia's part in the Revolutionary Wars 54

Disruption of the First Coalition . . 54

Prussia's interests in Poland 55

General view of the treaty of Basel 56

Recent studies by Bailleu and Sorel 57

Desire for peace general in the Empire . . 57

Austro-Prussian rivalry still active 58

First peace proposal at Regensburg, October, 1794 ........ 59

Opening of the Prussian negotiations at Basel 60

Count Goltz and his instructions 61

France firm — New instructions for Goltz 62

Goltz dies — His successor 63

Motives influencing the negotiators 63

Hardenberg as a Prussian negotiator 64

Idea of a neutral zone appears 64

Prussian mediation had already been proposed 65

Committee of Public Safety unfavorable to it 65

Hardenberg's ideas concerning peace with France 66

He considers three possible cases . . . . c 66

PAGE

Hardenberg proposes the neutralization of North Germany .... 68

Barthelemy's reply - 68

Barthelemy thinks Hardenberg would save Hanover 70

King Frederick William H. expresses his views 71

Parties and plans in favor of a demarcation line 72

Advantages to France of a demarcation line 75

Opposition of Committee of Public Safety to such a line 76

Prussia firm — Treaty concluded 76

Was King Frederick William II. pleased? ']'j

Tardy offers of English subsidies ^J

Treaty of April 5 not wholly satisfactory to Prussians 78

French criticize it . 80

French interest in North German commerce 80

Convention additionelle of May 17 81

Its secret articles 82

Hardenberg permits Hanover to secure a copy of open articles . . 82

CHAPTER III Hanover Accepts Prussian Neutrality

Hanover's attitude toward peace affected by

a. Her position as an electorate of the Empire 84

b. Her previous policy in the war 85

c. The dual position occupied by her ruler; the questions in-

volved

Characterization of Hanoverian policy from 1792 to 1795 87

Regency favorable to the peace proposals at Regensburg 87

Attitude of Elector-King George 88

His Hanoverian ministry disagree with him 88

Attitude of other German states toward the treaty of Basel .... 89

Importance of Hanover's decision: the task before the Regency . . 89 Duke of Brunswick intercedes for Prussia — Hanoverian Regency

favorable but act deliberately • . . . . 90

English policy under Pitt in 1795. King George restrains his Hanoverian advisers. 92

Regency's representations in Berlin, January to March, 1795 ... 93

The Regency's appeal to King George 94

Points in which they agree with their ruler's anti-Prussian views . 95 But they favor the acquiescence of Hanover in the treaty of Basel ;

their arguments • 96

The king hesitates 97

Pitt interrogated in the House of Commons q8

Austria tries to prevent Hanover's acquiescence 99

PAGE

King George accepts neutrality 100

He later reproaches his German subjects loi

The significance of Hanover's action in accepting neutrality . . . 102

Chapter IV

Failure of the Convention Additionelle of May 17, 1795.

Attitude in Hanover toward neutrality .............. 104

The weakness of the Prussian arrangement 104

The violation of the Demarcation Line. 105

Withdrawal of Prussian troops from Frankfort 106

The Regency desire a special acknowledgment of Hanover's neutrality 107

French however protest against Hanoverian violations of neutrality. 107

Attitude of King George. 109

Prussia the interested party no

Hostile forces cantoned in or near Hanover no

French discontented — their remedy iii

Prussia urging Hanover to observe neutrality ....in

Von Dohm's mission— His instructions 112

The Regency's reply— RudlofT's views 114

George III. agrees to disperse the troops at Osnabriick and Stade . 115

Delay in executing the order 116

Hanoverian provincial estates display particularism . 116

Berlepsch and the action of the Calenberg Estates . . * 117

Haugwitz seeks to put neutrality on a firmer basis 118

CHAPTER V Founding Neutrality as a System The failure of the policy begun at Basel 119

Difficulties in the way of securing the safety of North Germany

{a) The situation in Paris 120

{b) In BerHn 121

Possible ways of meeting the situation — Haugwitz 's choice .... 122

Hardenberg favors a vigorous policy 124

Prussia begins negotiations — Sandoz-Rollin's instructions .... 126

Attitude of the Directory towards neutrality 127

Haugwitz acts energetically — What neutrality as a system meant . 129

Haugwitz appeals to the North German states for their co-operation. 131

The replies I34

Hanover's attitude; the Regency; the King- Elector 134

PAGE

Doubts arise in Hanover — The question of supporting an army of

defence 138

Views of the Duke of Brunswick 139

Haugwitz, the Duke, and von Dohm confer — The result 141

Von Dohm's mission to Hanover — His instructions ....... 143

The Regency's reluctance to assume the burden of expense — Aristocratic influences 148

Von Dohm's ultimatum 150

Forces in Hanover that favored co-operation with Prussia .... 152 The meeting of the Calenberg Estates — The influence of Harden-

berg and von Berlepsch 153

Action of the Estates 154

Von Dohm in Brunswick 155

The Regency yields — Rudlofif sent to Brunswick 156

Preliminary conferences over the support of the Demarcation Army. 156

Hanover's plan — Rudloff retires 156

Contrast suggested by the im^portance of the situation 158

And the petty spirit in which it was met by the smaller powers . . 158

Could Prussia long tolerate such a situation ? . . 159

Von Dohm reasonably successful 161

Appendix A

The Regency's report on affairs in May, 1796, and Hardenberg's

visit to Hanover ~ 163

CHAPTER VI Founding Neutrality as a System [Cont.)

Double aspect of the Neutrality System 167

Origin of idea of a demarcation army 168

How was it to be supported ? 169

The critical nature of the issue 169

The Congress of Hildesheim as a solution . 170

How it was constituted . 171

Petty questions raised 172

Its deliberations 173

Importance of the Congress 174

Treaty of August 5, 1796, concluded 175

Haugwitz triumphs 177

Composition of the Demarcation Army 179

Neutrality maintained 1796 to 1801 181

Place of the neutrality period in Prussian history 182

The material and intellectual greatness of the decade, 1795-1805 . . 182

PAGE

Political significance 183

European events

In France 184

In the Empire 186

The Congress of Rastatt 186

The Hanoverian delegation 186

Their policy in the Congress 187

The renewal of war 189

Haugwitz for action — Frederick Wm. III. remains neutral .... 190

CHAPTER VII Prussian Occupation of Hanover in 1801

Complexity of the Napoleonic Era 192

The European situation in 1800 192

Napoleon vs. England 193

Revival of French hostility to Hanover 193

The germ of the continental system 194

Ways for the French to reach Hanover 195

Idea of Hanover for Prussia 195

Czar Paul I. aroused against England 197

His revival of the Maritime League of 1783 197

England's unwavering maintenance of her maritime principles . . . 198

Prussia would act as mediator 200

Haugwitz gives England friendly assurances 202

Prussia drawn into the plans of Paul and Napoleon 203

Haugwitz's skill in meeting the difificulties of the situation .... 204

Paul becomes more urgent 205

Prussia is pushed toward the occupation of Hanover 206

Napoleon renews his threats against Hanover 207

Prussia in her weakness is obliged to yield 207

She resolves to occupy Hanover, but delays 208

Napoleon threatens to occupy Hanover 209

The difiEiculties of Frederick William III.'s position 210

The neutrality system at stake 210

Frederick William's efforts to extricate himself 211

Czar Paul demands that Prussia occupy Hanover 212

The situation in Hanover 21

The fears of the Regency 214

Their vigorous protest to Prussia, February 12, 1801 215

Prussia does not reply, but Prussian opinion favors occupation . . 216

Should Hanover appeal to England ? 217

English opinion 218

455] TABLE OF CONTENTS ly

FACE

Views of the royal family 218

Duke Adolphus goes on a mission to Berlin 219

Duke's character; his aide-de-camp 221

Duke and Capt. von der Decken in Berlin 221

Von der Decken's interview with the king 222

King friendly to Hanover 225

Von der Decken sees Haugwitz 226

The case for Hanover seems hopeless 227

Motives and forces determining Prussia's conduct 228

The subject of indemnity as a background 228

Prussia's weakness 230

Czar Paul assigns Hanover to Prussia . 231

He threatens Prussia with an army 232

Prussia occupies Hanover 233

CHAPTER Vni

Prussian Occupation of Hanover in 1801 {Cont.) — The

Evacuation

The Prussian proclamation 236

Hanover submits 237

Spirit of the Regency - 237

Von Dohm succeeds Schulenburg 238

Assassination of Paul I. — Nelson's victory at Copenhagen . . . 239

Fall of Maritime League 239

Prussia's embarrassment 239

The subject of indemnity as a factor in interpreting Prussia's delay

in evacuating * 240

The suspicions of other nations 241

Prussia's indemnity plans . . 241

Their success depends on Napoleon 242

Napoleon offers Hanover 242

The offer advantageous 243

The probity of Frederick William HI 244

Russia reconciled with England; Prussia isolated 245

Prussia's conditional acceptance of Hanover 245

Napoleon's discontent with the reply to his offer 246

Prussia avoids discussion of its continued occupation of the Electorate 246

Is Hanover to be abandoned by Europe ? 248

England to its rescue 248

Ambassador Carysfort vigorously demands Prussia's withdrawal . 249

Russian co-operation lacks vigor 250 l8 TABLE OF CONTENTS [456

PAGE

Prussia hesitates about declaring its intentions 250

Kriidener, Russian ambassador, becomes more active 251

Russia's interest in saving Hanover 252

The embarrassment in Berlin 254

The crisis 255

August 8, 1801, as the crucial date 257

The conjunction of four important events 257

{a) Frederick William III. declares his good intentions toward Hanover.

{b) Prussia's indemnity plan revealed.

{c) Haugwitz goes on record as to Hanover.

{d) Napoleon demands that Hanover be delivered to the French.

Haugwitz's refusal 263

French-English peace negotiations in London, October, 1801 . . . 264

Withdrawal of the Prussians 265

Results of the occupation 265

Chapter VHI— Appendix A

Extract from Haugwitz's Memoirs 269

CHAPTER IX The French Occupation of Hanover in 1803

Gradual development of Prussian policy (1795-1803) 271

Prussia is drawn into complications by her desires for indemnity . 2']2

Prussia's indemnity fixed by treaty with France, May 22), 1802 . . 273

Exultation over the rich reward in Westphalian region 273

Hanover's suspicions aroused and her interests antagonized .... 273

Hanover's indemnity policy 274

The Regency unsupported fails to gain possession of Hildesheim . I'^'v

The Regency blind to the gathering storm 2TJ

Treaty of Amiens and its rupture, May, 1803 . 277

The standard according to which the events of 1803 will be selected

and grouped 278

Napoleon turns to Prussia for aid; Duroc's mission; Hanover

again the international pawn 2'j(^

Results of Duroc's mission 280

Haugwitz's views 281

Importance of Russian action in this crisis 283

Prussia's instructions to Jacobi in London and her appeal for Russian co-operation 283

457] 7 ABLE OF CONTENTS Iq

PAGE

Prussia's efforts to mediate fail in London; Russia's ambassador

indifferent 283

Situation in St. Petersburg — Peace tendencies 284

Russia's interest in the matter of indemnity 285

Intercedes for Hanover at the Memel interview, June, 1802 .... 286

Consequent dissension between Russia and Prussia 287

Haugwitz turns to Russia in crisis of 1803 288

King Frederick William III. will not occupy Hanover unsupported. 288

Awaiting Russia's action • 289

The situation in Hanover 250

Effect of Prussian occupation of 1801 and Prussian possession of

Hildesheim on the Regency's attitude 2Q0

Count Miinster's anti-Prussian influence in St. Petersburg .... 290

What might have been expected of a Hanoverian m.inistry .... 291

The usual way of treating the French occupation of 1803 292

Lack of preparation in Hanover; Electorate's isolation 293

Dependence on Russia; Simon Woronzow's encouragement . . . 294

Action of Hanoverian and English ambassadors in St. Petersburg . 296

This action too late to have really determined Russia's action . . . 297 The sufficient reasons for explaining Russia's failure to support

Prussia against Napoleon 297

Attitude of the king of Prussia — Parties in his cabinet 300

Captain Deckcn's second mission to Berlin 301

Queen Louise secures him an interview with the king 302

No results from this interview nor from one with Haugwitz .... 303

King Frederick William has a plan 305

The outbreak of war 306

The conference at Corbelitz; Haugwitz's appeal fails to rouse king. 306

Russia breaks silence, but too late 307

Indecision and divided responsibility in Hanover 308

Advance of the French under General Mortier 309

Hanoverian surrender, July 5, 1803 310

Prussia reveals her weakness 311

The responsibility resting on Frederick William III 312

Retrospect and conclusion . • 313

Addenda 316

Introduction

In the period between 1789 and 1803, no other minor German state so largely influenced the course of European affairs as the Electorate of Hanover. The reason for this lies not so much in the inherent greatness and force of the Electorate itself, as in a peculiar combination of circumstances by which the hitherto peaceful annals of Hanover are made to reflect like a mirror the history of Prussian poHcy, and, in a certain degree, the history of Revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe. The truth of this statement will be more apparent to one who recalls in outline certain historical events in the previous history of the eighteenth century, and studies the territorial results of these events upon the map of Europe in 1795.

The years 1714-1715 mark a turning point in the history of Europe. The age of Louis XIV. was ended and the eighteenth century had begun. By the treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt, Frederick I. had secured for his dynasty the proud title of king of Prussia, thus sowing the seed of an ambition whose harvest fields were Rossbach, Belle Alliance, Koniggratz and Sedan. The house of Savoy had fixed itself in Piedmont, around which it was destined to group the rest of the peninsula under the aegis of a united Italy. Austria, through the grant of the Spanish Netherlands, was placed at the threshold of France; upon the House of Hapsburg rested the

459] 21 obligation to defend the lower Rhine region against whatever infectious evil the festering Bourbon monarchy might disseminate. England had secured the key to the Mediterranean and the gateway to French Canada, and had assured to herself a line of Protestant princes. By the death of Queen Anne in 1714 this assurance became a reality through the accession to the British throne of a minor German sovereign, George William, Elector of Hanover. The historian of the eighteenth century will find in the development and interaction of the events here compassed in a single paragraph, many of the most interesting problems of the age. Of these, not the least important is the dynastic revolution just mentioned. It is this change, together with certain of its consequences, which has been chosen as the subject of the present study. The elevation of a German prince to the throne of England gave rise to a complex of political interests and antagonisms without parallel in history. On the one hand, the electorate of Hanover was bound to the Imperial House of Hapsburg by the constitution of the German Empire. On the other, its geographical situation made its every move a matter of the highest import to its most powerful neighbor and Austria's rival, the newly created kingdom of Prussia. Furthermore, the Elector's accession to the English throne involved his state in the fortunes of a power whose policy could be controlled by neither Hanover, Prussia nor the German Empire. Add to these complications the fact that England was entering upon a second Hundred Years' War with France and it at once becomes obvious that a history of Hanoverian-Prussian relations may furnish a vantage point from which to study European history at the close of the eighteenth century.

Geographical situation is a matter of so much importance in determining national policy that it requires more than a passing notice in any treatment of the relations between two powers. The problems of Prussian statesmen in the eighteenth century were essentially modified, if not created, by the fact that her lands straggled a five days' journey across that territorial wilderness known as the Holy Roman Empire of the German People. The Prussia of Frederick the Great, to apply Parkman's brilliant words on France in America, had two heads, one on the bleak shores of the Baltic, the other amid the vineclad hills of Meuse. On the Vistula it faced the Empire of the Romanoffs, on the Rhine it was in the shadow of the tottering Bourbon mionarchy. Its continuity was broken by the interposed territory of a dozen petty powers among which it wandered in uncertain length across the map, here broad and clear, there dispersed and indistinct, again lost in a congeries of ecclesiastical states. Such territorial disintegration not only created administrative difficulties which were in themselves a problem for the statesmen of Prussia, but it exposed the nation on two widely separated frontiers to dangers from enemies as powerful as Russia and France. Furthermore Prussia's own peace and quiet vv^ere conditioned upon the independence and neutrality of the minor powers enclaved within her limits; the difficulties of her leadership where there was no subordination would become almost insuperable if any of these states should attempt a policy hostile to her or should fall into the hands of her enemies.

In the very heart of the Prussian territory lay the German states of the king of England, vying with Saxony and Prussia in power and influence in northern Germany. Their uncertain length from Hamburg on the north to Gottingen on the south cut Brandenburg off from Cleves and the Mark ; their eastern boundary was at the gates of Magdeburg, their western at the vv^alls of Minden. On the throne of Hanover were the descendants of Henry the Lion, men who had once thought to rival the House of Hohenzollern in the struggle for the leadership of Protestant North Germany. The elevation of the Guelfs to the throne of Great Britain had ended that dream, but the change had created for Prussia dangers far more serious than dynastic rivalry. Whether for good or ill, Hanover, and with it Prussia, must now reckon with the enemies of England on the continent. Justly or unjustly, any great power at war with Great Britain would find it convenient to treat Hanover as an English continental possession, and this policy by very reason of the geographical situation just described, Prussia could not regard with indifference. It was such a view of the relations between Hanover and England that France most naturally adopted and for which she found plausible grounds in the attempt of the first two Georges to direct English policy from the standpoint of Hanoverian interests. Nor was the divergence of policy between Hanover and England during the earlier years of the reign of George HI. sufficient to prevent France from regarding Hanover as a convenient point of attack in her great struggle with an insular power v/hose navy rendered her inaccessible, Should Prussia at any tim^e during the great wars between these powers desire to remain neutral, and to make secure her neutrality by protecting Hanover from invasion, she would have to stand between the English sovereign and his German domains, while on the other hand she guarded them against French hostility. Such a situation would make Prussian-Hanoverian relations of central interest in Prussian history.

The eighty years before the treaty of Basel, with which this study begins, furnish so many illustrations of the clashing or combining of the interests mentioned above that in selecting the years between 1795 and 1803 we are not creating a period unrelated to the previous history of Prussia and Hanover or unconnected with their later development; 1795 does not begin, nor does 1803 end, Prussian-Hanoverian relations. Possibly an illustration or two drawn from the reign of Frederick the Great may help us to understand how easily Prussia's interest in Hanover might lead to negotiations of the widest import.

It will be recalled that in the struggles of the first half of the eighteenth century England had been directed by the first two Hanoverian sovereigns into the road which led to an alliance with Austria, and to the granting of subsidies to the smaller powers of north Germany in return for soldiers with which to fight France or defend Hanover. A divergence of purposes had gradually weakened the Anglo- Austrian alliance. Maria Theresa was absorbed in projects for the recovery of Silesia, a matter in which England, with a commercial and colonial empire at stake, manifested such small interest as to rouse the liveliest dissatisfaction on the part of the Empress-Queen. This was the diplomatic situation when in 1754 the opening gun of a great world struggle was fired in the woods of western Pennsylvania. England and France in America had begun what proved to be the decisive war in their century of conflict. George IL, alarmed for his Electo-^ rate, again sought by subsidies and by a renewal of the Austrian alliance to make England, as Pitt's brother-inlaw, Temple, expressed it, an insurance office to Hanover. The negotiations with Austria were, however, balked by Maria Theresa's insistence that Prussia be named as one of the objects of the allies' hostile intentions. The failure of these negotiations left England at the opening of the decisive struggle without an ally. The one hopeful phase of the situation was that in the solicitude of King George for Hanover's safety, his English and Hanoverian advisers had an interest strong enough to lead their testy, narrowminded master to an approchement with his hated nephew, Frederick H. of Prussia. A hint from the Duchess of Brunswick- Wolfenbiittel, a sister of Frederick, who was then seeking to marry one of her daughters to the future George HI., apprised Miinchhausen of George's mellower mood. This able Hanoverian minister ventured to ask on behalf of his Electorate and its sovereign the good offices of the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick- Wolfenbiittel with Frederick in behalf of the neutrality of Hanover.' The Prussian monarch was quick to follow the lead thus opened, and negotiations were begun which led ultimately to an English-Prussian alliance. Austria had already taken up the plan of a French alliance so long urged by Kaunitz, and the news of England's move served to hasten that "Diplomatic Revolution" which made France and Austria allies after two centuries of conflict. The complexity and world-extent of the interests involved in the French-English duel for empire is nowhere better illustrated than in these two years (1754- 1756), when a volley from the muskets of Washington's Virginians gave the signal to renew the struggle, while the negotiations begun by the King of England on behalf of Hanover's neutrality were "the germ of an alliance which was to shake the world." '