China, Japan and Korea

Front matter

^A V

.0 0.

.aO

Part I A Political Survey Chap

I. INTRODUCTORY ....

II. YUAN SHIH-k'aI, 1912-16 .

III. CHINA JOINS IN THE WORLD WAR

IV. THE REPUBLIC OF TO-DAY .

V. CIVIL WAR AS A PROFESSION - .

VI. china: the problem of reconstruction

VII. JAPAN : her vital problem

VIII. japan's policy IN CHINA .

IX. the japan of to-day

X. THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN KOREA

PAGS

I

68 89 113 135 156 176 192

PART II STUDIES AND IMPRESSIONS XI. ON A JAPANESE PACIFIC LINER XII. VMODERN TOKYO XIII. AT A JAPANESE THEATRE .

XIV<./A DAY IN SEOUL XV. (^SHANGHAI

XVI. NORTHWARD THROUGH SHANTUNG XVII. ^PEKING IN 1920 XVIII. AN EMPEROR IN WAITING .

XIX. THREE PALACES

INDEX ....

209 220 230 240

245 267 278

295 309 323 vn

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

DAWN ON THE CHIENTANG RIVER .

WISDOM IN THE ROUGH ^

VERY BUSY j

CHINA : THE ETERNAL PROBLEM

BREADWINNERS ....

A CHINESE GARDEN

A BUDDHIST PRIEST

ASCENDING THE RAPIDS, HWEI RIVER "j

A FISHERMAN ON THE WHANGPOO j

UNMARRIED GIRLS O.F THE MIDDLE CLASS, SHANGHAI

SUNSET ON THE HWEI RIVER ....

A VILLAGE ON THE CHIENTANG RIVER .

A WAYSIDE SHRINE ....

" SHE DWELT AMONG THE UNTRODDEN WAYS

HOMEWARD AT EVENING

THINGS ANCIENT AND MODERN ....

" THOSE THAT DIG AND WEAVE, THAT PLANT AND BUILD

"JUST A SONG AT TWILIGHT"

SCENE IN THE THEATRE QUARTER, KYOTO "j

THE PALACE MOAT, TOKYO j

FUJIYAMA THE PEERLESS .....

A JUNK ON THE WHANGPOO "j

BOAT TRAFFIC, SOOCHOW CREEK, SHANGHAlj

THE RICE HARVEST, JAPAN "j

PRIMITIVE TRANSPORT, JAPAnJ

A KOREAN FAMILY IN WINTER COSTUME "I

CORNER OF THE AUDIENCE HALL, SEOUlJ

To /ace page Frontispiece

I ■

26 30 38 56

82 90

100 108

144 160

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

To face ^age . 212

ON BOARD A JAPANESE LINER I WRESTLING j

THE MOATED WALLS OF CHIYODA PALACE^ TOKYoJ

UTAYEMON AND FUKUSUKE .....

THEATRE STREET IN KYOTO .....

IN THE OLD PALACE ENCLOSURE^ SEOUL. ]

KOREAN GIRLS AT A JAPANESE SCHOOL^ SEOULj

A QUAINT LITTLE MONSTER^ SHANGHAI "k

[ . . . .248

MODES AND FASHIONS, SHANGHAI J

YOUNG china: MARRIAGE UP TO DATE^I

A LADY OF FASHION, SHANGHAI j

MILITARISM IN THE MAKING )

THE FEMALE OF THE SPECIESj

GENERAL MA LIANG's TROOPS AT DRILL]

ANCESTOR WORSHIP J

CAMELS RESTING, PEKING "j

A CAMEL TRAIN FROM THE WESTERN HILLS, PEKINoJ

MILLET IN OCTOBER \

ON THE FROZEN PEIHO, TIENTSInJ

THE NORTHERN RAILWAY APPROACH TO PEKING l

UNDER THE WALLS OF PEKING j

A LLAMA RITUAL, PEKING "i

IN THE MANCHU QUARTER, PEKINGJ

ENTRANCE TO A TAJEN'S RESIDENCE, PEKING^I

IN THE ONCE-FORBIDDEN CITY, PEKING j

230 236

272 282 290

306 312

Chapter I

In a book published at the end of 1912,^ the year of the abdication of the Manchu dynasty and the estabhshment of the Chinese RepubHc, I endeavoured to trace the causes, and to predict some of the results, of that upheaval. Before proceeding to discuss the history of the eight years which have elapsed since that book was written, I propose to revert briefly to some of the views which it expressed and to some of the opinions which it evoked, in China and abroad. Eight years are all too brief a space of time in the life of a nation to afford any conclusive evidence as to the direction of its political evolution; nevertheless, the course of events since 19 12, and the actual position of affairs at Peking and in the provinces afford, I think, good ground for certain useful conclusions in regard to questions upon which opinion has widely differed, and still differs, in England and America.

Of these, the most important is, firstly, the general question of the fitness of the Chinese people for self-government ; and, secondly, the question of Young China's aspirations and achievements in the organisation and working of representative institutions.

I do not propose to recapitulate here the causes of the Chinese revolution of 1911-12 ; the truth is now generally recognised, I believe, that these causes were fundamentally economic rather than political, and that, until the social s^^stem of the Chinese people shall have been modified by process of education, the acute pressure of population upon means of subsistence, which results

1 Recent Events and Present Policies in China, 6 from that system, must continue to be an ever-recurring source of unrest and strife. It is also generally recognised that under these conditions, no matter what names and shapes authority may assume, the Chinese can never hope to be quietly and orderly governed, unless and until the Central Government is strong enough to keep in check, by force, the ever-latent elements of disorder. All over the world, and most noticeably since the War, men are being led to perceive that the increasing pressure of population upon the food resources of the planet, constitutes civilisation's gravest problem and the paramount cause 9f world unrest. In China, the social fabric is, comparatively speaking, so simple, that the connection between cause and effect is swift and unmistakable when pestilence or famine decimate whole provinces. A few observers there are who, while admitting the severity of the economic pressure which has made Chinese history for centuries a series of cataclysms, still profess to believe that it may be relieved by expedients, such as emigration, the scientific development of mines, or the improvement of agriculture. But, generally speaking, the truth appears to be realised that, even if it were possible to obtain temporary alleviation by any or all of these means, the fundamental problem would still remain unsolved, the application of the law of population being merely deferred, and its results aggravated, by such expedients, unless accompanied by a reduction of the birth-rate.

The views which I ventured to put forward in 1913 concerning the permanent causes of unrest, and incidentally of the revolution, in China, naturally appealed with greater force to Europeans there resident than to observers and students of Chinese affairs at a distance. Many of the latter, unfortunately, are by temperament or vocation disposed to believe in the efficacy of political formulae or religious beliefs to relieve society of the penalties of its collective ignorance or collective folly, and attach small importance to economics. For a certain very prevalent class of rhapsodists and idealists, the experience of a thousand yesterdays is always as nought compared with to-morrow's vision of the Promised Land. Show them, by weight of indisputable evidence gathered from trustworthy sources, that in the East no magic virtue of regeneration proceeds from the blessed words " Democracy " and " Republic," prove to them that the so-called Parliamentarians have reduced the political status of China to the level of San Domingo, they will denounce you as a reactionary, urge you to have more faith, and proceed to proclaim with increased fervour the application of their infallible panaceas.

Writing in 1912, while the Republic was still in the making, I observed that no stable form of government could possibly be evolved from the materials at Young China's disposal. The reasons for this belief were given, as follows : —

" Remembering the ancestry and genesis of Young China, being personally acquainted with many of its leading spirits, having followed its operations and activities in every province from the beginning of the present revolution, I am compelled to the conviction that salvation from this quarter is impossible, not only because Young China itself is unregenerate and undisciplined, but because its ideals and projects of government involve the creation of a new social and political structure utterly unsuited to the character and traditions of the race; because it is contrary to all experience that a people cut off from its deep-rooted beliefs and habits of life should develop and retain a vigorous national consciousness."

Another passage summarised the actual position created by the collapse of the Manchu Government's authority, as follows : —

" The army, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, has already repudiated Young China; the horde of hungry pohticians remains absorbed in futile arguments and sordid intrigues; the Government is without prestige, policy or power; three parties in the State, ahke forgetful of their country's urgent needs, struggle for place and pelf; the Cabinet is distracted by the advice of amateur politicians at the capital and the threats and protests of the provinces."

These opinions were naturally denounced with great vehemence by Young China in the vernacular Press, and challenged by more than one vocational optimist amongst the foreign advisers of the Chinese Government. They were also freely criticised by certain writers, notably in America, who had discovered, in Sun Yat-sen and his ready-made Republic, Heaven-sent proof of the saving grace of democratic principles. The Daily News, for example, quoted with approval the opinion of a well-known Oriental scholar, who, writing from Peking in November 1912, said : —

" The influence of men like Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing has tended to effect a rapprochement between the Nationalists and President Yuan Shih-k'ai, to the great improvement of the situation. The position here has improved to an extraordinary extent."

- A month later the Christian Science Monitor of Boston, U.S.A., severely criticising my views, gave a glowing account of the preparations which it seriously believed were then a-foot in China for " the elections for the first National Parliament." Its picture of political activities under the Republic is worth reproducing, not only because of its earnest absurdity, but because, in spite of all that has since happened, the same sort of nonsense is still being written by the incurable theorists who insist that the East is bound to derive moral and material benefits from adopting the political institutions of the West. Wrote the Editor of the Monitor : —

" Sharply contrasted with the pessimistic predictions of Mr. Bland, whilom representative of the London Times in Peking, now giving a series of lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston, are the hopeful comments of the Chinese Press and public men on the course of events during the first year of the Republic. . . . Unless our sources of information are much distorted, the twelvemonth has disclosed both Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shihk'ai as large enough to subordinate themselves and their ambitions to performing genuine national duties, one as a peripatetic teacher of racial unity throughout the provinces, and the other as provisional President, handling diverse domestic and international problems with sagacity and patience. No mere novices or doctrinaires are in power at Peking, as Mr. Bland would have the American public believe. . . . Evidently they err who think the Chinese ill-adapted to deal with principles and methods of government. The papers of State issued at Peking to-day not only lack most of the former ornateness of phrasing and absurdity of excuse for official lapses which often used to make the Imperial Decrees as ludicrous as they were cruel ; these papers are now straightforward, logical, and impressive in their vital dealings with concrete needs of the people."

Many visions of the new Chinese Arcadia were vouchsafed at this period. Here is one proclaimed by Mr. Hua Chuen-mei, Secretary of the China Society of America, in an article published by the New York Tribune in January 1913 : —

" Since the establishment of the Republic, all the officials of the country have been fulfilling their administrative and judicial functions, and commerce and industry have been resumed with added eagerness and enterprise. Every branch of civil life has been, or is being, reconstituted or modified to accord with the new national spirit. The people as a whole are content and pleased with the Government they have ordained, because even in the short space of a twelvemonth, that Government has demonstrated its honesty, its efiiciency, and its loyalty to the national ideals. . . .

" In the fall of 191 1, when the revolutionary armies in the Yangtsze Valley raised the standard of republicanism as against monarchism, China had found herself. The enthusiasm for popular sovereignty spread like wild prairie fire. The eighteen mutually jealous provinces under the Manchu regime now ceased to be divided.

The movement for a series of independent States was promptly thrown overboard, and the people of all China eagerly and without coercion fell into line, first to oust the Manchu, then to establish representative Government. . . . "... The people of China had spoken loud and unmistakably in favour of the democratic principle of Government. Besides, the form of republicanism, long ago communicated by American merchants and missionaries and by the Chinese students educated in American institutions of learning, had already universally infected the people, and as the years passed, the symptoms of a wider consciousness of popular rights developed into a veritable contagious disease for national freedom and enfranchisement . ' '

I have quoted the above, not only because of its melancholy retrospective interest, but because it is typical of the windy ullage with which the Young China of Western learning still regales its admirers abroad ; typical of the kind of bread which returns to us, after many days, cast by the hand of error upon the waters of delusion.^

It is only fair to say that public opinion abroad during the first years of the Republic was powerfully influenced by the consistently optimistic views of the late Dr. Morrison, the famous Times correspondent, who became an adviser to the Chinese Government in 1912. Dr. Morrison's sympathies were instinctively with the foreign-educated section of Young China, and in spite of many disillusions, he clung to his genial belief that it would eventually produce leaders imbued with disinterested patriotism and constructive statesmanship. His indomitable optimism and loyalty to those whom he served, led him to turn a tolerant, not to say a blind eye, to the seamy side of Chinese politics, and to emphasise their bright spots. Thus in the winter of 1912, his views on

1 Dr. Wellington Koo, lately Chinese Minister at Washington, put it even more artistically, when he said, " In reconstructing her government on the principle of sovereignty vested in the people as a body, China has thrown autocracy overboard and is putting her house in order under the aegis of democracy."

the situation, published as an interview in the Pall Mall Gazette, and circulated broadcast, were of a nature to encourage confidence in the future, if only because of the worthy doctor's world-wide reputation. As the Spectator observed : —

" Dr. Morrison's vision of China is radiant. Trade has reached a record; the soldiers who used to prey upon the country when dismissed penniless from the army, now receive their pay and become quiet and useful citizens; no one desires the return of the Manchus, because every one knows the difference between gross rapacity and a sincere attempt to govern decently ; daily newspapers and cheaper telegrams carry enhghtenment throughout the land, the Christian calendar has been officially adopted, and Sunday is recognised as a day of rest; and oil, by the genial light of which newspapers can be read in the long, dark evenings, has brought a moral illumination into the hves of the people, since they are no longer driven to the solacing distraction of opium."

It is also necessary to remember, in judging these opinions retrospectively, that political economy is|a dreary science ; that there is no delusion so prevalent as belief in the miracle of a nation re-born and structurally changed by means of a revolution; and that the enthusiasms born of that belief are always keen and contagious. He who, moved by the emotion of such enthusiasm, discerns the splendid dawn of a new era, may|be absolved if his vision is surcharged with couleur de rose. But when the dream- castles of that dawn have vanished in the clear light of day, a heavy responsibility rests with those who, either as zealots or as optimists de metier, continue to proclaim their solid virtues.

During the first two years of the Republic, the British Press as a whole shared the prevalent enthusiasm for the new era, to the extent that it was generally prepared to suspend its verdict as to the merits and capacity of Young China, and to judge the tree by its fruits. As a reviewer in the Spectator put it (December 7, 1912) : —

"If it were safe to surrender oneself entirely to the voice of authority in judging of Chinese affairs to-day, we should be guided unhesitatingly by Mr. Bland. But just now authority speaks with a divided voice. There is Dr. Morrison, for instance, who is as confident about the future of China as Mr. Bland is doubtful. Professor Reinsch ^ also inclines to the side of the optimists."

At the same time, the English Press, better informed concerning foreign affairs than the majority of American papers, was never greatly impressed by the eloquence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and by many it was felt that a grave responsibility was incurred by those missionaries and other well-meaning enthusiasts who had advised and encouraged Young China to believe, or at least to proclaim, that the solution of their country's dangers and difficulties was to be found in the adoption of a Republican form of Government. Thus, speaking of Sun Yat-sen, the Observer said (December 8, 1912) ; —

" To the support which the outer world gave to this unpractical theoriser, are due the facts that the Chinese Republic stands upon a base of sand, that the moderate men are looking forward to the re-establishment of a monarchy, the army to a military despotism or extended anarchy, the provinces to autonomy, and the robber Powers around China to spoliation on a scale even bigger than has hitherto been possible. Young China's friends have served the honest members of the party badly, by persuading Europe and America to accept as genuine the elaborate sham which has been erected, by talking of the solidity of the Republic and the acquiescence of the people,"

In a special review of " Recent Events and Present Policies in China," published in the Nineteenth Century for May 1913, Earl Cromer observed : —

" We English are largely responsible for creating the frame of mind which is even now luring Young Turks,

1 Formerly American Minister at Peking; now financial adviser to the Chinese Government in New York.

Chinamen, and other Easterns into the political wilderness by the display of false signals. We have, indeed, our Blands in China, our Milners in Egypt, our Miss Durhams in the Balkan Peninsula, and our Miss Bells in Mesopotamia, who wander far a-field, gleaning valuable facts and laying before their countrymen conclusions based on acquired knowledge and wide experience. But their efforts are only partially successful. They are often shivered on the solid rock of preconceived prejudice and genuine but ill-informed sentimentalism. A large section of the English public are, in fact, singularly wanting in political imagination. Although they would not, in so many words, admit the truth of the statement, they none the less act and speak as if sound national development in whatsoever quarter of the world, must of necessity proceed along their own conventional, insular, and time-honoured lines, and along those lines alone."

A little later Earl Cromer wrote to me : — " I am very glad you liked my paper in the Nineteenth Century ; it represents my sincere convictions. Although I do not possess any local knowledge of Chinese affairs, I have very little doubt that your forecast will turn out to be correct, only, as not infrequently happens with prophets, you will very likely have to wait some while before your prophecies are fulfilled. As a rule, people who see clearly into a general situation are rather apt to under-rate the time required for political evolution. The locus classicus on this subject is the case of De Tocqueville, who, in the very early days, cast an extraordinarily accurate horoscope of the course which would be run by the Second Empire, but it took seventeen years before events proved how correct he had been,"

When Earl Cromer wrote of the " genuine but ill-informed sentimentalism" which had led certain classes of Englishmen to sow seeds of unrest amongst Oriental peoples, he was judging from the results of his own experience and observation in the Near East. In China, our faddists, fanatics, and intellectual Bolsheviks have, no doubt, done their bit, but on the whole the influences which have created the most mischief, by breeding a spirit of indiscipline and sedition among the younger generation of literati, and by encouraging political alarms and excursions in the name of democracy, have been more American than English. It is worthy of note in this connection that, now that the chickens of this particular error are coming home to roost, it is from the same intellectual sources that emanate the latest warnings of the Yellow Peril, the American Vision of Pan- Asia, " welded into a common solidarity of feeling against the Dominant White Man," of the white race swamped in " the rising tide of colour," and civilisation wiped out " by the imperious urge of the coloured world towards racial expansion ! " ^ Thus, at the present moment, while one group of well-meaning enthusiasts is fervently advocating the abolition of the foreigner's extra-territorial rights in China, as a matter of abstract justice, another group of equally sympathetic advisers sees no remedy for the existing chaos but the application of strict foreign supervision, not only to China's finances, but to her internal political machinery ! ^

1 would ask the reader to believe that, in thus referring to the part played by foreign sympathisers and advisers during the period immediately following the Revolution, I have no wish to flourish the prophet's mantle, or to drag coat-tails of complacency. My purpose in traversing this old ground is two-fold. Firstly, to emphasise the fact that those who have encouraged the Western-learning " Intellectuals " of Young China to apply their illdigested text-book theories to the business of government, have incurred serious responsibility and wrought much mischief. (It must, I think, be admitted that if the disastrous experiments of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers had not been supported by Europeans on the spot, and by the sympathy of public opinion abroad, their career would have been brief. Yuan Shih-k'ai

* Vide The Rising Tide of Colour, by Lothrop Stoddard. Scribners.

2 Vide Modern Constitutional Development in China, by Harold M. Vinacke. Princetown University Press.

would have succeeded in restoring something Hke law and order, and the present chaos of strife and corruption would have been to a great extent averted.) Secondly, I desire to show that, notwithstanding the parlous results achieved by Young China's politicians in the name of Democracy, there is still a tendency, in certain quarters (especially where " moral uplift " is combined with a shrewd business instinct), to apply the old couleur de rose and to create a very misleading impression abroad as to the actual condition of affairs in the Far East, thus encouraging the self-constituted rulers of China in the belief that responsible opinion in America and Europe sympathises with their theories, and sanctions their practices, of government.

I have spoken of the optimist de metier. I know of no more striking example of the pernicious nonsense with which Young China has been fed and misled, than " the semi-official statement of China's case to the world," published by Mr. Putnam Weale in 1918, under the title The Fight for the Republic in China. When this book was written, the northern Military Party, subsidised by Japan, had just succeeded in defeating General Chang Hsiin's attempt to restore the Monarchy and his own fortunes, and in the collapse of this farcical coup d'etat, Mr. Weale found welcome proof of the devotion of the Anfu faction to the principles of enlightened Liberalism. Once again, whilst lawlessness stalked redhanded through the plundered land, and proofs multiplied on every hand that the so-called dem.ocracy had become more flagrantly venal than ever before, he descried the dawn of a new era, in which the world would " welcome China to the family of nations, not only on terms of equality, but as a representative of Liberalism and a subscriber to all those sanctions on which the civilisation of peace rests." He predicted that " within a limited period, Parliamentary Government would be more successful in China than in some European countries," and " something very similar to the Anglo-Saxon theory of

Government impregnably entrenched in Peking." In his opinion, " the marvellous revolution of 1911 had given back to this ancient race its old position of leader of ideas on the shores of the Yellow Sea." Finally, he expressed the confident belief, " based on a knowledge of all the facts," that China would shortly achieve " a united Government and a cessation of internecine strife." The whole tenour of his writing was such as to encourage the world at large to see in the sordid strife of politicians like Tuan Chi-jui, Chang Hsiin, Sun Yat-sen, and Tang Shao-yi, a conflict of high principles, from which an enlightened democracy was emerging, with heahng in its wings. " The new China," he declared, " is a matter of life and death to the people, and the first business of the foreigner is to uphold the new behefs." For those who fill highly-paid posts as advisers under the Chinese Government, this may be so, but for the majority of foreigners in the East, the " new beliefs," as manifested by the mandarins and military chieftains of the new dispensation, are an alien and parasitic growth, which threatens to paralyse the ancient and venerable tree of Chinese civilisation.

Mr. Weale's book was written before the world had witnessed Russia's appalling demonstration of the truth that when a nation unfitted for representative government is cast into the melting-pot of " red " revolution, an unprofitable scum rises to the top, and that the consequences for the man in the street are very different from those predicted by the Intellectual harbingers of the millennium. The world has witnessed the disillusion of the honest dreamers who believed that the Russian nation and its government would be purged of evil by the abolition of the autocracy; if China's affairs were not beyond its normal ken, it would know that here also, as in Russia, the patriotic Intellectuals have been put to silence and shame by the professional agitator and the place-seeker. Almost before Mr. Weale's book was pubUshed, the course of events at Peking had revealed something of the real nature of the " civilisation of peace " to be expected from the contending political factions, for General Chang Hsiin had been whitewashed (for value received) and orders had been issued by the President for the arrest of Sun Yat-sen and other Cantonese malcontents.

The present brief study of the actual condition of affairs in the Far East is based generally on observation of the conditions existing early in 1920. At the time of my visit to Peking, in February, the storm was brewing, which eventually led to the overthrow of Marshall Tuan Chi-jui, " Little Hsii," and the Japanesesubsidised " Anfu " clique by General Wu Pei-fu and the Chihli faction, to a heavy bill of costs by the military commanders, and a redistribution of the spoils of office. As usual, professional and amateur apologists for the " world made safe for democracy," vied with each other in proclaiming that the defeat of Tuan and his friends assuredly meant the end of false dawns, and that General Wu Pei-fu, with his National Convention, would inaugurate the long-expected new era. Well, Tuan bowed in due course to the superior forces brought to bear against him and went his dignified way into lucrative retirement ; the National Convention was speedily forgotten in the turmoil of new intrigues amongst the victors, and to-day the Directors of the Southern Parliament still refuse to be persuaded to come into the Northern fold, and still accuse the Northern leaders of selling their country's birthright for a mess of Japanese pottage.

In the meantime, while the politicians fight for place and power, what of the destinies of the common people, in whose name and for whose alleged benefit the contending factions appeal to the world at large? The sorrows and sufferings to which the " stupid people " have been exposed during the past ten years are very seldom mentioned by the apologists of misrule, and the Chinese Parliamentarians are more concerned in discussing the forms and proceedings of their embryo

Constitution than in relieving the miseries of provinces decimated by brigandage and famine. These things are lightly dismissed, or described as the inevitable condition of a race inured to such calamities since the beginning of time. The world will never know the nature and extent of the sufferings endured by the common people throughout China since the passing of the Manchu dynasty, nor will any census reveal the number of those who have " gone to their graves like beds." While Europe was at war, the affairs of the inarticulate East concerned us less than usual; and even to-day, when millions are silpntly dying of famine in North China, we hear more of Sun Yat-sen's latest political manifestoes than of measures for the prevention of these catastrophes. Your optimist de metier points triumphantly to the fact that China's foreign trade for the past year constitutes a record, and from this fact he proceeds to draw conclusions reassuring for the bond-holder and comfortable for the worthy people who like to believe that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

From the chapters of the present work which deal with China, the reader may learn something of the condition of affairs in the summer of 1920, and be able to form his own opinion as to the material and moral benefits which the Chinese people have derived from the attempt of the revolutionaries of 191 1 to adapt to their use and for their own advantage the political institutions of the West. But in order to make the story more complete in detail, and to bring it more fully up to date, let me supplement it with certain recent extracts from the North China Herald.