Unsettled questions touching the foundations of Christianity, a book for thoughtful young men

Front matter

? UNSETTLED ?

QUESTIONS m.

m iii pUi':m:;

CHAPTER FOURTH. Is Christ a Living Saviour? 137 xm

PROLEGOMENA.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF OUR ARGUMENT.

^^No difficulty emerges in theology icliich had not jpreviously emerged in jphilosojphy,^^ — Sir William Hamilton.

PEOLEQOMElSrA.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF OUK AKGUMENT.

It is of prime importance that those to whom an argument is addressed should have from the outset a clear understanding of the philosophical basis on which its process of reasoning is founded. It is incumbent upon the author to show the soundness of his system of thought, the indubitableness of the data with which he begins, and the sufficiency of the mode by which he connects all the steps of his argument from his data to his conclusions. It is also important for the author to define in advance, or as he advances, the precise sense in which he uses any words or phrases that have ambiguous meanings. Therefore, as a prolegomenary preface to the lectures that are to follow, I here lay down in brief, and define the philosophical basis of the system of thought which I hold, and on which I

ground my reasoning.

1. I hold that self -consciousness is the beginning of all human knowledge. I am conscious of my own existence. With this indisputable fact I begin, and upon it I build up my knowledge of myself and of the world by which I am surrounded.

I am. Whatever I may be, and however I may have come into existence, of this I am certain, I am. This is the one fact that is proved simply by the assertion, because there must be an asserter before there can be an assertion. I say that I am, and that is the end of all controversy ; because, if I were not, I could not say that I am. I may be mistaken as to what I am, but I cannot possibly be mistaken as to the fact that I am.

And now further, I feel, therefore I am a sentient being ; I think, therefore I am an intelhgent being; and I will, therefore I am a free intelhgence. A free intelligence is a person — one who thinks and who acts as self-directed by his own free choices. I am thinking as I now write, and I know that I can write down my thoughts, or refrain from writing them, just as I please. I think, and I am free to express my thoughts or to keep them to myself. I am a free person. I am to-daz and I know that I tvas yesterday ; therefore I remember. Since I remember I am a continuous being. I am and I tvas, I who feel, think, and will to-day am the same one who was feehng, thinking, and willing in all my past existence that is gathered up in my memory. My memory links my past existence with my present consciousness in a way that proves that I not only exist, but that I also persist in a continuous existence. By memory I not only recall a fact of past experience, but I awaken a present consciousness that I experienced at a past time the fact that is recalled. Therefore I am not a succession of separate and independent feehngs, thoughts, and volitions, but I am a continuous person who has experienced the successive states of consciousness which memory recalls. Thus I become conscious of the unbroken continuity of my self-identity. I am the something — the abiding personahty — that persists in a continuous existence in the midst of the succession of my changing feelings, thoughts, and vohtions. I am one and indivisible, and always the same one. But what am I ? I am more than a thought, or a succession of thoughts; I am a thinker. I am more than an act, or a succession of actions ; I am an actor. I think and I act, and I act as self-directed by my will. I am a continuous person. I remember my past thoughts and actions as my own; therefore I am a person of persistent and unbroken self -identity. I may cease to be in the future, but I have always been the 3ame person since I began to be.

There may be sensibility without personahty. A thing, an oyster, for instance, may be sensible of its own existence without being able to distinguish itself from other existences. It is mere sensitive matter. A thing may be conscious of its own separate existence without being able to define its relations to other things. In such beings there is a consciousness of individuality, but not of personality. A mere animal, a dog, for instance, is conscious of its own individual existence and of the impressions that other existences make upon it, but it cannot define its place in the universe nor its relations to the things by which it is surrounded. In this self-conscious animal life there is something higher than a mere sentient existence 5 there is a simulation of thought, if not thought itself. But it seems, so far as our observation can penetrate, that self-conscious animal life acts solely under the influence of internal impulses and external impressions, and as guided, not by a free will, but by the mysterious power of instinct. In all this there is nothing to contradict the hypothesis that all mere animal life, including its sensations and movements, is purely phj^sical and entirely under the domain of physical causation.

But when we come to man we find not only self-consciousness, but also self-direction in thought and action. Man is not only conscious of a distinct individuality, but of a separate personality. He knows himseK to be a person who thinks and reasons his way to his conclusions, and who wills and chooses his course in life. In order to free choice there must be discrimination between thoughts, and in order to this discrimination there must be a cognition of the relations of persons and things. This cognition of the relations subsisting between things is real or rational knowledge. So far as our observation can penetrate, we see nothing to warrant us in supposing that mere animals are capable of perceiving things in the complications of their relations to one another. They are not capable of rational knowledge. They have sensations and impressions, but this does not amount to rational knowledge. They cannot define and classify their sensations and impressions. They are not persons, but sensitive things that feel and act as impelled by their sensations. Their movements are effects produced by causes which have their origin in inward physical impulses, or in outward physical impressions. But yet the animal is something more than a bundle of sensations. There is a persistent something that feels and moves as impelled. That something may be nothing more than sensitive matter — who knows ? There is nothing within the purview of our observation to compel us to infer the existence in mere animal life of anything more than sensitive matter, susceptible of internal and external impressionSj and of movements prompted by such sensible impressions.

We have already found that man is something more than a composite bundle of sensations, thoughts, and volitions. He is a persistent something that not only feels and moves as impelled by his sensations, but which also thinks and acts freely under the self-direction of his thoughts. Is that something, which is a self-conscious, a selfacting, and a seK-directing free intelligence, mere matter? Can any conceivable form of mere matter account for the rational thoughts and free activities of human life ?

What is matter ? We know matter only in its phenomenal attributes. We see the phenomena and infer the entity of which they are the manifestations. The phenomenal qualities of matter are either primary or secondary. The primary attributes are those that belong to all matter, and without which matter cannot exist. The secondary are those qualities which are not essential to the existence of matter, and which may therefore exist in one mass of matter and not in another. A stone has extension and form, and is hard. Extension and form are primary and essential attributes of matter, but hardness is a particular quality of the stone. We cannot think of matter without conceiving of it as having some shape and as filling some space, but we may conceive of matter as being hard or soft, liquid or solid, visible or invisible, tangible or intangible. All matter must be extended, and must have some shape, some consistency, some size, and some weight. Now, incompatible attributes cannot inhere in the same entity at the same time. The same thing cannot be at the same time square and round, hard and soft, bitter and sweet.

Now let us apply these essential conditions of material existence to thought and volition and see if we can account for them as attributes of matter. Can we conceive of a thought or a volition as having physical dimensions or physical consistency — as being round or oblong, hard or soft, liquid or solid, white or some other color? If it is a phenomenon of a physical entity, it must fulfill an alternative of these several conditions of physical existence. We cannot conceive of a thought as having weight, size, shape, color, or a physical consistency.

lO PROLEGOMENA.

And besides^ can we conceive of a volition — a free choice — as enchained in the concatenation of physical cansation ? Are my volitions — am I myself — nothing but the inevitable outcome of the necessary determinism of physical causation? If there be nothing but matter in the universe, there can be no free will — no personahty. But I will — I know that I am fi^ee in my volitions ] therefore there is something in this universe that is not enchained in the iron links of physical causation — there is something that is not matter. We call that other entity mind. I am as a free intelligence not matter, but mind. Mind cannot be the product of matter. Matter may be the product .of mind, that is, of creative mind. At present we are only concerned about the human mind — our mind. We find that it is not matter. I am not a phenomenon. I am a persistent entity that thinks and wills ; and I remember my thoughts and my volitions. I have found myself, and I find that I am not matter, but mind. I am a person — a free intelligence that thinks, wills, and remembers, and acts as self -directed.

As a free intelligence I perceive the relations of things, and I compare and correlate their relations and draw inferences. Thus I accumulate a store of rational knowledge, inferring the unknown from

THE BASIS OF OUR ARGUMENT, II

the known. I am a reasoner, and the conclusions of reasoning, if grounded on a sound basis, and if its processes be logically conducted, are just as trustworthy as the data of consciousness and the facts of observation. Every argument must be founded on a sound philosophical basis of thought in order to conduct the reasoner to true conclusions. Science is concerned about the phenomena of things. Things may be either physical or psychical. The science of physical phenomena is physics. The science of psychical phenomena is metaphysics. Philosophy is concerned about the laws of thought. It is the foundation that underlies both physics and metaphysics. If the philosophical bases of an argument are not sound the conclusions are not trustworthy.

2. In my self-consciousness I find that I am capable of reflecting upon myself. I analyze my self-consciousness, and I find these three things necessarily involved in it : a subject, a verb, and an object. I — know — myself.

If I know, I must know something, and know that I know it. It is in this way that I come to know myself as a being that knows. When I think, I know that my thought is not myself, but something which I do. I distinguish between myseK and my thoughts. I know myself to be a subject that knows.

Thus I find that in my consciousness I distinguished between myself and the faculties of thought^ feeling, t\tI1, and memory of which I find myself possessed, and also between my faculties and their activities ] and yet I find that my different faculties are but different modes in which I myself, always one and always the same one, act. It is not a part of me that thinks, another part that feels, another part that wills, and another part that remembers ; but it is myself, always one and always the same one, that thinks, feels, wills, and remembers. Whatever other faculties or capacities I find myself in possession of, I find that they are only the various modes in which I am capable of acting, or of being acted upon. Thus I am conscious of being an indivisible one, and always the same one.

From this analysis I have the following indisputable data of consciousness, the indivisible unity and unbreakable continuity of my self -identity as a being who thinks, feels, wills, and remembers.

3. I now drop the prefix ^^self^- and consider consciousness as a mode in which I, the self-conscious being, act or am acted upon. We distinguish between consciousness and self -consciousness just as Sir William Hamilton distinguishes between perception-proper and sensation-proper. The two things are inseparable, but distinguishable. Self-consciousness is the man himself aware of his own existence, and consciousness is a modification in self -consciousness by which the man becomes aware of his faculties and their activities as distinguishable from himself and from one another. Consciousness is that state of self-consciousness by which we become aware of w^hat transpires within ourselves as thoughts, feelings, volitions, recollections, and the like. Man becomes conscious that his faculties and their activities are distinct, though inseparable, from himself. They are modes of selfmovements.

4. I am conscious not only of my self-existence and subjective activities and passivities, but also that I e:^ist in the midst of an external world by which my life is environed and conditioned. It is not needful, in order to a clear apprehension of our system of thought, for us to enter into the discussions of the philosophers as to how we become conscious of the external world. It is sufficient for us to say, in our view, perception is that modification in consciousness by which we are made cognizant of the external world and of the phenomena of the things in it. This is effected by impressions made upon the internal consciousness by the sensations of touch, vision, hearing, taste, and smell, when these senses oome into proper relations with their appropriate objects, or rather with the appropriate properties of external objects.

5. Beyond all this, I am conscious of another power within myself — the power of reason, by which I compare and correlate the data of internal consciousness and the facts of external perception, and construe them into the expressions of formulated thoughts. Thus I arrive at a cognition of the relations of things. This cognition of the relations of things is knowledge in the proper sense of the word.

6. In our system of thought the three great words are consciousness, perception, and reason. Consciousness is that modification of self -consciousness by which we become aware of what takes place within us ) perception is that modification of consciousness by which we are made cognizant, through the external senses, of what exists outside and around us ; and reason is that power of mind by which we compare and correlate the data of consciousness, including the facts of perception as reported to consciousness, and thus define the relations subsisting between them, and discover the further truths that are involved in those relations and their implications. The greatest of these is consciousness, because it is the source — fons et origo — from which the stream of human knowledge flows.

7. I find that by reasoning I advance from the known to the unknown by one or the other of two methods of thought : by the immediate inference, or by the syllogistic conclusion. When one thought or fact necessarily infolds and imphes a second thought or fact, then that second thought or fact must be received as the necessary inference from the first. Descartes' celebrated Cogito, ergo sum is not a syllogism, but is an immediate inference. The fact that I think necessarily infolds and implies the fact of my existence. The presence of thought implies the existence of a thinker. If the first fact is admitted on the testimony of consciousness, the second fact must be also received as an immediate inference from the first.

When two thoughts or facts are found to be in such a relationship to each other that the relation between them infolds and implies a third thought or fact, then that third thought or fact must be received as the syllogistic conclusion of the two preceding thoughts or facts. The conclusion may be affirmative or negative, that is, the relation between the major and the minor premises may necessarily include the third thought or fact, or may necessarily exclude it. Every vegetable substance is combustible. The tree is a vegetable substance. Therefore every tree is combustible. The second fact, that the tree is a vegetable substance, is so related to the first fact, that all vegetable substances are combustible, that the third fact, the combustibLlity of the tree, is included in that relationship. No vegetable substance has the power of locomotion. Man has the power of locomotion. Therefore man is not a vegetable substance. The second fact, that man has the power of locomotion, is so related to the first fact, that no vegetable substance has the power of locomotion, that it follows, as a third fact, that man is excluded from the class of vegetable substances. The syllogistic conclusion is the inevitable result that flows from the known relationship between two thoughts or facts, when the two thoughts or facts are found to be so related that their relation includes, or excludes, the third thought or fact in question.

8. In this way, by the immediate inference and the syllogistic conclusion, I find that my knowledge is continuously expanded and enlarged. Thus I advance, accumulating knowledge, from the known to the unknown. When the unknown becomes known I make it the foundation for further advancement.

In this progress of knowledge I start out with the fundamental axioms of thought as the ultimate foundation of all reasoning ) and on this f oundation I erect the temple of my knowledge by building into it all the facts of my experience, and the immediate inferences and syllogistic conclusions that those facts infold and imply.

But the question here arises, How do I come into possession of the axioms of thought which are the starting-points in every process of reasoning ? Is man's knowledge of them acquired by experience, or does he find them in his mind as innate ideas ? His knowledge of them, when viewed from different standpoints, has the appearance of being both innate and acquired. But if they are innate, they are not acquired ] and if acquired, they were not innate.

We are obliged to agree with Locke that there are no innate ideas — ideas inborn in the mind as its birth-furniture. It is questionable, however, whether there ever was a philosopher of any repute who held the doctrine of innate ideas in the sense in which Locke presents and refutes it. But, on the other hand, it seems to me that Locke and his disciples have gone to an untenable extreme in the doctrine that the mind of the new-born child is like a sheet of blank paper, upon which experience alone can write its record. It seems to me, rather, that the mind at birth is like a flowering plant just shooting through tjie ground. At birth the mind is as destitute of ideas as the shooting plant is of flowers ] but it is the nature of the plant to develop flowers as it naturally unfolds itself, and it is the nature of the mind to form primitive convictions of the fundamental laws of thought in the processes of its natural development. They are not innate, but are as naturally unfolded in the development of the mind as flowers are in the development of the plant. They spring, not from experience, but from the mind itself, just as the flowers spring from the plant. They are not born in the mind nor tvitli the mind, but are born of the mind. As soon as presented they are recognized as true and indisputable. They cannot be proved by any process of reasoning, nor can they be doubted while reason holds her seat upon the throne of the mind. Our knowledge of the laws of thought, that is, the conditions of thought in general, springs up in our minds, when the occasion calls them forth, as primitive convictions — as a priori cognitions; while our knowledge of the facts of experience is acquii^ed — is a posteriori knowledge.

Our a posteriori knowledge is oui- cognitions of facts and of their relations to one another, while our a p>riori knowledge is not a cognition of the facts of experience, but of the laws of thought, ^^ under which," as says Sir William Hamilton, ^^ our knowledge a posteriori — onr knowledge of facts — is possible.^^ Our cognitions of the necessary laws of thought, the self-evident axioms of thought, are not innate, but are primitive convictions of the mind that do not come into existence until the external occasion for their use calls them forth. As soon as suggested they are seen by all sane minds to be true, necessary, and universal. They are not innate, but are born of the mind itself, not as the product of experience, but as primitive convictions, arising in the mind itself when occasion calls for them. Hence, as Sir William Hamilton says: ^^This allimportant doctrine has never been so well stated as in an unknown sentence of an old and now forgotten thinker : ^ Cognitio omnis a mente primam origenij a sensibus exordium Jiabet primum.^ ^' Hence, our knowledge of the necessary laws of thought, which, from one point of view, seems to be innate, and from another point of view seems to be acquired, is neither, but is self-originated from the mind itself ] but the axioms of thought are never originated until an external occasion calls for them ; then they are immediately and universally recognized as primitive convictions of the mind, in themselves necessary and indisputable.

9. Our purpose in this prolegomenary essay does not require us to give a list of the axioms of thought, but only to designate and define those which we shall use in the lectui^es which are to follow. The following are the most important.

The data of consciousness are to be received simply on the testimony of consciousness as unquestionably trustworthy. This is the foundation on which all knowledge ultimately rests.

The facts of observation, both the facts of internal consciousness and of external perception, are to be received as realities — not as essential realities, but as phenomenal realities. We do not perceive existence in itself as absolute entity, but only in its phenomena ; but the facts of observation, while they are facts of phenomena and not of entities, are realities and not illusions. The difference between the data of consciousness and the facts of observation is this : the data of consciousness are the fundamental principles of existences, and the facts of observation are the j^henomena of things as they exist in theii' relations to consciousness.

The thii^d great axiom of thought is the law of causation. The human mind is so constituted that it demands a cause for everji:hing that exists, unless it be an eternal existence. Our thought cannot realize to itself the possibiUty of a phenomenon without a cause. By observation we simply know that the thing is; but this does not satisfy the mind. We want to know why or how the thing is. Scientific knowledge is the knowledge of things by their causes. The law of causation is the philosophical basis of all scientific inquiry. It is the only road that leads to scientific conclusions.

10. When I begin to think, I find that it is impossible for me to advance in a progression of thought without postulating the law of causation as the mode of thought. When I see an object and wish to understand it, I begin at once to search for the cause or causes that produced it. When I find the producing cause, then I feel that I understand the object. I have reached a scientific knowledge of it. In this process of thought I postulate the law of causation as the invariable method of existence. When we lay down the law of causation as a fundamental axiom of thought, we do not simply mean that it is the subjective order of the succession of thoughts within our minds, but that the mind conceives of it as the method of existence. Everything that exists, except the eternal thing, must have a cause. We advance 'from the known to the discovery of the unknown because tve hioiv — hy the cause of our Icnowing — that if such an effect exists it must have such a cause, or if such a cause exists it must produce such an effect. Every process of reasoning is a forward movement along the line of causation from the known cause to its necessary effect, or a backward movement from the known effect to its necessary cause. Science is the knowledge of effects in their causes, and of causes in their effects, and the systematic combination, in logical order, of the knowledge of things by their causes. Thus science is based upon the conception of the necessary sequence of cause and effect, as the invariable method of existence. This conception is found in every sound mind. One in whose mind it does not develop at the dawn of thought is a born idiot. One who loses it after it has once been developed in his mind has become insane. Without receiving the law of causation as the method of existence, one can never conceive of the existence of anything beyond the observed facts of the narrow circle of his individual experience. This law of causation, received as the invariable method of existence, is the fountain from which the whole stream of logical ratiocination flows. It is man's power to grasp this law, and by it to discover the unknown from the known, that elevates him above the beasts, which have no hght to guide them except the dull perception of their senses and the mysterious guidance of instinct.

When we analyze the law of causation as the invariable method of existence, we find that it involves in itself several corollaries.

It demands the postulation of an eternal existence as the First Cause of all causes. Without this uncaused beginning of causation there could be no existence at all except external existence.

It demands for every effect an adequate cause. Otherwise, a part of the effect would be an uncaused existence.

It demands that every cause must produce its full effect, except so far as its power is counteracted, that is, diverted, by other causes resisting its operation.

Like causes, operating under like circumstances, must produce like effects. Otherwise the law would not be universal and invariable.

There can never be any more evolved in the effect than was involved in the cause 5 but there may be more involved in a cause than is put forth in producing a given effect 5 that is, a part of the power of the cause may be unexerted, and retained as unused power.

11. It is on the law of causation, as the necessary method of existence, that the modern method of sci^itific experiments for the acquisition of knowledge is made possible. What is the boasted experimental philosophy of the present age, with its metliods of scientific experiments^ but a search for causes from known effects, or of effects from known causes? And how does the experimenting scientist, when his experiment gives a result, know that the result may not be an accidental and fortuitous manifestation, except on the law that the same cause in the same circumstances must always produce the same effect ? The law of causation as the invariable method of existence, and of changes in existence, is the corner-stone upon which the whole system of the experimental philosophy is founded. But we have already seen that the mind does not acquire its knowledge of the law of causation, as the invariable method of existence, from experience, but that it springs into existence, as a primitive conviction, as soon as the first, external occasion calls for it. Thus, the so-called Experimental Philosophy is founded on a principle that is found to lie outside the range of experience. And now, further, the fundamental principle on which the Experimental Philosophy is based, when followed to its consequences, carries its field beyond the range of experience and the reach of experiment. A man^s knowledge, by the law of causation as the method of existence, is carried beyond the field of his personal experience ; and, on the same law, human knowledge is found to be wider than the experience of mankind. Man knows, over and above the actual facts of Ms observation — the objects of his experience — all that he deduces from those facts as immediate inferences and syllogistic conclusions. The Experimental Philosophy, on its own terms, must admit as true whatever is necessarily inferred from the facts of experience and the demonstrations of experiments. This will carry Philosophy into the admission of truths of which man, in his present condition, has had no experience, and which he cannot bring under experiment by any contrivance or instruments as yet at his command. The observed and admitted facts of astronomy as to the magnitude and movements of the heavenly bodies necessitate the inference that there are other heavenly bodies which cannot be seen by the most powerful telescopes. Here man's knowledge, based upon the facts of his experience, extends far beyond the range of his experience and the reach of his experiments.