Forgotten fights to the A. E. F.

Front matter

Class 1.

Book.

CciiyrigMW eOEXRIGHT DEPOSm

CHAPTER I. America's First Chance: The Fight at Cantigny

"It is possible that in those ancient years when Rome was crumbling before the attacks of the barbarians from beyond the Rhine, or when western Gaul was trembling beneath the armies of Attila, the civilized world of the time may have felt itself as gravely threatened with destruction as did modern civilization during the months of April, May and June, 1918, when once again the Huns, as always through the ages, the assailants of the higher types of human development, were making their supreme effort to crush the armies of the Allies upon the soil of France. But never in past eras, certainly, was the stake involved for humanity so vast, so world-embracing, and never did the outcome of a supreme struggle seem to hang more perilously in the balance."

So has written a historian of the recent war, and surely no more truly has anyone ever before written!

Things were hanging in the balance during those three fateful months of 1918, for the German Army on the Western Front, now almost twice its former size, due to reinforcement from the collapsed Russian front; its troops armed and trained to perfection, and animated by the assurance of speedy and glorious success, opposing the armies of France and England, "doggedly determined still, but sorely worn and tried through nearly four years of ceaseless battle and cruelly battered by the plunges of the enemy in his spring offensive."

The gravity of the crisis was startingly apparent — something must be done, and that quickly! There was but one factor, which, although there was an element of uncertainty, might serve to throw the scales in favor of the Allies, and that factor was as yet wholly untried.

The enemy was driving a wedge between the British and French armies, and were attempting to smash their way through to the Channel ports, striking through the lines just west of Amiens, as well as another operation against the British in the vicinity of Kemmel Hill, in Belgium. The enemy smash was completely overrunning all weight of resistance which the war-worn Allies could throw in in their vain effort to stem the tide of invasion. Within eight short days after launching their mighty attack, the enemy had completely enveloped the Somme battle-fields, and had smashed through the lines of the Allied armies for a gain of about fifty or more kilometers. It seemed as if the fall of Amiens was imminent, and, with that city, the railway facilities centered there. Then, too, the gigantic proportions of the enemy offensive was tearing great gaping holes in the ranks of the Allied reserves, and the battle that was fast developing gave promise of soon placing the Allied armies in a very grave position. Accordingly, the Allies turned to America.

The advancing hordes of the enemy were everywhere victorious. In numbers of fighting men, guns, experience and morale, they had the edge on the Allies. Their forces had been constantly assembling in the Western theatre for the great attack that should end the war before America could bring her power and fresh reserves of men to bear upon their blows. Germany's pick of men, coupled with a choice selection of her best bets in generalship, and the whole machine backed with an experience extending over more than three years of such warfare, had been assembled for one last supreme spurt for the goal.

The enemy's initial blow had fallen powerlu^^ the point of junction of the French and British forces, and, somewhat late in the great struggle that had torn Europe to shreds for oyer three years, the Allies saw clearly, and for the first time, that there must be built up a more co-ordinate working of their armies if they should hope to gain the victory. The gravity of this situation resulted in a conference being called at Abbeville, on May 2, 1918, and, after much discussion, Marshal Foch was chosen as Allied Commander-in-Chief, the terms of this conference being stated as follows:

"General Foch is charged by the British, French and American Governments with the co-ordination of the action of the Allied armies on the western front; to this end there is conferred on him all the powers necessary for its effective realization. To the same end the British, French and American Governments confide in General Foch the strategic direction of military operations.

"The Commander-in-Chief of the British, French and American armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his Government, if in his opinion his army is placed in danger by the instructions received from General Foch.

(Signed) G. Clemenceau

Petain F. Foch Lloyd George D. Haig, F. M.

There were, at the time of the Great German Offensive of March 21st, 1918, in France, approximately 300,000 American troops, of which number, only a force of about four combat divisions could be available in the crisis. These four were: the 1st and 2nd, who were then in line, and the 26th and 42nd, who had just recently finished their first month's trench training. As a necessary part of their training in the trenches, some of these divisions had taken part in local combats, — the most notable being at Seicheprey, on April 20th, by the 26th Division,— but as yet, not one of them had been in battle as an integral fighting unit.

Accordingly, the 26th and 42nd Divisions at once took over quiet sectors to release veteran divisions for the great battle; the 26th relieving the 1st Division, which was ordered to the sector northwest of Paris, to take up reserve positions; the 42nd relieving two French divisions from their quiet sectors in Lorraine.

On April 25th, 1918, the 1st American Division received orders to relieve two French divisions before the town of Cantigny, lying in a sector, slightly northwest of Montdidier and about twenty-five kilometers southeast of Amiens, — in other words, at the very apex of the gigantic enemy wedge, driven there by their March Offensive, nearly severing the Allied lines. Amiens was still in danger, and there could be but one question uppermost in the minds of all of the Allied forces,— could the Americans hold? If they did not, all was lost; if they did, as the Allies firmly believed they would, then the dawn of the day of glory had begun to break.

Immediately upon entering the sector fronting Cantigny, the 1st Division was subjected to more intense defensive operations and raids than they had ever yet experienced.

Artillery fire was thrown upon them in deluges, night and day, while the enemy maintained frequent and annoying raiding tactics. But the Yankee doughboys came back, with all the vim and vigor and tenacity of their race, and it was not long until they had recognized the presence in their front of the 271st and 272nd Regiments of German infantry, with average strengths per company of about 150 men, — some of the best troops of the enemy forces at this time.

It soon developed that to hold the sector at this point would not suffice, for the strongly fortified and well-organized town of Cantigny, standing on rising ground ahead of the 1st Division, was affording the enemy admirable observation points which overlooked the American lines and rear areas. Furthermore, it presented a highly favorable position from which the enemy might advance in any further assaults he might send forward.

Cantigny faced the Yanks, out there across No Man's Land, and, in order to make the Allied positions safe and to afford a favorable *'jumping-off" place for a possible Allied counter-offensive, should the chance come, Cantigny must be taken. Accordingly, preparations were begun at once.

For this attack, the 28th Infantry was chosen, with the 26th Infantry furnishing one battalion for the support, and a number of French tanks and flame-projectors.

Officially, the preparations for this operation are stated as follows: "A section of terrain behind the American lines very similar in natural features to that occupied by Cantigny and its defenses, was selected for maneuvering, and trenches in replica of the enemy trenches were dug upon it. Sand tables showing the topography, woods, lines of change of the barrage, objectives, strong points, and all houses in Cantigny which might be expected to be organized as machine gun nests were prepared and carefully studied. Exact and detailed orders were prepared by the staff and the artillery arranged, accurately, time tables for the preliminary bombardment and the rolling barrage."

So much for the preliminary preparation for the attack.

And then came the night of May 27th- 28th; and morning saw the enemy going over the top along the Chemin des Dames, in what was later destined to prove itself the last of their great offensives, and which carried their lines down to the Marne at Chateau-Thierry and threatened Paris with imminent attack.

Zero hour for the Cantigny attack came on the morning of May 28th, at the usual time, — 5.30, just as the first faint streaks of coming day lighted up the flaming front lines. The attacking units were accompanied by a dozen French tanks and the flame-throwers were in position, the flying units were ready for their part in the observation, and the engineers were likewise ready for their pioneer work. Furthermore, approximately 250 pieces of artillery (75 mm to 280 mm) were ready to open the show at the appointed second.

The night was calm and starlit, and promptly at the zero hour, the artillery barrage began its work with a roar, and a hail of missiles crashed down upon Cantigny. Great, jagged, painful, and gaping holes began to appear in its walls and roofs, and its buildings flew into jagged splinters, and clouds of flying brick and stone-dust. This terrific fire paralyzed the enemy, and when, at half-past six, the fire ceased as drum-fire, and became the rolling barrage, for the infantry attack, advancing at the rate of 100 meters every two minutes, with the infantry following at the distance of fifty meters behind the barrage, the enemy was so bewildered that he could put up but comparatively little resistance.

"Mastered by the bayonets of the American infantry and terrified by the tanks and flame-throwers, the enemy surrendered in clusters, those who attempted to fight being shot down or taken, as the rush of assaulting troops mopped up the town and its covering trenches." That is the way one of those who was upon the ground at the time put the story of the fight.

Shortly after the launching of the attack the objective line beyond Cantigny was reached and this with only slight losses. It then, of course, became necessary to consolidate and hold the gains, against severe enemy counter-battery fire, which was beginning to fall upon our newly-won positions, in a devastating and withering barrage. It also developed that the enemy would attempt a counter-attack at once, and in order to hold the positions it was necessary to secure them at once, this work being accomplished by connecting a series of shell-holes by a system of shallow trenches. These systems were to be defended by the use of the Chauchat automatic rifles. This is the method of consolidation which was most generally employed during the series of brilliant American operations which so materially aided the Allied progress, during these critical months of midsummer, 1918.

Wire entanglements were constucted by the men of the engineer corps, under a galling and withering artillery fire and a constant machine gun barrage, while the third wave of the assault was employed in the construction of several strong points in the immediate rear of the front line, one of these points being in the edge of the woods east of the town of Cantigny, another in the little patch of woodland northeast of the town, and one in the cemetery north of the town.

Having completed these hasty preliminary works, the Yankee doughboys awaited the coming enemy counter, undergoing, for two hours, the unabated intensity of the enem}^ artillery fire, which was responsible for a large number of our casualties, and which was responded to by our own artillery as well as that of the French batteries which had been assigned to our attacking troops.

Naturally, the enemy was supremely confident that they could retake the lost positions from the ''green" American troops, and, about two hours after the town had been taken from them, they attacked from the reserve trenches in the vicinity of Lalval Wood, covered by a carefully checked and prepared barrage. This attack was launched against the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 28th Infantry.

One of the lessons which the enemy seemed never to have really learned was that they usually followed their barrage at too great a distance, — usually about two hundred meters. Our custom was to follow up the barrage at a distance of from fifty to one hundred meters, otherwise the artillery fire would have passed over the line to be attacked and, if followed at a distance of such magnitude as that employed by the enemy, would have given the infantry a chance to get reorganized and waiting for the attacking waves to come upon them. Our tactical employment of the barrage, in synchronization with the infantry attacks, was to follow the barrage at such short distance as to throw the bayonets into the enemy before they could have even partially recovered from the effects of the shell-fire, as they would then present a disorganized and confused mass rather than efficient fighting units.

Accordingly, the Yankee doughboys waited until the enemy waves were scarcely a hundred yards from them and then a burst of flame swept down the line, which sent the enemy reeling backwards towards Framecourt Wood, leaving at least 500 killed and wounded upon the ground.

This was the first of six enemy counter-attacks that came upon our lines, within forty-eight hours, each successive attack being more desperate than the preceding, and the enemy became more and more chagrined at their inability to retake the lost positions.

One military critic puts the situation in this manner: '* It was not only that they were of value to him in themselves ; the accumulating evidence of the dash and doggedness of the American troops as they continued to maintain themselves triumphantly against the utmost efforts that their adversaries could make was giving the lie so plainly to the German thesis that the American troops were no good and never could be made good ; that it was impossible for the American effort ever to become a decisive factor in the war, that the enemy dared not let them retain their advantage. If they did retain it, the news was sure to leak out to the German army and people and to strike a chill of terror and foreboding to their hearts, as they thought of the millions of other equally sturdy Americans who were on their way to France, in fact or potentiality."

This was the reason that the enemy continued to hurl a devastating deluge of shell-fire and gas into the crumbling ruins of the town, and throw forward the best of their troops in a vain effort to crush the thin but stubborn American line. But, in these same thinly held positions at Cantigny, they encountered the same strains of patriotic blood and determination never to yield, that had flowed through the veins of the ancestors of the defenders of that thin line, — the blood of the sons of those who had beaten back the British at Concord and Lexington, — the blood of men who *'had come three thousand miles across the sea to fight for human freedom and their own outraged rights, upon a foreign soil, and they now stood firmly to their task."

Finally, the enemy attacks were relaxed, after they had suffered the loss of nearly one thousand killed, half that number wounded and two hundred or more prisoners, together with several pieces of heavy and light artillery and many machine guns, rifles and munitions. Now it was that, seeing no sacrifice, however bloody, could ever recover their lost positions; that the moral effect of the fight must be balanced elsewhere, and that American blood had come at last to tip the scales in favor of the forces of Right and Justice and Liberty, they withdrew and settled down to their new positions.

Here, also, the men of the 1st Division, held to their lines until relieved by French troops during the night of July 8th-9th, when they received their well-deserved rest, short though it was, before they moved down to win new laurels for themselves on the fields of the Marne salient, southeast of Soissons.

"At Cantigny," says one military critic, "the^ 1st Division had taught the world the significance of the lesson that the American soldier was fully equal to the soldier of any other nation on the field of battle. Who can estimate the extent of the subtle influence which this proof exerted upon the gigantic armies locked in battle along the Western front, heartening the warriors of the Allies, dismaying those of the Central Powers, as they struggled literally for the mastery of the v/orld upon the fields of the Marne and Picardy and Flanders, through the weeks of June and July, 1918, — perhaps the most momentous weeks in all history."

Small wonder, is it not, that we men of the A. E. F., on meeting mud-bedraggled buddies, slowly and wearily tramping along the ''long, long trail" in the Argonne, and hailing them with the inevitable question of the fighting man: "What outfit, buddy?" and upon receiving, in reply: "First Division," could simply gasp out, "Oh!" and plod along on our weary way to the lines !

Chapter II

With the vSecond Division on the Paris- Metz Highway.

When the German Armies launched their great Aisne Offensive, on May 27th, 1918, the Allies found themselves as gravelythreatened here as they had been in Picardy, in March.

The German Army, between Reims and Coucy-le-Chateau, at this time was able to inflict some of the greatest surprises, if not the greatest surprise of their third great offensive of 1918. They were able to do this on account of their rapid concentration of their forces which they had brought into this sector.

The Seventh German Army, under the command of General von Boehn, and which was now operating along the plateau of the Chemin des Dames in the direction of Soissons and to the east and south of that city, and, in conjunction with the First German Army, under General F. von Below, operating to the east of the Seventh Army, with its left attacking Reims, had broken the Allied lines, and were advancing swiftly southward, driving backward the weary and inferior forces of the French and British, already worn out by their severe fighting in Picardy and Flanders.

Little wonder, then, that the face of the entire situation at this time looked exceedingly black and gloomy for the Allies. The enemy waves were forever advancing, toward the Marne, which was the coveted prize of their efforts, the attacking forces being constantly replenished by fresh troops from the Rhenish depots. To stop, or at least to check, these advances, the allied forces sent forward many frantic and heroic attacks, — all of them in vain, — for their forces were depleted and nearly exhausted.

Then came the later days of May, and the gray hosts were overrunning Soissons and Fere-en-Tardenois, and leaving the already devastated city of Reims, — "la Grande Blessee," as the good French peasants call it, — in a pocketed salient which was becoming daily more and more difficult for the allied troops to hold. And, furthermore, by the greatly increasing and constantly maintained pressure of the enemy masses, the wedge which they had driven into the allied lines was bulging dangerously in the direction of the French capital. This bulge was more apparent in the open and level country between the Ourcq and Marne rivers.

The allied forces threw every available reserve against the advancing masses of Prussian infantry, and succeeded in slackening the momentum of the enemy machine. Nevertheless, the enemy still possessed the decided advantage of having the initiative in their hands, and could therefore select

FORGOTTEN FIGHTS OF THE A. F. F. 33

almost any point, from which, using this advantage, they could drive another smaller wedge into the allied lines. The most likely place for such an attempt would therefore be at a point between Soissons and Chateau- Thierry, for it was at this face of the salient that they would then create a western face for their salient.

For the third time in a few short weeks, the French people saw their enemy succeed in driving backward their worn and weary poilus; they knew that the situation was one of extreme gravity; they knew that the hosts of the enemy must be stopped now, or all would be lost; but they set their teeth and refused to yield an inch more of their precious French soil to the desecrating feet of the invader! How sublime and heroic was the courage and the self-forgetting resolution of the French people in such dark days as those that preceded the battle of Chateau- Thierry !

The problem was very simple, on its face, for the allied command. They must halt the enemy attacks actually under way, and, at the same time, hold enough reserves at hand to meet attacks elsewhere. In doing this they must employ only just so much of their available strength as was necessary, keeping the remainder always well at hand for shifting to other points to meet the enemy attacks which might develop elsewhere.

Such was the task that confronted Marshal Foch during the dark days that came before the ever-memorable fighting of midsummer, 1918, and the fact that the forces available for him to accomplish this feat, were wholly inadequate, only enhances the brilliancy of the success with which he met the crisis.

The Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in France, General Pershing, had said: "All that we have is yours," at the time of the great German offensive of March 21st. Therefore, "with faith in the valor of the Americans, Marshal Foch ordered them to a place of the greatest danger, and therefore of the greatest honor, — to the banks of the Marne near Chateau-Thierry and to the great Paris-Metz Highway, where it crosses rolling hills to the northwest of Chateau-Thierry, there to throw themselves across the apex of the German invasion and bar the road to Paris."

Accordingly, the 2nd American Division, under General Omar Bundy, was ordered from its area, near Chaumont-en-Vexin, northwest of Paris, to the vicinity of Chateau- Thierry. They entrained at once, on May 30th, and moved to Montreiul-aux-Lions, establishing a divisional P. C. there. This is a little town on the Paris-Metz Highway, about ten kilometers west of Chateau-Thierry and on the main line of enemy advance.

As they advanced, the news from the front became steadily darker. The enemy was advancing always, and although the valiant French poilus were fighting bravely and heroically, they were greatly outnumbered

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I- d p z 2 and exhausted by their long fighting and marching. The enemy was pushing forward steadily, — so steadily in fact, that it would become necessary for the Americans to take up and establish a defensive position at once.

Accordingly, this was done, with the 9th Infantry in line between Bonneil (near the Marne, southwest of Chateau-Thierry) and Le Thiolet, which was on the Paris-Metz road; the 6th Marines, extending from Le Thiolet to Lucy-le-Bocage; and the 23rd Infantry, which was operating temporarily under command of the 43rd French Division, continued the line to the Bois de Veuilly.

Looking northeast from these positions, one's vision encounters a series of crests and slopes of a low ridge of hills, for the most part rather heavily wooded. Further along, the silvery thread of the little creek, — the Ru Gobert, so soon to become a part of America's great history, forever, — ran windingly, between the green and brown of its banks, through its valley, turning, serpentlike, in and out between the little scattered villages of Belleau, Torcy, Bussiares, and Bouresches. Still further on, one encountered the more steeply rising slopes of the opposite side of this valley, where the enemy lines had been established already, with his artillery sweeping the positions which the Yanks had but recently taken over.

After the Americans had organized their defensive lines, the French were to fall back through them, from their own indefensible and only temporary positions. This was the cause of much unjust criticism by people who have claimed to know that our valiant allies, the French poilus, had been in full retreat and that the Americans, advancing bravely to meet the enemy, had pushed through their disorganized ranks and stopped the Boche in a characteristic dashing Yankee manner. Such was not the case, and the War Department at Washington can furnish any careful investigator with the truth of the whole matter.

The falling back of the French at the Paris-Metz road was just as much a planned part of the operation as was the formation of the defensive line by the men of the 2nd American Division.

Let us try to play fair with the brave men who fought with our noble allies, for they, the poilus of France, had already won the battle before our men got there, for they had held the Boche during the highly critical time that the Americans were organizing the defensive positions where the enemy advance was to be stopped.

Friends, do not be prone to underestimate the aid which our valiant allies of all nationalities gave us, for we must remember that we were fresh, while they had been worn out by four years of fighting before we ever came into it at all ; they had lost whole families and had had their towns in scores wiped from the face of the earth by the devastating hand of war; our homes were safe and far from the destructive hand of the enemy ; and for every American grave upon the soil of France, there are a thousand French and English graves, beside those of the heroic Belgians. They were fighting and suffering and dying, while we were trying to find out whether or not we ought to fight, and whether or not we should stay out of it, and take the position of the passive neutral. Ask the men who fought beside him what they think of the poilu of France, and they will tell you that he was just as good and, perhaps, a lot better than they were. If the fighters think well of them, why not those who stayed at home?

Shall we ever forget the blue-clad poilus of France? Funny fellows, they were, to many of us, with their queer little caps, tilted gayly on one side of their heads, and their war-worn, and rain-faded horizon-blue uniforms. And what a multitude of little "musettes," — every last one of them, bulging like an Arabian water-skin, — filled with the little trinkets they loved so well, and with their rations for the long weary marches, or vigils of trench-life. And, over all, was slung his rifle, nearly as long as himself, — but carried almost tenderly, it seemed, as one would carry a child one loved!

It seemed to many of us that these sturdy souls of France were made rather for love and laughter, — for the associations of the tiny gardens where red wine and white wine of the southern vintage was wont to flow, and where men were wont to gather, of an evening, and pass the gossip of the day over the flowing glasses. One could almost picture them, sitting there, in the reddening sunlight of southern France or in Languedoc, or Burgundy, sipping their wines, while the maidens danced gayly in the open space between the tables; not born for the stern and awful realities of war, where the rough and weary road stretches red and lone and long, and desolate. But they surely trod its JDlighted and broken pathway, with a singing heart, — bravely and gayly! ever dismissing the pain and sorrow and pathos of it all with their heroic little: "C'est la guerre!" and a shrug of their shoulders.

We have seen them, treading the pathway down into the Valley of the Shadows, — worn and weary, and hungry, — racked and worn by the long days and nights in the lines, — yet forever smiling, that heroic and almost sublime smile, which it seemed, nothing under heaven could wipe away! Tender as women, always, when the little children came wonderingly to look at their sturdy forms, or glance over their rifles and ask them for: "Un cigarette, s'il vous plait, M'sieur." And yet, leaping with a snarl of rage and anger, upon the enemy, with his long, slender "Rosalie" at their throats!

Such is but a poor attempt to portray the poilu.

Returning once again to the day of June 3rd, 1918, we find that the enemy was already sounding out the front that was interposed across his advance to the Paris- Metz road, and was finding it solid. But he only put off his attacks until the next day, when he attempted to dislodge both the 2nd American and 43rd French Divisions, by launching an attack against the line from Montcourt, near the Marne, to Chezy-en- Orxois, about five kilometers northwest of the Bois de Veuilly. But his attacks were everywhere checked, due to the arrival of the other units of the 2nd Division, — the 5th Marines and a part of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, which had been reinforced by six groupments of French field artillery.