The philosophy of things

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THINGS

COMPLETE IN TWO BOOKS

ISSUED IN ONE OR IN TWO VOLUMES

Book One The Physical Universe By James Ferguson

DENVER COLORADO U. S. A.

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR

TRADE ADDRESS

"PHILOSOPHY OF THINGS" 1343-45 CURTIS STREET w

Copyright, 1922, By James Ferguson.

Set up, Electro-plated, Printed and Bound, IN DENVER COLORADO U. S. A.

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—PREFACE- TO BOOK ONE, THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE

The principal datum upon which this system is built was obtained from the old school books on Natural Philosophy, by David A. Wells and G. P. Quackenbos, published in 1857 and 1859. Later I read a few other books best among them being Youman's "Conservation of Forces" and Spencer's "First Principles." About this time (1877) I commenced writing on the subject of philosophy and my first effort was to explain the cause of Gravitation. The general theories worked out during the few years following that time, and which apply to gravitation, electric attraction and repulsion, molecular attraction and repulsion, (as in chemical changes) magnetic attraction and repulsion, the phenomena of the tides, comets, sun-spots and the universe as a whole, were published in 1899; now out of print. All of these theories, with copious additions, are reproduced in this book.

All but the last two chapters of this book were rewritten for the last time, prior to 1904. A brief review of the progress of philosophy since that time, seems necessary to a complete understanding of the contents of this book. But I must make it brief for a thorough review cannot be attempted here.

From the beginning it seems that the various systems of Idealism, subjective and objective, which deny the existence of things apart from mind, Realism or Naturalism, which contends for the reality of a world of matter, motion, mind, external to the conscious individual, and Scepticism or Agnosticism, which contends that not only the above named but all systems of philosophy are more or less doubtful, have covered the whole of the proper sphere of philosophy.

Early in my speculations I reached the idea that there must be a good reason for scepticism; and I thought I had found it in idealism. Subjective idealism assumes that all things are in the conscious mind and that they exist only when we are conscious. Objective idealism teaches that all things are ideas created by

Preface To Book One, Page II

God and existing independent of us; but we can absorb them. I gradually came to the idea that there was no truth in subjective idealism but there might be some truth in objective idealism. God makes things but He does not make our ideas about things. We make them ourselves and what we make depends on how we think. If we commit sin or act the fool we cannot blame God for it and so escape the responsibility of wrong doing. This form of idealism would give us a real basis for a science of morality, so I adopted it with the proviso that realism or naturalism, in short, all knowledge can be nothing in itself but a system of ideas in the mind, and the question for us to decide is, what is the true idealism? When we find the answer to this question, I believe scepticism will be routed from this planet.

I very soon reached the conclusion that ordinary judgment or common sense was the only mode of procedure in the quest for real knowledge, for me at least, and that good judgment must depend on knowledge of real things. The first step in philosophy, as I then thought and still think, is an answer to the questions, what are space, time, matter, motion, mind? (§ 1) If nature is one complete and perfect whole, it must have a set of laws or conditions of existence — a system of first and fundamental truths on which to rest and hold together. So far in philosophy it seemed clear that no such system had yet emerged but at the present time (1922) it may be best to mention here what other prominent writers have said about this question of ultimate truths. The following has appeared subsequent to 1899.

In his book "A Theory of Reality," 1899, George T. Ladd, Professor of philosophy in Yale University, says:

"But is space properly spoken of as though it was an active principle? To this question scientific psychology gives no hesitating or equivocal answer. It demonstrates beyond doubt that, considered from the psychological point of view, space is most properly and precisely just that. It attains its highest development in that systematic doctrine of spatial qualities and spatial relations which the physical sciences so successfully employ."

In another place he says: "Time and space are thus regarded in the light of universal "media." Things, with all that they really are and all that belong to them, are in these media."

Preface To Book One, Page III

The exact meaning of the word "media," is not clear to me and the dictionaries do not explain. But if no one can tell us what space or time is we cannot expect anything definite.

Ralph B. Perry, Professor of philosophy in Harvard University, says in his "Present Philosophical Tendencies" 1916.

"The critique of science which has just been examined might be termed a methodological critique, as distinguished from the metaphysical critique to which we must now turn. According to this critique, science has to do with appearance or phenomenon rather than reality, because of the nature of its basal concepts, space and time. These concepts are inherently contradictory or lacking in self-sufficiency; and physical nature as the realm of space and time, must be supposed to be in the end resolved into something else. They must be corrected, or overcome, in some higher Unity as evil is held to be transmuted into good in the providence of God."

He finds this critique in Immanuel Kant. According to Kant space and time are vitiated by antinomies. "This means that on the supposition of the reality of space and time, it is possible to prove with equal certainty, several contradictory pairs of thesis and counter thesis; such as that space has boundaries and has not, time has a beginning and has not, space and time have indivisible elements and have not, etc. The moral according to Kant, is that we must repeat the original supposition, and deny the reality of space and time."

E. G. Spaulding Professor of Philosophy in Princeton University, in his "New Rationalism" 1918, says:

"Space like time is an organized whole or relational complex that consists of several kinds of parts, and that has various characteristics. It consists of dimensions, such as lines, planes and volumes. Any finite space consists of smaller spaces; that is, lines as finite, consist of smaller lines, planes, of smaller planes, and volumes, of smaller volumes."

"Space, Time and Deity," is the title of a large and said to be a very important contribution to systematic philosophy in two volumes, 1920, by S. Alexander M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. HON. Fellow of Lincoln College Oxford, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester England.

Preface To Book One, Page IV

The first sentence in chapter one, volume one, of this work reads as follows: "It is not, I believe, too much to say that all the vital problems of philosophy depend for their solution on the solution of the problem what Space and Time are and more particularly how they are related to each other."

This is my own view exactly, but I have included Matter, Motion, Mind, in the first category. (First three chap. Book 1.)

He treats space and time empirically, describing and analysing them and considering their connections, if any, as we do other realities. He does not ask whether they are real in themselves or not but assumes that they are and asks what that reality is. To understand how space and time are related to each other he considers the matter in these words:

Page 44. "Other features will declare themselves as we proceed, some obvious, some less so. But they will be found to require for their understanding the understanding of how Space and Time are related to each other. These are often thought, perhaps commonly, to be independent and separate (whether treated as entities as here or as systems of relations). But a little reflective consideration is sufficent to show that they are interdependent, so that there neither is Space without Time nor Time without Space; any more than life exists without a body or a body which can function as a living body exists without life; that Space is in its very nature temporal and Time spatial."

Then follows a long and most elaborate discussion, all of which aims to show that space and time are not separate things but one thing — the one and the only whole thing; the primordial "stuff or matrix out of which things and events are made."

The author says page 60: "Meantime, I may proceed with the metaphysical exposition. We have then to think of Space and Time in much the following way. (a) By themselves each consists of elements or parts which are indistinguishable so long as the elements of the other are excluded, (b) In reality each point of space is determined and distinguished by its instant in time, and each instant of time by its position in space. The elements of the one reality which is Space-Time, and not either Space or Time alone, owe their distinctness in either kind to the complementary element."

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The reader may be able to understand the meaning of the three passages quoted above, but for me and in view of what follows they are a little hazy. On p.p. 340-341 he says:

"We are describing the infinite Space-Time as the substance which includes all substances and is the system of them. But the idea of infinity is prior to that of an infinite system of existents, which is really derived from it. * In truth, infinite Space-Time is not the substance of substances, but it is the stuff of substances. * Just as a roll of cloth is the stuff of which coats are made but is not itself a coat, so Space-Time is the stuff of which all things, whether as substances or under any category, are made. If I call it the stuff and not the material, it is to avoid confusion with the very much more specific idea of matter, as matter is commonly understood. Matter is a finite complex of space-time with the material quality, as we shall see later."

From the three passages quoted above I get the following by way of understanding. The universe, or all the categories of things, viewed collectively, is primarily a composite of points of space, and instants of time, determined and distinguished by their interdependent relationship. And these space-time elements are substantial entities. This, from my point of view, is very plainly an unwarranted confusion of the space-matter or nothing- something relation. The idea that an instant of time can be a substantial entity, or a point of space can be necessary to the continuation of time, or that these space-time elements can be distinguished and known as such yet be space-time itself, is beyond my range of thought. These space-time elements to be thinkable must be things and to be things they must have the regular background of difference — the one essential to the very existence of things and thought.

In the last passage quoted above this author plainly reveals the fact that he regards the universe as a compound, or perhaps more correctly speaking, a complex of different substances. A stuff is not a substance and what we call matter is neither stuff nor substance. Matter is something which has the material qualities, which stuff or substance has not.

How he has managed to make these distinctions in matter is not revealed and how far he has succeeded in working out

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a system of real things within his space-time fundamental, is also not evident. But from what follows it appears that he has not yet reached a systematic arrangement of all things, which explains the mysteries about them, as required by philosophy.

Page 336: * 'Space-Time is thus the source of the categories, the nonempirical characters of existent things, which those things possess because of certain fundamental features of any piece of Space-Time. These fundamental features cannot be defined. For to define is to explain the nature of something in terms of other and in general simpler things, themselves existents. But there iB nothing simpler than Space-Time, and nothing beside it to which it might be compared by way of agreement or contrast. They cannot even be described completely. For description like definition, is effected by reference to existent entities."

He thus ends in the inexplicable, as did Spencer and all the philosophers prior to this date. This at least is the result reached at the end of volume one, 347 pages. I have not yet seen volume two, but from a review of the whole by Professor Leighton of the Ohio State University I get the following:

"If time were bare time it would consist of perishing instants. Instead of a continuous time there would be nothing more than an instant, a now which was perpetually being renewed. Time would then be for itself and for an observer a mere now, and would contain neither earlier or later. * In order that time should linger, space must recur, a point must be repeated in more than one instant. * Space is generated in or by time. Space is the trail of time. Time is the occupation of a stretch of space. Space-Time consists of lines of advance connected into a whole or system, a system of motions. * The history of the universe is a continuous redistribution of instants of time among points of space." (The Philosophical Review for May 1921.)

Professor Leighton's review (a small part of which is reproduced above) gives us a more specific account of the inner nature of Professor Alexander's Space-Time. This, I suppose, will be sufficient to give the reader a very correct idea of this work, which is now said to be the latest, most complete, and most authoritative work in philosophy. Every studemt of philosophy should examine this work. It may help him to a better

Preface To Book One, Page VII

understanding of the real nature of things. At least it will be a good example of present philosophical tendencies and it may forecast a change to the interest of progress. It will be noticed that all the writers above quoted have offered no definite conclusion as to what space or time really are in themselves, except Professor Alexander; and he has failed to define his ultimate because he cannot find a suitable correlative. There is nothing beyond or deeper than his space-time ultimate.

Now, in as few words as possible I will try to make it plain why, not only this writer but all the others, have failed to touch bottom in philosophy. They have ignored or overlooked what I have called the most important distinction in philosophy — the Space-Matter or Nothing-Something relation. (Chapter First.)

The question "what are things," may truly be regarded as the first and most fundamental of all questions. Every thing, actual, ideal or relative, must be regarded as a thing and that which is not a thing must be nothing. The true philosophy must be a science of the whole, just as Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Psychology, Biology and Sociology, are sciences of the parts. It should be (1), a definition of things, (2), a primary classification of things, (3) , an explanation of the true relations and systematic arrangement of things, as would be required and understood by the ordinary common sense of mankind. This at least, is the view which appeals to my understanding and I believe it will be fully justified in the pages of this book.

Here I will repeat my definition of things along with a first classification of things, and some further comments which do not appear in the text. By bringing this matter in at this place the reader can readily compare my views with those of the others quoted above on this question of the ultimate nature of things, or what time and space are in themselves.

There is nothing but things and nothing, and even nothing must be something if we can think of it. Every thing is a thing for three simple reasons: (1), By reason of its Difference from other things and nothing. (2), By reason of its Relations to other things and nothing. (3), Because there is a space occupying Substance, (properly called matter,) in which it was necessary to create difference in order to create things.

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Here I am offering a fundamental classification of things.

All things belong to two classes: (1), Real things: (2), Relative things. Real things are all contained in the space occupying substance which we call matter. Relative things are what we have named Space, Time, Differences, Relations, Mathematics and its branches. Relative things differ only in their relations to real things; in themselves they are nothing — the only nothing we can think of, yet they are thinkable and so must be something; but they are something only in the relative sense.

In itself, space is a relative something — a necessary condition to the existence of real things. Whatever exists must be in space because there is no out of space. In its relations to real things space is nothing — not something as matter, motion or mind is. We can think of an unlimited empty space and being thinkable space must be an object of thought and must be regarded as a relative thing simply because it would not be anything at all if out of all relations to that which occupies space. This is likewise true of Time, Differences, Relations, Mathematics and all of its branches. Time is simply the duration or past, present and future of real things. Without the real things there would be nothing enduring and of course no time. The idea that bare time consists of perishing instants can be reconciled only with the idea that time is a substantial entity. The form of a substance may perish by a change of form; but nothing cannot perish. The true relationship of time, space, and real things is thus made to stand clearly in view.

Without real things relative things would not be known because mind is a necessary part of the reality. But relative things would exist without real things because they are the laws, principles or conditions indispensable to the existence of real things; the fundamental truths upon which the true system must rest. They are the rules or means of measuring or estimating the dimensions, numbers, forms, and relations, of real things, but they are not the real things. We can measure the distance between two objects in space bat we cannot measure space. When we measure the interval between two events in time we do not measure time, but we do measure the uniform motion of inert matter— the axial motion of the earth. Two added to two make

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nothing, but two real things added to two real things, make four real things. A material circle is a real thing, the form of a circle is a relative thing. Laws of Nature are not Nature.

What is nothing? This is another hard question, which, it seems has never been answered. So far as I can learn here is the first answer in human history.

In itself, nothing is something. It is a necessary condition to the existence and knowledge of real things. It is only in the difference and contrast of nothing-something, that any real thing can exist or can be known. An universal nothing would be a boundless empty space with no real thing in it, and this, of course is unthinkable, simply because there would be no one to do the thinking. But in the view of a thinking being, nothing may be a rational possibility or a relative thing.

In its relations to real things, nothing is nothing — not something as matter, motion or mind is — yet it may be known as a relative thing. So it comes to this: Nothing is empty space and empty space is a relative thing.

Since the human mind has never known what space or nothing is, we have no appropriate word for the expression of an absolute non-existence or a real nothing. The words 'real and relative* may seem inappropriate but what would be better? An absolute nothing would have to be, in itself, a state of being in which there is no space; and this of course would be a rational impossibility. So it follows that empty space, though relatively thinkable, is the only nothing that the human mind can think of.

It is not impossible to see that the same conclusion will apply to all the relative things. All are abstract truths which have no meaning if not viewed in some relation to real things. No real thing can exist without time and space in which to exist. Without difference in something real there are no real things. Without real things there are no real relations of things. The true principle of relativity is a branch of mathematics. The first step in the practical use of any branch of mathematics requires some knowledge of some form or complex of real things. We cannot figure on relative things. One of the great mistakes of modern science is in the very general belief that a thorough mathematical training is a needed qualification for physical re-

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search work. The mistakes of Prof. Einstein and his followers are discussed in the appendix to this book. It is there shown that they have all ignored or overlooked this very important distinction among things. It seems to be a very general belief that space and time have dimensions like material things. Space is supposed to have three dimensions; length, breadth and thickness. According to Einstein space and time are the same thing and it has four dimensions. It also has different lines of direction in different places and even in some places space-time is warped or curved exactly as we might expect of material lines.

It is a striking fact that all the writers so far concerned in the literature of Einstein and his followers, have used exactly the same language that we all use when writing or speaking of real things, as above defined, Nowhere can we find a word to show that any one has ever thought of making this distinction among things. Now the question: Is this view sound or justified by science and facts? Is it not true that if this definition and classification of things proves to be scientifically incontestable, that it must furnish the foundation for a complete and perfect SYSTEM OF SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY?

In a system like this we would have the well known and well recognized fundamental laws or conditions above named as relative things and which are necessary to the existence of anything.

On the Physical side of real things we would have the forms and states of Matter and Motion, with Inertia as their governing law and which would be the basis of the Physical Universe.

On the Mental side of real things we would have the forms and states of Mind, which, under the laws that govern the conscious Mind would form the basis of the Mental Universe.

With a limited physical universe and an atomic ether medium governed by physical laws as described in this book all the mysteries known to physical science may be in fact are explained. Principal among these mysteries are: the cause of gravitation or falling motion, the cause of electric and magnetic attraction and repulsion, the cause of chemical or molecular attraction and repulsion, the cause of the repulsive action of the sun on the tails of comets while in perihelio, the mystery of the tides and many minor mysteries; and all are explained and united under

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the well known laws of motion which govern the movements of inert matter. If this theoretical notion can stand the scrutiny of exact science it will be the most sweeping generalization ever offered to the world.

While setting up the last pages of this preface another new book on philosophy has come to my notice. Its title is:

"The New Idealism/' by May Sinclair, London and New York, 1922. The aim of this work is to examine the foundation of realism more critically, and to outline a reconstruction of idealism more closely than was possible five years ago.

The writer says in part: * 'Realism is ten times more formidable than it was in 1917. * The issue has been narrowed down to the field of Space and Time, and it is there that the battle between realism and idealism must be fought. The issue is very clear. For however realists may differ among themselves, whether they say with Professor Alexander that Space-Time is the ultimate reality, or with Professor Whitehead that the ultimate entities are events, they are all agreed that mind is not the ultimate entity and must be kept out of the problem. "

This writer makes a stromg plea for mind as one of the ultimates. She says: "Mind on any realist scheme, is only one more entity, one more change in a sequence of changes; the last thing, not the first, though highest, if you like, in value.' '

The realists are trying to account for mind as part of a system in which mind was not present from the beginning. Space- Time point instants, do not think. This authoress maintains that consciousness is ultimate, that there is primary and secondary consciousness and that the assumption of realism (that in the act of knowing we know that things exist in themselves apart from the knowing mind) is not justified by the new idealism.

The aim of this authoress seems to be for an improved form of objective idealism, wlaich recognizes an external reality; but whether the external world is purely mental or partly physical is not yet clear to me; in fact, all these discussions and disputes between realism and idealism have proved to be exceedingly confusing and much of it is incomprehensible to my mind. They all look to me like attempts to build a system of ideas which have failed to reach the real object in philosophy. The trouble

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must be in the point of view, in mine at leaat. How a point-instant of space-time, can be a real thing, yet not a space-time occupant, but space-time itself, is for me the best example of an impossibility that I can think of. This from my view point.

My views on this subject were not altgether acquired from books or education and I have absolutely no reason to think that they were a result of inspiration from on high. In early life I read but few books because I did not have them to read and I accepted as true only that which seemed to agree with a certain sense of right or innate judgment, which, so far as I could see, was always in me— simply natural. In 1863, at the age of 18, I hiked myself to the plains of western Kansas and Colorado and here, while rusticating close to nature, I got my point of view. This of course is not the college way and I suppose this is why bo many college men do not agree with me.

Here I will reproduce an exact copy of my original point of view, which was put in writing at least 40 years ago. I quote from my first book; set up and copyright issued in 1895. Published in 1899. First edition 100 copies; 18 copies sold; 61 copies sent to news papers and magazines; 21 copies still on hand.

None of the scientific or philosophic publications paid any attention to it and the few news-papers that took some notice of the book did not seem to understand it. Here is my original and still commanding view point. I cannot get away from it.

"An universal likeness (no difference) can be thought of only as a boundless nothing — or as pure empty space. Empty space does not contain any thing, and in itself it is nothing; at least it is the best example of nothing the human mind can have. It is possible to think of space in contrast with something, and so it may be regarded as an object of thought; but when considered in the strictly abstract sense (as separated from something) we cannot think of it as being something. Deeper than this deepest contrast of nothing-something, mind cannot go, and this is the limit and foundation of all knowledge.

"This contrast, or difference of nothing-something, is also an irrevocable condition to existence. In the universal likeness of pure space there is no difference, and in the entire absence of difference there are no things. Difference, therefore, is the

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first law of existence. Space being everywhere, that which exists must exist in space, and must be limited as space is unlimited. That which exists in or occupies space is called Matter. As to what matter is, the testimony of common sense can be relied upon with perfect safety, since we can only think of it as a space relation, differing from space, limited in space and as having form and motion in formless and motionless space. Matter being the only space relation is therefore the sole foundation of being. The universe (all things) must exist in matter and by reason of difference. Outside of matter is empty space or nothing, and in nothing there is no difference. The word "things" is said to be the widest in our language and it is wide enough to take in all but nothing. It is only things that can exist, and each and every thing, in order to exist, must differ from nothing and from other things. Mind can know only things and nothing, and each and every thing, in order to be known, must be distinguished from nothing and from other things, through a sense of their difference. Difference, therefore, is also the first law of sense and of knowledge. This, in brief, is Universal Relativity: the law of all laws, because it precedes and includes all things. Though recognized by Hobbes, Hamilton, Mansel,Bain, Spencer, Condillac, and others, it seems to me that this important principle has never been duly appreciated, or applied as far as it will go. Feeling convinced that this is the primary law, that there is nothing deeper, and that there is no limit to its application until we reach the limits of the universe, I have adopted it as my sole guide throughout this work. I have even entertained the idea that this law is the key to all knowledge. To define anything, is to distinguish and described, all its differences and relations. When we have done this we then know that thing. All differences in matter (things) admit of a primary classification as follows: