The question at issue in the Andover case : arguments of Rev. Drs. Joshua W. Wellman and Orpheus T. Lanphear, complainants in the Andover case : prepared for the hearing before the Board of Visitors, September 1, 1892 : prepared but not read

Contents

PAGE

Letters 5

Amended Complaint 7

I

First, we charge that the said Egbert C. Smyth holds beliefs, has taught doctrines and theories, and has done other things as hereinafter enumerated, which are not in harmony with, but antagonistic to, the Constitution and Statutes of the Seminary, and the "true intention" of its Founders, as expressed in those statutes.

ii.

Secondly, we charge that the said Egbert C. Smyth, contrary to the requirements of Articles XI. (eleven) and XII. (twelve) of the Constitution, as modified by Article 1. (one) of the Additional Statutes, is not a man " of sound and Orthodox principles in Divinity according to " " the fundamental and distinguishing doctrines of the Gospel of Christ as summarily expressed in the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, . . . and as more particularly expressed in the following Creed," to wit, the Creed of the Seminary; but that on the other hand, he believes and teaches in several particulars, hereinafter enumerated, what is antagonistic to the Seminary Creed, and, therefore, in violation of the Statutory requirements of the Founders.

in.

Thirdly, we charge that the said Egbert C. Smyth, in breach of the requirement of Article II. (two) of the Associate Foundation, upon which he is placed, is not an " Orthodox and Consistent Calvinist," but, on the other hand, believes and teaches, in several particulars, hereinafter enumerated, what is opposed to the Seminary Creed.

IV.

Fourthly, we charge that the several particulars of the " heterodoxy " of the said Egbert C. Smyth, and of his opposition to the Creed of the Seminary, and to the "true intention" of the Founders as expressed in their Statutes, are as follows, to wit : he holds, '* maintains and inculcates " : —

1. That the Bible is not " the only perfect rule of faith and practice," but is fallible and untrustworthy in some of its religious teachings.

Amended Complaint.

2. That Christ in the days of his humiliation was a finite being, limited in all his attributes, capacities and attainments ; in other words, was not 11 GOD AND MAN."

3. That no man has power or capacity to repent without knowledge of God in Christ.

4. That mankind, save as they have received a knowledge of " the historic Christ," are not sinners, or, if they are, not of such sinfulness as to be in danger of being lost.

5. That no man can be lost without having had knowledge of Christ.

6. That the atonement of Christ consists essentially and chiefly in his becoming identified with the human race through his incarnation, in order that, by his union with men, he might endow them with the power to repent, and thus impart to them an augmented value in the view of God, and so render God propitious towards them.

7. That the Trinity is modal, or monarchian, and not a Trinity of Persons.

8. That the work of the Holy Spirit is chiefly confined to the sphere of historic Christianity.

9. That without the knowledge of God in Christ, men do not deserve the punishment of the law, and that therefore their salvation is not u wholly of grace."

10. That faith ought to be scientific and rational rather than scriptural.

11. That there is, and will be, probation after death for all men who do not decisively reject Christ during the earthly life; and that this should be emphasized, made influential, and even central in systematic theology.

12. That Christian missions are not to be supported and conducted on the ground that men who know not Christ are in danger of perishing forever, and must perish forever, unless saved in this life.

13. That a system of physical and metaphysical philosophy is true which by fair inference neutralizes the Christian doctrine as taught in the Creed of the Seminary.

14. That there is a " New Theology better than the Old," which, we apprehend, is not in harmony with the Creed, but fatally opposed to the same.

15. That the said Egbert C. Smyth holds and teaches many things which cannot be reconciled with that " Orthodox and consistent Calvinism," which the Statutes require of him, and to which he stands publicly committed ; and that in repeated instances said Egbert C. Smyth has broken solemn promises made when he subscribed the Creed.

J. W. WELLMAN, H. M. DEXTER, O. T. LANPHEAR, J. J. BLAISDELL,

By Asa French,

Their Attorney.

Boston, November 8, 1886.

Preface

No apology is required of the complainants for publishing their arguments, which were not read before the Board of Visitors because of the decision to dismiss the Amended Complaint without further hearing.

Admitting the wisdom of the Board in dismissing the Complaint, in order to the performance of its duty in another way : the question at issue in the Andover Case is so momentous, the public interest in it so important, and the requirements of full and free discussion in the service of truth so imperative, as to require the complainants to give their arguments to the public in this manner, especially, when asked to do so by so many representatives of interested Alumni, together with others, and also since the public expectation was not to be satisfied by learning their views in any other way.

If any precedent were needed, in addition to the action of the President of the Board of Trustees in reading his argument in defence of the professors prepared for the hearing before the Board of Visitors, at a meeting of the ministerial association of which he is a member, shortly after the dismissal of the Complaint, reference might be made to the fact that The Andover Review, with other representatives of the public press, has been diligent in the defence of the professors, claiming without warrant that the dismissal of the Complaint was tantamount to their justification, and also publishing a series of essays on the Divinity of Christ, which, however they may have been intended in defence of the professors, must be taken as still further evidence of their departure from the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, as taught in the creed of the Seminary. Under these circumstances no valid reason could be given in the name of freedom of thought, and its public expression, for withholding from the public the arguments of the complainants.

These arguments are published in form and substance as they were prepared for reading before the Board of Visitors, except that in some instances reference is made to certain publications since that date and to certain recent events in illustration of the positions already taken. To correct certain misapprehensions respecting the standing of the complainants it may be proper to repeat here in brief what has been explicitly, and perhaps sufficiently, declared before: that, in the first instance, they appeared before the Visitors simply as " memorialists, " and acting according to what they believed to be the deliverance of predecessors of the Visitors in office; that, instead of acting as "memorialists," the}' consented to act as complainants under the permission and

10 Preface.

authority of the Visitors, when assured that they could not be heard in any other capacity ; and that they were to serve in this capacity only during the pleasure of the Visitors to receive their service.

It is also proper to say that, in the mind of the complainants, Professor Egbert C. Smyth, d.d., is not regarded in any sense more amenable to the charges of the Complaint than his professorial associate editors of the book entitled " Progressive Orthodoxy." That they have to speak of him as the alone Respondent is owing to circumstances not within their control. As the Complaint was first formulated, it was made against all the associate editors jointly, but objection being made on the plea that it would be more according to equity to put but one of the professors on trial at a time, the Complaint was changed so that charges were formulated against Professor Smyth alone. But at the conclusion of the arguments of both the Defendant and of the complainants, the motion was made by counsel of the Defendant to include with him in this hearing his associate editors on their acceptance of Professor Smyth's defence as their own, with leave to make such further statements as each for himself might desire. This was agreed to by counsel of the complainants and accepted by the Visitors. But it transpired that as one of the Visitors — Dr. W. T. Eustis — was not present when the other professors made these further statements, it did not appear to him that he could consistently and legally act with the other Visitors in coming to a decision which should include the professors whom he had not heard. Consequently the Visitors decreed to remove only Professor Smyth from office, according to the plea for equity made before the hearing of the arguments. This decree of the Board of Visitors having been set aside by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Trustees were not heard in the case, as they desired, a the Amended Complaint" against Egbert C. Smyth was declared to be " still pending," on which a hearing was ordered by the Board of Visitors to be had September 1, 1892, at which the complainants were cited to be present, with others, " to be heard thereon." In obedience to this citation the complainants appeared prepared to read the arguments contained in this pamphlet, which, however, they did not read because the Amended Complaint was dismissed, as already stated.

These arguments, instead of following the numerical order of the several specifications, are arranged according to what is conceived to be the order of thought — the two first in this order written by O. T. Lanphear, and the arguments following written by J. W. Wellman.

JOSHUA W. WELLMAN.

ORPHEUS T. LANPHEAR.

ARGUMENTS

REV. O. T. LANPHEAR, D.D.

ARGUMENT

Maintaining the Thirteenth Charge of the Amended Complaint.

To the Reverend and Honorable, the Board of Visitors in the

Theological Seminary at Andover.

Mr. President and Gentlemen, — I am to argue before you the thirteenth charge of the Amended Complaint, which is that the Respondent, Professor Egbert C. Smyth, d.d., "holds, maintains, and inculcates that a system of physical and metaphysical philosophy is true which by fair inference neutralizes the Christian doctrine as taught in the Creed of the Seminary."

While there may be, in some respects, a variety of opinions attached to "New Theology," whether as advocated in the volume styled " Progressive Orthodoxy " or elsewhere, there is in the philosophy underlying them a common interest. This philosophy is pantheistic, whether as pertaining to the domain of physical or metaphysical inquiry.

In England, the Rev. J. B. Heard, arguing for the New Theology, says in respect to the being of God that "unless we can make an approach to what for want of a better term we must call Christian Pantheism, our theology on the most fundamental question of all will strike a note to which modern science will have no response"; and lacking this response, " theology must," in his estimation, " fossilize." That the pantheism he has in mind has no Christian element appears when he says that " what in Spinoza was an evil dream of science is now a sober reality " ; since Spinoza held that " all things are but modes of God's infinite attributes." 1

The Rev. J. R. Illingworth, in his essay on the " Incarnation in Relation to Development," in the volume entitled " Lux Mundi," argues for the " higher pantheism," which, he says, "is so common at the present day," 2 though in this case the reason for pre-

1 Old and New Theology, p. 5S. Morell's Hist. Mod. Philos. p. 127.

2 Lux Mundi, p. 159.

suming to make the doctrine less offensive by calling it the " higher pantheism " is not apparent.

In New England, the author of " The Continuity of Christian Thought," while declaring that Maurice " more than any other modern theologian was in accord with the fundamental principle of Hegel," and admitting that "it is common to hear Schleiermacher, Hegel, and others spoken of as pantheists," does not call them pantheists himself, on the ground that " the term," as he thinks, " has never been denned," and what " its future destiny may be is still uncertain." l

The New Theology, as represented in the volume entitled " Progressive Orthodoxy," has the elements of pantheistic philosophy found in this theology as represented by other writers.

It is this pantheistic philosophy which neutralizes the Christian doctrine as taught in the Creed of the Seminary.

I. In the first place, this pantheistic philosophy appears in the views held respecting the Divine Immanence.

In " Progressive Orthodoxy," page 16, there is the following passage : —

We add a single remark upon the general philosophical conception of God and his relation to the universe which underlies these essays. It is a modification of a prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation [in accordance with the highest thought of the Greek Fathers] of the divine immanence. Such a doctrine of God, we believe, is more and more approving itself in the best philosophy of our time, and the fact of the Incarnation commends it to the acceptance of the Christian theologian.

This statement is important since it furnishes the key to the situation of all that follows in the discussion of the different topics. What, then, is the divine immanence according to the Greek Fathers ? This question cannot be answered without some reference to Greek philosophy, with which the theology of the Greek Fathers was in alliance. In general it may be said that the Greek philosophers had no idea of the personality of God, so that they defined creation as an emanation from God, and not as a creation in the proper sense. According to Plato, nothing has ever been created. All that is is eternal, not in form, but in substance. Something material has always existed, which would

1 Continuity of Christian Thought, p. 427 sg.

Argument on TJiirteenth Complaint. 15

be lifeless except that it has a soul — an unintelligent force by which chaotic agitation is produced. God, as the absolute or impersonal Being, endowed this unintelligent force with a portion of his own intelligence, and then this unintelligent force thus endowed becomes the world-soul, or Logos, which pervades the visible universe and constitutes one living animated whole, and is individualized in human souls. The soul of man, then, consists of the world-soul as an unintelligent force of matter, and that portion of God's own intelligence — or Logos — with which he has endowed that force. 1 Thus the Logos is the reason of God manifest in creation, which it fosters and sustains.

This notion of the Logos as the mediator between God and the world was not confined to the doctrines of Plato or the Greek philosophy, for, as Milman observes, this doctrine was held " from the shores of the Yellow Sea to the Ilissus ; it was the fundamental principle of the Indian religion and Indian philosophy : it was the basis of Zoroastrianism, it was pure Platonism, it was the Platonic Judaism of the Alexandrian School." 2 Thus, the Logos is not a person, or hypostasis in the Being of God, but an emanation from him, a ray of light shot out from him, as a ray of light shot out from the sun, and to be reabsorbed in him as a ray of light may be conceived as being reabsorbed in the sun. The world exists, then, in form, by an evolution of God, by his identity with the world through the Logos, so that really there is no vital distinction between God and the world. It has been well said, therefore, that " the whole fabric of ancient and modern pantheism rests upon the petitio principii, that the doctrine of evolution has the same legitimate application within the sphere of the Infinite and Eternal, that it has within that of the Finite and Temporal, — a postulate which annihilates the distinction between the two." 3 But in the annihilation of this distinction, God and the world are found to be identical. Man is a God-man by the identity of the Logos with his soul.

Again, Plato made ideas eternal and immutable, and as ideas were all included in the Being of God, and as ideas constituted the only really existing beings, then, all that is phenomenal or that affects the senses being mere shadows of the real, it follows that

1 Charles Hodge's Theology, vol. i, p. 322. Charles Bigg's Bampton Lectures, 1886, p. 15. 2 History of Christianity, p. 45. 3 Shedd's Hist, of Christ. Doct. vol. i, p. 13.

Plato's system in its essential character is really pantheistical. Thus all that there is of intelligence in the world, down to man, belongs, in Plato's view, to the divine substance. 1

So" the aim of Stoicism "was to bring the popular religion, allegorically explained, into union with a thoroughly pantheistic view of the world."

Aristotle held that human souls are only the divine reason in individual existence.

The Neoplatonists held that the affluence of God is emitted as fire emits heat, and that the soul of man is a mode of God's existence, a portion of his substance, and whose destiny is absorption in the Infinite Being.

According to the mysticism of the Alexandrian School, the Logos, or reason in God, is reason in man, so that in the pursuit of truth supreme authority should be ascribed to "God within us," and not to the Scriptures.

Origen held u to a spiritually conceived theory of emanation." " God, as the absolute unity, he taught, can only be a source of unity. So far as all existence springs from him, the unity of his own essence must reveal itself therein." " God therefore is to be originally contemplated as the fountain of a world of spirits, allied to his own nature." 2 As Origen held to the preexistence of the human spirit, and that it was at length sent into this world on account of sin, this passage shows that in that previous state the origin of the human spirit was an emanation from the divine essence, and so in quality identical with the divine.

Professor Allen says that " the statement of Hegel may differ in form from that of ancient Greek theology, but it is the same thing in essential principle." 3 But according to Hegel, " Deity is a process ever going on, but never accomplished ; nay, the divine consciousness is absolutely one with the advancing consciousness of mankind." "Apart from, and out of, the world, therefore, there is no God ; and so also, apart from the universal consciousness of man, there is no divine consciousness or personality." 4 Such is the Hegelian pantheism. Thus as the Greek philosophy in its relation to theology shows that in all its forms

1 C. Hodge's Theol. vol. i, p. 325, and on pantheism generally. See also Dollinger's Gentile and the Jew. 2 Neander, vol. i, p. 621. s Continuity of Christian Thought, p. 431. * Morell's Hist. Mod. Philos. pp. 473-477.

it was more or less pantheistic, and as the Greek Fathers derived the doctrine of the divine immanence from the Greek philosophy, it must be regarded as involving the identity of the human with the divine. It goes to support this view that the opinion of those who may be called experts, whether accepting or rejecting this view of the divine immanence, agree substantially in attributing to it this doctrine of identity.

Now, this pantheistic philosophy on which the doctrine of the divine immanence is based is opposed to the doctrine of Christian theism in the Andover Creed in several particulars : —

And in the first place, this opposition is seen in respect to the Creation. According to the theology of the Andover Creed, the world was created out of nothing, both in substance and form, and therefore the Creation had a beginning ; while according to the Greek immanence the world is an emauation from God, and without beginning, matter being eternal, while creation regarded as an emanation applies only to the form of things. Thus, the Greek immanence lies at the foundation of what is called monistic pantheism, that is, that there is in reality but one Being in the uui verse, and that Being is God. But as opposed to this, the theology of the Andover Creed holds that God created the world to be other than himself. Thus it is consistent with its claim that " the word of God contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is the only perfect rule of faith and practice, " for the Bible everywhere recognizes as true the intuitive convictions of men. One of these convictions is that God is other than the world, that God as spirit is not matter, nor is matter spirit. Thus the realistic dualism which lies at the bottom of all human convictions underlies also all the revelations of the Bible.

Again, the Greek immanence is opposed to the divine immanence of Christian theism which is the basis of the Andover Creed. In Christian theism the divine immanence is equivalent to the divine omnipresence. As Creation had a beginning, before the Creation God filled the immensity of space with his presence. In the Creation God did not displace himself, but remained equal to himself, everywhere present in the space filled by Creation and everywhere present in space not filled by Creation. God's omnipresence or immanence is his presence everywhere in Creation, while his transcendence is his presence

18 Argument on Tliirteenth Complaint.

everywhere beyond the Creation. In this doctrine of the divine omnipresence, or immanence, God is in no sense identical with the created universe, nor is the divine in any sense identical with the human. This doctrine of the divine omnipresence may be said to date from Augustine, who, though receiving his scientific discipline from Platonism as well as Origen, nevertheless disentangled his theology from Platonism in respect to the being of God. 1 He says that God " is entire in heaven alone, and entire in earth alone, and entire in both heaven and earth, and comprehended in no place, but everywhere entire in himself." 2

Calvin says that " God represents his residence to be in heaven ; for though, as he is incomprehensible, he fills the earth also ; yet seeing that our minds, from their dulness, are continually dwelling on the earth, in order to shake off our sloth and inactivity, he properly raises us above the world." 3

Charnock, who was a Calvinist, says that " God is most simple ; his essence therefore is not mixed with anything. God is not formally one with the world or with any creature in the world by his presence in it, nor can any creature in the world, no, not the soul of man, or an angel, come to be essentially one with God, though God be essentially present with it. He fills heaven and earth ; he is as much a God in the earth beneath as in heaven above, entirely in all places, not by scraps and fragments of his essence." 4

Emmons says, "that a cause can operate where it does not exist, is utterly inconceivable ; and, therefore, the presence of the Creator, must be coextensive with his works." It is no less a conclusion of reason than a dictate of revelation that God ' ' fills heaven and earth." 5

Thus in Christian theism, according to the theology of the Andover Creed, the divine immanence is the omnipresence of God in the world in such a manner that God is not " mixed," or identified with the world, nor is there any identity of the human with the divine.

But according to the Greek philosophy as taught at Andover, and the Greek theology shaped by that philosophy, the divine immanence is the omnipresence of God in such a way that God is

iNeander, vol. ii, p. 353. 2 Hodge, vol. i, p. 384. 3 Inst. i, 13. 4 Divine Attributes, p. 238. 5 Bib. Sac. vol. vii, p. 257.

identified with the world, and so as to establish the identity of the divine with the human, and thus " neutralizes the Christian doctrine as taught in the Creed of the Seminary."

It has been said by the defenders of " Progressive Orthodoxy" that it cannot be pantheistic because it admits of the divine transcendence ; but the answer is that it does not admit of the divine transcendence in the seuse that attaches to the transcendence in Christian theism. According to the latter, the quality of the being of God is the same whether considered in respect to his omnipresence in the world, or to his transcendence beyond the world. But, according to the Greek immanence, the identity of the human with the divine gives a quality to the being of God in the world different from the quality of the being of God in his transcendence beyond the world. In his transcendence the being of God is purely divine, but in his immanence the being of God is identified with the human, and so confounded with the world. Thus it appears that the transcendence which the Greek immanence can consistently admit must differ in kind from the transcendence of Christian theism, for in that the transcendence and immanence represent the being of God as the same in quality. The admission of a transcendence, therefore, does not, as some have supposed, go to prove that a theology is free from pantheism. Any representation of the transcendence as different in quality from the immanence, such as that immanence represents the actual or real being of God, while transcendence represents the ideal being of God ; or that immanence represents the known being of God, while transcendence represents the unknown being of God, — is contrary to Christian theism and in the interest of pantheism.

It should be observed that the omnipresence of God, as the divine essence present everywhere, does not satisfy the advocates of the divine immanence according to the Greek Fathers. They call this omnipresence a presence merely by u contact," or " contiguity," while they are satisfied with nothing short of that " pervasive" and " permeating" presence of the divine essence which constitutes the identity of the human with the divine. They can affirm, with Professor Cocker, that " God is immanent in man, and that man is immanent in God," and that "the reason of man is a beam of the eternal reason." 1 In general, the advocates of

ir rheistic Conception of the World, p. 353.

this Divine Immanency claim that any view of creation which represents man as other than God in being, action, reason, moral attributes, and personality," is a deistical view. To this effect Dr. Douglass says that "Divine Immanency stands opposed to dualism in all its forms." 1 It follows, then, that God and man are in no sense two, but are in reality one. When man thinks, chooses, and acts, it is not man as an individual person and free agent that does these things, but God who thinks, chooses, and acts in human form. In short, this Immanence represents God as in the continuous act of a creation which consists solely in the evolution of himself ; hence there can be no dualism, and no such distinction as that between the Natural and the Supernatural, between Immanence and Transcendence, for the only proper thing to say of God is, that he is the "All."

Thus, though in "Progressive Orthodoxy" it is not indicated what definite shade of meaning is attached to the " divine immanence, in accordance with the highest thought of the Greek Fathers," yet the statements of these Fathers respecting this doctrine, as well as the interpretation of experts and the views of those holding the doctrine, show conclusively that the basis of the doctrine is pantheistic philosophy, and therefore that it is opposed to the Christian theism of the Andover Creed.

II. In the second place, the pantheistic philosophy of "Progressive Orthodoxy" is seen in the substantial rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity required in the Andover Creed, in favor of a Modal or Monarchian theory. Theologically, this has already been argued under the seventh charge of the list, so that here there is only occasion for brief reference to the philosophy on which the Modal theory rests, as illustrated by the views of Sabellius and Arius.

In the Sabellian view, the names Father, Logos, and Holy Ghost are simply " designations of three different phases under which the one divine essence reveals itself." 2 The Father — the Absolute — remains the same, but evolves himself in the Son and the Spirit, while in the Triad there is no distinction as to essence. There being no personal distinction in the Triad, there was nothing inconsistent in supposing these only seeming personalities should disappear, be annihilated, or be reabsorbed in the essence 1 Divine Immanency, Bib. Sac. vols, xlv-xlvii. 2 Neander, vol. i, p. 595.

of the impersonal Absolute. But this implied the completed pantheistic circle of evolution and involution, in respect to which Neander justly remarks that "as Sabellius made Christ's personality to be nothing more than a transient appearance, so he must have conceived it to be also in regard to all personal existence." 1 Thus Sabellianism was based on that pantheistic philosophy of Emanation which confounded God with the world.

Arius undoubtedly supposed that he was establishing " the Oriental system of emanation and subordination which obtained a settled form through the labors of Origen." 2 But this system was pantheistic, whether in speaking of the Logos as an emanation or a radiation from God. In Origen's conception of Christ it must be kept in mind that he believed in the " preexistence of souls," and "the original rectitude, and perfect equality, of all created spirits, as they came from the hand of their Maker ; but when they all declined, though in different degrees, from their first and perfect love, and thence received their diverse assignations, in earth and skies, that, which is now the soul of Jesus, was alone found stedfast. As a reward for this integrity, and to effect the purposes of the divine Incarnation, this soul was received into the most perfect union with the Logos, they [this soul and the Logos] completely embracing each other, so as to become in a sense One Spirit. Thus united, and by this indispensable medium, God was born a man." 3 Now this pantheistic conception of the Christ, in whom the Logos of itself was not a person since only a ray shot out from the Father, but became a person through union with the preexistent soul of Jesus, was retained in the view of Arius, as he understood it, so that when he called Christ a creature he only intended to affirm that there was a time when he did not exist, without assuming in any manner that his origin was not by emanation when at length his being began. Thus, however Sabellius and Arius may have differed in other respects, they agreed in this, that the origin of the Son was by emanation from the Father ; for the thought is the same whether it be said that the Son proceeds from the Father by efflux, radiation, emanation, or evolution. To admit that evolution is legitimate in the Infinite and Eternal, and so in the divine essence ; that this essence has continually the power of