The Cambridge history of British foreign policy

Front matter

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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY

OF

Preface

IN offering to our readers the First Volume of The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, from the beginning of Pitt's first Administration (1783) to the Peace of Versailles (19 19), we have little to add to the announcement put forth by our University Press less than two years and a half ago. The work was designed as a connected narrative of the subject and a consecutive account of its bearing on the political history of this country and empire, and on that of the world at large. As such, it is intended to combine with a strict adherence to historical truth, wherever ascertainable, a national point of view — in other words, an avowed regard for the interests, and above all for the honour, of Great Britain ; and the list of contributors to it has been confined to historical scholars who are British subjects by birth. Our work has accordingly not shrunk, and will not shrink as it progresses, from seeking to vindicate for British Foreign Policy that claim to consistency which in certain respects has been denied to it by some of its censors, and in others allowed to it only in the way of sarcasm. Its relations to political aims or ideals not confined to a single nation, or to particular groups of thinkers and their followers within it, have been neither overlooked nor, we believe, prejudged — whether or not these aims have in the past been submerged with efforts made to accomplish them, and whether or not on the fulfilment of these ideals depend the future peace and prosperity of the world.

Our readers will understand that, in the several chapters of this History, military and naval events, as well as the progress of parliamentary legislation and administrative changes at home or in other parts of the empire, due to the influence of the Crown, of parties and movements in Church and State, and to the voice of public opinion and the Press, have been kept in constant view, without being themselves discussed. The successive stages of Indian and (British) Colonial history have in no instance been regarded as detached from that of Great Britain and Ireland. The narrative is throughout based on documentary evidence and has, so far as possible, been arranged in chronological sequence, though without any attempt, more especially in certain summarising sections of the later Volumes, to maintain a synchronistic system of dates.

This History is divided into six Books, each consisting of a very small number of Chapters, which again are, in the large majority of cases, subdivided into sections of varying length, dealing with vi PREFACE

particular subjects, episodes or aspects of British Foreign Policy. The First of these Books is preceded by an Introduction, which attempts to summarise the course of English, or British, Foreign Policy, in the whole of the period to which these terms may be held applicable, and to indicate some of the threads lending coherence to its processes and tendencies. Though the narrative is continued till the Peace of 1919, our readers will be prepared to regard the sketch of the War of 1914- 191 8 and of the settlement in the character of an Epilogue. The narrative as a whole will be followed by a brief general survey, undertaken with the cognisance and approval of authoritative opinion, of the administrative system of the British Foreign Office, from 1793 (at which date an important change was introduced into it) to the present time.

Both narrative and Introduction are accompanied by brief notes, chiefly references or of the nature of such, or reproductions of extracts from important documents, treaties, Instructions, despatches, or speeches. In the Appendices to vols. 1 and II, particular documents of this kind, hitherto either unpublished or inaccessible without difficulty, are printed in extenso or in extract. To each Volume is appended a short Bibliography, which in no instance pretends to be exhaustive or to do more than supply titles of some of the books and papers not mentioned in the Bibliographies to corresponding portions of The Cambridge Modern History, or to similar works, with the addition of those of a few specially used by the writers of Chapters or shorter sections of the present History.

It has been thought well to find room for a brief general characterisation of the principles and achievements in Foreign Policy of the chief British statesmen and diplomatists engaged in it in the course of the period here surveyed. In the case of Castlereagh or Canning, Palmerston or Salisbury, whose foreign policy left its mark not only on its own age, and also in the case of Stratford Canning and a few other representatives of Great Britain at the contemporary centres of diplomatic activity, a summary estimate of the sort seems irresistibly called for. On the other hand, our narrative will abstain from attempting to influence a general judgment of the public services of the agents, at home or abroad, of our Foreign Policy by remarks or suggestions as to their personalities.

In issuing the First Volume of this work, the Editors desire, on behalf of the Syndics of the Press as well as on their own, to express their thanks for the countenance and goodwill shown to their project

PREFACE vii

by those to whom it was notified before being carried into execution. The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., H.M.'s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, kindly permitted resort, under proper conditions, to the Archives of the Foreign Office, and Sir J. A. C. Tilley, K.C.M.G. (British Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and now His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil), and Mr S. Gaselee, C.B.E., Librarian, have already facilitated our proceedings in this direction 1 . We owe a similar debt to the Public Record Office, more especially to Mr Hubert Hall, Litt.D., Assistant Keeper of the Records and Literary Director of the Royal Historical Society, whose support is never denied to any endeavour for securing or widening the foundations of historical knowledge. The Editors are, also, particularly indebted to the advice and encouragement of the Right Hon. Lord Sanderson, .G.C.B., whose great experience as Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Right Hon. Lord Fitzmaurice whose public services as Under Secretary of State, together with his eminence as a political historian, gave high value to their counsel. They desire to add their thanks for similar suggestive aid to the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce, O.M., who at an early period in his public career (1886) held the office of Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and was, as we all know and rejoice, our Ambassador to the United States from 1907 to 191 3; to the Right Hon. Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G., late His Majesty's Minister at Tokyo and Pekin and author of the invaluable Guide to Diplomatic Practice; to Sir G. W. Prothero, Litt.D., F.B.A., who knows how gladly they would have welcomed him as a collaborator ; to Professor C. H. Firth, LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A., and other friends. Special instances of assistance will be duly acknowledged as the work progresses ; but the Editors are anxious to take the first opportunity of recording their deep sense of the generous confidence with which the Rev. J. Wallace Kidston and the other Executors of the late Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., have placed in their hands a very large collection of MSS. designed by him as materials for a History of European Policy. They consist mainly of classified extracts and notes concerning the Foreign Policy of the chief European States from the 16th century onwards — Russia of course occupying

1 To the latter we owe the permission to print, at the head of the successive Books of this History, the list of Secretaries and Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs from 1873, published in the Foreign Office List.

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the most prominent place among them. This varied collection was carried on by Sir D. M. Wallace in connexion with his lifelong study of modern politics and history and his services from 1891 to 1898 as Director of the Foreign Department of The Times. It is obvious that, as the lines on which Sir D. M. Wallace's contemplated History would have been constructed differed from those followed by the present work, so our references to his MSS., could not but be, in the main, incidental. As such, should any particular use be made of his MSS., it will be duly acknowledged in the course of these volumes ; but, in the meantime, the Editors are desirous on behalf of the Syndics and of themselves of acknowledging the obligation under which they have been generously laid by his Executors.

The Editors have to thank the officials and staff of the University Press for the care they have bestowed upon the production of the present volume, and Miss M. Pate for her indefatigable assistance in preparing its contents for the Press. They are also much obliged to Miss A. D. Greenwood for undertaking, at an inevitably short notice, to supply the Index.

A. W. W.

G. P. G.

December ; 1921.

Since the above Preface was in print, Lord Bryce, whose interest in our scheme is noted there, has died — seemingly in the very midst of his long and unwearied labours. In him has passed away a scholar, who, just sixty years ago, by a University prize essay illuminated a path of historical enquiry hitherto rarely trodden among ourselves, and whose contributions to political history as a whole cover a uniquely wide range of observation, research and deduction in the fields successively surveyed by him. And there has also passed away a statesman whose services, especially in the sphere of foreign policy and diplomatic action, have found their consummation in helping, more directly than those of any of his contemporaries, to draw closer the bonds of friendship, based on mutual understanding, between a great kindred nation and our own. The relations thus established, largely through his insight and influence, will we believe constitute one of the firmest foundations of a world's union of peace, and will, in any event, transcend in their intrinsic strength any of the alliances, compacts and concerts discussed in these pages.

Introduction

By Sir A. W. WARD, Litt.D., F.B.A.

Master of Peterhouse

I. England's insularity before the Norman Conquest. Political and military relations with France, and commercial with Flemish and Low-German towns, under the Norman and the Plantagenet Kings. Foreign policy of Edward III, and of Henry VII and VIII. The Balance of Power. The vicissitudes of the Reformation period and the development of Elizabethan policy. Pacificism of James I. Beginnings of English Colonisation page I

II. The Civil War and the Peace of Westphalia. Foreign policy of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate. Spain and the United Provinces. Treaty with France (1655). Sum of the foreign policy of Cromwell. Beginnings of Charles II. Aix-la-Chapelle, Dover and Westminster. Isolation of English policy of Charles II . . . . . . . 13

III. William III and his purpose. The Partition Treaties and the Grand Alliance Treaty. The War of the Spanish Succession and the Utrecht Settlement. British interests at Utrecht. The Barrier Treaties . . 39

IV. George I and the Personal Union. The Hanoverian Junto-. Great Britain and the Northern War. Hanoverian acquisition of Bremen and Verden. Stanhope and the Quadruple Alliance. Carteret and the Swedish- Settlement. Peace of Nystad. Pacific policy of Walpole. The Alliance of Hanover. The Congress of Soissons and the Second Treaty of Vienna. Great Britain and the Bourbon Family Compact. Great Britain and the War of the Austrian Succession and the Second Silesian War. Foreign policy of the Pelhams, and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Continued rivalry between France and Great Britain ......... 58

V. The Reversion of Alliances. 'Treaty of Westminster' (1756). Great Britain and the Austro-French Alliance. The Seven Years' War. Pitt's first Ministry, and the Foreign and Colonial policy of Great Britain. The Russo- Austrian Alliance. Prussian victories in 1757. Convention of Kloster-Zeven. British successes in Bengal and Canada (1757-8). Virtual establishment of naval supremacy of Great Britain. Failure of Pitt's Italian scheme. Declaration of Ryswyk. French peace overtures refused. The Schouvaloff Treaties. Death of George II. Resignation of Pitt and War with Spain. British maritime and colonial successes (1762). Peace negotiations with France and Spain. The Peace of Paris. Conclusion of the Seven Years' War ............. 97

VI. Ministerial changes: the Grenville and Rockingham Governments. The North American Colonies and the Repeal of the Stamp Act. Ministry of Grafton, with Pitt. The Tea Duty. Ministry of North. The Falkland Islands x CONTENTS

incident. The American War of Independence. France and the American Governments. Restricted British proposals. Armed Neutrality. Declaration of Catharine II. Peace negotiations (1782) and definitive signature of Treaties (1783). Results of 1763 and of 1783 127

Chapter I 1783-1792

By J. H. CLAPHAM, Litt.D., C.B.E.

Fellow and Tutor of King's College

The international situation after the Peace of 1783. British isolation. The Family Compact. Austro-Russian cooperation. Pitt nursing British resources. Ireland. India . . . . . . . . .143

The American desire for a ' Family Compact.' Difficulties in carrying out the Treaty of 1 783 . Failure to arrange a commercial treaty. Anglo-American diplomatic relations 1783-97. The Jay Treaty . . . .149

British Ambassadors and British policy. Harris. The problem of the United Provinces. The Franco-Dutch treaty of 1785. Decline of British influence . . . . . . . . . . . .157

Vergennes' policy and the commercial treaty of 1786 . . ..164

Great Britain, Prussia and the United Provinces. The Prussian invasion of Holland. Hertzberg's diplomatic projects. British policy in Poland. The Triple Alliance of 1788 170

Wars in Eastern and Northern Europe. British intervention between Denmark and Sweden, 1788. Reform in Poland . . . .181

Troubles in the Habsburg dominions, 1789. The Revolution of Brabant. Pitt's Memorandum of August 1788. France supposed to be crippled, 1789 186

Prussia's forward policy against Austria. Death of Joseph II, Feb. 1790. The policy of Leopold. Great Britain and the Convention of Reichenbach . 190

The affair of Nootka Sound. Its relation to Britain's policy towards France in 1790 ............ 197

The Congress of Sistova. Oczakoff. Great Britain again isolated. She withdraws into herself .......... 202

Great Britain and France in 1792. Resolute neutrality. Talleyrand's abortive Missions. The mistaken confidence of 1792 . . .212

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER II THE STRUGGLE WITH REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE ' y

By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.

Late Fellow of Christ's College

Vere Harmsworth Professor of Naval History

I. Non-intervention policy of the Pitt Cabinet. The situation in Europe. The French Decrees of Nov. — Dec. 1792. Attitude of Catharine II. Declaration of War by France . . . . . . . .216

II. Great Britain and her Allies. The Polish Question. Tension with Spain. Vacillations of Prussia. Malmesbury's Mission. Loss of Belgium. A Weakening of the First Coalition. The Triple Alliance (1795). Hostility of the Dutch Republic and Defection of Spain. Rupture with Spain. British peace overtures (1795, 1796) 236

III. Opposed Aims of Pitt and Burke. Failure of the Peace Overture. Austria's Aloofness. The Peace Proposals of 1797. Results of their Failure. Frederick William III. Effects of Bonaparte's Eastern Expedition . 265

IV. Preliminaries to a Second Coalition. The fiasco at Naples. Anglo- Russian Alliance. Friction with Austria. Collapse of the Second Coalition. British Mediterranean policy. Action against the Armed Neutrals. The Compromise of June 17, 1801. Egypt. Preliminaries of Peace. The Treaty of Amiens ........... 286

Chapter III 1 802-1812

By Professor J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.

I. Problems of the Peace. Complaisance of Addington towards Napoleon's Encroachments. Egypt and the Maltese Question. Negotiations with France. Rupture of the Peace of Amiens. Responsibilities for this event. The Whig Opposition. Pitt's Return to Office 309

II. Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Rupture with Spain. Aims of Alexander I and Czartoryski. Attitude of Pitt. Negotiations with Russia. The Third Coalition and its Collapse. Death of Pitt 331

III. The Ministry of All the Talents. Sicily and N.W. Germany. Fox and the Negotations with France. Their Breakdown. Death of Fox. Napoleon's 'Coast System' and the British retort. The Berlin Decree. Failure of British military policy. The Portland Cabinet. Canning and the Copenhagen Expedition. Arrangements with Portugal. The Orders in Council and friction with the United States. Great Britain and the Spanish National Rising. The Convention of Cintra 348 xii CONTENTS

IV. Great Britain and Austria. Unsuccessful coastal Expeditions. Collapse of Austria and Sweden. Wellesley and French Peace Proposals. The Sea Power and the Land Power. Castlereagh's overtures to Sweden. Stratford Canning and the Russo-Turkish Peace. Beginnings of a new Coalition . -371

Chapter IV

By C. K. WEBSTER, M.A.

Late Fellow of King's College ; Professor of Modern History

in the University of Liverpool

I. From the Treaty of Kalisch to the end of the year 18 13

The New Coalition and the New Cabinet. Castlereagh and his subordinates. Main lines of British policy. Maintenance of colonial and maritime supremacy, obligations to Allies, erection of 'Barrier' against France, Abolition of the Slave Trade. Cathcart and Lord Stewart. Instructions of April 9th, 1813. Treaties of Reichenbach (June 14th). Austrian intervention and the Armistice. Instructions of July 5th, and July 13th, 1813. Renewal of the struggle. Mission of Aberdeen. Instructions of September 18th, 181 3. A new kind of Alliance desired : Aberdeen and Metternich. Castlereagh's attitude towards Austria. The ' Frankfort Proposals.' Aberdeen and the negotiations with St Aignan. Stewart's protests. Failure of the Alliance negotiations. Friction between Austria and Russia. British policy and Holland. Castlereagh and the ' Frankfort Proposals.' Castlereagh and the Alliance. Resolve of the Cabinet to send Castlereagh to the Continent . . 392

II. The Fall of Napoleon and the First Peace of Paris

Castlereagh's Instructions of December 26th, 1813. The 'Memorandum on a Maritime Peace.' Castlereagh's role. The question of the Bourbons. Castlereagh and Metternich. The meeting at Langres. The negotiations at Chatillon. The discussions at Troyes. Castlereagh and the Armistice Proposal. The Treaty of Chaumont. Rupture of the Chatillon negotiations. The Cabinet and the Bourbons. Castlereagh and Metternich agree to their Restoration. The Allies at Paris. The Treaty of Fontainebleau. Castlereagh and the Peace. The Slave Trade. The Treaty of Paris. Failure to decide the reconstruction of the Continent. Castlereagh and Spain. Castlereagh, Bentinck and Murat. Castlereagh and Constitutional liberty . . 429

III. The Congress of Vienna

The Allies visit to England. Preliminary negotiations. Castlereagh and Talleyrand. The British Staff at Vienna. The Cabinet and the Negotiations. Castlereagh's plans. The ' Balance of Power.' Preliminary Discussions. The Polish-Saxon Question. Castlereagh and Alexander. Castlereagh's plan of an Austro-Prussian alliance. Its failure. Dissatisfaction of the Cabinet. Castlereagh's new plan. Castlereagh and Talleyrand. Crisis of the negotiations. The Treaty of January 3rd, 1815. Castlereagh's role of Mediator in

CONTENTS xiii

the final settlement. Castlereagh and the Poles. The Italian questions. Castlereagh and Murat. Negotiations leading to the Restoration of the Sicilian Bourbons. Castlereagh's 'Project of Guarantee.' Wellington at Vienna. British policy on minor Questions. The Abolition of the Slave Trade. Negotiations with France, Spain and Portugal. The 'Declaration' at Vienna ........... 459

IV. The Return of Napoleon and the Second Peace of Paris.

Great Britain and Elba. Attitude of the Cabinet to Napoleon on his return. The surrender of Napoleon and St Helena. Castlereagh and the 'Traitors.' Castlereagh and France. Differences with the Cabinet. The proposal of Temporary Occupation. The proposals of the Allies. Castlereagh and dismemberment. The Cabinet and the Allies won over. The terms offered to France. Treaties of November 20th, 1815. The 'Holy Alliance.' The ' Quadruple Alliance.' Castlereagh's position as a Foreign Minister. His ' European ' policy. His weaknesses ....... 500

Chapter V The American War And The Treaty Of Ghent

1812-1814 By Professor C. K. WEBSTER, M.A.

I. Causes of the American War. Impressment and the British Right of Search. The Orders in Council. Difficulties of the American Government. The rupture. Attempts to obtain peace. Armistice offered. Russian Mediation. American acceptance and British refusal. Castlereagh's offer of direct negotiations accepted. The American and the British Commissions . 522

II. British and American Instructions. Importance of Gallatin. Far-reaching British demands. Skilful American diplomacy. Gradual growth of British desire for peace. Wellington's opinion. American Counter-project. Both sides abandon claims. Signature of the Treaty. Reception by public opinion in England and America . . . . . . • 535

APPENDICES TO CHAPTERS II— III

A. The Causes of the Rupture with France .... 543

B. British War Policy (February 1793 to April 1795) . . . 549

C. The Spanish Crisis (April 1795 to September 1796) . . . 561

D. Anglo- Austrian Relations (November 1795 to November 1797) 564

E. Attempts to form the Second Coalition (1798) . . . 578

F. Letters of Lord Mulgrave to Pitt 587

G. Negotiations with Sweden and Russia (181 1-1 8 1 2) . . . 589 H. Extracts from Stratford Canning's Despatches from Constantinople (1812) ......... 599

INDEX 610

INTRODUCTION

I

THIS work proposes to treat, within definite chronological limits, the history of British Foreign Policy — in other words, to discuss the relations in that period of the British Empire to Foreign Powers, the conditions at home and abroad which governed the conduct of those relations, the principles more or less consistently followed in the conduct of them, and the personal influence of the principal British agents responsible for it. However interesting, it cannot be imperative, in setting forth upon such an undertaking, to go back at length into a past which, as a matter of course, contained in it innumerable germs of the future, but which differed essentially from the period marked out for present treatment in many of the conditions of its public as well as of its private life.

A brief sketch indicating some at least of the threads connecting earlier with later epochs of our Foreign Policy as a State and as an Empire is, therefore, all that can be attempted here by way of introduction to the narrative that is to follow.

Whether or not a people is only to be held happy when its rulers are without a foreign policy, none can assuredly afford to dispense with such unless it has no foreign affairs. In our own records, an era of the kind could hardly be found from the time onwards when, under Egbert, the English nation first achieved political unity, and the kingdom, as a polity moulded by its great monarchs Alfred and Edgar, after in turn resisting and accepting Danish sway, became the prize of what was no longer a dynastic, but a national struggle, to be apparently settled by the Norman Conquest in its own favour. But England still remained merely the extreme Western home of civilisation — an ultima Thule, it has been grandly said, as of old; and her insularity was a chief determining element in the early course of her historical life — making her exceptionally strong in unity — long before the seas engirdling her carried her into the world of modern life and assigned to her a controlling place in it.

Meanwhile, William the Conqueror had not only prepared, but throughout his reign maintained and developed, his great achievement

w. sea. i. i by a system of foreign alliances, of which the most signally important was that with the Papacy — in the Hildebrandine age in particular. With his active and efficient diplomacy began that long chapter of medieval history which is concerned with the political and military relations to France of England and her ruling dynasty. Little more than a century after the Conquest, Henry II (the first conqueror of Ireland) might be described as a greater potentate in France than his French suzerain; but his power was feudal, and, even of this, most was lost in the reign of John. Yet this unhappy King, too, followed a foreign policy of his own. His quarrel with Pope Innocent III, though not especially of the King's making, rendered Magna Carta possible ; but the victory of the Barons did not suffice to overthrow his Throne. Soon after his death, Lewis of France was driven from England ; and, after John's successor had come of age, he and his dynasty, encouraged by a continuous growth of national consciousness, showed every desire to revive the aggressive foreign policy of their predecessors. Henry III accepted the Crown of Sicily for his son Edmund, and his brother Richard of Cornwall was elected German King. The interests of the Papacy, together with those of the dynasty, lay heavy upon all classes of the subjects of the Crown; and, while Pope Alexander IV duly declared the Provisions of Oxford void, their immediate sequel was the expulsion of foreigners from the realm. Notwithstanding the catastrophe of Simon de Montfort, England's first great Protector, a memorable constitutional change — borough representation — was finally established under Edward I, reflecting what, like all sound reforms, was already a historical fact — viz. the importance of the towns (from London downwards) in the public life of the nation. English foreign policy, moreover, had ceased to be absorbed in dynastic enterprises or designs, or satisfied with the advantages to be gained by the landed magnates, no longer isolated as these were by their nationality from the rest of the population. On the other hand, a different kind of foreign connexion had steadily advanced. Flemish and Low-German towns — not sea-ports only, but towns in the interior of the Empire also — had maintained trade relations with this country already before the Norman Conquest. Henry II had confirmed the privileges of the Cologne "factory" in London, before its parent association had been outrivalled by a body of Lower-Saxon towns, headed by Lubeck, which, in the course of the thirteenth century, appropriated to itself the once generic name of the Hansa. The progress of this intercourse, and of

FOREIGN POLICY OF EDWARD I AND III 3

that with the Flemish towns, which reached its height at a later date, could not otherwise than directly affect the continental relations of England and her Government and shape the beginnings of a commercial, which became an integral element in her foreign, policy.

But as yet the sword was the determining factor. The great reign of Edward I, who came out of the midst of a crusade to enter upon the mighty task awaiting him nearer home, was one of widespread foreign conquest, though at the same time of the firm planting of domestic reforms. He mastered both Wales and Scotland, though the principality was not incorporated in the English State till the reign of the second Tudor King, while Scotland retained her recovered autonomy even after the personal union under our first Stewart. Edward I's relations with France had become embittered before he entered upon his first conquest of Scotland, and had led to his conclusion of a futile alliance with the German King Adolphus ; on the other hand, the defensive alliance concluded with France by John Balliol before his deposition, established the tradition of a Scoto-French league, which beset English foreign policy almost continuously down to the days of Elizabeth. But, if it was Scotland herself which at Bannockburn undid the English Conquest, that Conquest itself and the whole of Edward I's overbearing policy could not have been carried out by the King without a nation at his back, or without the widespread resources of a singularly active commercial diplomacy 1 . When, under his grandson Edward III, after an unstable settlement with Scotland, the country resumed warlike action against France, which now remained, for a hundred years, its dominant passion, diplomatic transactions of a directly political kind were an inevitable necessity. The chain of foreign alliances concluded by Edward III with the German Princes along the Lower Rhine, and thence even with the potentates of the Palatinate, Wiirttemberg and Savoy, forms an early example of the series of subsidy treaties which is, perhaps, the most long-lived feature of British foreign policy; and (in 1337) the "system" was extended so as to include the Emperor, Lewis the Bavarian, himself. But the Peace of Bretigny (1360), which, by a drastic partition, was to have at last ended the struggle for the throne of France, held good for less than nine years; and the renewed War speedily led to disastrous

1 When his supply of money fell short in consequence of his banishment of the Jews, Parliament came temporarily to the rescue, and he was able, with advantage to the Crown, to fall back upon the banking guilds in the North Italian cities.

results for the English dominion in France. Thus, in the tragic reign of Richard II, the efforts against France, following on that of England's Flemish ally, broke down in their turn, as did the attempted invasion of Scotland ; and failure abroad, coupled with the effects of the social catastrophe at home, brought the national life to the state of despair which precedes dissolution. In the end, the unfortunate King, lured back to England from an expedition to Ireland, lost his English Crown. The kinsman who took it from him was a prince of wide foreign experience acquired by travel, and would have willingly entered into the inheritance of the foreign policy of Edward I. But the insecurity of his tenure at home deprived him of the power of action in France, though the distracted internal condition of that kingdom offered so favourable an opportunity for intervention in its affairs.

The renewal of the French policy of Edward III, and the assertion of claims at once wider and weaker, fell to Henry V, in whose settlement, as after Agincourt it found expression in the Treaty of Troyes, the Alliance with Burgundy was a necessary factor. But it was not written in the book of fate that England should be permanently burdened by the inheritance of a great foreign dominion, which, had she retained possession of it, must have strained beyond bearing the powers of the nation in the satisfaction of an unnatural ambition. The Wars of the Roses, while they went far towards destroying the ascendancy of the great Houses, left the economic condition of the people largely untouched ; so that, at the close of the struggle, the country stood face to face with the intelligent despotism (a phrase to which the Eighteenth Century has no prerogative claim) of the Tudors. At the same time (since foreign policy is a branch of government to which public opinion, accustomed as it is to judge mainly by results, is not wont to apply logical reasoning), there can be no doubt that the dissatisfaction caused by the loss of France sensibly contributed to the downfall of the rule of Henry VI; or that his rival, after seating himself on the Throne, had actually to seek a momentary refuge against French intrigue in the Netherlands. With their master, Charles the Bold, Edward IV was on friendly terms, though he could not depend on him as an ally against France, and death overtook him on the eve of a struggle with an adversary whose equal he had never proved himself.