The world war; a short account of the principal land operations on the Belgian, French, Russian, Italian, Greek and Turkish fronts

Chapter I

Armies and Plans at the Beginning of the World War.

General Plans. — Concentration on the West Front, — French Army, — British Army, — Belgian Army, — German Army 1

CHAPTER n.

From the Frontier to the Marne.

Liege, — Operations in Alsace-Lorraine, — Movements of the 3d, 4th and 5th French Armies, — Advance of the German Armies, — Battle of Charleroi, — Battle of Mons,-^Battle of Ardenne-Meuse, — Second Plan of General Jcffre, — Battle of Le Cateau, — The Battle of St. Quentin-Guise, — Von Kluck's March on Paris, — Retreat to the Marne, — Operations of the 3d and 4th French Armies, August 25-September 1, — Third Plan of Genei'al Joff re 14

CHAPTER III. From the 3Iarne to the Channel

Battle of the Aisne, — First Battle of the Somme, — Battle of Arras, — British Operations South of the Lys River, — Battle of Flanders, — Battle of the Yser, — Dixmuide, — Battle North of Ypres, — Battle South of Ypres 52

CHAPTER* IV.

Operations on the Russian and Serbian Fronts.

The Gernian-Austi'ian-Russian Boundary in 1914, — Plans, — Battle of Tannenberg, — Russian Invasion of Galicia, — Operations in West Poland, — Operations in Serbia in 1914, — Turkey 62

Chapter V

General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1915.

Operations on the West Front. — The Battle of Neuve Chapelle, — German Attacks on Ypres. — Battles of Festubert and Artois in May, — Battles of Loos, Artois and Champagne in September, — The Argonne, — St. Mihiel Salient, — Vosges Front 75

Chapter VI

Operations on the Russian. Serbian and Italian Fronts in 1915.

Winter Operations in East Prussia, — Winter Operations in the Carpathian Mountains, — Operations in Galicia March to June, — Operations in the Baltic Provinces March to June, — Operations on the Russian Front July- September, — Operations in Serbia, — Operations on the Italian Front. ... 90

CHAPTER VIL

The Armenian Front, — Mesopotamia, — Egypt, — Dardanelles 106

Chapter VIII

General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1916.

Verdun, — Somme Drive 120

CHAPTER IX. Operations on the Italian, Russian, Rumanian and Greek

Fronts in 1916.

Operations on the Russian Front During the Attack on Verdun, — Austrian Attack in the Trentino, May-June, — Advance of Southern Group of Rus- \ sian Armies June-August, — Operations on the Italian Front August- December, — Salonika, — The Rumanian Campaign 138

CHAPTER X. Armenia, — Mesopotamia, — Egyptian Front 150

CHAPTER XL General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1917.

Attack and Defense, — Allied Plans for 1917, — Retreat of the German Armies on the West Front, — British Attack near Arras, — French Attack Along the Aisne, — British Operations in Flanders or Third Battle of Ypres, — Messines Ridge, — Battle of Passchendale Ridge, — Verdun, — Renewal of Battle of Passchendale Ridge, — French Attack on the Aisne, — Battle of Can[ibrai 156

CHAPTER XII. Operations on the Russian, Rumanian, Italian and Salonika

Fronts in 1917.

Russian Front, — Rumanian Front, — Italian Front, — First Italian Attack, May-June, — Second Italian Attack, August-September, — Austro-German Counter- Attack, October-December, — Salonika Front 177

Chapter XIV

General Plans and Operations on the West Front in 1918.

Allied Plans, — German Plans, — Selecting the Front of Attack, — Allied Line in the West, — Battle Zone, — Forward Zone, — Rear Zone, — The Attack, — American Troops in France, — April Attack on West Front, — May- June Attack on the West Front, — Last German Offensive, — July Counter-Attack, — Haig's Counter-Attack, August 8-15, — Haig's Counter- Attack, August 21-September 1, — Petain's Counter-Attacks in August, — German Retreat on the Somme, — Haig's Counter-Attack of September 2, — German Retreat from Somme and Lys Salients,— Oapture of the St. Mihiel Salient, — The Final Campaign, — Offensive in Flanders, — The Cambrai-St. Quentin Offensive, — Retreat of the Germans between the Oise and Reims, — Attack on the Hermann Line, — German Retreat between the Lys and Sensee Rivers, — The Champagne-Meuse Offensive, — First Phase, — Second Phase, — Last Phase and Pursuit 192

CHAPTER XV. Operations in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy and Turkey

in 1918.

Russia, — Rumania, — Bulgaria, — Italy, — Turkey 250

CHAPTER XVI. Strategy of the War

Diplomatic Strategy, — Military Strategy 261

Chapter I. Armies And Plans At The Beginning Of The

WORLD WAR.

Shortly after the outbreak of the World War, eight nations became involved in its military operations; these were Belgium, France, Great Britain, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro on the one side and Germany and Austro-Hungary on the other. Operations were at once begun on three fronts : on the west front the greater part of the German Army became engaged with the Belgian, French and British armies ; on the east front a small part of the German Army and the greater part of the Austrian Army became engaged with the Russian Army ; on the south front, the smaller part of the Austrian Army became engaged with the armies of Serbia and Montenegro.

The Belgian Army was reorganized in 1913 when universal conscription was adopted instead of conscription with substitution. Under the new organization the army was to be made up of 6 divisions, 2 cavalry divisions and 1 cyclist battalion. Each infantry division was made up of three mixed brigades of two regiments of infantry and 3 four-gun batteries. The divisional troops consisted of 2 field batteries and 4 field howitzer batteries, 1 regiment of cavalry, engineers, etc. The cavalry divisions were made up of 3 two-regiment brigades and 3 four-gun batteries. Half the battalions of infantry had machine gun sections of two guns. The total strength of the field army was about 125,000 men and each division about 20,000 men. In addition to the field army, it was necessary to provide garrisons for the three great fortresses of Liege, Namur, and Antwerp.

The peace strength of the army was only 43,000 men. Its expansion at the outbreak of the war necessitated the enrollment of a large number of reserves who had been long separated from the army and the course of events gave no time for their proper training.

The French Army was the most important Allied force on the west front at the outbreak of hostilities, it had a peace strength of 660,000 men. It was composed of the Metropolitan and Colonial armies. The Metropolitan Army had 45 divisions organized into 21 army corps ; of these all but one were permanently stationed in their corps districts in France. The 19th corps had its 4 divisions in Algieria, Tunis and Morocco, but was to be brought to France at the outbreak of the war. The Colonial Army had 12 regiments in France and the remaining regiments in the French colonies other than those of North Africa; only the regiments in France were available at the outbreak of the war and from them was formed the Colonial Corps. Attached to the army corps for administrative purposes were 10 cavalry divisions and 32 battalions of chasseurs. >

As the system of universal conscription had been in operation in France since 1872, the army had a large supply of trained reserves. At the outbreak of the war, service in the French Army was 3 years with the colors, 11 in the Reserve, 7 in the Territorial Army and 7 in the Territorial Reserve. The Reserve was to furnish the men for recruiting the regular army to a war footing and to furnish in addition reserve divisions of which 25 seem to have been formed on the mobilization of the army. The Territorial Army, composed of men from about 35 to 40 years of age, was also to form a large number of divisions for fortress garrisons, etc. A number of these divisions took an active part in the early part of the war. The Territorial Reserves, organized only in small units, were employed to guard railways, etc.

At the beginning of the war, the French division was usually composed of 12 battalions of infantry and a regiment of 9 four-gun batteries of field artillery. Two divisions formed an army corps which had in addition a regiment of cavalry, 12 four-gun batteries of field artillery, a battalion of engineers and special arms. There was no heavy artillery attached to the corps as this was army artillery. Some of the chasseur battalions were attached to corps and others formed chasseur divisions. The cavalry division consisted of 6 regiments of cavalry, 1 bicycle company and 2 four-gun batteries ; it was formed into 3 brigades. When cavalry corps were organized, they usually consisted of 3 divisions. Each infantry battalion and each cavalry brigade had a machine gun section with 2 guns. The strength of the division was about 15,000 men and the army corps of 2 divisions about 33,000 men.

At the beginning of the war, the French Army was able to mobilize 45 divisions of the active army, 2 divisions of Colonial troops, a division of chasseurs and 25 divisions of reserves, or 73 divisions in all. Besides the corps cavalry, there were available 10 cavalry divisions.

The Regular Army of Great Britain had a strength of about 250,000 men distributed as follows:

Home establishment 125,000

Indian establishment 75,000

Colonial establishment 45,000

390,^00^

On mobilization, there was to be formed from the Home Establishment and the Army Reserve, the Expeditionary Force. All the plans for the mobilization of this force were completed and it could be placed on a war footing in a short time. It was composed of 6 infantry divisions, a cavalry division and army troops. Each infantry division had 12 battalions of infantry organized into 3 brigades, 1 squadron of cavalry, 3 battalions of field artillery each composed of 3 six-gun batteries, 1 battalion of field howitzers composed of 3 six-gun batteries, 1 heavy battery of four guns, engineers, signal troops, etc. Each battalion of infantry had a machine gun section. The entire division had therefore about 12,000 infantry, 76 guns and howitzers, and 24 machine guns; its total strength was about 18,000 men. The cavalry division had four brigades of cavalry of 3 regiments of 3 squadrons each, and four six-gun batteries besides engineers, etc. Its total strength was about half that of an infantry division. The army troops consisted of an infantry brigade, a cavalry brigade and the usual train troops. The total strength of the Expeditionary Force was about 120,000 men.

The Expeditionary Force, for which replacements could be furnished by the Army Reserve, was the only British force available for the early operations of the war. No other trained troops would be available until regulars were withdrawn from the colonies and new divisions organized or divisions were brought from India. Other troops formed from volunteers, the Special Reserve and from the Territorial Army would require a long period of training.

The Russian Army had a peace strength of about 1,200,000 men. It was distributed throughout the empire in the following manner :

Russia 27 army corps formed of 53 divs. and 8 rifle brigades. Caucasia 3 " " " " 5 " "4 "

37 " " " " 68 " " 18 "

Two rifle brigades are equivalent to a division. The cavalry divisions were distributed as follows:

Russia 19 divisions and 2 independent brigades.

Caucasia 4 " " —

Turkestan 1 " "2

Siberia — " " —

24 " • " 4 " "

The division had 16 battalions of infantry and 6 eight-gun batteries with a total strength of about 18,500 ; the rifle brigade 8,500 ; and the cavalry division 4,000. The army corps had a strength of about 40,000 and was made up of 2 divisions and a brigade of cavalry.

Since 1912 service in the Russian Army had been 3 years with the colors, 7 years in the First Reserve, 6 years in the Second Reserve and 5 years in the home defense contingent. The annual recruit class numbered about 400,000 men. At the outbreak of the war 2,000,000 men of the first reserve were called into service to recruit the army to war strength, form reserve divisions and supply replacement troops. The Russian program provided for the formation of 32 reserve divisions in Russia proper from the reserves.

As a result of the reforms introduced into the Russian Army after the Russo-Japanese War, the regular divisions of the Russian Army took the field well armed and equipped but there were not sufficient reserves of arms or equipments to replace the material lost in campaign and it was difl!icult to secure these supplies from the Allied and neutral countries.

The Serbian Army had been recently engaged in two wars in which it had gained valuable experience but had lost a large number of men. It was thought however that it could place in the field about 200,000 more or less trained men. The army was recruited by universal conscription, the periods of service in the First Ban being IVo years with the colors and 8I/2 years in the reserve. The army was small and only about 20,000 recruits were taken in each year. In time of peace the army consisted of 5 divisions each composed of 12 battalions of infantry and a regiment of artillery composed of 9 four-gun batteries; on mobilization each regiment was to receive another battalion of infantry making the organization similar to the Russian division but with fewer guns. In addition to the divisions, there was a cavalry division, a regiment of mountain artillery, a regiment of field howitzers, and a regiment of heavy artillery. Five additional divisions were authorized in 1913, but these could not have been fully organized at the beginning of the war. They were probably completed at the outbreak of the war by volunteers and men from the Reserves of the First Ban, thus giving a field army of about 200,000 men.

A second reserve or Second Ban was composed of the men who had finished their service with the colors and corresponded in age limits to the Territorial Army of France. It was not organized in time of peace. These men would serve as replacement troops. The Third Ban corresponded to the Territorial Reserve of France but was not organized. As the Serbian Army was fighting on its own soil in 1914 it may be assumed that every able bodied veteran of the recent wars was in the ranks.

The strength of the Montenegrin Army was estimated at about 30,000 to 40,000 partially trained men organized into small battalions of infantry. It had 25 four-gun batteries and a number of machine guns. The army was equipped for mountain warfare but not for general field service, and will not be considered in estimating the strength of the Allied forces.

At the outbreak of the war, the peace strength of the German Army was about 780,000 men. It was organized into 25 army corps of which 3 were from Bavaria, 2 from Saxony, 1 from Wurtemberg and the remainder from Prussia and the smaller States. Each corps was composed of 2 divisions whose normal composition was 12 battalions of infantry, 1 regiment of cavalry, 1 brigade of field artillery, 72 guns, and a battalion of engineers. Some of the divisions had three brigades or 18 battalions of infantry. Each infantry regiment had a machine gun company of 6 guns, or 2 per battalion. Each army corps had a regiment of heavy artillery of 8 batteries of 4 guns or howitzers each.

The German Army had 110 regiments of cavalry of which 50 would serve as divisional cavalry and 60 would form 10 cavalry divisions of 3 brigades each. The cavalry division had 3 six-gun batteries and a machine gun section.

Of special infantry, corresponding to the French chasseurs, the German Army had 18 battalions of rifles each with a machine gun company and a bicycle company. In addition there were 36 machine gun companies unattached.

The German Army was especially strong in trained reserves as the army was recruited by universal conscription, its enlisted strength was kept at about one percent of the population, and the service with the colors was two years. The periods of service were 2 years with the colors, 5 in the Reserve, 5 in the 1st Landwehr, 5 in the 2nd Landwehr and 7 in the Landsturm. The Reserve and 1st Landwehr corresponded to the French Reserves, the 2nd Landwehr to the Territorial Army, and the Landsturm to the Territorial Reserve. About 300,000 recruits were taken into the army each year.

On mobilization the Germans could probably form from the Reserve and 1st Landwehr about twice as many divisions as the French could from their Reserve, or about 50 divisions. It may be assumed therefore that she formed early in the war about 100 divisions.

The Austro-Hungarian or Austrian Army had a peace strength of about 350,000 men. There were 15 army corps of 2 divisions and 1 of 3 divisions. In addition there were 16 divisions of Austrian and Hungarian Landwehr who had a shorter term of service than the regular army and had not served regularly with the colors. One of these was assigned to each corps. The normal composition of the division was similar to the Russian division; 16 battalions of infantry, 1/2 regiment of cavalry, 2 regiments of field artillery with 48 guns and 2 six-inch howitzers. Each army corps had in addition 2 battalions of heavy artillery, 8 howitzers, and a battalion of engineers.

In the regular cavalry there were 19 brigades and in the landwehr 7 brigades from which there were to be formed 8 regular and 8 landwehr cavalry divisions with 3 four-gun batteries each. Like the Russian cavalry, the Austrian cavalry regiment had 6 squadrons and 4 regiments formed a cavalry division.

The army was recruited by universal conscription; the periods of service were 2 years with the colors, 8 years with the reserve, and 2 years in the landwehr. At the outbreak of the war, the strength of the army may be assumed as 39 divisions of infantry and 10 of cavalry.

In one respect the Austrian Army was weaker than any of the others; it was made up of men of many different races speaking different languages. The Germans and Hungarians who ruled the empire furnished only half the strength of the Austrian Army; the other half was made up of Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Jugoslavs and Italians who had little interest in fighting for the Empire.

The following gives a rough estimate of the field forces that were ready to begin operations at the end of period of mobilization. This does not include French Territorials or German units corresponding to them. After the first operations, the available means of the various States in men, material resources, neutral assistance, etc., became factors which grew in importance as the war

was prolonged.

Infantry Divisions. Cavalry Divisions.

Belgium 6 1

France 73 10

Great Britain 6 1

Russia proper 57 20

Russia, reserves, estimated. 32 —

Siberia 5 1

179 33

Germany 100 10

Austria 39 10

The following table gives the composition of the army corps in the five principal armies on mobilization in 1914:

Infantry

Cavalry

Artillery field heavy

British . . .

24 battalions

1/4 regiments

144 pieces

8 pieces

French . . .

German. , .

it

32 "

Russian.. .

1 brigade

Austrian..

V2 regiment

10 "

Although the Central Powers were relatively weak in the number of divisions, their central position with their excellent railway systems and the more thorough preparation of Germany did much to counter-balance the weakness in numbers.

GENERAL PLANS.

From the formation of the offensive and defensive alliance between France and Russia, the General Staff of each country had been working on a joint plan of operations in case of war with the central allied States of Germany, Austria and Italy. Since the problem first presented itself it had been simplified by diplomatic means, as the German Navy was neutralized by an understanding with Great Britain, and the neutrality of Italy was assured if Germany and Austria assumed the offensive. As the Central Powers might assume the offensive on either front while remaining on the defensive on the other, it was desirable that both the French and Russian armies should be concentrated as rapidly as possible on the frontier, and each should attack in order to relieve the pressure on the other and thus compel the Central Powers to divide their forces more evenly between the eastern and western fronts.

The problem of mobilizing the French Army and concentrating it on the frontier was an easy one because of the excellent system of French railways; but the Russian problem was more difficult. The great extent of that country required a wide distribution of her army corps, and the thin network of railways made it impossible to mobilize her corps and transport them to the frontier as rapidly as France or the Central Powers. To meet the situation, as strong a force as was deemed possible was concentrated in the three frontier districts whose headquarters were Wilna, Warsaw and Kiev. In these three districts were stationed about one-half of the Eussian European corps and three-fifths of the Russian cavalry divisions. The advance posts of the Wilna district were on the frontiers of East Prussia and those of the Kiev district on the frontier of Galicia. From the Warsaw district troops could be moved either into East Prussia or into Galicia. In the Warsaw district the army corps were all east of the Vistula River, two hundred miles from the frontier, as it was deemed dangerous to station them in West Poland; this territory was occupied by cavalry divisions only.

The second line districts had their headquarters at Petrograd, four hundred miles from Wilna, at Moscow seven hundred miles from Warsaw and at Odessa four hundred miles from Galicia. In these districts there were 11 army corps and 3 cavalry divisions, designed to reinforce the frontier district as soon as railway conditions would permit.

In the event of war between Russia and France and the Central Powers it was planned to concentrate the great mass of the German Army on the west front to seek a decision with France while the Austrian Army was concentrated on the eastern front against Russia. This would draw the main Russian force to the Austrian front and remove the danger of an immediate invasion of East Prussia by a large Russian force. Before Russia could concentrate her troops on her frontier to overwhelm the Austrian Army, it was assumed that German troops could be withdrawn from France.

At the outbreak of the war, the situation was however changed by the fact that Austria was already at war with Serbia and had mobilized a large part of her army on the Serbian front. The whole Austrian Army was therefore not available for operations against Russia. This was probably the cause of the prompt declaration of war August 1 by Germany against Russia as soon as it was ascertained that secret orders had been given for the mobilization of the Russian armies by the Minister of War.

Concentration on the West Front.

French Army.— In order to understand the French scheme of concentration it must be remembered that in the Franco-German War, both France and Germany had respected the neutrality of Belgium and it was generally admitted that the invasion of that State would lead to complications if not war with Great Britain. Since that war, Belgium had constructed the fortifications of Liege and Namur which made invasion along the line of the railway from Cologne to Paris more difficult. If Germany should violate the neutrality of Belgium the probabilities were that she would move through the territory south of Liege and Namur.

It was the ardent desire of every Frenchman to recover the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and therefore an invasion of these provinces would meet with universal approval in France. However, on making the plan it was necessary to consider the possibility of an invasion of south Belgium by the German armies. Should Russia carry out her part of the joint plan, it was not probable that the German force on the west front would at the end of the concentration period greatly outnumber the French force, and it might even be less strong. An offensive campaign was therefore deemed practicable.

The general plan of concentration contemplated the formation of six armies from the active corps and reserve divisions.

Army of Alsace First Army Second Army

General Pau General Dubail General Castelnau

2 corps 4 corps 5 corps

1 division chasseurs 2 reserve divisions 5 reserve divisions

2 reserve divisions

Third Army Fourth Army Fifth Army

General Ruffey General Langle General Lanrezac

4 corps 4 corps 3 corps

3 reserve divisions 3 reserve divisions 2 cavalry corps Army Troops

Of the ten cavalry divisions, three formed the 1st cavalrv corps, three the 2d corps, two were attached to the 4th Army, one to the 3d Army and one to the Army of Alsace.

The Army of Alsace was to be formed in the area around Belfort for the invasion of southern Alsace. The 1st Army was

Id

formed in the area northeast of Epinal and was to be the right wing of the main invading force. The 2d Army was formed in the area at Toiil and Nancy and was to be the center of the main invading force; to it was attached the 2d cavalry corps. The 3d Army was formed on the left of the 2d, east of Verdun, and was to be the left wing of the invading force. The 4th Army was concentrated in the area behind the 2d and 3d armies as a general reserve. The 5th Army was concentrated in the area to the left of the 3d Army, and was facing the boundary of southern Belgium. Still further west, at Verviers near Hirson, was a group of three reserve divisions also available on the Belgium front. Other reserve divisions were in the fortified curtain extending from Verdun to Toul.

The concentration was designed to meet two situations. If the Germans concentrated all their forces on the Franco-German frontier the advance into Lorraine would be made by the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 5th armies with the 4th Army in support. If the Germans invaded southern Belgium, leaving only a part of their forces in Alsace and Lorraine, the 5th Army was to move to the left m.aking room for the 4th, and the 3d, 4th and 5th armies were to cross the Meuse and attack the German armies in southern Belgium, while the 1st and 2d attacked in Lorraine. In both cases the Army of Alsace would advance into southern Alsace.

The mobile garrison of the fortress of Maubeuge, 25,000 men, and the group of reserve divisions at Hirson would prevent any raiding operations between Maubeuge and the Meuse River.

The concentration did not provide for a German movement in force through Belgium north of the line Namur and Maubeuge, since it was not believed that the Germans would extend their army so far north, and if they did, they must weaken their line in southern Belgium and in Lorraine, where if the French won a victory, any German forces north of that line would be obliged to retreat. It is possible that the British and Belgians were expected to hold the line of the Meuse below Namur.

The French armies were commanded by General Joifre, who had since 1911 been assigned to the command in case of war in addition to his duties as Chief of Staff of the French Army. The commanders of the armies and corps were made on his recommendation.

British Army. — Great Britain did not declare war until the German troops invaded Belgium. The Expeditionary Force was at once mobilized and the first troops reached France about the middle of August. The force sent over consisted of the cavalry division, 4 infantry divisions forming the 1st and 2d army corps, 1 brigade of infantry for the line of communications, and 1 brigade of army cavalry. Two divisions were temporarily detained in England. At the request of the French commander, the British Army was concentrated around Maubeuge with headquarters at Le Cateau, instead of around Amiens as originally planned.

The command of the British Expeditionary Force was given to Sir John French, an officer of wide experience who had been appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1911.

Belgian Army. — The mobilization of the Belgian Army was ordered in the last days of July and at once one of the six divisions was sent to Liege and another to Namur. The other four divisions were prepared for field orperations,

German Army. — The German Army was mobilized at the same time as the French, and at about the same time it began entraining for the frontier. The problem that confronted the German military authorities when preparing for this war was not so simple as that which confronted General Moltke in 1870, for then the German Army was nearly twice as strong as the French Army, the former having 475,000 men and the latter 250,000 men. In preparing the German plan it was not possible to count on great numerical superiority. After the Franco-German War, the French had greatly strengthened their eastern frontier by the construction of fortifications. These consisted of the fortified curtains of Verdun-Toul and Epinal-Belfort, each consisting of two great fortresses connected by a continuous line of barrier forts at intervals of seven to ten miles. Although these barriers were constructed a quarter of a century before, and the forts could no longer be considered proof against the recently constructed howitzers, the barriers would however greatly strengthen the resistance of the French armies if an attempt were made to penetrate France from Alsace and Lorraine.

On the Belgian front, France had also constructed fortifications at the same time she constructed the barrier curtains in the east. With the exception of Maubeuge these however had long been neglected as Belgium had since fortified Liege and Namur, and with her Russian alliance and her reorganized army, France was no longer as weak as she was immediately after the Franco- German War.