Moral philosophy: including theoretical and practical ethics

Front matter

MORAL PHILOSOPHY:

INCLUDING

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ETHICS.

Preface

— one of the widest and richest fields of investigation

— has almost universally been overlooked.

It has been the aim of the anthor to give, as far as possible, a science of morals, and not merely a treatise on moral subjects. With a view to this, the principles which lie at the foundation of the science are first discussed, as concisely as may be, in the opening division of the work ; and' in the subsequent division these principles are considered in their application to the practical duties and relations of life.

Of the several classes of duties, that class which pertains to the state — or Political Ethics — has received in these pages a fuller discussion than is usually given in works of this kind ; yet not fuller, perhaps, than its relative importance demands. It has seemed to the author that the youth of a free country should be carefully instructed in the first principles of civil government, and in the rights and obligations of the citizen. It is the proper province of Moral Philosophy, which treats of the various duties of life, to do this. Yet, strange as it may seem, no branch of moral science has probably received less attention, in this country, than Political Ethics. J. H.

Chicago, August 1859 o o ]sr T E ]sr T s .

Section I. — Slavery Defined, 118

Section II. — Slavery, as thus defined, a Moral Wrong, 121 Section III. — Effect of Slavery on the National Morals,

AND THE National Wealth, • . . 126

Section IV. — Arguments in Favor of Slavery, . . 130

Part IV. Duties To The State

CHAPTER I.

Page

NATURE AND FOUNDATION OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, 221

Section I. — Origin and Object of Civil Government, 223

Section II. — Foundation of Civil Government, . . 228 Section III. — Historic Sketch — Different Opinions as

to the Nature of Civil Government, . 239

CHAPTER II.

VARIOUS FORMS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, . . . 243

Section I. — Analysis of the several Functions and

Forms of Government, 244

Section II. — Historical Sketch of Forms of Government, 249

Chapter III. Duties Of The Subject To The State, ... 271

CHAPTER lY.

DUTIES OF THE STATE TO ITS SUBJECTS, ... 283

CHAPTER Y.

Section I. — General Relations and Duties of States to

Section II. — Ethical Relations of Republican States to

each other, 322

XIV ' CONTENTS.

CHAPTER III. Section I. — Of Prayer, 338

Section II. — Of the Sabbath, 346

I. — Presumption in favor of a Sabbath. II. — Institution and Authority of the Sabbath.

CONFLICT OF DUTIES, 359

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

NATURE AND PROVINCE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Moral Philosophy, ichat. — Moral Philosophy is the science which treats of morals — the science of right. Natural Philosophy teaches us the laws of external nature; Intellectual Philosophy, the laws of the human mind; Moral Philosophy has to do with the laws of human conduct and duty. As thus defined, it is equivalent to Ethics. It may be termed, also, the science of duties, inasmuch as right and duty are, as regards moral action, one and the same.

Term used in a wider sense. — By the earlier English writers the term Moral Philosophy was used in a much more extended sense, to denote in general the science of mind, in distinction from physical science — whatever treats of intellectual in distinction from material things. As thus employed, it includes psychology as well as other sciences; and this u^ is still, to some extent, prevalent.

NATURE AND PROVINCE

Thus many of the works of English and Scotch philosophers on psychology are termed Moral Philosophy. By French writers, also, the morale is frequently placed in contrast with the physique.

Indeed, the dividing line between mental and moral science has not, as yet, been very closely drawn, for the most part, by those who have written upon either. Many of our own most popular works on Moral Philosophy treat of topics which properly pertain to psychology, as, e. g.^ the nature of Conscience, the Sensibilities, the Will, and other topics of like nature. These are faculties of the mind, and, as such, it j^ertains to psychology to explain and unfold them. Moral Philosophy, so far as it has occasion to make use of these phenomena, must go to psychology for the facts and the explanations, just as it must go to astronomy for the facts and laws of planetary motion ; or to logic for the laws of thought and forms of reasoning. Its proper office is to teach, not logic, nor astronomy, nor psychology, but the science of right — of duty. It has to do neither "svith the affections, the emotions, nor the wiU, except so far as these are involved in the investigation and statement of duty.

Intimate connection of Mental with Moral Philosophy. — The connection between the two sciences is indeed very intimate ; and for this reason they should be all the more carefully distinguished. The very idea of right is to be sought among the primitive conceptions of the mind. To perceive and judge of the right, is one of the most important offices of the reflective power of the mind. The

OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

emotions, affections, desires, furnish a powerful class of motives to human action, whether right or wrong. The will, or the power of voluntary mental action, constitutes the basis of human accountability, and lies, therefore, at the foundation of ethics. Hence, not improperly, the faculties now designated have been termed, by some philosophers, the active and moral powers of man. Dugald Stewart thus designates them.

In regard to the faculties now under consideration, a correct psychology is absolutely essential to a correct science of moral duty.

In another respect, also, is the connection of the two sciences intimate. Duty pertains, first and chiefly, not to the external conduct, but to the responsible, intelhgent mind, whose thoughts, feeling, and volitions find their expression in that outward conduct, and determine its moral character. To teach me what are my duties, is to teach me what thoughts and affections I ought to cherish ; what purposes and volitions I ought to form and put forth; in a word, what ought to be my entire mental activity, as exerted in the various relations of life. Mental science contents itself with ascertaining what are the varied phenomena of mental action ; moral science, while relating chiefly to the same department of observation, — i. e., the human mind, — inquires not so much what are the laws and operations of its various faculties, as what they ought to be.

General divisions. — The science of morals properly divides itself into two parts — the theoretical and the

2*

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

practical. Before proceeding to discuss the various duties which pertain to the well-ordered conduct of life, it is necessary to inquire first into those general principles on which, as a basis, morality rests, — as, g.^ the nature of right, the ground of right, the rule of right, the province of right, — and in what consists the moral quality of actions. This inquiry into, and discussion of, the general principles which lie at the foundation of morals, may be termed the theoretical part of the science. The way will thus be prepared to take up and discuss, in then* order, the several duties that devolve on man in the various relations of life ; and this may be termed the practical part of the science.

DIVISION FIRST. *

THEORETICAL ETHICS.

THEORETICAL ETHICS.

Chapter I

THE NATURE OF RIGHT. § 1. — Right in Itself Considered.

Essential Attributes. — The term right expresses a simple and ultimate idea ; it is, therefore, incapable of analysis and definition ; nor does it, like many other ideas, stand in need of definition in order to be understood. It expresses an eternal and immutable distinction, inherent in the nature of things, not the creation of arbitrary power, whether of man or God. Wherever there is voluntary action of any intelligent rational being, there is always, and always must be, a right and a wrong; and all moral action is, of necessity, either the one or the other. The distinction is one universally recognized. The idea of right lies among the simplest furniture and first principles of the human mind. It manifests itself with the dawn of reason and intelligence. It is not an idea of the schools, a distinction known only or chiefly to metaphysicians ; but is the property alike of the learned and the simple, of the child and the philosopher. Opinions may vary widely as to

THE ITATURE OF RIGHT.

what is, and what is not, right action ; what one system or one age pronounces to be right, another system or another age may decide to be wrong ; but, as to the essential difference between the right and the wrong, as ideas, or principles of action, no age or system was ever at a loss — no mind, however feeble, was ever confused.

This Idea, ichence derived. — It is a question of some importance how we come by the idea of right. Some have attributed it to fashion and education, as did Locke and his followers ; others to the laws, human or divine, which forbid or sanction certain actions ; others regard it as the product of a special sense, whose office it is to take cognizance of moral distinctions, as the eye perceives color, and the ear sound. Others again regard the idea of right as a simple and ultimate one, and as such underived, a primary original conception of the human mind, not innate, but connate, an elementary dictum of reason.

The universality of the idea, — its early manifestation in childhood, prior to education, and the influence of example, — as well as the clearaess and strength with which it manifests itself, in all conditions of society, and under all the varying circumstances of life, — these things go to show that the idea of right is founded in the constitution of the mind, and not derived from any source external and adventitious. Nor can those who take the opposite view give any satisfactory account of the origin of this idea; since, to attribute it to education, leaves the question still open, where did the first man, the first educator, derive his idea of it ; while to ascribe it to law, human or divine, is still wider of the mark, inasmuch as law always presupposes the right, as the foundation on which it rests. To attribute, then, the origin or the idea of right to law, is to place the foundation upon the building, instead of the building upon the foundation. And as to the theory of a

THE NATURE OF RIGHT.

special sense, whose office it is to take cognizance of the right, it is sufficient to say, that there is no evidence of any such special faculty of the mind, nor is any such needed.

For the further investigation of this topic, the reader is referred to the author's treatise on Mental Philosophy, in which the question, and its several theories, are more fully discussed.

^ 2. — Right, as distinguished from other Ideas of similar

IMPORT.

Right and Duty. — Right and duty are not i^recisely synonymous terms, yet are nearly equivalent. We are always under obligation to do that which is right — it is our duty. The right in morals once ascertained, the doing of it is, under all circumstances, a duty. Kight is the foundation of obligation, and coextensive with it. It is the rightness of the thing that creates its binding force, and makes it obligatory upon us. There can be no moral obligation to do what is not in itself a right thing to be done.

Still, right and duty, though coextensive, are not of precisely the same import. Right is the abstract, in itself considered. Duty is right, considered in relation to us as personal agents — as doers ; obligation is the binding power of the right over us, which makes this or that a duty.

Another View. — Some writers make a further distinction between obligation and duty than that which I have now indicated — making obligation more comprehensive than duty. Thus a man may be obliged, by force of circumstances, or by the laws of the land, to do what is not right. Such is the view taken by Whewell, in his Elements of Morality. That which is here called obligation, however, is not really such, but rather compulsion, or necessity. "No combination of circumstances, and no power of law, can

THE NATURE OF RIGHT.

create moral obligation. In morals, that, and that only, conveys obligation which bears the high seal and impress of right. Whatever goes beyond this, or violates this, — whatever power and pressure of circumstances it may draw around it, whatever sanction and authority of law, — can never bind the conscience, or impose on the spiritual nature of man the restraints of a moral obligation. Law may come in, with its sanctions and penalties, to secure the performance of the right ; it may cast the heavy sword of power into the scale that hangs in doubtful balance ; or it may require and enforce the wrong ; but in neither case can it create a moral obligation which did not previously exist. Had there been no law, it would still have been my duty to do the right. It is still my duty, even though the law forbid. Obligation and duty are coextensive.

Hight and Rights. — The term rigJit varies in significance, according to its use, as an adjective, or as a noun ; or, more properly, according to its use in the singular, or in the plural. Might is the principle that should regulate my conduct towards others ; my rights are what I may justly expect and require from others, in their intercourse with me — what they ought to do as respects me. That which is my right, is another's duty ; and that which is my duty, is another's right. Every right, then, has its corresponding duty. It is my duty, for example, to obey God ; and that obedience he has a right to require. It is my duty to obey the state in all its just and proper requirements — in all things not inconsistent with higher obligations ; and this obedience the state has the right to demand of me. In like manner, all my rights look to the corresponding duties of others ; and all my duties, to the rights of others.

There would be no rights^ were there not in the first

THE NATURE OF RIGHT.

place such a thing as right. From this, obligation results, duty results, and so rights exist.

Yiew of Whewell and others. — If, with Whewell and others, we make rights to depend for their existence on the laws, it follows that there are no rights except those which society recognizes and creates through the medium of law ; and were there, for any reason, no longer any law, no man would any longer have any rights ; — which is by no means the case. Law may define and prescribe my rights ; it may enforce them, see that they are respected and observed; but it does not, and cannot, create them. They are founded in the principles of natural justice, and of universal and immutable right. Were there no laws — were the institutions of society swept away — there would still be rights, so long as there were intelligent and rational beings in existence sustaining certain relations to each other. Suppose, for example, two persons cast ashore upon a desert island, where, beside themselves, is no human being — ■ where, of course, is no state and no law. Each of these persons has still, by the law of nature, certain rights, inalienable from him ; as, e. g.^ the right to his own person, his own labor, his own property ; and were the other to wrest these from him, he would be guilty of a manifest wrong-— of palpable injustice.

Those who take this view, moreover, go upon the supposition that the laws are based upon right and justice — as unquestionably they should be, but unfortunately are not always. There may be, in the course of human affairs, iniquitous, unjust laws; such things have been, and will be again. Such laws, according to the view in question, however, create rights and impose duties. In such a case I have, according to this theory, the right to demand of others what it is not right for me to demand of them ;

a

THE NATURE OF RIGHT.

while, on the other hand, it is my duty to do what it is not right for me to do.

If it be replied, that in this case the rights supposed are merely legal rights, and not moral ones, I answer, that, according to the theory, all rights are legal ones, and must be first legal before they can be moral. It is the law that creates rights, moral or other. The morality presupposes and depends upon the legality, as the quality presupposes the substance. To distinguish in this manner between a right which is merely legal, and one which, in addition to that, is also moral, is to step back from the theory that it is law which creates rights.

The truth is, neither right nor rights are dependent on law for their existence. There are rights which are not defined by law — which, possibly, are forbidden by law. All rights exist before they are thus defined. Both my duties and my rights depend for their existence on right ; and this again depends, not on society, nor law, but is founded in the eternal and immutable nature of things.

The rights, so called, which are established by law, may or may not coincide with moral rights. However this may be. Moral Philosophy has to do, not at all with legal rights, as such, but only with moral. With jurisprudence, as distinct from morals, it has no more to do than with constitutional law, or the science of government.

GROUND OF RIGHT.

Chapter II. Ground Of Right

Principle of Obligation. — Duty implies obligation. To say that it is my duty to do a given thing, is to say that I ought to do it. Were there no such thing as obligation, there would be no such thing as duty. It is evident then, at a glance, that the principle of obligation is an essential element in morals : it meets us at the threshold, it lies at the foundation of the science on which we are entering.

Such is the constitution of the human mind, that no sooner do we perceive a given course to be right, than we recognize also a certain obligation resting on us to pursue that course. It is a conviction of the mind inseparable from the perception of the right. Given the one^ and we cannot escape the other.

Ground of Moral Obligation. — The question arises here,

What is the ground of this ought f — what constitutes it ? What is that, in any given action, that imposes on me the obligation to do the same? I ought to do this and that:

TTAy ought?

Whatever answer we may give to this question, we must come back ultimately to the simple position — we ought, because it is right. The rightness constitutes the obligation. The question, then, virtually resolves itself into this — What constitutes right?

This is a question of no little moment. It has received, at different times, and by different authors, widely differ-

GROUND OF RIGHT.

ent answers, and these various answers constitute so manydifferent theories of morals. They lead us over an interesting and most important field of inquiry, involving one of the deepest problems in the whole range of philosophical thought.

In the preceding chapter, I had occasion to refer to the source of our idea of right, and also to the question, What constitutes our rights? The question now before us is quite distinct from each of these. We are now to inquire, not whence comes the idea of right, but what is right itself f — not what makes rights^ but what makes right f

Prhicipal Theories. — The principal theories of morals, or grounds of obligation, proposed by different writers, may be reduced, perhaps, to these four: 1. Utility; 2. Law; 3. The nature and character of God ; 4. The eternal and immutable nature of things. Each of these has been regarded as the true ground on which to place the distinction of right and wrong, and the consequent moral obligation. The two former of these, again, have each a twofold aspect : Utility, as the ground of right, may denote either the happiness^ the pleasure accruing from a given course (which is itself a species of utility), or the more direct advantage resulting from it. Or, if we place the matter on the ground of legal enactment, the law which makes the right and the wrong, may be marHs law, or it may be God's.

We have, then, these divergent paths opening before us, each proposing to conduct to the true solution of our problem, each trodden by many a mighty man in the domain of thought : the utilitarian theory, with its twofold aspect, the pleasure and the advantage of the thing; the legal theory, twofold also, as of human or Divine authority ; the theory which makes the Divine character the foundation

GROUND OF RIGHT.

of right ; and, finally, that which bases it on the immutable and eternal nature of things.

Let us, then, examine these several theories in their order :

I. The Utilitarian. — Utility as denoting Pleasure. Understanding by this term, in the first place, pleasure., rather than advantage, the doctrine is this: — the reason why we pronounce one thing right, rather than another, is, that we find the one act to be attended, uniformly, with pleasure to the doer; the other, with pain. One contributes to his happiness, the other detracts from it. i^"ow, the pursuit of happiness, it is contended, is the grand motive and spring of all human action ; and if it be once established that the actions which we call right are such, invariably, as to promote our happiness, no other reason need be assigned why we thus regard them. And this, it is contended, is the case. If we select any instance of what we call right action, we find it to be an action which is accompanied with pleasurable emotion. And this is the ground of our approval, the reason why we pronounce the action right.

Now, it is not to be denied, that to do right brings with it a present satisfaction and true happiness. Such is the constitution of our nature. The question is, whether this tendency to produce haj^piness is what makes a given act right. Is the thing right because it produces happiness? or does it promote our happiness because it is right? Which is the true statement? When I pronounce some past act of my life to be right, and approve it as virtuous, is it because I remember that it gave me great pleasure ? — and when I cherish the feeling of self-reproach and remorse, in view of past conduct, is it on the ground that the given action was accompanied with unpleasant and painful sensations ?

GROUND OF RIGHT.

The Theory not satisfactory. — The simple statement of the question would seem sufficient. We feel instinctively that our decision and approval rest on far other and higher grounds. Virtue and happiness are by no means identical. We have different terms for them, and mean different things by them. The one cannot be resolved into the other. If it be true that all right things are pleasant, it does not follow that all pleasant things are right, much less that their pleasantness makes them right. Many are the propensities of a corrupt nature, the indulgence of which is attended Avith present gratification, which still are evil and only evil; and in their pleasantness consists the very strength of the teniptation they present. The man who yields to the force of such temptations, however, by no means approves the course that he pursues. He goes to the commission of the wrong, not with a conviction that he is doing right, but under a protest from his conscience, and with a feeling of self-reproach and self-condemnation. This ought not to be, according to the theory now under consideration. He ought rather to approve his conduct, on the ground that he was secKmg therein his own happiness ; and his self-approval ought to rise and increase in proportion to the pleasure he receives.

As denoting Happiness of the Community. — N'or is the case materially altered by substituting the happiness of others, in place of personal happiness, as the ground of right. No doubt right action contributes to the happiness of the community, and swells the sum total of the world's enjoyment ; but is it this that constitutes the rightness of the act? Is the noble consciousness of doing right, with all its power to sustain the spirit of a man under the pressure of the heaviest calamities and the gloom of the darkest hour, merely this — the conviction that somehow, in consequence of what he has done, men will, on the whole, enjoy themselves better? Independent, and irrespective of all such considerations, is there not a far nobler satisfaction in having done that which was right, in itself considered, and for its own sake ?

The view now considered was the distinctive tenet of the ancient Epicurean philosophy ; and has been held, in later times, by Hume and Shaftesbury in England, and by their followers generally.

As denoting Advantage. — Considering, now, utility as denoting advantage or expediencg, we come upon somewhat different ground, — capable, however, of attack and defence by essentially the same arguments. In fact, the former view maybe regarded as a modification of the latter; the one specific, the other generic, in its form; — pleasure being itself a species of advantage, at least in the opinion of those who make it the rule of right. Hence, very generally, the advocates of the former view are advocates also of the latter. Still the latter is, of the two, the broader and higher ground.

Self-love, according to this view, is the grand motive of human action. Men do what they think for their advantage. Now, it is found by experience that a certain course of conduct is for ,the advantage, and the opposite for the disadvantage, of the doer. Hence they come to regai d the one course as right, and to be pursued, — the other as wrong, and to be avoided. In a word, it is the utility or expediency of the thing that constitutes the ground and reason of its rightness. Such is the doctrine of Bentham and his followers.

And here it is admitted on all sides that virtuous action does contribute to the advantage, in many Avays, of the doer. The question is, whether this is what makes it virtuous — whether this constitutes its rightness. Is it right because expedient, or expedient because right ?

GROUND OF RIGHT.

Consequences of this Theory. — Let us see what follows from this theory. (1) If expediency is the ground of right, then interest and duty are identical in idea — synonymes for the same thought. To prove a given action right, all that is necessary is to show that it is advantageous to the doer. The same act performed from the same motives, with the same spirit and intentions, is right to one man, and wrong to another ; nay, is right to one and the same man, at one time, and wrong at another, according as it turns out for his advantage or not. We can never be sure that we are acting virtuously, until we know how the action is to affect our personal interests. Men have acted from the highest and purest principles, yet have been in reality far from virtuous, because what they did proved not for their own interests. They ought, therefore, to cherish feelings of self-reproach and remorse in view of their conduct.

(2) It follows from this theory that there is no such thing as intentional wrong-doing. Men always act, it is said, from the principle of self-love. They do what they think is for their own advantage. Finding by experience that certain actions tend to their advantage, they come to regard such actions as right, and the opposite, for the same reason, as wrong. What have we here for a syllogism ?

Man acts always with reference to his own good. To act with reference to one's own good, is to act right; therefore, man invariably acts right ! He may mistake, and do what is in the end disadvantageous ; but it was a mistake, an error of judgment, and not an intentional wrong. This is on the whole a very favorable view of things, and may serve to relieve somewhat the sombre aspect in which the world and poor erring human nature present themselves to a certain class of minds. Men are not so bad, after all. They do as well as they know how. They mean to be selfish, and to consult their own interests; and if they

GROUND OF RIGHT.

sometimes come short of duty in tliis respect, it is an error of the head and not of the heart.

(3) It follows, also, that there is no such thing as disinterested virtue. Utility is the ground of rectitude, the foundation of obligation. We ought, therefore, to give a man credit for his conduct, just in proportion as we perceive him to have been governed throughout by a regard to his own personal advantage. To act thus is to act right, and to comply with the claims of duty. There can be no virtue which springs not from this source. The more fully a man promotes his own interests, and seeks his own personal advantage, in all he does, provided only there be no direct violation of the rights of others, the higher esteem ought we to cherish for that man in our hearts. On the other hand, where an action is of such a nature that we are not quite sure whether the man teas really seeking liis own advantage, or that of others, in what he did, we ought to withhold our approbation.