Reminiscences of the Civil War

Front matter

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II. General McClelland and the Army of the

Potomac leave the Washington front

for the Peninsula.

IN THE EARLY SPRING of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was a well organized and equipped army; the regiments formed into brigades, divisions, army corps, and well supplied with artillery and cavalry, fully officered, considerably drilled and disciplined, but only a small share of it experienced in campaigning and warfare — this it was about to get in abundance.

It was generally believed that the Confederates had massed a large force, estimated at 100,000 to 125,00 men at Manassas. This then was the enemy to face the Army of the Potomac. So, as soon as the roads were in condition to permit the army to make the move, we, the entire army were ordered to advance onto Manassas. The weather and roads were fair, and there was no trouble on the march. Upon arrival at Centreville, we found there was no rebel army near, though plenty of evidence that a large force had been camped in the vicinity, but the army had vamoosed, retreated.

Well, now what was to be done.? After some delay it was announced that we were to march back to Alexandria, and there embark on steamboats, to be taken to the Peninsula, then to Richmond.

In due time we started one morning on our march to Alexandria, but before we got started it began to rain, not very hard at first, but it soon increased, until it came down in torrents and kept it up all day. It was a cold rain and as the day progressed all the streams were working to capacity and more; there were few if any bridges, compelling us to ford many streams knee deep to waist deep. Of course in those days we had no clothing or blankets that would shed the rain, our uniforms, overcoats and blankets were flimsy, shoddy, I guess, that would readily take in the rain, pass it on to our bodies until we were soaked to our bones, I think, and then run down our blouse sleeves and pants legs in streams. A good thing we wore shoes that couldn't hold much water; caps, too, were no protection. This severe cold rain storm, coming so soon after our winter quarters and no enemy near, practically broke up all the organizations that were on the march, and each one trudged along as best he could; at least I trudged along all day, not daring to stop in that cold rain, and loaded down with a great surplus of water, ever onward toward Alexandria. At last, just as it was beginning to get dark, I arrived in Alexandria, and found that our regiment was

[20 1 assembling in a hall of a brick building, all the seats having been removed. A few of my company and myself pre-empted a corner; I threw off my knapsack and haversack, and I assure you it was a relief — I had no idea they could be so heavy. I had hardly taken off the rest of my accoutrements when a call sounded through the hall: ''Nagle, Nagle!'' My corner answered : "Here, Here!'' It was now quite dark; as I approached the entrance or exit, I met my eldest brother, who was looking for me.

I have related elsewhere that he had charge of a large force of railroad carpenters, with headquarters at Alexandria. I need hardly assure you that it did not require much urging on his part, to have me accompany him to his boarding place. I left all my belongings in the corner, and told my comrades I would be back in the morning. I went with him, and had a hot cooked supper, instead of the water-soaked mess in my haversack, a clean, dry bed to sleep in — the first time I had slept in a house and bed since leaving Buffalo, over a year before. After breakfast next morning I rejoined my comrades in the hall. The return march to Alexandria was ended, but The End was not yet.

It developed about this time that there was a difference of opinion between the General commanding. Gen. McClellan, and those in authority over him, regarding the number of troops to go with him to the Peninsula. Gen. McClellan wanted to take his entire army (this did not include the nondescript forces within the fortifications of Washington) while the higher authorities did not want the Washington front stripped entirely of the active field army, laying the Capital open to an easy attack by the enemy. President Lincoln did not want to take the responsibility to decide, left that to the military arm of the Government, thought McClellan's plan might succeed, *'if he moved quick enough," but insisted that Washington must be left safe beyond all peradventure. This resulted in detaining the First Army Corps, General McDowell commanding, on the Washington front, from which, however, two divisions were later on sent to the Peninsula; the rest of the Army embarked at Alexandria and went to the Peninsula. The campaign on the Peninsula under McClellan has no part in these reminiscences.

I believe that the Army of the Potomac in the Spring of 1862, before it left the environs of Washington, was the best organized and equipped ever organized on this Continent — there was not one conscript or drafted man in the ranks. It was fresh and soft and lacked experience to be sure, but was on the way of hardening and getting experience. In my opinion, it should never have been divided into parts that would

[22 1 not be in easy supporting distance of each other, unless indeed it was large enough so that either of the parts was strong enough to cope successfully by itself with any combination of forces the enemy might possibly bring against it — this it was not claimed to be. Furthermore, there was just as good opportunity for fighting and keeping the Capital covered at the same time, as there was hundreds of miles away. There is no doubt but that the safety of Washington was the most important consideration, as Lincoln insisted upon, and had the entire army gone to the Peninsula, the chances are that the Confederates would have made so formidable an attack on Washington, perhaps before the last of the Army had disembarked on the Peninsula, that the government would have been compelled to recall the Army to defend the Capital, if not actually to recapture it from the Confederates, as it was obliged to recall later what had gone, after it was defeated.

Strategy is all right in itself, and is not to be ignored, but after all, war is destructive and can only be won by the destruction of the manpower and resources of your adversary, by the continued hammering, grinding and chewing, as was done by Grant, two years later. This can generally be done as well on one field as another; there is strategy to be exercised on the actual field of battle, as well as in the general campaign,

[23 1 and I believe it to be even more important to gain victories than the general strategy of the campaign, but devolves more upon the officers and troops on the field, though not wholly, than upon the general command.

While the rest of the Army of the Potomac was embarking and on its way, the First Army Corps, under General McDowell, started again on its march southward — this time Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock was our destination. We met no Confederate forces till we reached Fredericksburg, and then only a few, who seemed quite willing we should take possession. We were, however, overtaken on the way by a most severe snowstorm, which lasted several days, a wet heavy snow, the fields were covered to a depth of from 10 to 12 inches with a soft wet snow. This broke up the organizations for the time being more efi^ectually than a large force of Confederates could have done. It however, cleared the atmosphere, the sun came out bright, and soon after hot. We resumed our march; but a very few days later, when we had completed the alloted distance for that day's march and had left the road to prepare for the bivouac, it was announced that there was no water anywhere near, and were requested to march on five miles farther where there was said to be plenty of good water. Of course we "fell in'' and resumed our march. We had gone on the road but a short distance when a thunder storm came up, the rain came down in torrents, it grew dark, we could see the pools of water and mud puddles only by the flashes of the lightning, but we trudged on until we reached our destination for that day. The rain had stopped, but night had set in, we were in a new country that had apparently not been visited by any army, for the rail fences were fine and high, and I assure you it did not take us long after breaking ranks to start a rousing big fire by which to dry ourselves. Next morning everything was serene and we again resumed our march to Fredericksburg.

Little worthy of note occurred while we were at Fredericksburg — it was one round of guard and picket duty, drill and camp duty. We were encamped most of the time on Marie's Heights, the exact ground that the Confederate Army fortified and held securely the following December against Burnside's onslaughts. Our Company was for a time guard at McDowell's headquarters, at the ''Lacey House." By the way, I met Maj. Lacey of the Confederate Army some years after the War, and he told me that what we called the "Lacey House" was really named ''Chatham."

At one time our Company was detailed to guard a foraging train of wagons outside of our lines. We repulsed the attack of a force of irregulars or bushwhackers — nothing serious, but the weather was very hot.

After our return to camp I had a great craving for a drink of whiskey. I feared I would have an attack of sickness if I didn't get it. I will here state that up to that time of my life, I do not believe that I had even tasted either beer, wine or whiskey, yet the craving was so great I did not want to disregard it, so I bided my time until I could see Johnnie Mansfield alone — he had been my tent mate, but was at that time keeper of the medicines in the Surgeon's tent. I said, ''Johnnie, I want a good strong drink of whiskey." 'Theodore, I haven't any except what is saturated with quinine." "Well, give me some of that." "Come around to the back of the tent" — a wall tent. He brought out a big jug and a glass, I held the glass. "Now, Johnnie, I don't know how much is a good stiff drink, but I want it." He poured out about one-third of a glassful. "Oh, Johnnie, I can drink more than that." "Well, Theodore, it's pretty strong." "Oh, fill it up, Johnnie." He laughed, but filled the glass; I drank it like that much cool spring water, and to my own surprise it had no other effect upon me than it would had it been spring water, except that it satisfied my craving. I have had no such craving or experience since, and this was over sixty years ago. Now, while I have been a teetotaler or nearly such all my life, and have never been financially or otherwise interested in the liquor business directly or indirectly, if the subject were an open question I would be strongly opposed to a Prohibition Amendment, and the Volstead enforcement law.

It is an interesting speculation what the Patriots of 1776 would have said or done had King George and his associates constructed an Eighteenth Amendment, passed a Volstead enforcement law, supplemented it with a Pinchot Dry law, and spent millions upon millions of dollars of their hard earned money to "Reform" them, to search the passengers of railroad trains, and passing automobiles for what — for witches.? No, for a bottle of wine!

Enough said

To come down to more recent times that are within the memory of the living: Horace Greeley the greatest American Editor, would, upon occasions say, "That must be law for it isn't common sense." What would he say were he living now.f^ From this it would appear that Horace Greeley was not possessed of an idolatrous reverence for Law. He was, nevertheless, the greatest living Disciple of Justice (to all) and Liberty. Lest I may be misunderstood, I will say in imitation of the spirit of what many of our politicians have said "I am not writing an

Anti-anti-saloon or anti law enforcement article — Oh no, I am only jotting down a few reminiscences of the long, long ago.

At one time I had been to view a fine dam and lock across the Rappahannoc River, above Falmouth; this made a fine large reservoir of water between steep hills on both banks of the river. Going back to camp I roamed over the fields or commons, I do not think there were any streets or roads, and came across an old neglected grave, the ground was sunken in and overgrown with weeds, there was no enclosure either of the grave or the field, and no other grave anywhere in sight. It probably had received no care since it was made many years before. A small headstone, probably twelve to fifteen inches square, all out of plumb, informed me that Mary Washington was buried there. I do not know whether or not the beautiful memorial now erected in her honor is on the site of this grave, it seemed to me to be a little farther from town, but the town may have grown that way. At any rate, if it is not on the site of that grave it is near it.

We remained at Fredericksburg until about the first of August, when we became a part of General Pope's Army.

III. In Pope's Virginia Campaign in 1862

EARLY IN AUGUST, 1862, while still located at Fredericksburg, we became a part of Pope's Army; he was concentrating the armies in front of Washington, of which he had command, and which were scattered from Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg on the left to the Shenandoah Valley on the right. King's division, of which we were a part marched from Fredericksburg to Culpepper and Cedar Mountain, where we arrived after dark on the evening of the day of the battle of Cedar Mountain, expecting to do battle the following morning.

I will here recall that General McClellan's campaign on the Peninsula had ended in failure, and in fact his entire Army was recalled to Washington, and was at that time on the way back to Acquia Creek and Washington. This had left the principal Confederate Army, which had defeated McClellan, without an enemy in front, and therefore free to take the offensive against Washington, and which campaign they, the Confederates, were then inaugurating, and it was the plan of the Union Commanders to hold with Pope's Army the line of the Rappahannock, until McClellan's troops could arrive to re-enforce it and then resume the offensive.

Now Cedar Mountain, where we were, must be forty or more miles in advance of Rappahannock, so the retreat of this advanced army began. We acted as rear guard, and that is particularly hard, trying duty, marching slowly day and night. When the column comes to a stop, it may be for fifteen minutes or it may be for only one-half minute, always you must keep **closed up'' and that don't give time even to sit down, and this, when kept up, becomes very tiresome.

We arrived at and crossed the Rappahannock (on the stringers of a destroyed railroad bridge), in due time, without molestation, but then considerable skirmishing took place for a number of days, the heaviest of which I was engaged in was at Sulphur Springs, where artillery was also in action — some of the hotel buildings were destroyed by fire.

After holding the line of the Rappahannock for some days, it became evident that the Confederates were planning to outflank us before the troops from the Peninsula could re-enforce us to any considerable extent. The army was, therefore, ordered to retreat to the vicinity of Manassas. For a few days following, there was much marching and counter-marching, on the same road, or here, there and elsewhere. Of course for the most part we in the ranks did not know the reason, the cause or the object of all this; we obeyed orders and indulged in more or less grumbling, yet these few days were days of great moment.

Pope's campaign was coming to a climax, and the Union and Confederate Armies of Virginia were soon to meet in mortal combat; in fact were engaged in it then. Much has been written of the movement of troops, orders of generals and so forth, mostly in criticism of these days; I have read much of it. I will say that General Pope and his army were in a critical position, a larger force of Confederates than his own was confronting him, and the large re-enforcements promised him by the War Department were not arriving fast enough. For this Pope was not to blame. For one matter equally if of not more important, however, I consider him to blame, and that is that he did not have the information regarding the enemy's movements that he should have had, especially as he was on the defensive, and that I think he could have obtained if he had exerted himself more efficiently in that direction. It is not my purpose to trace the movements of the different bodies of troops in these days — that is impossible, and will recall only one or two incidents. Of course we took a most active and lively part in all that was going — marching, skirmishing, fighting battles, and so forth. Again I record my opinion that General McDowell should have been appointed to the command of this Army instead of General Pope. I think he would have done much better than did Pope.

In a general way it may be said that on the 28th day of August, 1862, that part of General Pope's Army that had been for some days along the Rappahannock was on the march toward Manassas, our. King's Division, bringing up the rear. About four o'clock in the afternoon we, the 21st New York Regiment were marching along with the rest of the division on the Warrenton Turnpike, at a point between Gainsville and the Stone Bridge across the Bull Run, unaware of any enemy being near, when suddenly a rebel battery fired on us at short range from a hill at our left. The shells went over us, the range was so short, I wonder they didn't use grape and cannister. Instantly, before word could possibly come from any other part of the line our Colonel, Wm. F. Rogers, gave the command clear and distinct as a bugle call: ^'Companies *C' and *D' deploy as skirmishers." Without a moments' hesitation we (I was a member of "C" Co.) deployed and advanced up the hill, promptly followed by the rest of the Regiment, in fact in short order by the entire King's Division.

When we skirmishers developed the enemy line of infantry, our regiment coming up, we took our places in the line, and then followed a most sanguinary battle. For a little distance we drove

THEO. M. NAGLE

JOHN H. MANSFIELD the enemy, but then it became a stand-up fight, neither side giving way. It was mostly musketry firing at our part of the fine, and was kept up until after dark, firing at the flash of the enemy fire. When firing finally ceased, about nine P.M., we held the most advanced position we had had. Then what was to be done? We had no orders to advance or to retreat, so we stood in our tracks for a long time, while our officers were trying to find out from higher oflScers what we were to do, to remain there and resume the fight in the morning, or to retrace our steps to the Warrenton Pike, and continue our march to Manassas, which was interrupted by this event not on the schedule. We understood that no word could be obtained from headquarters, so the Division Commanders concluded to carry out the last orders, viz: to march to Manassas. In the meantime we in the ranks had lain down and gone to sleep until about one o'clock when we were awakened to resume the march that had been so ruthlessly interrupted, and at about daylight arrived at the point near Manassas to await further orders, which came soon enough. Our action in leaving the battlefield after the battle was over, and continuing the march that was interrupted has been much criticised by critics, but it seems to me that it was the only thing to do under the orders.

This battle was called by us, the Battle of Kings Division, while all the accounts I have read of it mentions it as the battle of August 28th. (Sometimes called the battle of Gainesville). The Reports say **Losses on both sides were very severe, the Confederates losing many officers of high rank." On our side it is stated in report of General Gordon that, "more than one-third of the Federal command were left dead or wounded on the field." General Jackson (Stonewall Jackson, the Confederate Commander) called it "a fierce and sanguinary conflict."

The following day, August 29th, we lay idle for several hours in the afternoon on a hillside overlooking the battlefield of Groveton, less than half a mile away. We could see plainly the movements of the troops with their flags on both sides as far as the smoke of battle permitted us to see, and wondered why we were not ordered into the fight. At last, perhaps about six o'clock or after, came a courier, stafl^ officer or orderly, and we moved off in the direction of the field of conflict. We met some regiments coming out, and it seemed that we were to relieve them, and we made our way to the extreme front. In the meantime it had been getting dark, and the battle was over; we had accomplished nothing, had not fired a shot, but all the uncertainties of the situation gave rise to much anxiety — perhaps more than we had experienced the evening before in the battle. At one time we were fired upon, in the dark, by troops of our side, but as far as I know no damage was done. A Httle later in our movements in the dark, we came upon a Federal battery that was ready to fire grape and cannister into us, and would have done so in another minute, except for the lucky and timely explanation made by one of our officers. Going still a little further we stopped on a hill side, dropped to the ground, and in a few minute were so sound asleep nothing short of the booming of battle could have awakened us. It was here that our Lieutenant George Hurst was shot through the palm of his hand.

After idling away a number of hours on a pleasant afternoon, we were called upon to go through, for a number of hours well into the night, a most perplexing and anxious experience, and had accomplished nothing.

The following day, August 30th, 1862, occurred the momentous *'Second Battle of Bull Run." Of course we were in it from first to last, and while I am quite familiar with most of the details and remember plainly many of the scenes and experiences, I will not here relate them. The battle-field proper, that is the arena upon which the two armies contended for victory that day, is about two miles square or a little more. It is or was generally open, that is free of woods, except at the southerly edge, the ground rolling, in fact quite hilly — the highest ground being south of the Turnpike, around and back of the Henry House Hill, and Bald Hill opposite. The ground being free of woods mostly, enabled me at times to see all parts of the field where the conflict was going on, this, together with the fact that I have been nearly all over the ground several times since the War, and have read many accounts of the battle and the entire campaign, and especially because I was *'in it" all the time, makes me feel quite familiar with the subject.

The battle was the most sanguinary I was ever in; other battles I participated in were sanguinary in spots, but this was sanguinary all along the line, all the time, and the advantages of the ground pretty nearly equal to both sides, except when Jackson's Corps took shelter behind an unfinished railroad embankment, with the field in front of him enfiladed by Longstreet's batteries, and we going blindly to the attack, time and again with tremendous losses on our side and but little on theirs. I think now, that if we could not have coaxed Jackson and his men to come away from their shelter, dared them to come out, or outflanked them, we should have let them stay there as long as they pleased; we had as much time for the business in hand as they, and could wait as long (we were getting pay by the month, not by the job.) The urgency was not so great as to take chances in such a trap prepared for us. Seriously, if the one who gave the order to dislodge Jackson in that position with frontal attacks had been on the ground when the first line of attack was shattered, and if he had had any sense he would have concluded all other lines would be shattered in the same way, he would have given the order to withdraw, saved lives on our side, and used the troops elsewhere to better advantage.

The battle began about the middle of the day with our attack on Jackson's troops, north of the Warrenton Turnkipe, and developed toward our left, culminating in the most severe fights, first on Bald Hill and then on the Henry House Hill, to both of which troops that had been in line on our right were rushed during the battle. As the day drew to a close our army began to withdraw to the east bank of Bull Run, protected by our troops holding the Henry House Hill; by midnight our entire army was between Bull Run and Centreville. Pope's army had been defeated, but not routed or destroyed; every organization was complete, though decimated, and could have been depended on to carry out any orders, so far as its numbers were able.

The battle of Chantilly, which is some six or seven miles north of Centreville, came next, in which I also participated. While this battle was going on, a severe electrical storm raged most of the time, followed by a heavy downpour of rain; our part of the line was in a forest, with much underbrush; the noted General Phil. Kearny and General Stevens were among the killed.

By this time troops from the Peninsula were arriving, and I hold they should all have been forwarded to Pope at Centreville as fast as possible, and permitted him to take the offensive, which he surely could have and would have done successfully with the substantial re-enforcements. Instead of that, he was ordered to withdraw his Army to the Defenses of Washington. Much could be said and written on this action, but I will not enter upon that.

In accordance with these orders we were soon on the march again toward Washington, and one night, long after dark, as we came to a halt we bivouaced beside the road and in the morning found it was right in front of our old camping ground on Upton Hill and immediately occupied it. The weather was hot, and I had put up my little shelter tent and lay in the shade of it, when I heard some one inquiring for me. I jumped out of the tent instantly and saw my eldest brother. I was glad to see him of course, and he was greatly relieved to see me. I have told elsewhere that he had charge of a large force of railroad carpenters at Alexandria, and he had started out to find me, inquiring on the way for the Twenty-first, New York. He was repeatedly told, '*0h, the 21st is all cut up'' or "Oh, the 21st is all cut to pieces." When at last our location on Upton Hill was pointed out to him, and he saw only a small batch of shelter tents put up, he thought the report that the 21st was all "cut to pieces" must be true, and his faith in finding me was at a low ebb; however, when I jumped out of my tent he was satisfied that though the 21st may be all cut up, I was not cut up. We spent some little time together chatting, and then he started on his way back to Alexandria, while I awaited orders, which came very soon.

We were now in General McClellan's command, and were about to start on the Maryland Campaign. Orders came promptly to march over the "Long Bridge" to and through Washington. We made no stop in Washington. There were many new and old troops in Washington at the time, the streets were lined with soldiers, mostly new troops, seeing us old vets marching through Washington. While I remember that we entered Washington by way of the "Long Bridge" I do not remember which street or road we took on our way out. Rockville, Maryland, is the first town I remember passing. We had now got fairly started on the Maryland Campaign of 1862.