Whence came the universe? The fundamental problem of creation

Front matter

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Foreword

If the men of science could distinguish between their legitimate scientific conclusions and their metaphysical speculations, and if Christian apologists were less ready than some of them are to set limits to the realm of secondary causes, Science and Religion would have no difficulty in lying down together without either being incorporated in the other. Professor Asa Gray occupied a position in the scientific world scarcely second to any other authority. Yet he had no difficulty in accepting, on the one hand, the Nicene Creed, and, on the other, the Darwinian theory of the origin of species through natural selection. But this did not interfere with his implicit belief of a pervasive design in nature. One of his latest publications was entitled "Darwinian Teleology," in which he showed conclusively that, however much the Darwinian theory might extend the action of natural causes, it could not supersede the necessity of a designing mind to set those causes in operation, and to direct their course. The greater and more com.plicated the machinery to produce definite results, the greater and more complicated is the design, calling for a more exalted conception of the designer. A book printed by the linotype process involves even more evidence of design than one printed from separate type set up by hand.

The men of science properly deal only with secondary causes, from observation of which they draw conclusions of more or less probability with reference to conditions both past and future. Their investigations never lead them to ultimate facts. It is still as true as ever that, however much you may lengthen the chain of natural causes, you cannot reach the ultimate link that fastens it to its permanent support.

With regard to the ultimate source of the universe of secondaiy causes, only three suppositions are possible : ( i ) that the self-existent eternal cause was spiritual and personal; (2) that it was material; and (3) that both spiritual and material essences were self-existent and eternal. The man of science who assumes that the self-existent cause of all things was material,

2 Foreword

instead of simplifying the mystery of existence has gratuitously multiplied it ; for, out of purely material forces, he must develop personality and design — qualities that do not inhere in material particles and forces. If, on the other hand, he assumes the self -existence of both spiritual and material essences, he has made a gratuitous supposition which makes his mystery threefold ; for it involves the mystery of the union of the two independent, self-existent, ultimate causes. Whereas the theist unifies the mystery (which is a scientific process), and finds in secondary causes (which on examination seem to be more and more spiritual) the handiwork of the Creator — too complicated, indeed, for us to fully understand, but whose nature can be easily apprehended by faith. In these secondary causes we can clearly "find God," though we cannot by any means "find Him out."

It is gratifying in these times of ephemeral publications to get hold of a treatise which goes to the bottom of the matter, which is not content with mere generalities but ferrets out all the ambiguities, fallacies, and non-sequiturs of atheism, materialism, monism, and agnosticism and brings them to the test of the most recent and most reasonable scientific conceptions of the universe. The author is specially strong in the use of the facts which demonstrate the finite and temporal character of the universe and the evidences of design apparent both in organic and inorganic nature. The work displays profound and most complete knowledge of the latest theories of astronomy, chemistry, physics, and biology.

We have followed with greatest interest the argument of Dr. Gruber in the present volume, and can most highly commend it for its comprehensiveness, and for the skill which is shown in stating the arguments for Theism, and in answering the supposed objections which have been raised by modern scientific discoveries. The volume commends itself equally to theologians and to men of science, and if read will do much to bring these classes together on a plane where they can reason together without animosity and work together in the promotion of the common ends of science and religion.

G. Frederick Wright.

Contents

Foreword . . i

Introduction 9

I Theories as to the Origin of the Universe . . . .15 I Several Speculative Theories Briefly Stated . . 15 II Scriptural Idea of Creation Ex Nihilo — A Transcendental One .19

Introduction

To the thoughtful mind the questions, Whence? What? Why? and Whitherf spontaneously suggest themselves on every side. The subjects of the origin j being , purpose and destiny of man and nature, have therefore In all ages occupied the minds of men. Indeed all philosophy Is an attempt to ansvv^er these great questions. The first of them, that of the whence, or of origin, lies back of the other three and In a sense Involves them. It constitutes the subject to be considered In this book.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT

Has the universe existed from eternity, or w^as it, even as to Its material or substance, created by a Divinity In time, or at time's beginning? This Is the real question. To one w^ho has arrived at the conclusion that the universe has existed from eternity, there Is but a step to every possible negation, from the denial of a miracle to confirmed atheism. To one w^ho has become convinced that it w^as created, even as to its material or substance, by the Christian's God, everything else, from the simplest miracle to the crow^ning miracle of the Incarnation of the Son of God, is as nothing for faith to grasp and even for reason to accept.

If a miracle be defined as an event in nature that cannot be explained by the ordinary law^s of nature, then the establishing of the fact of the creation of the universe, ex nihilo or out of nothing — as this event must have antedated existing nature and therefore nature's laws — should be of supreme Importance to both faith and reason. By the very definition of a miracle, such a creation must have been the great primal or fundamental miracle, transcending and Indeed Involving all accredited miracles In created nature.

Thus, the fact of the creation of the universe ex nihilo being accepted, that of all other Biblical miracles becomes not only

10 Introduction

possible to faith, but also acceptable to reason. Between such creation and its perhaps even more wonderful counterpart, the Incarnation, all other miracles, in addition to their immediate purpose, should serve also as striking illustrations of continued Divine immanence.

Hence, as this subject has often stood out as a chief point or occasion of difference between what might in a general way be called the Academy and the Church, or supposedly between nature and accredited Revelation, it is one of supreme importance to both science and religion.

But even apart from this scientific and religious, or scientifico-religious, importance of the subject, it has also a more purely philosophic side, as we have indicated in our introductory paragraph, that appeals to every searcher after truth and every thoughtful reader. Therefore, even from the purely intellectual — or we might say, scientifico-philosophic — side, the subject is one of absorbing interest.

SCOPE AND TREATMENT

It does not come within the scope of this work to discuss the particular manner of creation by a Deity, whether it was instantaneously or gradually, virtually by one act or by a long series of repeated acts, wholly directly or chiefly through secondary causes. Nor do the creative days of the first chapter of Genesis enter into our consideration. The chief purpose of this work is to prove that the universe of matter and its correlate energy, together with life, must necessarily have been created out of nothing by a supreme or absolute Personality. And it is, therefore, the fact, not the manner nor the time, of that primal creation that here chiefly concerns us.

Nor do the Christian Scriptures enter much into our discussion, as we are addressing ourselves more especially to that apparently growing class of people who will not accept the Scriptures by themselves as credible evidence. In reasoning with such upon such a subject, it is only fair to them that we should waive, or at least withhold, the evidence which to them is not acceptable. It is, therefore, necessary to meet them upon the basis of their own premises of reasoning. And, indeed, as the very intellectual atmosphere is becoming more and more scientific, it is not only the professional men of science, but also

Introduction II

those with an acquired scientific attitude, that look for scientific evidence. Hence, it is this evidence for a creation ex nihilo by a transcendent Deity, not that of the Christian Scrip* tures, that we are endeavoring to present. We are here placing science, not Scripture, upon the witness stand. And, even much less so are we in this work setting forth or defending the detailed Christian facts of the Scriptures, as a development of the more specifically Christian evidences. The setting forth of these facts in the light of all the evidence of present scholarship, requires a separate volume and a different method of treatment.

And yet, after scientifically establishing, from the evidence from nature itself, the fact of a creation ex nihilo, by a supreme Deity, it is also only fair to the Christian view-point to show that the evidence of the Christian Scriptures matches this evidence from nature. This is rather the reverse of the usual method of approaching the scientific searcher after truth or the honest doubter, but it should need no argument to prove it to be the only proper method. An unscientific Christian — if we might use such terminology — would have a right to expect to be convinced, if conviction were attempted, from his own view-point, that a certain scientific fact is not in conflict with Revelation. So a physical scientist — or an individual with a scientific attitude toward truth — who has honest doubts, has a right to expect to be convinced, if conviction is attempted, upon his own premises of reasoning, that a certain Scriptural doctrine is not in conflict with scientific fact. This must, therefore, be kept in mind by the reader, as, step by step, we endeavor to prove, from established and assumed premises of science, that nature really agrees with Revelation in its testimony for a creation ex nihilo. Fully believing in the "round table," our invitation is, Come, let us reason together.

It is, therefore, because we are reasoning from the viewpoint of the scientific thinker, that even many of the as yet unproved scientific theories are made to bear upon our subject and are treated as though they were or expressed scientific facts. And, thus, in addition to showing that established science really testifies to a creation of the universe ex nihilo, our argument also proves that even the more speculative theories of science point in the same inevitable direction. Hence, the evident inference should be that all the indications of the present develop-

12 Introduction

ments of science point to the same absolute creation by an absolute sovereign Personality as is so manifestly set forth in the Christian Scriptures.

Many of the arguments against the anti-theistic conceptions of the universe herein set forth, are a development of arguments repeatedly employed by the wx'ittr in reasoning vj'ixh scientific and other honest doubters, as w^ell as w^ith self-confessed pronounced atheists. As those arguments, in actual discussion, wext found to be unanswerable, they w^ere briefly set forth in short papers, as well as in occasional addresses on the evidences for God in nature. And, now, in this volume they are more fully elaborated for wider application.

It should be said also that, for the sake of completeness, certain very important points at least partially enter into the argument of more than one chapter. But, all unnecessary repetition is avoided. In the interests of fuller illustration and greater emphasis of some points here and there only briefly made, the reader is, however, occasionally referred to other chapters, in which such points or arguments are more fully developed.

Throughout the whole, the aim has been clearness in argument no less than perspicuity in language. And, although even the latest scientific theories necessarily figure prominently in the discussions, these are, we believe, made as intelligible as is ordinarily possible in the case of such subjects. Indeed, for this very reason, some of these theories are developed somewhat more at length than should ordinarily be necessary in such a treatise, so as to make their application in our argument all the more definite and convincing also to the scientifically untrained mind.

Moreover, where mathematics enters into our arguments, only such applications of it are made as are necessary to make our points definite and clear. But all its higher functions and applications are avoided. And, indeed, should any of our readers not wish even to follow certain of these mathematical demonstrations, they will still have the satisfaction of seeing the results or conclusions reached. After all, the chief interest in such a discussion lies in the fact that a certain inevitable result or conclusion must follow from certain accepted premises, rather than how that result is attained. And yet, although we might thus have given only the conclusions of such

Introduction 13

processes of reasoning, for more certain conviction we let the processes, in an abbreviated form, appear with their conclusions. Thus, we believe that our argument for the creation of the universe out of nothing by a supreme spiritual Personalit}^ — Whom the Christian adores as God — will be simple enough for the average reader and yet have some interest for the man of science, while we trust it will bring conviction to both. Care has been exercised to avoid errors; but some may nevertheless have crept in.

And now, with the invitation to the various classes of readers. Come, let us reason together, we shall send forth this volume on its intended mission, submitting its contents to their careful consideration and candid judgment.

L. F. G.

St. Paul, Minnesota June, l^i*/

Chapter I

It may be said, in a general way, that there are two distinct views as to the possible origin of the universe. According to the one, it was a creation or a development from an eternally existing substance or stuff, whether that substance be considered as the essence of an ever-operating Divinity, or as eternal matter operated upon by an external Divinity or developed by some supposed inherent potentialities. According to the other, it was a creation out of nothing in time, or at time's beginning, by the omnific will of an eternal and absolute Creator. And the former of these views, more especially, comprises a number of somewhat different theories.

I SEVERAL SPECULATIVE THEORIES BRIEFLY STATED

The theories of the origin of the universe that have been offered by unenlightened human reason, are numerous; but they may for all practical purposes be divided into several distinct groups. It is not necessary for our purpose, however, to consider all of them, nor here to discuss even any one of them in detail.

According to the Hindu Rig- Veda, the universe was originally a confused chaotic darkness, which the great originator or god first dispelled and then created water with its seed of light. Out of this seed he developed a golden egg, in which Brahma sat a year in meditation; and, finally breaking it, he made heaven and earth out of its two halves. According to modern materialism, the universe had no beginning. But it is regarded as the result of an endless series of developments from itself by its own inherent energy. The former may be said to put the hen first ; the latter apparently puts the egg first, generally even to the denial of the existence of the hen.

As we have given the theory of the Rig- Veda for Eastern philosophic speculation, we shall also let several authorities speak for Western philosophic science. Upon the subject of the supposed cosmic development, Ernst Haeckel, the great champion of monistic philosophy, has expressed himself in the following words: *'By this [Monism] we unambiguously express our conviction that there lives 'one spirit in all things,* and that the whole cognizable world is constituted, and has been developed, in accordance with one common fundamental law. We emphasize by it, in particular, the essential unity of inorganic and organic nature, the latter having been evolved from the former only at a relatively later period" {Monism as Connecting Religion and Science, 1894, P- 3o). And this development is, of course, assumed to have been or be an eternal process, as expressed by A. W. Bickerton in the following statement: "Agencies were found that elevated dissipating energy, and others that tended to disperse matter, until a complete mechanism disclosed itself; that rendered it possible that we exist in a cyclic scheme of creation, in which there is no evidence of a beginning or promise of an end, but a cosmic whole infinite and immortal" ( The Birth of Worlds and Systems, 191 1, p. 10). Moreover, the natural inference or conclusion from such a supposed process, on the part of Western philosophic science, is that matter, energy and even life are eternal. Thus the great Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius speaks as follows: "Man used to speculate on the origin of matter, but gave that up when experience taught him that matter is indestructible and can only be transformed. For similar reasons we never inquire into the origin of the energy of motion. And we may become accustomed to the idea that life is eternal, and hence that it is useless to inquire into its origin" {Worlds in the Making, 1908, p. 2i8). And, of course, from such premises, it must be only logical to conclude that the universe is an uncreated entity. And this has come more and more to be the pet theory of a growing group of scientists. And although

Theories as to the Origin of the Universe If

this is the implied view in the works of these men, it has within recent years very frequently become a matter of open declaration. Among many such statements as might be cited, we would quote the following by Dr. Saleeby in The Academy of March 25, 1905 : "Radium-clocks have been made that will go for a million 3^ears; but I believe that the Universe was never made and will go on forever" (Vol. LXVIII., Article: The Life of the Universe, p. 342 ) . Thus the universe is held to be infinite, eternal and therefore uncreated, and the idea or need of a God is supposedly eliminated from the universe.

Between this extreme materialistic position and that of the Rig-Veda there are modified theories of every shade, some closely approaching the former and others closely approaching the latter. The mythological theories of paganism are, however, generally associated with some idea of emanation, the physical universe being regarded as a series of effluxes from the Godhead. The philosophico-scientific theories are associated with some idea of development, by properties and forces inhering in supposed eternally existing matter.

In a general way, it may thus be said that Oriental speculation makes the universe to flow forth from Divinity itself — although even John Milton, Sir William Hamilton, et al., also entertained similar views — while Western philosophy makes it to arise out of eternal matter. And in both there is undoubtedly a bold groping after, and almost a grasping of, at least a part of the real truth. But while there are elements of truth in both, they nevertheless both sadly miss the kernel of truth itself. In making the universe an emanation from Divinity, Oriental philosophy ends in the ultimate identifying of God and the universe, leaving the universe and all within it essentially divine. In making the universe simply an inherently necessary evolution from eternal matter. Western philosophy tends to eliminate the idea of God, at least as a personality, altogether. And, between these two extremes, human speculation in Orient and Occident has ever been oscillating, now deifying nature, now materializing all; but the true conception of what really constitutes creation has been absent from both.

It is interesting to note, however, that there is a tendency in Western philosophy, in a sense, to approach, or rather even to pass. Eastern philosophy on this subject. Impelled by the inevitable God-necessity to explain the universe, some Western philosophers have come to regard the universe as a v^rhole as itself God. In Oriental philosophy it is primarily only an emanation from God, though resulting in its own deification. Thus, some Western Philosophers have been driven by the inadequacy of the purely materialistic explanation of nature to arrive at practically the same end as that which Eastern philosophers have reached. There are, of course, several forms of this so-called pantheism, one of them being but a very little advance upon pure materialism.

Driven by the impelling sense of the necessity of a Divinity back of, or within, the great All to account for its existence, Ernst Haeckel gives utterance to the following: "As the simpler occurrences of inorganic nature and the more complicated phenomena of organic life are alike reducible to the same natural forces, and as, further, these in their turn have their common foundation in a simple primal principle pervading infinite space, we can regard this last (the cosmic ether) as all-comprehending divinity, and upon this found the thesis: 'Belief in God is reconcilable with science'" {Monism, p. 92).

While we do not want to anticipate our fuller answer, to be given later, we might call attention to the faulty reasoning in this quotation. The whole argument is based upon unproved premises, and therefore the conclusion is untrustworthy. Where, for example, is the proof that "the simpler occurrences of inorganic nature and the more complicated phenomena of organic life are alike reducible to the same natural forces"? And whence did the learned philosopher derive his information that these natural forces have "their foundation in a simple primal principle pervading infinite space" ? These assumptions are taken as facts only in the interests of a theory. What then is the final value of the theory? Why could not the author just as readily say Personality as principle, and thus practically express the profounder Christian truth, toward which all real philosophic speculation has more or less tendency instinctively ultimately to gravitate?

And what is true of the reasoning in the above quotation is equally true of others cited earlier. But the mere calling of the attention to such assumptions should be sufficient in this connection to put the reader on his guard as to the reasoning of these men on this subject in general.

In contrast with the pantheism of some eminent Western philosophers, we might call the conception of creation of Eastern philosophers panextheism. The Christian conception might then truly be spoken of by the term panentheism, although this word is subject to abuse. There is a broad general sense, therefore, in which all three agree; namely, that all is from God. In Eastern philosophy all is from God as an emanation from His divine substance — all from or out of God — panextheism. In the prevailing form of philosophic pantheism all is from God as a manifestation or unfolding of His own being — all is God. To the Christian philosopher all is from God as an entity called into being by His creative will — all from, in the sense of potentially in, God — panentheism. But, in all the speculations on the subject of creation, some creative Divinity is either assumed or implied. Nor can any theory be conceived of as workable that attempts to remove God altogether from His universe.

More than this brief statement of the prevailing philosophic views of creation it is not necessary here to give. Other details of the materialistic conception will be given in our further discussion, as also there will be of the Christian conception.

II SCRIPTURAL IDEA OF CREATION EX NI- HILO—A TRANSCENDENTAL ONE

The undoubted Scriptural idea of creation, as we hope conclusively to prove later, is that which furnishes the title of this book; namely, that of a creation ex nihilo, out of nothing. This idea of creation, by the free volition of an absolute or unconditioned and eternal Being — of the material itself, out of nothing — is, of course, foreign to mere human thought and speculation. The mind of man is so constituted that the idea of the unconditioned can never really enter unenlightened consciousness. It must ever reason from known or accepted premises or data, and to it the idea bodied forth in the expression ex nihiloj is even unthinkable as an element of such premise.

I man's limitations as to the conception of such an

IDEA

To the natural man there are only two sources of information, hi? limited consciousness and experience. And neither consciousness nor experience can afford him any data as to ultimate origins. Thus, a somethinff from nothing — an effect without any apparent cause — is totally unthinkable. It does in no way form part of experience, for by experience we know only of a making from existing materials; and it cannot enter, or be an element of, the consciousness of a conditioned mind. The mind is finite, as it is but part of a created (as we hope to prove), and therefore conditioned or limited, material and spiritual universe, as we know even from consciousness; and it is by that conditioned universe that it is in turn conditioned at every point. And, therefore, only as a creature, and conditioned, and in terms of a created,^ conditioned and conditioning, universe can the mind reason.

It is this conditioned nature of the human mind that gives such apparent force to the adage, ex nihilo nihil fit, and makes it the philosophic axiom that it is commonly regarded to be. It is this also that indirectly gave birth to, and sustains, as great working hypotheses in the present state of nature, such great scientific doctrines as those of the universality of gravitation, the uniformity of nature, the conservation of matter and energy, and those of tri-dimensional space and time as necessarily measured duration, as well as all accepted axiomatic truths. And, indeed, here is its legitimate sphere. Without a consistent application of the principle that underlies these scientific doctrines, both scientific and mechanical progress would be impossible. It is here applied to the determination and application of laws operating in an already existing universe in its present state, in which an accumulation of proper data is accessible, but to which, however, such data for reasoning are limited.

But, when that conditioned nature of the mind becomes the ulterior background for, or the ultimate cause of, the mind's denial of what lies beyond its limited or conditioned consciousness and experience, such as a creation ex nihilo, it is plainly applied to, or operative in, what is by nature totally foreign to it. Or, when the mind in its conditioned nature attempts with certainty to solve the problem of the primal origination of the existing universe, then it attempts what does not belong to its proper sphere, and what therefore lies beyond the range of its every function. All its data for reasoning are limited to what already exists, however it came to be. Here, then, the conclusions of unenlightened reason cannot be trusted. It is, therefore, absurd for the human mind to stand in judgment on the problem of creation.

Some statements of Sir William Hamilton bearing upon this subject add confirmatory evidence for the point just made. Note, for example, the following: "We are utterlj^ unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive, either, on the one hand nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming nothing" {Discussions, Third Edition, 1866, p. 605). As v^^e cannot, how^ever, agree wath Hamilton in his different application of this principle, an analysis of this statement seems necessary.

As above explained, it is true, as this author says, that v^^e are unable to construe in thought as possible, or to realize, either absolute creation or absolute destruction. But it is not necessarily true, as he also implies, both here and elsev^here, that such creation and destruction are not possible. It is also true that we cannot conceive of nothing becoming something, or of something becoming nothing. Who would believe in such an impossibility! It is surely far from us to believe in such a becoming. Nor do we believe even in a creation of nothing into something, or of a destruction of something into nothing, as if nothing were a thing out of which something was created or into which something might be converted by destruction. Of course, such an impossibility could not be conceived.

By absolute creation, as already indicated, is meant the creation of something without previously existing materials, so that something is made to exist where before there was nothing. And so, by absolute destruction is meant the total blotting out of an existence, so that the existence altogether ceases to be. And yet, as clearly shown, even this cannot be directly conceived of by the finite mind. Therefore, whatever meaning as to creation or destruction Hamilton meant to convey, he said truly that we are utterly unable to conceive of it. But, in denying the possibility of absolute creation and absolute destruction, he was reading into the being, thoughts and acts of an unconditioned God, the limitations of the being, thoughts and acts of conditioned man.

This error of Hamilton was a natural conclusion from the contradictory elements in his philosophy of the Unconditioned, and from his apparently faulty notion of casuality. By these errors in his philosophy he was driven to say, "When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, wt think this, by supposing, that he evolves the universe out of nothing but himself" {Discussions, p. 605). Such creation vi^ould merely mean emanation. And yet, as if laboring under the palpable difficulties involved in his reasoning on this subject, or as though perhaps impelled by his own early Christian convictions, he also in places apparently approached the Christian conception of creation. Some such meaning may be read into the following words: "It [creation] is conceived, and is by us conceivable, merely as the evolution of a new form of existence by the fiat of the Deity" {Lectures on Metaphysics and Loffic, 1859, Vol. IL, p. 405).