Rear-Admirals Schley, Sampson and Cervera [microform] : a review of the naval campaign of 1898, in pursuit and destruction of the Spanish Fleet commanded by Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera

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Preface — A Biographical Sketch of the Author . . 9

Chapter

Preface

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE

AUTHOR

The feeling displayed by the Navy Department of the United States; between the officers of the navy, and throughout the country, that resulted from the events of the naval campaign of 1898 in the West Indies, in the pursuit and destruction of the Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, would seem to justify a review of those events; and some reference to the career and experience of the author hereof may not be without interest in determining his fitness to undertake such review.

I was born in the town of Newark, Licking County, Ohio, of New Jersey parentage and lineage, in the year 1832; was appointed midshipman in the navy of the United States November 14, 1846, and sent to the then newly established “Naval School,” as it was then called, at Annapolis, Md., for a few months. It is proper here to state that when the Hon. George Bancroft, then Secretary of the Navy, established that institution the intention was that when a lad was appointed midshipman his first two years of service were to be passed there; he was then to be sent to sea for a three years’ cruise; then brought back to the Naval School for one year; and at the end of the year be examined by a board of captains of the navy, and, if passed, be warranted as passed midshipman.

The Mexican War broke out in May, 1846, and a great need of young officers having developed, I was soon ordered away for service on board ship.

lO and on March 26, 1847, sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, for Vera Cruz, on board the sloop-of-war SaratogUy under command of the late Admiral David G. Farragut, then a commander in rank. It was his first command.

Farragut hoped to get to Vera Cruz before the capture of the castle of San Juan d’Ulloa, and on the way down the crew of the ship were assiduously practiced in all sorts of apparently useless drills, such as boarding from yard-arms, dropping hand grenades upon the decks of imaginary ships, etc. It was long years afterwards that we learned that his plan and purpose were to dress the ship up as an old merchantman, run the blockade into the harbor, tie up alongside the castle, and “board” from our yard-arms and attempt to capture it; but his plan was frustrated by the fact that the castle surrendered the very day the ship sailed from Norfolk.

Although there were no naval enemies to fight, yet almost as soon as we arrived the dreaded “Yellow Jack” broke out and continued its ravages until December. We had 105 cases, and 26 deaths, out of a complement of 159 officers and men. This was a lesson of patient performance of duty in the face of death that has not been without its effect upon my subsequent life.

After the usual midshipman's experience of five years, two of which were on the coast of Africa, where I suffered shipwreck, I again came to the Naval School — which had meanwhile been recognized by Congress and dignified by the title of “Academy.” After a year’s study and preparation, in June, 1852, I was graduated as passed midshipman, second of a class of which the late Rear- Admirals Lewis A. Kimberly, Bancroft Gherardi, Daniel L. Braine, Lieutenant George U. Morris, who fought the Cumberland against the Merrimac; Captain Kidder R. Breese, who was Rear Admiral

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA ii

David G. Porter’s fleet captain during nearly the whole of that distinguished officer’s Civil War service; Lieutenant John G. Sproston, the first regular officer of the navy to give his life in the Union cause, and others of like character were members.

I then served as passed midshipman for nearly three years on the Mediterranean Station, on board the U. S. sloop-of-war St, Louis, under command of Commander Duncan N. Ingraham; and was an officer of that vessel when Ingraham rescued Martin Kozta (one of Kossuth’s patriotic band of revolutionists) from the Austrian brig-of-war Huzzar, whose officers had kidnaped him from shore at Smyrna in 1853.

That incident has long been practically forgotten, but it then set the world of diplomacy on fire, and established the principle that one who comes to the United States, renounces allegiance to the ruler of the land of his birth, and, under our naturalization laws declares his intention to become a citizen of the United States, becomes, ipso facto, entitled to, and will receive, the protection of our flag and power.

In September, 1855, I was promoted to be lieutenant, but having in the meanwhile become engaged to be married, in November, 1856, I resigned my commission. Having read law in Cincinnati, in the office of Hon. Salmon P. Chase, ^ I graduated LL. B. from the Cincinnati Law School.^

I was admitted to the bar of Ohio April 14, 1857, and on June 3 married my Virginia sweetheart (Miss Kate McLean, of Norfolk). I practiced law until the Civil War broke out.

On April 13, 1861 (though at that time an ardent

^Then Governor of Ohio, subsequently Secretary of the Treasury under President Lincoln, and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

^President William H. Taft was graduated from and for several years was dean of that school.

Democrat), I volunteered to resume my former place in the navy, to aid in the maintenance of the Union, and was the first officer who had formerly resigned from the regular navy to be reappointed (on May 8th, i86i). I was subsequently reinstated, and commissioned Lieutenant-commander (July 22, 1862), In my former place on the regular navy list.

I served through the Civil War with credit and some distinction; was the executive officer of the frigate Minnesota} in the five days’ bombardment of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and the senior officer in the naval assault on that fortress January 15, 1865, concerning which assault Rear Admiral Porter, in his report, said: “Nowhere in the annals

of war have officers and sailors undertaken so desperate a service. The work, as I said before. Is really stronger than the Malakoff tower, which defied so long the combined power of France and England. The courage of these officers deserves the highest reward.” And Rear Admiral Porter recommended the author and five others (viz: Lieutenant Com-

manders K. R. Breese, Charles H. Cushman, and Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., and Lieutenants George M. Bache and Roswell H. Lamson) for promotion for personal gallantry displayed in that deadly assault.

When hostilities were entirely over I again resigned my commission and retired to private life. Had I remained In the navy I would now be a rear admiral on the Retired List.

I am a counsellor-at-law of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the highest courts of Ohio, New Jersey, and New York.

As one of the counsel for Rear Admiral Schley before the Court of Inquiry held In 1903, I had every opportunity to acquire full and accurate knowledge of all the facts and reports of the campaign.

While it will be evident to the reader of this review that my professional, legal, -naval, and personal judgments are favorable to Admiral Schley, I yet trust to be believed when I say that I would not willingly do the slightest injustice to any other officer, because I regard them generally as still my professional brethren.

This book has been written without any consultation with Rear Admiral Schley, who has never seen a line of it, and does not know that is has been written ; and it is proper to say that Schley’s book, ‘‘Forty-five Years under the Flag,” was also written by him without consultation with the writer of this book, who never saw a line of it until after this book was entirely written.

For all facts stated in this review proof is given. Opinions based on, and inferences drawn from, those facts are, of course, my own.

The author feels confident that a careful reading of this review will dispel all misunderstanding of that campaign, a misunderstanding which has pertinaciously been promulgated in the effort to convey false impressions in respect to the principal actors in it.

JAMES PARKER.

Perth Amboy, New Jersey, September i, 1907.

Chapter I Preliminary

The Admiral of the Navy, George Dewey, well says, in his Introduction to the book “James Lawrence,” which he most fitly styles “the admirable work of Lieutenant Commander Albert Cleaves, U. S. N” :

“It is by the close and careful weighing of the causes which produced the wonderful results of our sea battles of the past, that we equip ourselves for the warfare of the future.”

The complete success and far-reaching results of the United States naval campaign of 1898, in the pursuit and destruction of the Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, are without a parallel in the naval histories of the world; and are fruitful of lessons for the future, of warning against the mistakes and errors of judgment, departmental or Individual, that may have occurred, and of example that may serve as Inspiration and guide to the navy that Is to carry on the record of excellence ; and of brave deeds well and effectively done, in the past, under and for the flag and honor of our country.

Chapter II Causes Of The War With Spain

It is common to attribute that war to a particular cause; but the truth is that the sentiment which brought it about had been growing for centuries; certainly since the days when the Spanish Armada was sent against England In Queen Elizabeth’s time.

There is no doubt that there has been transmitted to us from our English ancestry a feeling of contempt for what English-speaking sailors from that day to this have called the ‘‘Dagoes”; and that the Spaniard has always been regarded by English-speaking peoples as a pompous, exaggerated, rapacious, bloodthlrtsy and tyrannical type of man. The record of the crimes of Spain against the peoples of Holland, Peru, Chili, Mexico, and the Philippines is a black one, truthfully told in the pages of Prescott and other historians, and Is well known and Indubitable.

It may well be doubted If any other nation (not of Spanish blood or teaching, and professing to be Christian and civilized) can be truthfully charged with such a deliberate murder of defenseless prisoners as that of Captain Joseph Fry and his fellow-martyrs at Santiago de Cuba In 1874; and It Is the highest retributive justice that the power of Spain on this hemisphere should have been brought to an end there by Fry’s countrymen; and that the last of Spain’s naval vessels In American waters — the Cristobal Colon, named after him who by his discoveries gave to Spain her first power over the people of the Antilles — lies a submerged wreck at the mouth of the Rio Tarquino, near which Fry and his ill-fated companions were captured and taken to their murder at Santiago de Cuba.

Another remarkable coincidence is that the Infanta Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera’s flagship (which was the only vessel of his fleet saved from the beach after the Battle of Santiago), was, while on her way to the United States, driven ashore by a violent gale at nearly the exact spot where Columbus landed In 1492 and planted the standard of Spain; and lies there a wreck.

Since we became a nation every effort that has been made by Spain’s colonies In America to throw off her tyrannical yoke has had the earnest and active sympathy of the people of the United States. Our adventurous young men have freely risked their lives In that behalf. Numerous “filibustering expeditions,” so called, have gone from our shores to aid, with arms and men, the Cubans In their efforts for independence; and from the walls of all the military prisons in the “ever faithful Isle” — as the Spaniards persisted, notwithstanding, In calling Cuba — thousands of bullets can be dug, ghastly proofs of the fate of those patriots or their associates who unsuccessfully had attempted to overthrow 'the Spanish domination. All such efforts, and they were many, came to defeat until the United States government and people took an active part In the movement In the year 1898.

“It was in the air,” at the b^innlng of that year, that war between the United ^ates and Spain was imminent; and it needed only an incident to make that war a reality.

CHAPTER III THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLE- SHIP ''maine^"

That incident came when our battle-ship Maine ^ while lying peacefully moored to a buoy where she had been placed by Spanish pilots, in what was then the friendly harbor of Havana, was on February 17, 1898, blown up. By this disaster 270 of her officers and men were hurled, unexpectedly and instantly, to death.

No more dastardly act was ever perpetrated. Those who did it waited until most of the victims were asleep for the night — when, of course, they had least chance of escape.

The whole world stood amazed, and our entire nation, though blazing with indignation, waited until a most patient and careful investigation could be had. A naval court of inquiry, of which Captain William T. Sampson was president, made it certain that a submarine mine or other instrumentality had been exploded under the ship; but how so exploded has never yet been discovered. There are some significant facts, however, that demonstrate but too clearly that, while privity on the part of the Spanish authorities in the atrocity has not been shown, those authorities must have known whether the Maine was located over or in dangerous proximity to such instrumentality, because they knew exactly where every such — if there were such in that harbor — was located; and they have never given up that knowledge to us.

If such mine was located near that buoy to which the Maine was moored, it seems evident that it must have been done for the purpose of exploding it under a friendly vessel, because none others were ever moored there; and the Maine was so moored by direction of the Spanish port officers.

The explosion must have been caused by someone entirely familiar with the location of the mine, because it could have been effectively exploded only when the Maine was directly over It, as the winds and tides would change her position in respect to it. It must therefore have been exploded by some Spanish official who had the means of determining with precision when she was over It; and who had access to the batteries by which alone the explosion could be effected.

The Spanish authorities could easily have located all who had such knowledge and access; and this they have never done, so far as we know.

Admiral Dewey, in the Introduction to Cleaves’ book before referred to, says: “Out of the accounts of great battles, by sea and land, we seize as watch-: words the phrases of the commanders.”

Thus the words “Remember the Maine (like those other words, “Remember the Alamo!”; Lawrence’s dying cry, “Don’t give up the ship!”; Farragut’s, “Damn the torpedoes, go ahead!”; and Dewey’s quiet command, “You may fire when you’re ready, Gridley,” which sounded the death-knell of Spain’s dominion over the Philippines) became an Inspiration to the country at large, and the navy in particular.

Chapter IV Events Preliminary To The Declaration Of War

Events moved very rapidly in the early part of 1898. Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard commanded the North Atlantic Station at the time the Maine was destroyed, and on March i, 1898, appointed a court of inquiry to be held on board the steamer Mangrove, at Havana. The members of the court were Captain William T. Sampson, president; Captain French E. Chadwick, and Lieutenant Commander William P. Potter, members; and Lieutenant Commander Adolph Marix, judge advocate.

After a most thorough investigation the court reported that, in its judgment, the ship had been blown up from without; but did not, except by inference, implicate the Spanish authorities; and that it was “unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.”

On March 5, by recommendation of President Mc- Kinley, Congress voted fifty millions of dollars then lying idle in the Treasury, to be used by the President, in his discretion, for national defense. This great mark of confidence and purpose was displayed without distinction of party, and almost unanimously.

Warlike preparations immediately began, and were continued with zeal. New vessels then building in England were purchased, examinations of vessels suitable for auxiliary purposes were made in our various ports, and warlike spirit and activity everywhere prevailed.

On March 17 Senator Proctor, of Vermont, who had been an officer of distinction in the Civil War, had been Secretary of War, and had just returned from an inspection of the “reconcentrado camps” in the island of Cuba, made an address in the Senate of the United States that created a profound impression, not only In the United States, but abroad. His descriptions of the horrors he had seen in those camps, of the slowly starving old men, women, and little children, (whose only fault was that they were suspected of being in sympathy with their husbands, fathers, brothers, or sons who were in the patriot army of Cuba,) declared in clarion tones to the country and the world, that to relieve the suffering people of that Island from the cruel domination of Spain was not only a national, but a moral, duty on our part. It removed all lingering doubts.

Two names will go down to history In a common infamy: The Austrian Field Marshal Haynau,

whose atrocious treatment of the Hungarian and Austrian patriots of 1848-9 aroused the Indignation of the world; and the Spaniard, Captain-General Weyler, by whose orders the atrocities that Senator Protor described were committed.

The President’s call for volunteers for army and naval service was responded to by a vast multitude of men. North and South, East and West, vied with each other in display of patriotic zeal. Veterans of the Blue and veterans of the Gray stepped out with their sons and grandsons, in patriotic emulation, to march and suffer and, if necessary, to die under the Old Flag, when and wherever they might be called upon to go.

Into the navy, as parts of the naval militia, went the yachtsmen that owned and ran expensive yachts, who left their business to become enlisted men and, with dainty hands that had never known labor. Indulge in the pleasant tasks of coaling ships and scrubbing decks.

There was only one rivalry — who should do and dare and suffer most in the great good cause and duty of the hour, and for the honor and glory of the United States and the Stars and Stripes.

CHAPTER V THE ‘‘flying squadron” IS FORMED

To form the squadron that will go down to history as “The Flying Squadron” several ships were taken out of the North Atlantic fleet and sent to rendezvous at Hampton Roads. These were the armored cruiser Brooklyn (Captain Francis A. Cook) ; battleships Texas (Captain John W. Philip; Massachusetts (Captain Francis J. HIgginson) ; and armored cruisers Minneapolis (Captain F. M. Wise) ; and Columbia (Captain James H. Sands). The last two were soon sent to the New England coasts, and some smaller vessels and a collier {Sterling) were sent to Hampton Roads in their stead.

On March 24 Rear Admiral Sicard broke down under the strain of his greatly increased official labors and anxieties and was relieved from his command.

Sicard was a distinguished officer who had served faithfully and with distinction during the Civil War. In command of the gunboat Seneca he took part in the battles of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and voluntarily — for he was under no obligation of duty to do so — headed the officers and men from his vessel in the naval assault on that fort, January 15, 1865, where he behaved with much gallantry. He had served as chief of bureau in the Navy Department, had commanded the monitor Miantonomoh in the North Atlantic fleet when it was under command of Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce, and succeeded that able officer in command of that fleet.

His detachment left Captain William T. Sampson the senior officer of that station; and on March 27 Captain Sampson published an order in which he announced: “By order of the Honorable Secretary of the Navy I have assumed command of the United States naval force on the North Atlantic Station; and hoisted my pennant on board the armored cruiser New York, at 3.30 P. M. this day.” And then after announcing his staff as follows : Chief of staff, Captain French E. Chadwick (who was also the captain of the flagship New York) ; assistant chief of staff, Lieutenant Sydney A. Staunton; flag lieutenant, Charles

C. Marsh; secretary ensign, E. L. Bennett; he signed himself, “William T. Sampson, Captain, Commander-in-Chief, U, S, Naval Force, North Atlantic Station

The above named continued to be his staff during the Spanish War. Up to this time Sampson had been the captain of the battle-ship Iowa, Captain Robley

D. Evans was on March 28 ordered to the command of that ship, and thus became next in rank to Sampson. In the opinion of the author that appointment of Evans was a most significant move; for, that Sampson was a frail man and therefore liable to break down at any moment was a fact that was not unknown (certainly should not have been) to the officials of the Navy Department; and If he did break down, Evans, as senior captain, would have become Sampson’s successor, just as Sampson did when Sicard broke down. It would never have done to detach Sampson and put Evans In his place — the whole navy would have cried out in condemnation of that; but If Evans could succeed to the command In the way Indicated the scheme might have gone through with much less comment.

If this was the scheme, one very important individual was “left out of the count.” That was Captain Chadwick, chief of staff, who apparently made up his mind that Sampson should not break down.

Evans, who bears the sobriquet of “Fighting Bob,” has always been a lucky character, “reaping where he had not sown, and gathering where he had not strewn;” but his luck seems to have failed him in this matter. Where he got his sobriquet of “Fighting Bob’’ neither he (as he says) nor anyone knows. He was an acting ensign in the Fort Fisher assault, but although he was painfully wounded in the legs, none of the official reports mentioned him for bravery; and in fact he was not conspicuous.

Several months after the assault I learned that he had been placed on the retired list because of his wounds, and, for the purpose of remedying the injustice of retiring a young officer because he had been wounded in battle, I wrote the letter praising him which Evans quotes on page 108 of his book, “A Sailor’s Log.” If I had known what effect the letter was later to have, it would not have been so strongly worded.

When in 1866 selections were made to fill up the increase in the grades authorized by Congress in that year, Evans was advanced thirty-four numbers — over the heads of the present rear admirals. Glass, Sands, Sigsbee, and many others who had a much better fighting and professional record than he. When those over whom he had been promoted complained of injustice, a naval board of distinguished officers, of which the late vice admiral Stephen C. Rowan was president, reported that his advancement, to the extent to which it had been made, was an injustice to those over whom he had been promoted, and that an advance of ten numbers was all that Evans’ conduct merited. A second board of rear admirals recommended that Sands, Glass, and Sigsbee should be restored to their places above him. Notwithstanding that Sands had stooped over Evans, at his request, and bound up his wounds under the furious fire at Fort Fisher, and had then gone further into the fight and had been mentioned in the reports for gallantry displayed, yet Evans in Congress had the bills defeated that were introduced to effectuate the recommendation of the boards of admirals.

He was a good “Fighting Bob” to prevent justice being done to his brother officers.

After the battle of Fort Fisher Evans had no opportunity for fighting (except with his tongue) until the Spanish War occurred.

The foregoing incidents of his history are given because he, in his “Sailor’s Log,” “points with pride” to my praise of him in that letter from which he quotes, and it is but just that the whole truth about the matter should be told.

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Chapter VI

COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY IS PLACED IN COMMAND OF '^THE FLYING SQUADRON

Commodore Winfield Scott Schley had been promoted to that rank in regular order, on February 6, 1898. On March 28 he was assigned to the command of the Flying Squadron, and hoisted his broad pennant on board the Brooklyn on that day. It was a high compliment, and it may be presumed that it would not have been paid him but for the conviction that he was the man to fill the part which that squadron was expected to play. As its name implies, it was intended that the squadron should be in continual readiness to fly to meet the Spanish ships should they appear on our coasts. On April 6 the Navy Department, in a confidential circular to Captain Sampson, commanding, etc., said: ‘‘Should the department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Porto Rico, it is possible that the Flying Squadron may be sent thither; in which case some of your vessels may bd needed to reinforce that squadronF^ Therefore at that date it seems to have been intended to take away from Sampson a part of the vessels of his command to add to Schley’s command.' Schley in command of the augmented Flying Squadron was then to find and fight the Spanish fleet, which was the important duty of the war, while to Sampson was left the performance of the other duties pertaining to his position as “captain commanding the North Atlantic Station,” such as blockading the Cuban ports, etc.

Commodore Schley’s statement of his doings as soon as he assumed command, made to the Court of

^ Italics are mine. — J. P.

He said: ‘‘During the time that we lay at Hampton Roads the squadron was organized. Its commanding officers were brought together, and the general plan of campaign was thrashed out. I put the squadron on a war basis, established the matter of pickets and patrols, and also the masking of lights. During the time we were there I explained to the commanding officers that as It would be Impossible to construct a plan of battle that would meet unforeseen contingencies, the general plan of the squadron would be to cruise In line of battle ; and Its general principle would be to attack the head of the leading vessels, concentrating fire upon them. In order, first, to obtain the moral effect; and, second, to throw them Into confusion, making victory over them very much more successful and complete.

“I did this for the reason that the older plans had all been to attack center and rear, resulting In the escape, usually, of a part of each squadron. I thought that the attack on the head of a squadron, which was, to some extent, new, would Involve the destruction of the whole, and this was to be the general plan of action as explained on that occasion.

“These preliminaries arranged, target practice was taken up with sub-callber guns. It resulted In an accuracy of fire which, I think, was fully demonstrated In the action that occurred some months later.

“There was a good deal of restlessness, naturally, among the squadron at being held from what they thought was the scene of action; which was, happily, relieved when orders were received from the Secretary of the Navy to proceed off Charleston, where orders would await us.”

Schley’s “Squadron General Order No. 9,” which was Issued at Hampton Roads April 22, 1898, elaborately provides directions for the efficiency of the squadron in minute particulars. It will be found in full in the Record of the Court of Inquiry, 1 .^ 1216, and it is commended to those who are not, and wish to be, informed as to the commodore’s preparedness for emergencies.

In thus discussing with his captains the general plans to be pursued in attacking and otherwise dealing with the enemy, should he be met, Schley was but following the plan Nelson had pursued in that memorable chase after the French fleet after its escape from Toulon, culminating in its destruction in the Battle of the Nile.

Concerning this, Fitchett (an English writer of merit) says : “Throughout that memorable cruise, whenever the weather permitted he (Nelson) summoned his captains on board the flagship, where he would fully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed to execute upon falling in with the enemy.”

^ Report of Court of Inquiry.

Chapter VII The Naval War Board

An anomalous body with this pretentious title sprang, like Minerva from the brain of Jove, Into existence at the outbreak of the war with Spain; but who was Jove, and how he came to give being to such a Minerva, has not yet been explained.

“History repeats itself.” So long a time had elapsed that It had been forgotten how, during the Civil War, the efforts of our generals in the field had been rendered abortive by Interference from Washington, whose “Organizers of Victory” and “Committee on the Conduct of the War” had come to be more dangerous to our armies than all the foes that confronted them.