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Mysticism, Freudianism and scientific psychology

Knight Dunlap · 1920 · Scanned text · Free in the US

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About this book

Author
Knight Dunlap
Language
English
Published
1920
Length
45,168 words · about 3 h 10 min
Sections
4 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States

 

Contents (4)
  1. Preface about 2 min
  2. Contents under 1 min
  3. CHAPTER II Freud and the Psychoanalysts 44 about 1 h 24 min
  4. IV = about 1 h 43 min

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Preface

The past decade has witnessed a remarkable revival of popular interest in philosophical mysticism and in spiritualism. Along with this revival has gone a spread of the so-called ' ' newer psychology ' ' of Freud and his satellites, which, beginning in the medical field, now claims the whole arena of human activities. The spiritualistic developments have been, by various authors, attributed to the war ; and perhaps the war, with its profound mental and spiritual upheavals, may have contributed to them. The simultaneous developments in the hoary cult of philosophical mysticism, and the newer cult of Freudianism nevertheless indicate that the movements have derived their impetus only in small part from the events of the last few years, but are the expressions of forces which have been much longer in their releasing, and depend on deeply implanted principles of human nature.

To show that it is no mere curious accident which leads booksellers to shelve together books on these three topics, is in part the purpose of the present volume. The fact that patrons who look over the stock on one of these subjects are apt to be interested in the others, has its foundation in the real

8 Preface

unity of the three, which runs through their diversities. And all three involve an assault on the very life of the biological sciences ; an assault which scientific psychology alone is capable of warding off. In impKcit recognition of this fact, each makes its immediate attack on the methods and results of scientific psychology. Hence it is the duty of the psychologist to enlighten the public concerning the real nature of this siren trinity.

I had projected the inclusion in this volume of a study of spiritualism, along with that of mysticism and psychoanalysis. But the adequate treatment of spiritualism really requires a volume to itself, and is not essential to the discussion of Freudianism, although it illuminates the latter. Moreover, spiritualism makes its maximal appeal to a part of the public which differs from that to which psychoanalysis is most attractive; its antagonism to science is more open and undisguised. Psychoanalysis, which attempts to creep in wearing the uniform of science, and to strangle it from the inside, is the more immediate danger, and spiritualism may be allowed to wait.

I hope in a later volume to analyze the phenomena on which spiritualism is built, and point out the commonplace psychological principles on which they may be explained. In the same volume also, I plan to give a full exposition of the phenomena and causes of dreams.

Preface 9

I may here record my opinion that the final result of the Freudian movement may be beneficial, although the immediate effects are the deluding of many persons, and the temporary checking of psychological research. Just as Christian Science has tremendously accelerated the progress of Scientific Medicine, so psychoanalysis, by compelling psychology to put its own house in order, ^vill eventually help in the development of the Scientific Psychology it aims to thrust aside.

The constructive third part, on the Foundations of Scientific Psychology, was included at the suggestion of Dr. Buford Johnson, to whose critical assistance is due in great measure such coherence as this volume may have. I am very much indebted also to Professor W. D. Furry for his careful and capable revision of the proof.

Knight Dunlap.

Baltimore, August, 1920.

Contents

CHAPTEE I

Page Mysticism 13

Meaning of the Term, 13; Mystical Doctrine/6f Knowledge, 15; Origins of European Mysticism, 17; Dionysius the! Areopagite, 18; Influence of Scotus Erigina, 18; German, Flemish, and Spanish Mysticism, 19; Alexandrian School, 20; Third Kind of Knowledge as Agnosia, 22; Identity of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, 25; Knowledge as Love, 26; Maeterlinck and the Knowledge of Other Souls, 28; Attitude towards Woman, 32; Quasi- Mystieism and Pseudo-Mysticism, 33; Santa Teresa, 35; Effects of Anesthetics, 37; Mystic Experience as an Emotional State, 38 ; Sexual Factor in Mystic Experience, 39; Anti-Social Aspect, 40; The Mystic an Intellectual Slacker, 41; Fallacy of Ambiguous Middle Tetm, 42

CHAPTER II Freud and the Psychoanalysts 44

Origin of Psychoanalysis, 44; Program and Claims, 45; Unconscious Mind the Essential Postulate, 46; Repression and the Complex, 48; Conflict, 49; Sexual Origin of Complexes, 50; Sex Desire in Infancy, 52; Infantilism, Oedipus Complex, Electra Complex, 53; Luther's Theory, 55; Jung's Mother and Complex, 58; Freudian Use of Term ''Sexual," 59; Fallacy of Secundum Quid, 60; Wish Fulfillment, 61; Causation of Dreams, 61; Manifest Content, 68; General Sex Symbols, 68; Technique of Dream Interpretation, 72; Artificial Dreams, 75; Jimg's Number Dream, 77; Actual Symbolism in Dreams, 78; Forgetting, and Various Other Effects of Complexes, 80;

Contents 11

Page Selective Nature of Psychoanalytic Interpretations, 83 Similarity of Freudian and Spiritualistic Arguments, 87 Suggested Extensions of Freudian ^'Explanations," 88 The Mystical Foundations of Freudianism, 89; Antagonism between Psychoanalysis and Science, 92; Riklin's Analysis of Fairy Tales, 93; Doctrine of the Unconscious as Eefuge for Scientific Slackers, 95; Involving Fallacy of Ambiguous Middle, 97 ; Use of Fallacy Deliberate, 99 ; Practical Eesults of Psychoanalysis, 99; Janet's Opinion, 100 ; Possibility of Cures by Building up Complexes, 102 ; Evil Eesults where Cures Fail, 103; General Method of Cure, 103 ; Pornographic Aspect of Freudian Propaganda, 104; Value of Eepression, 105; Method of Eepressing Desires, 107; Pathological Sex Activity as a Cause of Neuroses, 108; Prostitution as a Factor, 110.

CHAPTEE III

The Foundations of Scientific Psychology 112

Fundamental Points in Scientific Procedure, 112; Empirical Basis and Working Hypotheses, 112 ; Experimental Method, 114; Scientific Proof, 115; Anecdotal Method and Selective Eeasoning, 116; Exactness of Terms, 116; Starting Point of Psychology, 119; Epistemological Dualism, 120; Unconscious Consciousness Impossible, 122; Consciousness not a Stuff, 124; Ambiguity of Term, 125; Physiology and Psychology, 126; Working Hypotheses of Psychology, 128; Innate Ideas, 128; Instinct and Volition, 130; Biological Conditions of Consciousness, 130; Eeaction Arc Hypothesis, 132; Eeaction and Consciousness, 133; Conditions of Thought, 136; Emotion, 137; Consciousness as Awareness of Eeal Objects, 140; Historical Continuity of Psychology, 141; Development of Perception, 141; Drainage in Habit Formation, 143; Imagination not Involved in Perception, 145; Association of Ideas, 146; A Type of Habit

12 Contents .

Page Formation, 147; Illustrations from Memorizing Words and Learning to Waltz, 149; Integration and Attention, 153; Neural Condition of Consciousness Synthetic, 157; Habits of Habits, 158; Application of the Reaction Hypothesis, 158; The Nature of the Self, 159; Persistence of Habits, 160; Causal Basis of Conscious Actions, 163; Relation of Psychology to Social Sciences, 164; Psychology and Psychiatry, 165; Sei Factor in Conscious Life, 166; Pathological Sex Experiences, 167; Memory and Modifications of Nervous System, 168; Unconscious Mind a Fiction, 169; Pseudo-psychologies, 171; Unaccredited Psychologists, 172; Scientific Attitude of Psychologists, 173.

MYSTICISM, FREUDIANISM AND SCIEN- TIFIC PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

MYSTICISM

The term mysticism and its cognate terms mystical and mystic have in popular usage a range of somewhat confusing meanings. In the technical language of philosophy, however, these terms have a definite application to a specific doctrine of knowledge : and it is with this narrow and proper significance of the terms that we are here concerned. The words themselves are derived from the Greek word mysterion which means a '^secret religious ceremony.'' *^ Mysterion'' in turn is derived from the word myo which means *^to be mysterious or secret;" literally, *'to keep one's mouth shut." *' Mysterious " and '^ mystery" are from the same word from which these other terms are derived. Originally a ** mystery" was something which should be kept secret, which one could not reveal. In modern usage, however, a ^^ mystery" is merely something about which one cannot learn the truth. ** Mysterious " is the adjective cognate ^T.th ^^mystery;" and ^^ mystic" as an adjective belongs with these two terms. ' ' Mystic " as a noun, means one who holds the doctrine which is called *^ mysticism," or who practically applies some of the results of that doctrine.

Mysticism may be defined briefly in a well established phrase as the belief in a third hind of knowledge. It has played so important a part in the history of thought that the attempt to understand it is well worth while, and its understanding throws light on some of the perplexing points in modern psychology.

^ Knowledge has in the past been described as being of two sorts. Sometimes the two sorts of knowledge have been designated as ^'sensuous" and ^intellectual," sometimes as ^'perceptual" and '' ideational. " As a matter of fact these two divisions of the field of knowledge are not equivalent : The sensuous and the perceptual are not coextensive ; neither are the intellectual and the ideational. Perhaps a better description of the two classes of knowledge is obtained by designating one as the knowledge of sense perception and the other as the knowledge of inference or reason. I perceive, on looking out of my window, that my barn is in flames: this is a form of knowledge I have of the event in progress. I know also, although my senses do not give me the direct information, nor do I strictly perceive it intellectually, that the bam was fired by lightning and that I Avill receive no insurance because my policy on the barn has expired. These things I know by inference or reason. The distinction between these two kinds of knowledge may not be as great as it seems to be, and further psychological analysis may show that it is valueless : but there can be no objection to the distinction as a preliminary or tentative one, and there can be no question but that the experiences classified in accordance with it really exist.

The psychologist holds that all knowledge may be included under the two headings above indicated. No knowledge which is neither perceptual nor inferential is taken account of by psychology. The mystic, on the other hand, holds that these two kinds of knowledge, or the totality of knowledge which may be tentatively classified under these two heads, do not exhaust the field. There is, the mystic insists, a third hind of knowledge, which, according to the mystical evaluation, ranks higher than either of the other two. Not necessarily higher in the sense of being more complex, or of being the result of a longer temporal course of development, but higher in value. This theory of a third kind of knowledge is the essential and fundamental point in mysticism.

Mystics and mysticism in the strict sense of the terms have existed in all civilized European countries for the last fourteen hundred years at least; yet in spite of this wide temporal and geographical distribution there is a remarkable simplicity and uniformity in the mystical declaration of principles wherever found. There are a number of conventional names, all of which are admitted to be metaphorical, for the act or fact of knowing in this assumed third way. Three terms in especial have been employed in various languages to designate this act. These are the terms wnion, love, and ecstasy. *^ Union" emphasizes what is claimed as the fundamental characteristic of this act, namely that the subject who knows, and the object which is known, become in the act one and the same, by the one being absorbed into the other.* **Love" is metaphorically significant because in its literal use it signifies the force which attracts and binds together two individuals. It was, in a more general sense, assumed by ancient Greek philosophy to be the force which binds together the different parts of the universe, making one out of many ; just as in the more literal sense it is the force or attraction which binds two individuals, each incomplete in itself, together into a complete social individual capable of the total human functions. ** Ecstasy," which means literally a ** standing out," or getting out of, one's self, alludes to the

^'•Mysticism is the art of union with reality. The mystic is a person who has attained that union in greater or less degree; or who aims at and believes in such attainment." Underhill: Practical Mysticism, p. 3, same alleged fact: of the knowing subject losing its identity in the kno^\TL object.

Since it is above intellect and above sense perception as these are conceived by psychology, the mystical third kind of knowledge cannot be communicated from one person to another, nor can it be described in language. Moreover, it cannot be thought by the mystic himself. The true mystic realizes this consequence of his hypothesis and admits his inability to think about, or to describe that which he knows in his ecstasy. He claims that all that is said about the mystic knowledge is mere metaphor; excepting only the statements that the knowledge may be obtained, and that its value is above all other values. Plotinus, for example, says :

It (unity) is unspeakable and undeseribable. IS'evertheless we speak of it, we write about it, but only to excite our souls by our discussions, and to direct them towards this divine spectacle, just as one might point out the road to somebody who desires to see some object. {Enn. VI, Bk. IV, 4.)

European mysticism is directly traceable in the line of historical descent from an early period of the Christian Era. Its connection \\i.th Oriental mysticism is problematic, in spite of the strong resemblances between the two. It is possible that the European mysticism owes something to the Oriental: it is also possible that the indebtedness is largely in the other direction. This problem is of little consequence for the understanding of European mysticism, whereas the tracing of the lineage in the West is important, since the theories and even the phraseology of the latter day mystics are essentially those of the earliest members of the school and are directly derived from them. In spite of changes in style, differences in the purposes of application, and variations in the expansion of details, the basic ideas have been little changed throughout.

The historical source of modern mysticism is the small collection of writings of a certain Dionysius,* who has been supposed to have been the Dionysius converted by Paul on the Areopagus or Mars Hill, and who is therefore called ^ ^ Dionysius the Areopagite." He is identified with St. Denys or Denis, the Patron Saint of France and is supposed to have been the first Bishop of Athens. The more weighty critics doubt the authenticity of the writings in question and ascribe them to a date about 500 A.D., hence referring to their author as the **pseudo- Dionysius." Whatever may be the truth of this controversy the flood of modem mysticism was loosed from a Greek manuscript written by someone who called himself Dionysius.

The important writings of Dionysius were translated into Latin about 850 A.D. by Scotus Erigina,

*An English translation of Dionysius' writings has been made by Parker: Dionysius the Areopagite, 1897.

the organizer of the University of Paris. Thus not only by the teaching of Erigina and his pupils, but also by the dissemination of the Latin version of Dionysius' writings from the University of Paris, the course of modern philosophy, and in a still larger degree the course of religious speculation, has been seriously a:ffected. The Medieval mysticism emanating from Paris was directly responsible for the later mystical schools which flourished in different parts of Europe at di:fferent periods. German mysticism, as represented by the three Dominican Monks — Meister Eckhardt (1260- 1329 circa,) Tauler (/^ormf. 1300-1316), Suso (1300- 1365 circa), and the Theologica Germanica (written by a member of the '^Friends of God'' in the middle of the fourteenth century) ; and Flemish mysticism, represented by Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) together constitute the third great phase in the development of Western mysticism.

Spanish mysticism, represented by Juan de la Cruz (1542-1591) and Santa Teresa (1515-1582) ; the French mysticism of the Quietists represented by Madame Guyon (1648-1717) ; and the Anglo- American mysticism of Coleridge, Emerson, and Christian Science, while flowing from the historical sources in an easily traceable current are confused and mingled with much quasi-mysticism and pseudo-mysticism. The Neo-Flemish mysticism of Maeterlinck on the other hand, is a crystal pure stream from nndefiled ancient sources. In Maeterlinck is set forth the spirit of Dionysius and of the other great mystics in snch fashion as to make Maeterlinck one of the company which his psychological adversaries must admire.

At the present day pure mysticism is increasing in its spread and influence along with a dark and muddy current of quasi-mysticism and pseudo-mysticism. The perpetual conflict between science and mysticism was never more acute than at the present day, and it is because of the vital nature of this conflict that it behooves us to examine carefully the foundations of true mysticism in order that we may recognize it and its bastard progeny however they may be disguised.

The principles and expressions of the mysticism of Dionysius the Areopagite agree closely with those of the so-called Alexandrian philosophy: so-called because of its dissemination from the city of Alexandria in Egypt. The first philosopher of this school of whom we have definite knowledge was Ammonius Saccas, who taught in Alexandria between 170 and 243 A.D. He was the son of Christian parents but abandoned Christianity for philosophy. The most important member of the school was Plotinus (205-270 circa), a Greek, bom in Lycopolis in Egypt; who studied under Ammonius in Alexandria for eleven years, went to Eome about 244, and there taught philosophy until his death in 270. The theories of Plotinus were edited by his pupil Porphyry in six Enneads or divisions of nine books each. Porphyry, who was an anti- Christian, also wrote a biography of Plotinns from which our information concerning that philosopher is in the main derived.

Plotinus considered himself a follower of Plato 's philosophy and as the reestablisher of pure Platonism. The resemblance to the Plato of the Banquet and Phoedrus is clearly recognizable, and the Alexandrian philosophy is usually called neo-Platonism. Nevertheless, Semitic influences are discernible in this philosophy, although the sources are obscure. Plotinus was evidently familiar with the writings of Philo Judeaus, (20 B.C.— 40 A.D.) the Jewish philosopher of Alexandria; but Porphyry denies that his master was influenced by Philo.

Parker and others think that the Alexandrian philosophy was derived from the writings of Dionysius. It is, however, more probable that Dionysius obtained his views from the Alexandrians. Certainly there is such marked resemblance between them that historical connection is hardly to be doubted.

According to the Alexandrians, that which is known, in the higher or third kind of knowledge is Divine Being or God. In the act of knowing, therefore — in union or ecstasy — the knower is absorbed into and is indistinguishable from the Divine

Known. This union is not attained at any moment at which, the mystic may desire it, but is the consummation of long effort and achieved but occasionally. Plotinus, according to Porphyry, attained the mystic experience but four times during his life time and Porphyry himself achieved it only once.

That is how this divine man, who by his thoughts often aspired to the first (principle), to the divinity superior (to intelligence), climbing the degrees indicated by Plato (in his Banquet), he held the vision of the formless divinity, which is not merely an idea, being founded on intelligence and the whole intelligible world. I, myself, had the bkssed privilege of approaching this divinity, uniting myself to him, when I was about sixty-eight years of age.

That is how ''the goal seemed to him located near him.'* Indeed, his goal, his purpose, his end was to approach the supreme divinity, and to unite himself with the divinity. While I dwelt with him, he had four times the bliss of reaching that goal, not merely potentially, but by a real and unspeakable experience. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, XXIII: Guthrie, PlotiTms' Complete WorTcs, Vol. I, pp. 33-34.

There are two terms used by Dionysius which are of exceptional interest because these or their equivalents are found in the writings of the Alexandrian school and of the later mystics. One of these terms is Agnosia which means literally "lack of knowledge." The other is Divine Gloom, Both of these are used to describe the mystic knowledge and the mystic object. According to the mystic theory, the third kind of knowledge is so far above ordinary cognition that it m^y be described as no knowledge at all: while it is analogous to knowledge, it so far transcends psychological limitations that the difference is more important than the likeness. Hence ' ' Agnosia ' ' is held to be more descriptive than is ^* knowledge," and ^^ darkness" the more accurate symbol than ^4ight." This paradoxical method of description is a deliberate indication of the claim that, strictly speaking, the experience is indescribable. Thns Dionysins :

Darkness becomes invisible by light, and especially by much, light. Varied knowledge, and especially much varied knowledge, makes the Agnosia to vanish. Take this in a superlative, but not in a defective sense, and reply with superlative truth, that the Agnosia, respecting God, escapes those who possess existing light, and knowledge of things being; and his pre-eminent darkness is both concealed by every light, and is hidden from every knowledge. And, if anyone, having seen God, understood what he saw, he did not see Him, but some of His creatures that are existing and known. But He himself, highly established above mind, and above essence, by the very fact of His being wholly unknown, and not being, both is superessentially, and is known above mind. And the all-perfect Agnosia, in its superior sense, is a knowledge of Him, Who is above all known things. Dionysius, Letter to Gaius Therapeutes: Parker, Part I, p. 141.

We pray to enter within the super-bright gloom, and through not seeing and not knowing, to see and to know that the not to see nor to know is itself the above sight and knowledge. For this is veritably to see and to know and to celebrate superessentially the Superessential, through the abstraction of all existing things, just as those who make a life-like statue, by extracting all the encumbrances which have been placed upon the clear view of the concealed, and by bringing to light, by the mere cutting away, the genuine beauty concealed in it. And, it is necessary, as I think, to celebrate the abstractions in an opposite way to the definitions. For, we used to place these latter by beginning from the foremost and descending through the middle to the lowest, but, in this case, by making the ascents from the lowest to the highest, we abstract everything, in order that, without veil, we may know that Agnosia, which is enshrouded under all the known, in all things that be, and may see that superessential gloom, which is hidden by all the light in existing things. Dionysius: Mystic Theology, Caput II, see. I. Parker, Part I, p. 133.

Thus also Plotinus :

The principal cause of our uncertainty is that our comprehension of the One comes to us neither by scientific knowledge, nor by thought, as the knowledge of other intelligible things, but by a presence which is superior to science. When the soul acquires the scientific knowledge of something, she withdraws from unity and ceases being entirely one; for science implies discursive reason and discursive reason implies manifoldness. (To attain Unity) we must therefore rise above science, and never withdraw from what is essentially One; we must therefore renounce science, the objects of science, and every other right (except that of the One) ; even to that of beauty;, for beauty is posterior to unity, and is derived thereform, as the day-light comes from the sun. That is why Plato says of (Unity) that it is unspeakable and undescribable. Nevertheless we speak of it, we write about it, but only to excite our souls by our discussions, and to direct them towards this divine spectacle, just as one might point out the road to somebody who desires to see some object. Instruction, indeed, goes as far as showing the road, and guiding us in the way; but to obtain the vision (of the divinity), is the work suitable to him who has desired to obtain it.

If your soul does not succeed in enjoying this spectacle, if she does not have the intuition of the divine light, if she remains cold and does not, within herself, feel a rapture such as that of a lover who sees the beloved object, and who rests within it, a rapture felt by him who has seen the true light, and whose soul has been overwhelmed with brilliance on approaching this light, then you have tried to rise to the divinity without having freed yourself from the hindrances which arrest your progress, and hinder your contemplation. You did not rise alone, and you retained within yourself something that separated you from Him; or rather, you were not yet unified. Though He be absent from all beings, He is absent from none, so that He is present without being present. Plotinus: Enn. VI, Bk. IV, 4. Guthrie: Plotinus' Complete Works, Vol. I, pp. 154-155. Taylor: Select Worls of Plotinus, pp. 306-307.

For, in order to express something, discursive reason is obliged to go from one thing to another, and successively to run through every element of its object. Now what can be successively scrutinized in that which is absolutely simple! It is, therefore, sufficient to reach Him by a sort of intellectual contact. Now at the moment of touching the One, we should neither be able to say anything about Him, nor have the leisure to speak of Him: Only later is it possible to argue about Him * * * The true purpose of the soul is to be in contact with this light, to see this light in the radiance of this light itself, without the assistance of any foreign light, to see this principle by the help of which she sees. Indeed, it is the principle by which she is enlightened that she must contemplate as she gazes at the sun only through its own light. Now how shaU we succeed in this? By cutting off everything else. Plotinus, Enn. V, Bk. HI, 17. Guthrie: Plotinus' Complete Works, Vol. IV., pp. 1120-21. Taylor: Select Works of Plotinus, p. 288.

It is characteristic of the Alexandrian mysticism and also characteristic of some of the later mysticisms that the good and the beautiful are identified. That which is the object of the mystic knowledge is the reality transcendent to the reality found in the world of psychological experience. This reality is good and also beautiful; thus epistemology, ethics and esthetics are identified, the three sciences becoming for the mystic, one and the same discipline. If we bear this in mind many of the terms used by the early and later mystics become significant. The identification of mystic knowledge with love has a multiple importance. It is directly derived from the early Greek philosophy in which Eros is the directing power which coordinates the diverse parts of the nniverse, supplying the ^'action at a distance'' which is the necessary concept for naive physical speculation. On the other hand, the use and elaboration of the concept of love by the mystics may indicate a vague recognition of the erotic nature of ' ' ecstasy. ' ' Plotinus ' use of the term is typical. •

Another proof that our welfare resides up there is the love that is innate in our souls^ as is taught in the descriptions and myths which represent love as the husband of the soul. In fact, since the soul, which is different from the divinity proceeds from Him, she must necessarily love Him; but when she is on high her love is celestial; here below, her love is only commonplace; for it is on high that dwells the celestial Venus (Urania) ; while here below resides the vulgar adulterous Venus. Now every soul is a Venus, as is indicated by the myth of the birth of Venus and Cupid, who is supposed to be born simultaneously with her. So long as she remains faithful to her nature, the soul therefore loves the divinity, and desires to unite herself to Him, who seems like the noble father of a bride who has fallen in love with some handsome lover. When however the soul has descended into generation, deceived by the false promises of an adulterous lover, she has exchanged her divine love for a mortal one. Then, at a distance from a father, she yields to all kinds of excesses. Ultimately, however, she grows ashamed of these disorders; she purifies herself, she returns to her father, and finds true happiness with Him. How great her bliss then is can be conceived by such as have not tasted it only by comparing it somewhat to earthly love-unions, observing the joy felt by the lover in obtaining her whom he loves. But such mortal and deceptive love is directed only to phantoms; it soon disappears because the real object of our love is not these sense-presentations, which are not the good we are seeking.

On high only is the real object of our love; the only one with which we could unite or identify ourselves, which we could intimately possesSj because it is not separated from our soul by the covering of our flesh. This that I say will be acknowledged by any one who has experienced it; he will know that the soul then lives another life, that she advances towards the Divinity, that she reaches Him, possesses Him, and in his condition recognizes the presence of the Dispenser of the true life. Then she needs nothing more. On the contrary, she has to renounce everything else to fix herself in the Divinity, alone, to identify herself with Him, and to cut off all that surrounds Him. We must therefore hasten to issue from here below, detaching ourselves so far as possible from the body to which we still have the regret of being chained, making the effort to embrace the Divinity by our whole being, without leaving in us any part that is not in contact with Him. Then the soul can see the Divinity and herself, so far as is possible to her nature. She sees herself shining brilliantly, filled with intelligible light; or rather, she sees herself as a pure light, that is subtle and weightless. She becomes Divinity, or, rather she is divinity. In this condition the soul is a shining light. If later she falls back into the sense-world, she is plunged into darkness. Plotinus, Enn. VI, Bk. IX, 9. Guthrie: Plotinus' Complete WorTcs, Vol. I, pp. 166- 168. Taylor: SeUct Works of Plotinus, pp. 317-319.

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