Address of the free constitutionalists to the people of the United States

Front matter

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Book ^AlJk^

I

The real question, that is now convulsing the nation, is not — as the Republican party would have us believe — whether slaves shall be carried from the States into the Territories ? but whether anywhere, within the limits of the Union, one man shall be the property of another ?

Whether a man, who is confessedly to be held as property, shall be so held in one place, rather than in another ? in a State, rather than in a Territory ? is a frivolous and impertinent question, in which the man himself can have no interest, and which is unworthy of a moment's consideration at this time, if not at all times. If he is to be a slave at all, the locality in which he is to be held, is a matter of no importance to him, and of little or no importance to the nation at large, or any of its people.

If there are to be slaves in the country, a humane man, instead of feeling himself degraded by their presence, would desire to have them in his neighborhood, that he might give them his sympathy, and if possible ameliorate their condition. And the man, who, like the Republican party, consents to the existence of slavery, so long as the slaves are but kept out of his sight, is at heart a tyrant and a brute. And if, at the same time, like the more conspicuous members of that party, he makes loud professions of devotion to liberty and humanity, he thereby just as loudly proclaims himself a hypocrite. And those Republican politicians, who, instead of insisting upon the liberation of the slaves, maintain, under the name of State Rights, the inviolabilitj' of the slaveholder's right of property in his slaves, in the States, and jet claim to be friends of liberty, because they cry, " Keep the slaves where they are ; " " No removal of them into the Territories ; " ^^ Bring them not into our neighborhood,''^ — are either smitten with stupidity, as with a disease, or, what is more probable, are nothing else than selfish, cowardly, hypocritical, and unprincipled men, who, for the sake of gaining or retaining power, are simply making a useless noise about nothing, with the purpose of diverting men's minds from the true issue, and of thus postponing the inevitable contest, which every honest and brave man ought to be ready and eager to meet at once.

II

We repeat, that the true issue before the country — the one which sooner or later must be met — is nothing less than this : Shall any portion of the people of the United States be held as property at all ?

So far as the practical solution of this question depends upon existing political institutions, it depends mainly upon the constitution of the United States.

If the constitution of the United States — " the supreme law of the land" — declares A to be a citizen of the United States (we use the term citizen in its technical sense) then, constitutionally speaking, he is a citizen of the United States everywhere throughout the United States, — " any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding ; " and no State law or constitution can depose him from that status, or deprive him of the enjoyment of the least of those rights, whicii the national constitution guarantees to the citizens of the United States.

If, on the other hand, tliat same " supreme law " declares him to be property, then, constitutionally speaking, he is property everywhere under that law ; and his owner may, by virtue of that law, carry him, as property, into any and every State in the Union, and there hold him as a slave forever, — " any thing in the constitutions or laws of such States to the contrary notwithstanding."

There can, therefore, be no such di8tinctIon made between the States, as that of free and slave States. All are alike free, or all are alike slave, States. They must all necessarily be either the one or the other ; since the constitution of the United States, being " the supreme law " over all alike, must necessarily determine, in all alike, the status of each individual therein, relative to that " supreme law.^' In other \Yord3, the constitution of the United States, and not any constitutions or laws of the States, must determine, in the case of each and every individual, ■whether he be a citizen of the United States, and entitled to the benefits and protection of the national government, or not. If it determines that any particular person is a citizen of the United States, entitled to the benefits and protection of the national government, then certainly he cannot be deprived of such citizenship, or of the protection and benefits which that citizenship implies, by any subordinate or State government; for, in that case, the constitution of the United States would not be " the supreme law of the land." If, on the contrary, the constitution of the United States determines that any particular individual (native or naturalized) is not a citizen of the United States, nor entitled to the benefits and protection of the national government, it can do 80 only because it has itself declared him to he property ; since that is the only cause that can prevent his being a citizen of the United States, and entitled, as such citizen, to the benefits and protection of the government of the United States. The declaration of no subordinate law, that he is property, can break the force of that " supreme law," which declares everybody (native and naturalized) a citizen, whom it does not itself declare to be a slave.

The government of the United States cannot act directly upon the State governments, as governments, requiring them to do this, and forbidding them to do that. It must, therefore, act directly upon individuals ; else it cannot act at all. It is practically a government only so far as i^ does operate upon individuals. It must necessarily know, by virtue of the United States constitution, the individuals upon whom it is to operate ; otherwise it would be in the situation of a government not knowing its own citizens, and consequently not knowing to whom its own duties were due.

The rights, which the general government secures to the people, are as much i^ersonal rights, and come home to each separate individual as directly and fully as do the rights secured to them by the State governments. And the rights secured to the people by the national government, as much imply personal liberty, on the part of the people, as do the rights secured to them by the State governments ; for, without personal liberty, the former rights can no more be enjoyed than the latter. Hence the indispensable necessity that the general government should know, for itself, independently of the State governmeiits, who are, and who are not (if any are not) citizens of the United States ; for otherwise, we repeat, it cannot know to whom its own duties are due.

To say that it rests with the State governments to decide upon whom the United States government shall act, or upon whom it shall confer its protection or benefits, is equivalent to saying that " the supreme law " is dependent upon the arbitrary will of subordinate laws, for permission to operate at all as a law. It is consequently equivalent to saying that the subordinate law may nullify the supreme law, and exclude it from a State altogether, by simply declaring that no persons whatever, within the State, shall be citizens of the United States ; and consequently that there shall be no persons, within the State, upon whom the supreme law can operate, or upon whom it shall confer its benefits.

We repeat the proposition, that, if the State constitutions or laws can determine who may, and who may not, be citizens of the United States, and enjoy the benefits of the United States government, each State may nullify the constitution, government, and laws of the United States, within such State, by declaring that there shall be, within the State, no citizens of the United States, to enjoy those benefits, or upon whom the laws of the United States shall operate.

It is, therefore, indispensable to the existence and operation of the government of the United States, that the constitution of the United States shall itself determine upon whom the United States government shall operate, and who are its citizens, " any thing in the constitutions or laws of the States to the contrary notwithstanding ; " and that the State laws and constitutions shall be allowed to have nothing to do with the matter.

To say that a State can make a man a slave, is only another mode of saying that a State can deprive the United States of a citizen, and abolish the government of the United States, so far as that citizen is concerned. And to say that a State can deprive the United States of one citizen, is equivalent to saying that a State can deprive the government of the United States of all its citizens, within the State. And to say that a State can deprive the government of the United States of all its citizens, within the State, is equivalent to saying that the State can entirely abolish the United States government, within such State. This is the necessary conclusion of the doctrine, that the States can make a slave of any individual, who would otherwise be a citizen of the United States.

If all the people of the States were made slaves, plainly the United States government would have no citizens, upon whom it could operate ; and it would, therefore, be virtually abolished. And, in just so far as the people of the United States are made slaves, in just so far is the United States government abolished. This whole theory, therefore, that the States have a right to make slaves of the people of the United States, is nothiag less than a theory that the States have the right to abolish the government of the United States, by withdrawing individuals from the operation of its laws.

To say, as is constantly done, that the United States constitution " recognxze^^'' as slaves, those whom the States may declare to be slaves, is equivalent to charging the constitution with the absurdity of recognizing the right of the States to make slaves of the citizens of the United States. And to say that the constitution of the United States recognizee the right of the States to make slaves of the citizens of the United States, is equivalent to charging it with the absurdity of actually recognizing the right of each separate State to abolish the government of the United States, within such State.

It therefore results that the constitution of the United States.

" the supreme law of the land," must necessarily fix the status of every individual relatively to that law ; and that, in fixing the i<tatus of each and every individual, relatively to that law — that is, in determining whether an individual shall be a citizen of the United States or not, — it necessarily fixes his status as a freeman, or a slave.

And it necessarily does this independently of, and in defiance of, any subordinate or State law ; for otherwise it could not be '• supreme."

To say that the national constitution is " the supreme law of the land," and yet that it depends upon each of thirty-three State governments to say upon whom that supreme law shall operate, or whom it shall protect, is as absurd as it would be to say that one man is an absolute monarch over thirty-three States, and yet that he is wholly dependent upon the consent of thirty-three subordinate princes, for permission to rule over his own subjects.

If the constitution, laws, and government of the United States are to be limited, in their operation within each State, to such individuals as the States respectively may designate, then each State may, so far as its own territory is concerned, determine who may, and who may not, send and receive letters by the United States mall ; who may, and who may not, go into a United States custom-house for purposes of commerce ; who may, and who may not, go into a United States court-house ; and so on. If this were the true relation between our general and State <'0vernments, then the United States constitution, instead of declaring that " this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to tlie contrary notwithstanding," ought to have declated that this constitution, and the laws and treaties made by the United States In pursuance thereof, shall have effect, within each State, only so far as such State shall consent, or only upon 5=uch Individuals as such State shall designate.

III

Another proof that the general government must determine for itself, independently of the State governments, who are, and who are not, citizens of the United States, is found in that provision of the constitution, which declares that " the United States shall guarantee to every State of this Union a republican form of government."

Although the constitution presumes that the State governments will be representative governments, yet this provision for " a republican form of government" certainly requires that the United States shall guarantee to the States something more than a mere representative government; for a government maybe a representative government, and yet the constituent body — or the body enjoying the right of suffrage — be so small, and the principles of the government so exclusive and arbitrary, as to make the government a perfect tyranny, as to the great body of the people. A guaranty, therefore, of a representative government simply, would have been of no practical value to the people.

It is plain, too, from another part of the constitution, that the constitution does not mean to imply that a representative form of government is necessarily a republican form of government ; because if it did, it would have made some specific provision as to the extent of the suffrage to be enjoyel by the constituent body. Whereas it leaves that matter to be regulated at the discretion of the States respectively.*

It is certain, therefore, that the " republican form of government," which the United States are bound to guarantee to the States, is something essentially different from, and more than, a representative government, representing such portions only of the whole people as may chance to get the power of a State into their hands, wielding it arbitrarily for their own purposes.

What, then, is implied in this " republican form of govern-

* " The House of Representatives shall be composed of members, chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the requisite qualifications' for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature."—^;-;. /., see. 2.

ment ? " This certainly^ if no more, is implied — for this must necessarily be implied in the very terms, " a republican form of government," — viz., that at least all the members of the republic shall enjoy the protection of the laws.

Whatever other disagreements there may be in men's minds, as to the essential requisites of " a republican form of government," certainly no man in his senses can deny so self-eviient a proposition as this, — that such a government necessarily implies that all tbe acknowledged meinbers of the rqmblic must be under the protection of the laws.

This being admitted, it follows that the United States must guarantee to each State a government, that shall give the protection of the laws to all the acknowledged members or citizens of the State.

But who are the acknowledged memhQvs, or citizens of a State ? We answer, that, whomsoever else they may, or may not, include, they must certainly include all the citizens of the United States, within the State. This must necessarily be so ; because it would be absurd to suppose that those people, in the various States, who united to form the national government, and thereby made themselves citizens of the United States, would also unite to guarantee a republican form of government for each of the separate States, unless they themselves were personally to have the benefit of this guaranty. It certainly cannot be supposed that they would be so foolish and suicidal as to unite to guarantee to others a government within the States, the benefits of which could be denied to themselves, or the power of which could be turned against themselves for purposes of oppression.

This guaranty, then, on the part of tho United States, of a " republican form of government " for each State, is a guaranty of a government, under which at least all the citizens of the United States, u'ithin the State, shall have the protection of (he laws.

From this proposition it follows inevitably that the United States government must determine, independently of the State government, who are the citizens of the United States, tvithin a State; for, otherwise, it could not know when it had fulfilled this guaranty to them of the protection of a republican form of go vernment. The guaranty itself might be wholly or partially defeated, at the pleasure of the State government, if it were left to the State government itself to determine who were, and who were not, among those citizens of the United States, within the State, for whose benefit this guaranty had been made. And the State government might very likely have great motive to defeat the guaranty, either in whole or in part.

It must be borne in mind that this guaranty of a republican form of government to the citizens of the United States, within a State, is a guaranty against the oppressions of any anti-republican form of government, that may succeed in obtaining power in a State. Yet clearly the United States could not protect its own citizens against such anti-republican government within the States, unless it could determine, independently of the State governments, who its own citizens, within the States, were.

We insist that this argument is entirely conclusive to prove that the United States Government must determine, for itself, who are its own citizens within the respective States ; and that the constitutions and laws of the States themselves can have nothing whatever to do with the matter.

IV

Still further proof that the constitution of the United States, and not the constitution or laws of the States, controls the citizenship of every person born in the country, is found in the fact that a simple act of congress is acknowledged by all to be sufficient, in defiance of all State laws and constitutions, to confer the privilege of United States citizenship upon persons of foreign birth. It would certainly be very absurd to give to congress such a power in regard to foreigners, if neither the United States constitution, nor the United States government had any similar power in regard to the natives of the country ; for, in that case, the constitution would do more for foreigners than for natives.

V

We therefore hold it demonstrable, at least, if not self-evident, that the constitution of the United States, " the supreme law of the land," must, »imply hy virtue of its supremacy, fix the status of every individual in the United States, independently of the State governments ; that it must operate directly upon each and every individual, native or naturalized, declaring him entitled, as a citizen of the United States, to the protection and benefits of the national government, or declaring him to be property, subject only to the will of his owner, and therefore entitled to no personal protection at all, either from the general or State governments.

VI

If it rests with the State governments to say whether the natives of the country shall be citizens of the United States, and liave the protection of the national government, or be property, subject only to the will of their owners, then certainly it rests equally with the State governments to say whether naturalized persons shall be citizens or slaves ; for naturalization by the United States government can at most but put the persons naturalized on a level with the natives. And that is all that the principle of naturalization implies.

This question therefore, as to the power of the States to convert men into property, is not one that concerns the natives of the country alone. It concerns all immigrants as well ; since the general government can certainly have no more power to protect immigrants against being reduced to property ,thanit has to protect those born on the soil.

VII

There are, then, three decisive proofs that the United States government must determine for itself, independently of the State governments, who are, and who are not (if any are not) citizens of the United States.

The first of these proofs is, that otherwise the United States government could not know its own citizens, or consequently know to whom its own proper and ordinary duties were due.

The second proof is, that otherwise the United States government could not know when it had fulfilled its guaranty of " a republican form of government " to the citizens of the United States, within the States respectively.

The third proof is, that otherwise the United States constitution and laws could either do more for foreigners (by naturalization) than they can do for those born on the soil ; or else naturahzation itself, by the United States government, would be an utterly useless process for protecting the persons naturalized against being reduced to property by the State government.

VIII

Assuming it now to be settled, that the constitution of the United States fixes the status of every person, as a citizen or a slave ; and that it does so, " any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding ;" let us ascertain what its decision on this point is. To do so, we have only to ascertain by and for whom the constitution of the United States was established. This the instrument itself has explicitly informed us. It declares itself to have been established by " the people of the United States," for the benefit of " themselves and their posterity." From this declaration of the constitution itself there can be no appeal. And the instrument is to be interpreted throughout consistently with this declaration. Thus interpreted, it implies that all the then " people of the United States," with their " posterity," were to be citizens of the United States, and, as such, to have the benefit and protection of the general government ; and consequently that none of them could be lawfully reduced to the condition of property. It also authorizes congress to naturalize all persons of foreign birth, coming into the country, without discriminating between those that may come in voluntarily, and those that may be brought in against their will. It also authorizes Congress " to punish offences against the law of nations ; " and thus authorizes the punishment of all attempts to enslave the people of other nations, whether they come here voluntarily, or are brought here u

by force. It also, without making any discrimination as to persons, authorizes the writ of habeas corpus^ which denies the right of property in man. It also requires the United States to " guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government ; " under which at least all the citizens of the United States, within the State, shall have the protection of the laws. In these various ways, the constitution of the United States, " the supreme law of the land," has made the principle of property in man impossible anywhere within the United States ; and has empowered the general government to maintain that principle, in opposition to any subordinate or State government.

We are aware that the supreme court of the United States, in the Dred Scott case, have asserted that the phrase, " the people of the United States," did not mean all the people, but only all the white people, of the United States. And they attempt to fortify this opinion by saying that the Declaration of Independence itself did not mean to assert that " all men were created equal," but only that all white men were created equal. To this view of the case we will, at this time, offer no other answer than this : that, if this famous clause of the Declaration of Independence is to be interpreted according to this opinion of the supreme court, the whole instrument must also be interpreted in accordance with it ; and the necessary consequence would then be, that the Declaration of Independence absolved only the ivhite people of the country from their allegiance to the English crown, leaving the black people still subject to that allegiance, and entitled to corresponding protection. Thus Queen Victoria would have now, in our midst, four millions of subjects, whose rights she ought at once to take care of, as she would undoubtedly be very willing to do.

We are also aware, that, although " the idea that there could be property in man " was studiously excluded from the constitution itself, it is nevertheless historically known that an understanding existed, outside of the constitution, among some of the framers, and other politicians of that day, that, if the honest character of the instrument itself should be successful in securing its adoption by the people, these framers and others would then use their inflaence to give to the instrument an interpretation favorable to the maintenance of slavery. And we are aware that it is now claimed that this outside understanding ought to be substituted, as it hitherto has been, for the instrument itself, and acknowledged as the real constitution, so far as slavery is concerned.

Our answer on this point is, — that this outside understanding could have existed among but a small portion of the whole people ; that they dared not incorporate it in the constitution itself; that, instead of being any part of the constitution itself, it was but a traitorous conspiracy against the very constitution, which they, with others, induced the people of the United States to adopt ; that it could have had no legal effect or validity, even among those who were actually parties to it ; and that we, of this day, would not only be slaves, but idiots, if we were to allow the criminal purposes of these men to be substituted for the constitution ; and thus suffer ourselves, in effect, to be governed by a set of dead traitors and tyrants, who no longer have any rights in this world ; who, when living, dared put only honest purposes into the constitution ; and who, if now living, would deserve to be punished for their treason and their crimes, rather than reverenced as patriots and statesmen, and taken as authority as to the true meaning of the constitution.

The fraudulent interpretation given to the constitution at large, in respect to slavery, has been accomplished mainly by means of the fraudulent interpretation given to the one word " free," in the clause relative to representation and direct taxation. The conspirators against freedom, with their dupes, have, from the foundation of the government, claimed that this word was used to describe a free person, as distinguished from a slave. Whereas it had been used in England for centuries, and in this country from its first settlement, to describe a native or naturalized person, as distinguished fro7n an alien. Thus our colonial charters guaranteed that persons born in the colonies should " be free and natural subjects, as if born in the realm of England." When the troubles arose between this and the mother country, in regard to taxation, our fathers insisted that they were ^\free

British subjects," and therefore could not be taxed without their consent. And, up to the Revolution, the words /reg and/re<?me?2, if not the only words used, were the words principally used, to designate native or naturalized persons, as distinguished from aliens.

After the Revolution, the word "/ree " continued to be used in this political sense, through the country generally. And, at the time the constitution of the United States was adopted, it was so used in the constitution of Georgia, Art. XI. ; in the general naturalization law of Georgia, passed Feb. 7, 1785, Sec. 2 ; in a statute of Georgia, passed Feb. 22, 1785, granting lands to the Count D'Estaing, and making him " 2kfree citizen " of the State; in the constitution of South Carolina, Sec. 13; in a statute of South Carolina, passed March 27, 1787, naturalizing Hugh Alexander Nixon ; in the constitution of North Carolina, Sec. 40 ; in the constitution of Pennsylvania, Sec. 42 ; in numerous acts of the legislature of Massachusetts, from the year 1784 to 1789, naturalizing the individuals named in them; in the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut, then continued in force as constitutions ; in the Articles of Confederation, Art. IV., Sec. 1 ; and in the Ordinance of 1787. The statutes and constitutions of several of the States used the words freeman 2im\ freemen in a nearly similar, if not in precisely the same, sense.