A candid examination of theism

Preface

The following essay was written several years ago ; but I have hitherto refrained from publishing it, lest, after having done so, I should find that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the essay sets forth. Judging, however, that it is now more than ever improbable that I shall myself be able to detect any errors in my reasoning, I feel that it is time to present the latter to the contemplation of other minds ; and in doing so, I make this explanation only because I feel it desirable to state at the outset that the present treatise was written before the publication of Mr. Mill's treatise on the same subject. It is desirable to make this statement, first, because in several instances the trains of reasoning in the two essays are parallel, and next, because in other instances I have quoted passages from Mr. Mill's essay in connections which would be scarcely intelligible were it not understood that these passages are insertions made after the present essay had been completed. I have also added several supplementary essays which have been written since the main essay was finished.

It is desirable further to observe, that the only reason why I publish this edition anonymously is because I feel very strongly that, in matters of the kind with which the present essay deals, opinions and arguments should be viii PREFACE.

allowed to produce the exact degree of influence to whicli as opinions and arguments they are entitled : they should be permitted to stand upon their own intrinsic merits alone, and quite beyond the shadow of that unfair prejudication which cannot but arise so soon as their author's authority, or absence of authority, becomes known. !N'otwithstanding this avowal, however, I fear that many who glance over the following pages will read in the " Physicus " of the first one a very different motive. There is at the present time a wonderfully wide-spread sentiment pervading all classes of society — a sentiment which it would not be easy to define, but the practical outcome of which is, that to discuss the question of which this essay treats is, in some way or other, morally wrong. Many, therefore, who share this sentiment will doubtless attribute my reticence to a puerile fear on my part to meet it. I can only say that such is not the case. Although I allude to this sentiment with all respect — believing as I do that it is an offshoot from the stock which contains all that is best and greatest in human nature — nevertheless it seems to me impossible to deny that the sentiment in question is as unreasonable as the frame of mind which harbours it must be unreasoning. If there is no God, where can be the harm in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence ? If there is a God, surely our first duty towards him must be to exert to our utmost, in our attempts to find him, the most noble faculty with which he has endowed us — as carefully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to furnish of his own existence as we investigate the evidence of inferior things in his dependent creation. To say that there is one rule or method for ascertaining truth in the latter case, which it is not legitimate to apply

PREFACE, ix

in the former case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity, if he exists, has not supplied us with rational evidence of his existence. For my own part, I feel that such an assertion cannot but embody far more unworthy conceptions of a Personal God than are represented by any amount of earnest inquiry into whatever evidence of his existence there may be present ; but, neglecting this reflection, if there is a God, it is certain that reason is the' faculty by which he has enabled man to discover truth, and it is no less certain that the scientific methods have proved themselves by far the most trustworthy for reason to adopt. To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the question as to his existence is both more morally and more reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other light. Or, stating the case in other words, I believe that in whatever degree we intentionally abstain from using in this case what we hnmjo to be the most trustworthy methods of inquiry in other cases, in that degree are we either unworthily closing our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we are guilty of the worst among human sins — " Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways." If it is said that, supposing man to be in a state of probation, faith, and not reason, must be the instrument of his trial, I am ready to admit the validity of the remark ; but I must also ask it to be remembered, that unless faith has some basis of reason whereon to rest, it differs in nothing from superstition ; and hence that it is still our duty to investigate the rational standing of the question before us by the scientific methods alone. And I may here observe

X PREFACE. ,

parenthetically, that the same reasoning applies to all investigations concerning the reality of a supposed revelation. With such investigations, however, the present essay has nothing to do, although I may remark that if there is any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible in the structure of a professing revelation, such evidence, in whatever degree present, would be of the best possible kind for substantiating the hypothesis of Theism.

Such being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the most truly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the following pages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion were more negative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice in me for this reason to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of the present kind could ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism, there might be much for its author to regret, but nothing for him to be ashamed of ; and, by parity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result of such an inquiry is seen to have a tendency to negative the theistic theory, the author should not be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his conviction as to the degree of such tendency, provided only that his conviction is an honest one, and that he is conscious of its having been reached by using his faculties with the utmost care of which he is capable.

If it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate a character that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I reply that they are nevertheless the test methods available, and hence that the retort is without pertinence : the question is still to be regarded as a scientific one, although we may perceive that neither an affirmative nor a negative answer can be given to it with any approach to a full demonstration. But if the question

PREFACE. xi

is thus conceded to be one falling within the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that the mere fact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently impossible should not deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a well-recognised principle of scientific research, that however difficult or impossible it may be to 'pro'ce a given theory true or false, the theory should nevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being tested, by the full rigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration cannot be hoped for, it still remains desirable to reduce the question at issue to the last analysis of which it is capable.

Adopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the following analysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour of the theory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of light which the progress of modern science — physical and speculative — has shed upon it. And forasmuch as it is impossible that demonstrated truth can ever be shown untrue, and forasmuch as the demonstrated truths on which the present examination rests are the most fundamental which it is possible for the human mind to reach, I do not think it presumptuous to assert what appears to me a necessary deduction from these facts — namely, that, possible errors in reasoning apart, the rational position of Theism as here defined must remain without material modification as long as our intelligence remains human.

London, 1878.

ANALYSIS.

Chapter I. Examination Of Illogical Arguments In Favour Of Theism

SECT. PAGE

1. Introductory i

2. Object of the chapter 2

3. The Argument from the Inconceivability of Self-existence . 2

4. The Argument from the Desirability of there being a God . 3

5. The Argument from the Presence of Human Aspirations . 3

6. The Argument from Consciousness ..... 4

7 . The Argument for a First Cause 6

Chapter II. The Argument From The Existence Of The Human Mind

8. Introductory 10

9. Examination of the. Argument, and the independent coin-

cidence of my views regarding it with those of Mr. MiU . 10

10. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a re-enimciation

of it in the form of a Syllogism 11

11. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot explain Mind in

the abstract. Mill quoted and answered. This defect

in the Syllogism clearly defined 12

1 2. The Syllogism further defective, in that it assumes Intelli-

gence to be the only possible cause of Intelligence. This assumption amounts to begging the whole question as to the being of a God. Inconceivability of Matter thinking xiv CONTENTS,

SECT. _ ^ PAGB

no proof that it may not think. Locke himself strangely concedes this. His fallacies and self - contradictions pointed out in an Appendix 14

13. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a Materialist, but

assuming that he is one, he is as much entitled to the hypothesis that Matter thinks as a Theist is to his hypothesis that it does not 16

14. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly equivalent value,

save that while Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a certain basis of fact to rest upon. This basis defined in a footnote, where also Professor Clifford's essay on " Body and Mind " is briefly examined. Difficulty of estimating , the worth of the Argument as to the most conceivable

being most likely true 17

15. Locke's comparison between certainty of the Inconceiv-

ability Argument as appKed to Theism and to mathematics shown to contain a virtual though not a formal fallacy 19

16. Summary of considerations as to the value of this Argu-

ment from Inconceivability 20

17. Introductory to the other Arguments in favour of the con-

clusion that only Intelligence can have caused Intelligence 21

18. Locke's presentation of the view that the cause must con-

tain all that is contained in the effects. His statements contradicted. Mill quoted to show that the analogy of Nature is against the doctrine of higher perfections never growing out of lower ones 21

19. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in favour of the

proposition that only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. Hamilton quoted to show that in his philosophy the entire question as to the being of a God hinges upon that as to whether or not human volitions are caused . . 22

20. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. Hamilton

erroneously identified this theory with the fact that we possess a moral sense. His resulting dilemma . . 23

21. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus identifying genuine

fact with spurious theory, yet his Argument from the fact

of our having a moral sense remains to be considered . 26

22. The question here is merely as to whether or not the pre-

sence of the moral sense can be explained by natural causes. A priori probability of the moral sense having been evolved. A posteriori confirmation supplied by Utilitarianism, &c 27

CONTENTS, XV

Chapter III. The Argument From Design

36 37 38

23. Mill's presentation of tlie Argument a resuscitation of

Paley's. His criticism on Paley shown to be unfair

24. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation pointed out .

25. The same fallacy pointed out in another way

26. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in order to illus

trate the root-fallacy of his Argument from Design Mill's observations upon this Argument criticised .

27. Result yielded by the present analysis of the Argument

from Design. The Argument shown to be a petitio principii 43

Chapter IV. The Argument From General Laws

28. My belief that no competent writer in favour of the Argu-

ment from Design could have written upon it at all, had it not been for his instinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument from General Laws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency insisted upon 45

29. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws

prior to the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The Rev, Baden Powell quoted . . 47

30. The nature of General Laws when these are interpreted in

tei-ms of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The word "Law " defined in terms of this doctrine . 52

31. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws

subsequent to the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy 53

32. The self- evolution of General Laws, or the objective aspect

of the question as to whether we may infer the presence of Mind in Nature because Nature admits of being

iritelligently interrogated 54

2Z. The subjective aspect of this question, according to the data

afforded by evolutionary psychology .... 57 xvi CONTENTS.

SECT. PAGE

34. Correspondence between products due to human intelligence

and products supposed due to Divine Intelligence, a correspondence which is only generic. Illustrations drawn from prodigality in Nature. Further illustrations. Illogical manner in which natural theologians deal with such difficulties. The generic resemblance contemplated is just what we should expect to find, if the doctrine of evolutionary psychology be true 60

35. The last three sections parenthetical. Necessary nature of

the conclusion which foUows from the last five sections . 63

Chapter V

THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD.

36. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion reached ',in the

previous chapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely scientific, and not of logical conclusiveness. Preparation for considering the question in its purely logical form . 64

37. The logic of probability in general explained, and canon of

interpretation enunciated ...... 66

38. Application of this canon to the particular case of Theism 67

39. Exposition of the logical state of the question ... 67

40. Exposition continued 69

41. Result of the exposition; "Suspended Judgment" the

only logical attitude of mind with regard to the question

of Theism . , 70

Chapter VI. The Argument From Metaphysical Teleology

42. Statement of the position to which the question of Theism

has been reduced by the foregoing analysis ... 72

43. Distinction between a scientific and a metaphysical teleology.

Statement of the latter in legitimate terms. Criticism of this statement legitimately made on the side of Atheism as being gratuitous. Impartial judgment on this criticism 74

CONTENTS. xvii

SECT. PAGE

44. Exammation of the question as to whetlier the meta-

physical system of teleology is really destitute of all rational support. Pleading of a supposed Theist in support of the system. The principle of correlation of general Jaws. The complexity of Nature . . .78

45. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and judgment that it

fairly removes from the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology the charge of the latter being gratuitous . 80

46. Examination of the degree of probahility that is presented

by the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising an examination of the Theistic objection to the scientific train of reasoning on account of its symbolism, and showing that a no less cogent objection lies against the metaphysical train of reasoning on account of its embodj'ing the supposition of unknowable causes. Distinction between "inconceivability" in a formal or symbolical, and in a material or realisable sense. Reply of a supposed Atheist to the previous pleading of the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencer quoted on inconceivability of cosmic evolution as due to Mind ... 83

47. Final judgment on the rational value of a metaphysical

system of teleology. Distinction between "inconceivability " in an absolute and in a relative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of mind which it is rational to adopt towards the question of Theism. The desirability and the rationality of tolerance in this particular case . 93

Chapter VII. General Summary And Conclusions

48. General summary of the whole essay 102

49. Concluding remarks no

APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS.

Appendix

A Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument against the possibility of ISIatter thinking on grounds of its being inconceivable that it should . .117 xviii CONTENTS.

PAGE

Supplementary Essay I.

Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and criticism to show that it is' inadequate to sustain the doctrine of "Cosmic Theism" which Mr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it 129

Supplementary Essay II.

A Critical Examination of the Kev. Professor Flint's work on "Theism" . . . 152

Supplementary Essay III.

On the Speculative Standing of Materialism . . . i8i

Supplementary Essay IV.

On the Final Mystery of Things 189

THEISM.

Chapter I. Examination Of Illogical Arguments In Favour

OF THEISM.

§ I. Few subjects have occupied so much attention among speculative thinkers as that which relates to the being of God. Notwithstanding, however, the great amount that has been written on this subject, I am not aware that any one has successfully endeavoured to approach it, on all its various sides, from the ground of pure reason alone, and thus to fix, as nearly as possible, the exact position which, in pure reason, this subject ought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought that an exception to this statement ought to be made in favour of John Stuart Mill's posthumous essay on Theism ; but from my great respect for this author, I should rather be inclined to regard that essay as a criticism on illogical arguments, than as a careful or matured attempt to formulate the strictly rational status of the question in all its bearings. ISTevertheless, as this essay is in some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yet appeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came from the pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most serious attention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the course of the following pages.

A

2 EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

Seeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer has hitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question as to the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any attempt, however imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of every school — the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious rapidity which of late years has marked the advance both of physical and of speculative science, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting us towards a reasonable and, I think, a final decision as to the strictly logical standing of this important matter. However, be my attempt welcome or no, I feel that it is my obvious duty to publish the results which have been yielded by an honest and careful analysis.

§ 2. I may most fitly begin this analysis by briefly disposing of such arguments in favour of Theism as are manifestly erroneous. And I do this the more willingly because, as these arguments are at the present time most in vogue, an exposure of their fallacies may perhaps deter our popular apologists of the future from drawing upon themselves the silent contempt of every reader whose intellect is not either prejudiced or imbecile.

§ 3. A favourite piece of apologetic juggling is that of first demolishing Atheism, Pantheism, Materialism, &c., by successively calling upon them to explain the mystery of self-existence, and then tacitly assuming that the need of such an explanation is absent in the case of Theism — as though the attribute in question were more conceivable when posited in a Deity than when posited elsewhere.

It is, I hope, unnecessary to observe that, so far as the ultimate mystery of existence is concerned, any and every theory of things is equally entitled to the inexplicable fact that something is ; and that any endeavour on the part of the votaries of one theory to shift from themselves to the votaries of another theory the onus of explaining the necessarily inexplicable, is an instance of irrationality which borders on the ludicrous.

• IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. 3

§ 4. Another argument, or semblance of an argument, is the very prevalent one, " Our heart requires a God ; therefore it is probable that there is a God : " as though such a subjective necessity, even if made out, could ever prove an objective existence.!

§ 5. If it is said that the theistic aspirations of the human heart, by the mere fact of their presence, point to the existence of a God as to their explanatory cause, I answer that the argument would only be valid after the possibility of any more proximate causes having been in action has been excluded — else the theistic explanation violates the fundamental rule of science, the Law of Parcimony, or the law which forbids us to assume the action of more remote causes where more proximate ones are found sufficient to explain the effects. Consequently, the validity of the argument now under consideration is inversely proportional to the number of possibilities there are of the aspirations in question being due to the agency of physical causes; and forasmuch as our ignorance of psychological causation is weU-nigh total, the Law of Parcimony forbids us to allow any determinate degree of logical value to the present argument. In other

1 The above was written before Mr. universe possible, not the best absol-

Mill's essay on Theism was published, utely : that the Divine power, in

Lest, therefore, my refutation may short, was not equal to making it

be deemed too curt, I supplement it more free from imperfections than it

with Mr. Mill's remarks upon the is. But optimism, prior to belief in

same subject. " It may still be a God, and as the ground of that be-

maintained that the feelings of mora- lief, seems one of the oddest of all

lity make the existence of God emin- speculative delusions. Nothing, how-

ently desirable. No doubt they do, ever, I believe, contributes more to

and that is the great reason why we keep up the belief in the general mind

find that good men and women cling of humanity than the feeling of its

to the belief, and are pained by its desirableness, which, when clothed,

being questioned. But, surely, it is as it very often is, in the form of an

not legitimate to assume that, in the argument, is a naive expression of the

order of the universe, whatever is tendency of the human mind to be-

desirable is true. Optimism, even lieve whatever is agreeable to it.

when a God is already believed in, is Positive value the argument of course

a thorny doctrine to maintain, and has none." For Mill's remarks on

had to be taken by Leibnitz in the the version of the argument dealt

limited sense, that the universe being with in § 5, see his "Three Essays,"

made by a good being, is the best p. 204.

4 EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

words, we must not use the absence of knowledge as equivolent to its presence — must not argue from our ignorance of psychological possibilities, as though this ignorance were knowledge of corresponding impossibilities. The burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and from the nature of the case this burden cannot be discharged until the science of psychology shall have been fully perfected. I may add that, for my own part, I cannot help feeling that, even in the present embryonic condition of this science, we are not without some indications of the manner in which the aspirations in question arose ; but even were this not so, the above considerations prove that the argument before us is invalid. If it is retorted that the fact of these aspirations having had proximate causes to account for their origin, even if made out, would not negative the inference of these being due to a Deity as to their ultimate cause ; I answer that this is not to use the argument from the presence of these aspirations ; it is merely to beg the question as to the being of a God.

§ 6. Next, we may consider the argument from consciousness. Many persons ground their belief in the existence of a Deity upon a real or supposed necessity of their own subjective thought. I say "real or supposed," because, in its bearing upon rational argument, it is of no consequence of which character the alleged necessity actually is. Even if the necessity of thought be real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to affirm is, that it is impossible for him, by any effort of thinking, to rid himself of the persuasion that God exists ; he is not entitled to affirm that this persuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the human mind. Or, as Mill puts it, " One man cannot by proclaiming with ever so much confidence that he perceives an object, convince other people that they see it too. . . . When no claim is set up to any peculiar gift, but we are told that all of us are as capable of seeing what he sees, feeling what he feels, nay, that we actually do so, and when the utmost effort of

IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. 5

which we are capable fails to make us aware of what we are told, we perceive this supposed universal faculty of intuition is but

* The Dark Lantern of the Spirit Which none see by but those who bear it.'"

It is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument must, from its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save its assertor ; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is not universal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument.

And now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether the alleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a real necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are the ^dctims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable that their minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute from the minds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the above quotation, " They may fairly be^ asked to consider, whether it is not more likely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in their minds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an impression in theirs." ^N'o doubt it is true that education and habits of thought may so stereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what is conceivable to one man or generation may not be so to another ;i but to adduce this consideration in this place would clearly be but to destroy the argument from the intuitive necessity of believing in a God.

Lastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if the impossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law of human mind — which it certainly is not — the fact of his existence could not be thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much more probable than it now is — as probable, for

1 The words "or not conceivable," relatively conceivable," as explained are here used in the sense of ' ' not in Chap. vi.

6 EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

instance, if not more probable, than is the existence of an external world; — but still it would not be necessarilytrue.

§ 7. The argument from the general consent of mankind is so clearly fallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I shall pass it over and proceed at once to the last of the untenable arguments — that, namely, from the existence of a First Cause. And here I should like to express myself indebted to Mr. Mill for the following ideas: — " The cause of every change is a prior change ; and such it cannot but be ; for if there were no new antecedent, there would be no new consequent. If the state of facts which brings the phenomenon into existence, had existed always or for an indefinite duration, the effect also would have existed always or been produced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of causation, within the sphere of experience, that the causes as well as the effects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem, therefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for a first cause, is repugnant to it ; and that the very essence of causation, as it exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First Cause."

The rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are tolerably obvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his essay. I shall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them.