Lex talionis; an analysis of the forces whose resultant produced the Treaty of Versailles

Preface

AT the instance of the Supreme War Council the -Z jf supervision by the respective governments of the Associated Nations over the control of news, which had been highly developed during the war, was perpetuated during the period of the Peace Conference. Under the policy followed at Paris many facts of historical importance remained undisclosed at the time.

Since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, however, much information has been published piecemeal, as it were, which is of great value to the historian who would describe the events of the seven months following the Armistice.

Deductions from the facts, as made in the following pages, are the author's. The facts themselves are such as have been available for many months to any student who cared to make researches through the files of the daily and periodical press in England, on the Continent, and in the United States.

WARREN HILLS

Baltimore, Md., September I, IQ22.

Table Of Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. — The American Peace 9

II. — The Peace Agreement 37

CHAPTER I. The American Peace

THE purpose of this book is to state the issues of the Great War as they were officially proclaimed, to set forth the character of the agreement which terminated hostilities, and to disclose the forces whose resultant produced the Treaty of Versailles.

Three years have passed since hostilities ceased, and one begins to grow impatient with enthusiasms which were normal when the hazards of war were upon us, but which, if kept alive under artificial stimulation, retard the clearing of the vision which the lapse of the years should bring.

Old Caspar told little Willemina much about the glorious victory of Blenheim, but could not answer her question "what they killed each other for?"

In the hope, then, that the analysis which follows may pursue the methods of sound mental processes, and escape the flaws attributable to too great, or too little, emotional sensitiveness in its treatment of the facts, the story will be told without effort at embellishment and as accurately as may be.

In 1 9 14 the United States had no cause of quarrel with any of the nations of Europe. When war on a major scale began there its causes were not generally understood here, but there was more general sympathy io Lex Talionis

with the Entente Nations than with the Central Empires. President Wilson urged neutrality "in thought as well as deed." It seemed to be his judgment at that time that the fundamental principles of government for which the United States stood were not jeopardized by the struggle in Europe.

In 19 1 6 the President sought to draw forth an expression of war aims from both sides, with a view to peace negotiation. At that time the protests of the United States against submarine depredations upon neutrals had been heeded, and depredations were not resumed again until February, 19 17. On this occasion the President declared that the general objects which statesmen on both sides had in mind were virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world, but that the concrete objects for which the war was being waged had never been set forth. It was suggested that the terms upon which the belligerents on one side and the other would deem it necessary to insist might not be so irreconcilable as some had feared.

This method of making public statements of war aims was thereafter insisted upon by President Wilson, and was for some time opposed by the spokesmen of the Central Empires, one of whom at a later date deprecated the use of "public statements which we shout to each other from the speaker's tribune." They expressed the desire for a conference in some neutral country based upon "a certain degree of mutual confidence in each other's honesty and chivalry."

The reply of the Entente Nations expressed the view that the time had not yet come when a peace which

The American Peace i i

would be of lasting benefit could be secured. A specific declaration was made, however, that Belgium, Servia and Montenegro must be evacuated and restored, invaded portions of France, Russia and Roumania evacuated, with reparations, and that in the reorganization of Europe the principle of nationalities must be recognized.

On January 22, 19 17, in addressing Congress on the subject of his peace proposals of 19 16, when the immensity of the devastation was becoming clearer, the President stated that he took, it for granted that the peace must be followed by some definite concert of powers, which would make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again; that the United States must add their authority and power to that of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. He declared against a new balance of power, and advocated that a supernational authority be created, based upon the organized major force of mankind; and outlined some of the settlements afterwards comprised in the Fourteen Points.

The depredations of the German submarines against American commerce on the high seas, which were resumed in February, 19 17, and persisted in against repeated protests by the American Government, afforded a casus belli under a principle which the United States had never been slow to defend, and they declared war against Germany in April, 19 17.

From this date the aloofness of neutrality was put aside by the American Government, and intimate and sympathetic relations were entered into with the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy. Their individual war aims became a matter of greater interest to the American Government and the American people, and their distinguished representatives who came to this country to inform us were warmly welcomed. Technical advisers from the French and British Armies taught us the science of trench warfare, and their statesmen and financiers kept our Government advised at Washington.

The European nations had been engulfed in the desperate struggle for more than two years and a half, and these visitors to America bore the impress of it. Most of the military advisors carried the marks of wounds; all felt a deadly hatred of the enemy. It was a revelation to the Americans in training to learn that in trench warfare no quarter was given, and that wounded enemies on the ground were to be dispatched.

Every effort was made by the British, French and Italian Governments and peoples to strengthen the ties of sympathy between themselves and the United States, and to impart to the American people a sense of the cruel and treacherous character of the enemy with which they were now dealing. The quality of the European hatreds was something theretofore unknown in American psychology; it was an exotic watered by a propaganda which utilized without restraint every stimulus that might make it grow.

Day by day full reports of the terrible and heroic struggle were spread before the American readers, the emotional stimulus constantly increased in intensity, and in 191 8 produced and sent to France the great military force known as the A. E. F.

In August, 1917, the United States, then being a belligerent, the President replied to a proposal for peace made by His Holiness, the Pope of Rome, declining it as in substance a return to the status quo ante bellum. 1

In the Autumn of 19 17 Georges Clemenceau succeeded Ribot as Premier of France, and a lack of cooperation among the allies which had hitherto prevailed was overcome by the creation of the Supreme Allied War Council, consisting of the Prime Minister and a military representative of each government.

On November 29 a plenary session of an Inter- Allied Conference was held in Paris, in which sixteen nations were represented. Colonel E. M. House was the chairman of the American delegation. The pur-

1 In this reply the President set forth the menace of the vast military establishment controlled by the irresponsible German Government, and stated that this power was not the German people but the ruthless master of the German people; that to deal with it in the way proposed would only involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy, and that a peace must be based upon the faith of all the peoples involved.

Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, he said, was deemed inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all an enduring peace.

"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting."

pose of the conference was to bring about coordination of effort and to present a united front to the enemy on the question of terms of peace.

The President, in his fifth annual message to Congress, on December 4, 19 17, at a time when Italy was hard-pressed, recommended a declaration of war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and laid stress upon the principle that autocracy must be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world. 2

In this message, in speaking of the common judgment of the nations, the President's words indicated that he spoke for the allied governments also, and this was confirmed when ten days later Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech before the lawyers at Gary's Inn declared Great Britain to be in accord with the statement of war aims made by President Wilson.

In addressing the Commons in December, Mr. Lloyd George stated that British peace terms included the

2 "When this force is checked and defeated we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace upon generosity and justice to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors."

"When autocracy is defeated, when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe, and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and of covenant for the life of the world, we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice — justice done at every point, to every nation that the final settlement must affect — our enemies as well as our friends."

restoration of territory occupied by Germany, with reparations, and that the future of the German colonies should be based upon the wishes of the native races. 3 After Lloyd George's speech to the Trades Unions, he allowed President Wilson to become the exclusive spokesman for the Allies in dealing with Germany. His

3 The day before the President's speech of January 8, 1918, was delivered, Lloyd George, in an address to the Trade Unions said:

"We are not fighting a war of aggression against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations bent on the destruction of Germany. The destruction or disruption of Germany has never been a war aim with us. Most reluctantly, and quite unprepared, we were forced to join in the war in self-defense, in defense of violated law in Europe. The British people have never aimed at the breaking-up of the German peoples or the disintegration of their state. Our wish is not to destroy German greatness, Germany's great position in the world, but to turn her aside from schemes of military domination to devote her strength to the beneficent tasks of the world.

"We are not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its Capital or the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish.

"We are not fighting to destroy the German constitution, although we consider a military autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism. Our viewpoint is that the adoption of a democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old spirit of military domination had indeed died in the war, and it would be much easier for us to conclude a broad democratic peace with her. But that is a question for the German people to decide.

"The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decision of a few negotiators, striving to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation. Therefore, government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement. For that reason, also, unless treaties are upheld, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written."

only expression thereafter on war aims or peace terms was contained in an address to the American soldiers in France on July 5, 19 18, in which he said that if the Kaiser and his advisors were prepared to accept the four points mentioned by the President in his speech at Mt. Vernon the day before they could have peace immediately.

The collapse of the resistance of the Soviets against the armies of the Central Empires resulted in the assembling of a peace conference at Brest-Litovsk on December 22, 1917, followed after long negotiations by the signing of a peace treaty on March 4, 19 18, involving the cession of much territory and the payment of a heavy indemnity.

These negotiations furnished the occasion of the President's address to Congress on January 8, 19 18, which contains the Fourteen Points, and is the first document which forms a part of the actual agreement by which hostilities were brought to an end.

The President's speech of January 8, 1918, adverted to the parleys then in progress at Brest-Litovsk, which had been watched in the hope that it might be possible to extend them into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. It stated that the representatives of the Central Powers had first presented in that meeting an outline of settlement which, if less definite than that of the Russians, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms were added; that that program proposed no concession at all, either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations, but meant in a word that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied, as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. The President thought that the general principle of settlement first suggested had originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, while the concrete terms came from the military leaders; that the spirit of the settlement did not represent the spirit of the German Reichstag as manifested in July, 19 1 7, but that of the military leaders who resist and defy that intention, and insist upon conquest and subjugation.

It is in response to the need for definition of principle and of purpose, therefore, as shown by the results of the Brest-Litovsk parleys, that the speech of January 8 sets forth the fourteen conditions of peace 4 which, inasmuch as the general preliminary terms of the Brest-

4 The Fourteen Points were:

1. Open covenants and open diplomacy.

2. Freedom of navigation upon the seas.

Removal of economic barriers ; equality of trade.

4. Reduction of armaments guaranteed.

5. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims.

6. Evacuation of Russian territory; a free Russia.

7. Evacuation and restoration of Belgium with unlimited sover-

eignty.

8. Evacuation of French territory ; restoration of Alsace-Lorraine.

9. Readjustment of Italian boundaries along lines of nationality.

10. Autonomy for peoples of Austria-Hungary.

11. Evacuation and restoration of Roumania, Servia, and Monte-

negro; Servia accorded access to sea; relations in Balkan states determined upon historical lines of allegiance and nationality, with international guarantees of territorial integrity.

Litovsk Treaty had been nullified by the specific program of practical terms afterwards added, were clearly intended to present terms so plain and specific that in any final peace settlement additional and inconsistent provisions could not be included.

In addition to the Fourteen Points the speech included clearly-stated principles for the guidance of the peace negotiators. 5

12. Turkish sovereignty maintained, but subject nationalities to

be free and autonomous, with Dardanelles opened under international guarantees.

13. Independent Poland guaranteed; access to sea.

14. Association of nations.

6 Among the statements of principles to be accepted are the following:

"It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace when they are begun shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind.

"We are willing to fight until such arrangements and covenants are achieved, but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program removes.

"We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement of distinction or of learning or of pacific enterprise, such as have made her record very bright and enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her, either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, the new world in which we live, instead of a place of mastery.

"Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealing with her or

On January 24 the German Chancellor, Count von Hertling discussed this speech in the Reichstag. He expressed general agreement with the first five of the fourteen points, refused to permit interference by the Entente in Russian affairs, and disclaimed a purpose of forcible annexation of Belgium, but refused to discuss the Belgian question until the Entente should admit that the integrity of the territory of the Central Empires was the only possible foundation for peace negotiations. 6 our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial dominion.

"We have spoken now surely in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle is made a part of its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess."

"The Chancellor delivered a general defense of German policy as instituted by Bismark, and reviewed the historic vicissitudes of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

He said that in the recent speech of Lloyd George he failed to recognize a sincere desire for peace or even a friendly spirit. "Between the lines there is always present the suggestion that it is his duty to sit in judgment on guilty Germany for all sorts of crimes."

He thinks that in one respect the tone of President Wilson has changed. "It appears," he says, "that the unanimous rejection by the German people at the time of the attempt of Mr. Wilson in reply to the Papal note, to sow discord between the German Government and the German nation, has done its work. It was possibly this unanimous rejection which led Mr. Wilson on to the right road, and perhaps a beginning has been made, because now there is no longer any question of the suppression of the German nation by an

These January interchanges on the whole seemed to make the prospects of peace remote. The Entente insisted on a declaration of German purpose with regard to Belgium. The Central Empires refused to commit themselves with regard to Belgium so long

autocratic government, and the former attacks upon the House of Hohenzollern are not repeated." (President Wilson subsequently, however, maintained his demands in this respect.)

He declared that the conditions of the evacuation of the occupied parts of France were to be agreed upon between France and Germany, and that Germany would not give up Alsace-Lorraine.

Points 9, 10, and n he left to the Foreign Minister of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy to answer. Point 12 he left to Turkey to answer and pledged his support to that power. The right of the Entente to intervene in Poland (point 13) was denied; and with reference to point 14, an association of nations, he stated that the Imperial Government was willing to investigate the principle of a league of nations after all the other questions in suspense had been settled. "The principles for a general world peace," he said, "we also admit, and they could form points of departure and aims of negotiation. Where, however, concrete questions are concerned — points which are of decisive importance to us and our allies — there the wish for peace is less apparent.

"Our enemies do not wish to destroy Germany, but they cast furtive and covetous glances toward parts of our lands and those of our allies. They speak with respect of Germany's position, but the idea that we are culprits who must do penance and promise reformation, repeatedly makes itself apparent. This is the usual tone of the victor to the vanquished. This also is the tone of the man who points to all our former statements of willingness for peace as mere signs of weakness."

In conclusion, Count von Hertling stated that if fresh proposals of peace were made they would examine them carefully because their aim was no other than the reestablishment of a lasting general peace, but that this lasting general peace was not possible so long as the integrity of the German Empire, the security of her vital interests, and the dignity of the Fatherland were not guaranteed. — (World Almanac, 1919).

as the Entente demanded Alsace-Lorraine, Trieste, the Trentino, Transylvania, and the Banat, whose separation would violate the territorial integrity of the Central Empires.

In his address to Congress on February 1 1 President Wilson replied to the spokesmen of the Central Empires. He regarded Count Czernin's reply as uttered in a very friendly tone. Count Hertling's reply he considered vague and confusing and as contemplating a settlement effected by individual barter and concession, after which the new League of Nations would have the function of holding the balance of power steadily against external disturbance.

This speech visualizes the war as above all a struggle between the principles of imperialism and democracy, and sees the issue as one which is no longer in the hands of ministries and councils, but one which must now be tried "in the Court of Mankind." 7

7 "In view of the infinite sacrifice of these years of tragical suffering no peace can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice, no mere peace of shreds and patches."

"Is it possible Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it; is, in fact, living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag resolutions of the 19th of July, or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace — not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between state and state. * * *"

"Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man of whatever nation may say

The President's address at Baltimore on April 6, 191 8, was full of indignation. Information had been received of the general character of the dictated treaties of Brest-Litovsk signed on March 5. The question he had asked, he said, whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking, had been answered in unmistakable terms; "They

on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world ? The Reichstag resolutions of July frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected. Peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril."

The President sets forth four principles to be applied : first, the essential justice of the particular case; second, peoples and provinces are not to be bartered ; third, territorial settlements must be made in the interests of the populations concerned ; fourth, well defined national aspirations to be accorded satisfaction so far as that can be accorded them. "A general peace erected upon such foundations," he says "can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. * * * Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers. * * * *. Having set our hands to the task of establishing a new order of reason and justice we shall not turn back."

The four principles laid down in this address were commented on by Chancellor von Hertling in addressing the Reichstag on February 25. He said that he could fundamentally agree to them and that peace could be discussed on such a basis. At a later date his statement was concurred in by Count Czernin who, however, expressed doubt whether President Wilson would succeed in uniting the allies on such a basis.

have avowed that it was not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will". The President declared that he accepted the challenge and that the people of the United States accepted it. "There is then but one response possible for us; force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust." 8

8 In the same address the President also said:

"We have ourselves proposed no injustice or aggression. We are ready whenever the final reckoning is made to be just to the German people, deal justly with the German power, as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment.

"To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonor our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not ready to accord. * * * For myself I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace, at any time that it is sincerely proposed — a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer."

In March, 1918 the President sent the following to the Congress of Soviets assembled in Moscow :

"May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment, when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom, and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of Russia?

"Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once

In his address of May 18, 191 8, on the opening of the Red Cross campaign, the President commented on the insincerity of the German peace approaches, and declared his intention to stand by Russia as well as France.

The most critical and decisive moments of the war on the western front were now approaching. The general offensive opened by the Germans in March carried their armies forward month after month. The Russian armies had been disposed of, releasing the German divisions in the east for reinforcement of the line on the western front. 9 On more than one occasion minutes alone intervened between the allied armies and the collapse of the entire allied front.