A reply to Dr. Ware's Letters to Trinitarians and Calvinists. ...

Contents

INTRODUCTION, p. 4 9.

Chapter I. 9—41

Dr. Ware's opinions and reasoning with respect to the human character, examined. — Man's character judged by a wrong standard, 12. — Basis of Dr. Ware's reasoning, 13. — His first argument, from the characteristics of early life, examined, 18. — Second, from the interest taken in children, 26. — Third, from the repulsiveness of the doctrine of depravity, 27. — Fourth, from the commands, precepts, &c. 29. — Fifth, from representations of Scripture, 34.

Chapter II. 41—47

Result of observation and experience, as to original depravity.

Chapter III. 47—61

Human depravity native. — Examples of the proper use of words and phrases employed in stating this doctrine, 48. — Whether the words natural, native, &c. are applicable to human depravity, 51. — Depravity found in all men of every generation, 52. — Appears early,

52. — Cannot be traced to any change, subsequently to man's birth,

53. — Operates spontaneously, 57. — Hard to be eradicated, 58. — An infant will certainly be a sinner, 58. — Argument from Scripture referred to, 60. — Summary, 61.

Chapter IV. 62—35

Objections to depravity, 62. Unitarian mode of reasoning un-

philosophical, 62. — Proper mode of reasoning, 65. — Moral depravity not inconsistent with the divine perfections, 78 — 85.

Chapter V. 85—113

Native depravity not inconsistent with moral agency. — What constitutes moral agency, 86. — Men sinners as soon as moral agents, 87. — Difficulties attending Dr. Ware's theory, 90. — No more inconsistent to suppose man inclined to sin at first, than afterwards,

Jv

CONTENTS.

100. — Man culpable for defects of character, however acquired, 100. — Difficulties attend both theories. — Influence of bad example 108. — How far the circumstances of Adam's sin invalidates the argument of the Orthodox, 110.

Chapter VI. 113—128

Manner in which Dr. Ware confutes scripture arguments. — Argument from Gen. vi. p. 113. — Principle involved in Dr. Ware's reasoning, and its consequences, 116. — The Bible accounts for it, that some are holy, while the generality are sinful, 126. — The worst men selected as specimens of human nature, 127.

Chapter VII. 128—140

Dr. Ware's reply to the argument from John iii. 3 5 Rom. v. 12 ; and Ephes. ii. 3.

Chapter VIII. 140—149

The doctrine of man's native depravity of great practical importance.

Chapter IX. 149—198

On the doctrine of election. — Uncandid representation of the doctrine, 150. — Proper view of it, I51.-The controversy respects the divine administration, 155 — Mistakes corrected, 156.— Objections considered, 158.- — No injustice in distinguishing grace, 159. — Dr.Ware's theory attended with as great difficulties as the Orthodox, 164. — Fact confirms the doctrine, 169. — The divine purpose ensures the

influence of motives, 171. Makes men moral agents, 173.—

Extracts from Wesley, 1 74.— Difficulties attending the denial of the doctrine, 175. — Argument from John xvii. p. 176. — Ephes. i. 3 — 11. p. 182. — The supposition that communities only are elected, 183.— Rom. ix. p. 193.

Chapter X. 198—216

Atonement. — Doctrine of redemption, as held by Dr. Ware, 198. — Five objections to his scheme, 199 — 208. — Remarks on figurative language, &c. 209.

Chapter XI. 216—228

Dr. Ware's objections to Divine influence, considered, 216 — 220. — Moral influence of the two systems compared, 220.

Introduction

When I wrote the Letters to Unitarians, I meant to treat the subjects of the present controversy so explicitly, and to extend my remarks to such a length, that I might, in any case, have a full apology for declining a rejoinder. I then had, and have still many and weighty reasons against being a party in any religious controversy. In the first place, it is not the way in which 1 have generally supposed I could best labour for the promotion of the cause of Christ. The duties imposed upon me by my office are sufficiently extensive and important, to occupy all my time and my powers of action ; sufficiently diversified, abundantly to satisfy my love of variety ; and so congenial to my inclinations, as to afford all the enjoyment which can be expected by any man, oppressed with the cares of public life and the imperfections of human nature. But for my reluctance to engage in controversy, I have had another reason. In the regular course of my official duty, though I have much to do with all the controverted subjects of religion, and though I never impose any restraints upon the freedom of discussion, but those of decency ; it has still cost me no effort, to keep my mind free from agitation. But as to public religious controversy, I have observed its unhappy influence upon so many men of distinguished excellence ; I have seen that it has so often marred the best natural temper; that it has so often occasioned the offensive boast of victory, or that which is no less offensive, the sullen mortification of defeat ; that 2 it has so often injured the beauty of men's characters, cooled the ardour of their piety, and detracted much from their comfort, or at least from the comfort of their friends, that I have earnestly wished to avoid the danger. I have wished also, if possible, to avoid the sufferings of controversy ; the unhappiness of being exposed to the charge of bigotry or party spirit, of ambition or meanness, of arrogance or imbecility ; the unhappiness of being reproached or despised by my opposers, or the greater unhappiness of feeling any disposition to reproach or despise them. Besides, I have thought, that, at least so far as I was concerned, truth and piety might be more successfully promoted by more silent, gentle means. I have feared that an attempt even to advance the cause of pure religion, in a controversial way, would kindle a fire which would endanger the most precious interests of the church, and which Christians, possessing the strongest attachment to Christ, and blessed with the largest portion of his spirit, might in vain try to extinguish.

These and other like considerations may seem trifling to men on both sides, who cherish a disputatious spirit, who pant for the noise and strife of controversy, and who have never soberly considered the evils likely to result from it. But in my mind, such considerations, as I have suggested, are of no ordinary importance ; and for a long time they produced in me a resolution against controversy, which, till of late, I thought could never be overcome. But as it is, I must now go forward, hoping to derive benefit to myself from the kind and amiable temper of my opponent, and no less benefit to my cause, from the frankness with which he declares his opinions, and the zeal with which he attacks mine.

I do not come to this task with an expectation of producing, generally, any material change in the views of confirmed Unitarians. I should be a poor proficient in the science of the human mind, could I not foresee, that my arguments will be likely to appear as inconclusive to them, as theirs do to me. My age and experience have somewhat cooled the ardour of feeling, which might once have led me to indulge different expectations, and to think that my opponents and all others might easily be convinced of the truth of my opinions. I have lived long enough to learn, that arguments have a different weight in the judgment of different men, and that something besides argument is concerned in controversy. In the present case, the facts, which are the principles of reasoning, are different ; just as might be the case with two philosophers, who, making use of instruments not agreeing together, or using the same instruments in very different ways, might come to a different judgment respecting the phenomena of light, or any other material substance ; in consequence of which, both of them might reason correctly on the ground of what they had discovered to be the properties of that substance, and yet be conducted to different and opposite conclusions. In the controversy respecting depravity, the facts, which are admitted by the two parties, as the foundations of their respective systems, are not the same ; nor is the method of ascertaining what facts really exist, the same. Now it is very natural for us to suppose, that the habits of thinking, and feeling, and judging, which have led men to embrace the Unitarian creed in regard to this subject, will give them but a poor opinion of our arguments. If we were exactly in their case, we presume our judgment would be like theirs. Did not our own experience, — did not a faithful comparison of our heart and life with the rule of duty, fully convince us of the fact* that our own nature is the subject of an original, deep-rooted corruption ; no external evidence could easily induce us to believe the fact in relation to others.

It may be asked then, what good I hope to accomplish by pursuing this controversy ? One good purpose, perhaps the principal one, which I hope to effect, is, to satisfy the serious friends of orthodoxy, that, after all the attacks which have been made upon their religion, it rests on an immoveable basis ; that it has as much solid argument to support it, as they have ever supposed. I hope also to convince those who, not being yet settled in their belief, are candidly inquiring, what is truth, that the system of orthodoxy, at least in its principal features, so far corresponds with the word of God, and with sound experience, and that its moral tendency is in so high a degree salutary, that they ought to make many a serious pause, before they reject it. And finally, I should be glad to do something towards convincing candid Unitarians of that, which has indeed always been sufficiently proved, that those who embrace the scheme of orthodoxy, do not necessarily resign all claims to manly strength of understanding, nor show themselves enemies to freedom and fairness of investigation.

There are many passages, of a taking plausibility, in Dr. Ware's Letters, against which a charge of incorrectness might easily be sustained, but which, as they relate to matters of small consequence in the controversy, I shall pass over with little or no attention. I say this to guard my readers against supposing, that my silence on any part of the Letters is to be interpreted as a sign of approbation. My purpose is to fix on the main points of the controversy, and to dwell upon those arguments, on which all who will bring themselves to patient and thorough inquiry, must lay the greatest stress. If we can defend the general principles which have governed our reasoning ; if we can, by legitimate arguments, support the chief doctrines of our system, and vindicate them from the chief objections of opposers, the work is done. Let the strength of the foundation be made to appear, and we shall not doubt the building will stand. And as to the scheme which we feel it to be our duty to oppose, — if we can succeed in taking away its foundation, we shall deem it sufficient, without either making a violent attack upon the superstructure to hasten its fall, or standing by to exult in its ruins.

Chapter I

To prepare the way for an useful investigation of the subject of human depravity, I shall present in one connected view the opinions which Dr. Ware has advanced in different parts of his third Letter.

" I insist," he says, " that the account usually given of human wickedness is exaggerated." — " Men are not the mere brutes and fiends it would make them. There is much good as well as evil in the human character;" (meaning the natural character.) " As much as there is of wickedness and vice, there is far more of virtue and goodness." — "If we take a fair and full view, we shall find that in by far the greatest part of human beings, the just, and kind, and benevolent dispositions prevail beyond measure over the opposite ; and that even in the worst men, good feelings and principles are predominant, and they probably perform in the course of their lives many more good than bad actions ; as the greatest liar does, by the constitution of his nature, doubtless speak many truths to every lie he utters." — " Man is by nature — or as he is born into the world, innocent and pure ; free from all moral corruption, as well as destitute of all positive holiness ; and until he has formed a character either good or bad, an object of the divine complacency and favour." — 6< He is by nature no more inclined to vice than to virtue." — " In early life, we see no proofs of depravity, of malignity, of inclination to evil in preference to good." — " What I have stated I am persuaded is the general character, until the disposition and tendency of nature has been changed by education, example, and circumstances." — " 1 know not a single mark of early depravity common to children in general, which may not be fairly traced to causes which imply no degree of depravity, and no fault of character or disposition." — " No man, I am persuaded, was ever led by personal observation and experience to the thought of an original depravity of human nature." — " Young children," (he means in their natural state,) " are what men are to become by regeneration." — " Those now born into the world in christian lands, are, as the Ephesians were after their conversion to Christianity, saved by the grace of God, quickened, raised from the dead, made nigh by the blood of Christ, fellow citizens with the saints, of the household of God" — " All this language was applied to the Ephesians universally after their conversion, and all of it is as applicable universally now to those who are Christians by birth, as distinguished from those who are heathen by birth."

The scheme more briefly is this. Man is born into the world free from corruption of nature, or propensity to evil. We see no proofs of depravity in childhood, no proofs of inclination to evil rather than good. All who are now born into the world in Christian lands are saints, saved by grace, as the converted Ephesians were. Every mark of depravity common to children may be traced to causes which imply no depravity at all. Even in the worst of men good feelings and principles are predominant.

It may be useless for me to stop here to express the astonishment that good men must generally feel, at such a description of the human character. For myself, while I have the Bible, and my own heart, and the world before my eyes, it is as impossible for me to admit the truth of the system above stated, as the truth of a system of philosophy which denies the principle of gravitation ; and for the same reason.

Dr. Ware says he is persuaded, that "no man was ever led by personal observation or experience to the thought of an original depravity of human nature." I have no doubt he has such a persuasion ; but it is a little remarkable that he should have it, when by conversing either with authors, or with living Christians, he might so easily have discovered its contrariety to fact. Thousands and millions of enlightened Christians have declared, and multitudes of them in writing, that personal observation and experience have led them to believe in the moral depravation of man, or in his native propensity to evil. They have said it when they have had no motive to say it, but the strength of their own conviction. They have said it in their most solemn devotions ; and they have said it most frequently, and felt it most deeply, when the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ has shone in their hearts with the greatest clearness. And I will add what has been remarked by many writers, that those who have most carefully studied human nature, even among pagans, have acknowledged, and that in very strong terms, an inward depravation and corruption of man, rendering the mind averse to good and inclining it to evil.

In reflecting on this subject, I am led to inquire how it can be accounted for, that any man of sober judgment should entertain such views respecting the human character. Now so far as reasoning is concerned, I am satisfied, that the principal errour in the scheme of Unitarians and Pelagians generally, lies in this, that they judge of marts character by a wrong standard. This controversy respects man, not as an animal or intellectual being, nor as a member of domestic or civil society, but as a subject of God's moral government. Viewed in this light, he is required to conform to the moral law. This is the only rule of duty, the only standard of right feeling and right action. If we would know whether any subject of God's moral government is holy or sinful, or in what degree he is so, we must compare his moral character with the divine law. So far as he is conformed to that law, he is holy. So far as he is not conformed, he is sinful. And as we are taught, that love to God and love to man is the sum of what the law requires; it is perfectly safe, and often very convenient in our reasoning, to make use of this summary of the law, as standing for the whole. This then being our rule of judgment, what will be our conclusion respecting the moral character exhibited by human beings in early life ? Let the inquiry relate to the first character they exhibit, as moral agents ; so that we may not unnecessarily perplex the subject, at the outset, by looking after the moral affections or actions of men, either before they are moral agents, or before the divine commands can be applied to them. Is it the general character of men, that, as soon as the divine law is declared to them, they are disposed cordially to obey it ? We will not so shape the inquiry, that it shall relate merely to exemption from sin. The real question is, whether holy love to God and man is the first moral affection which human beings generally exercise, after they become moral agents and are expressly informed what God requires of them. Keeping this point distinctly in view, let us now proceed to examine

The reasoning by which Dr. Ware supports his opinion respecting the human character.

The reasoning of Dr. Ware on this subject is indeed plausible, being founded upon those natural qualities of the youthful mind, which are honoured with the names of virtue, and universally regarded as amiable and useful. He says, " innocence, simplicity, and purity are the characteristics of early life." — 44 Veracity, kindness, good-will, flow from the natural feelings." — " How early does the infant discover affection, attachment, gratitude to those from whom it receives kindness." These are charming names, and I am very sensible that charming qualities of human nature are denoted by them. And charming too are the complexion and features of a beautiful child, the sprightliness of its temper, and the activity of its limbs. But do any or all of these constitute conformity to the moral law ? Do they render a child holy?

But Dr. Ware, with a view to consistency, will probably say, he does not mention the lovely qualities which are characteristic of early life, as a proof of moral virtue, or holiness, because the infant child has not yet actually formed a character, either good or bad, and so is neither holy nor unholy. But although this would have an appearance of consistency in one respect, it would, in another respect, involve the writer in a great inconsistency. For if this is his meaning, how is it possible to 3 make his remarks, p. 26, apposite to his subject ? His subject is man's moral character. He had just before been charging the Orthodox with giving an exaggerated description of human nature, inasmuch as they do not take proper notice of what is " virtuous, and kind, and amiable, and good ;" — words all denoting moral qualities. After thus distinctly bringing forward his subject* that is, human nature in respect to its moral qualities, he says,"our most correct ideas of human nature will be drawn from the characteristics of infancy, and the earliest indications of disposition, tendency, and character in the infant mind." Forgetting what he ventures to say in other places, that men by their natural birth receive no moral character, and have none, before they are born again, he here speaks of the indications of character in the infant mind.

Let us give this language a fair examination, and see whether any sense whatever that can be put upon it, will make the writer who uses it consistent with himself. — When he speaks of the indications of character in the infant mind, I ask what character is meant ? Is it the character which belongs to man, as a moral agent, or in relation to a moral law ? Then it would seem the infant mind has such a character, and that character must be either good or bad, holy or unholy ; which would be contrary to Dr. Ware's statements, p. 20, 41, and elsewhere. But if he does not mean the moral character of man, or his character as a moral agent ; then his observations, p. 26, do not relate at all to the subject of controversy, For the only point at issue is, what is man's nature or character, as a moral agent, and in relation to a moral law ? I ask then again, has the infant really a character in this respect ? If so, that character must be either holy or unholy ; and then what becomes of Dr. Ware's favourite position, that infants are both free from moral corruption and destitute of holiness, and that they have no moral character, either good or bad, before they are born again? On the other hand, if it is a fact, as he maintains, that infants have no moral character; then the characteristics of infancy which he enumerates, p. 26, can nowise relate to moral character, i. e. they can nowise relate to the subject under consideration ; and so far as this subject is concerned, he might just as well mention a fair complexion or beautiful countenance, as 64 innocence, simplicity, and purity."

It may, however, be said, that 44 the characteristics of infancy, and the earliest indications of disposition, tendency, and character in the infant mind," though the infant mind does not yet possess a moral character, may still help us in some other way, to " correct ideas of human nature." Dr. Ware will not say that these characteristics of infancy prove the nature of man to be holy by proving that holiness really belongs to the infant's mind ; for, as remarked before, this would be contrary to one of his main points. How then does his reasoning stand ? Does he mean to say, that those things, which are characteristics of human nature at a period when moral character does not exist, that is, that those properties of infancy which cannot be indications of any moral character at the time, are true indications of that moral character which subsequently exists ? But this again would involve his reasoning in difficulty, because, according to his views, mankind after becoming moral agents, are not thus innocent, and pure, and free from inclination to sin.

But as I wish to do full justice to my opponent, and as far possible to give to his words the very sense which he meant to express, I must say, that his language and his reasoning plainly imply, that human beings, at that period of infancy to which he refers, do really possess a moral character. What he has written in different places, taken together, evidently show that this is his opinion. He says, p, 26, " we draw our most correct ideas of human nature from the characteristics of infancy, and from the earliest indications of disposition, tendency, and character in the infant mind." Among these characteristics of infancy, he mentions " innocence, simplicity, and purity ;" which he doubtless means we should understand to be moral qualities. And a little below, after speaking of an infant as an object of interest to those about it, he asks, " Would it be so if it appeared to possess nothing good, and no tendency to good?" evidently implying that it does possess something good. In another place, he represents men as becoming " reasonable, accountable beings, by their natural birth." If they are accountable beings, they are moral agents, and must have moral dispositions. He says too, still more plainly, p. 31, that young children have a " good disposition;" " that they are what men become by regeneration ;" that they " are objects of the Saviour's complacency," and " proper objects of imitation." From these very plain, unequivocal declarations of Dr. Ware I cannot but infer what his real opinion is, namely, that by their natural birth men become moral, accountable beings, and have a moral disposition or character which is good ; good or holy in such a sense, as to entitle them to the Saviour's complacency, and make them heirs of his kingdom. I am compelled to think this is the position he would maintain, though in several places he seems to slide away to another side of his system, and asserts that men by nature have no moral character, and are equally distant from holiness and from sin, and equally without any natural tendency to one or the other.

Before proceeding to a direct examination of Dr. Ware's arguments in support of his opinion respecting human nature, I will make one remark. If my position, that men are by their birth morally corrupt is thought to be absurd, on account of their being incapable, at first, of possessing any character, good or bad ; the position of Dr. Ware is in this respect equally absurd. For if men, as they come into the world, — if infants, are capable of being "pure" they are capable of being impure. If they are capable of having a good disposition, or " tendency to good," they are capable of a bad disposition, or a tendency to evil. If they are capable of such a character as will render them "objects of divine complacency," they are equally capable of such a character as will render them objects of divine displeasure. It is Dr. Ware's opinion, p. 21, that man is by nature as capable of vice as of virtue. I should hope therefore that neither he, nor any one who embraces his opinions, will ever again allege the incapacity of infants to be the subjects of moral corruption, as an objection against the doctrine of native depravity.

When I say that many plain and unequivocal declarations of Dr. Ware and the general current of his reasoning prove that he believes man by nature the subject of real virtue or holiness, I would not willingly oblige myself to show, that he has nowhere written any thing contrary to this. For in commenting on John iii. 3, 6, he does indeed represent that " men receive by their natural birth only human nature ; that they receive no moral character, but only the faculties and powers in the exercise of which a moral character is to be formed ; and that the formation of a moral character, (he does not say whether good or bad,) introduces them into a new state of being, and may be called a new birth ; and in p. 42, he seems to think the implication of the passage is, " that men do not possess by birth that character of personal holiness, which is necessary to their being Christians." It may be easier for Dr. Ware, than for me, to reconcile these representations with the passages to which I have before referred.

Let us now see, by what particular arguments he supports the opinion, that men are by nature not only free from moral corruption, but inclined to virtue.

He first argues from the innocence, simplicity, and pwrity of early life, and from the veracity, kindness, good-will, attachment and gratitude, which flow from the natural feelings of children.

To guard against being imposed upon by names, let us here inquire what is that innocence, simplicity, purity, &c. which are in reality characteristic of the infant mind?

The word innocence, when applied to men in regard to moral character, signifies freedom from moral defilement, or guilt. But when applied to other things, it commonly denotes that they are harmless, or free from a tendency to do hurt. In this sense a dove and a lamb are said to be innocent, if I mistake not, this is generally the meaning of the word, when applied to infant children. It is in regard to this kind of innocence, that they are so often compared to lambs and doves.

Simplicity, when applied to rational beings, properly signifies artlessness, freedom from cunning or deceit. Infants and young children may have simplicity in this sense, merely because they are incapable of subtilty or cunning, or because they have had no temptation to learn any deceitful arts.

In what sense Dr. Ware uses the word purity it is not easy for me to determine. If he uses it in that high moral sense, in which our Saviour uses it when he says, i; blessed are the pure in heart," and so means to assert as a general truth, that moral purity or holiness is a characteristic of early life ; I would not repeat in my reply what has already been suggested, as to the contrariety of this to other representations in his Letters ; but would direct the reader's attention a moment to the shape which his reasoning assumes.