War-time strikes and their adjustment

Preface

The writer has endeavored in the following pages to give as complete an account as space and. available material will allow of the larSbr difficulties which occurred during the war and of the machinery which was created to adjust them. It has, of course, been impossible to deal with every one of the thousands of strikes which took place — even controversies of considerable size and importance had to be omitted — nor has any attempt been made to thoroughly cover the events of the post-armistice period. But inasmuch as most of the labor difficulties after the signing of the armistice were directly connected with those which took place during the war itself, it was considered desirable to include some of these later occurrences as far as such a course was practicable.

This book is based upon the writer's personal experiences in Government work during the war, upon statements made to him by officials of Government Boards, employers, union leaders and others, and upon awards and reports of labor adjustment agencies, the testimony taken at many hearings, the Monthly Labor Review of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and other publications of the U. S. Department of Labor, economic journals and the publications of trade unions, corporations and employers' associations, the Congressional Record, and the newspaper files.

Many of the chapters have been submitted to the men who were connected with the labor boards during the war. Some of the errors which are almost unavoidable in a presentation of facts covering so wide a range have in this manner been eliminated. The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness for this help and also for the cordial cooperation with which his requests for information and material have been received by members of labor adjustment boards, employers and labor unions. It would be impossible to give the names of all of the persons who have given their assistance; he wishes, however, to especially mention Mr. Payson Irwin, Mr. V. Everitt Macy and Mr. Stanley M. Isaacs, Prof. Henry R. Seager, Prof. Wm. Z. Ripley, Prof. Edwin vi PREFACE

R. A. Seligman, Miss Julia O'Connor, President, Telephone Operators' Department of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Fred Hewitt, Editor, Machinists 7 Journal; B. M. Squires, chairman, New York Harbor Adjustment Board; John Fitch, and Harold Stearns for assistance on the manuscript.

Contents

PAGE

Introduction by Felix Adler xi

Part I. The Mediating Agencies Chapter

I. The Industrial Background I

General Causes of Unrest 2

Opposition to Unionism 3

Other Causes 4

The War and Our Industrial Unpreparedness . . 6

Specific Causes of Unrest 7

Pre-War Mediating Agencies io

II. The Emergency Construction Wage Commission . 14

III. Shipbuilding . . . . ■ 20

Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board .... 20 Industrial Relations Division, Emergency Fleet Corporation 31

IV. Shipping 33

Marine and Dock Industrial Relations Division . . 33

National Adjustment Commission 39

The New York Harbor Wage Adjustment Board . . 45

V. The President's Mediation Commission 53

VI. Special Agencies of the War and Navy Departments 58 Administrator of Labor Standards in Army Clothing . 58 Arsenal and Navy Yard Wage Commission 62 National Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission 63

VII. Special Agencies of the War and Navy Departments

(Continued) 65

Industrial Service Sections of Ordnance, Quartermaster

and Aircraft 65

Industrial Service Section — Quartermaster Corps . . 71

Industrial Service Section — Aircraft . ... 72

The Bridgeport Strikes • 73

vii viii CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

VIII. Railroad, Fuel and Food Administration ... 82

Railroad Administration 82

Fuel Administration 95

Food Administration 104

IX. Telegraph and Telephone . . . ... . . 106

X. The National War Labor Board 116

XI. War Labor Policies Board and Conference Committee

of Labor Adjustment Agencies 126

Conference Committee 128

XII. United States Labor Department and State Boards 133

United States Labor Department 133

Bureau of Industrial Housing, U. S. Labor Department 134

State Boards 136

Massachusetts . 137

New York 144

Kansas 145

Part II. Principles

XIII. General Principles ........ 151

No Strikes or Lock-outs during the War .... 154

Collective Bargaining 160

Right to Organize 164

Coercion 169

No Change from Union to Open Shop or Vice Versa . 170

Union Recognition 172

Maintenance of Established Standards . . . . 175

Equal Pay for Equal Work 176

XIV. Hours 178

XV. Wages 188

The Minimum Wage . 191

Increases in the Cost of Living 195

Standardization ,. 195

Increase in Productive Efficiency 203

Bonus and Piecework 209

Wage Charts 211

Part III. The Psychological Background Of Industrial Unrest

XVI. The Employer 22

XVII. The Workers 23

CONTENTS ix

CHAPTER PAGE

XVIII. The Public 244

XIX. The I. W. W. and the Loyal Legion of Loggers and

Lumbermen 255

Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen . . . 270

XX. Conclusions 273

I. Strike Data, 1914 to 1919 291

II. Emergency Construction Wage Commission . . 297

III. Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board .... 298

IV. National Adjustment Commission 299

V. New York Harbor Wage Adjustment Board . . 300

VI. Railroad Wage Boards 301

VII. National War Labor Board 303

VIII. War Labor Policies Board 311

IX. Conference Committee of Labor Adjustment Agencies 314

X. Labor Clauses 314

XL Chart 318

Introduction

The author of this book was rarely equipped for the work he undertook. An employer of labor of large business experience, he was one of the dollar-a-year men who gave their services to the Government during the war, was assigned first to the Housing Department of the Shipping Board, then to the Ordnance Department, and took an active part in the settlement of labor controversies. He thus came into touch at first hand with the matter of such disputes, and the various methods by which it has been attempted to settle them. He supplemented the personal knowledge of the subject he thus gained by a comprehensive study of the material contained in official reports and other available documents.

In the book thus produced, two qualities seem to shine out: painstaking accuracy and deep sympathy with the human factor in industry.

Mr. Bing's bias as a so-called capitalist might be expected to incline towards the group to which he belongs. On the contrary, nothing is more apparent than his eager desire to be absolutely just in presenting the case of labor. It is exceedingly difficult to be just. The author has scrupulously endeavored to be so.

I have no doubt that this work will form a valuable addition to the library of social reform, and that it will be widely read, appreciated and pondered by those who are interested in the supreme practical question of our time.

FELIX ADLER.

I

CHAPTER I The Industrial Background

The war created an emergency in which it was necessary, besides recruiting and drilling an enormous army x and building up the navy to the required war strength, to embark on a shipbuilding program of hitherto unthought of size, hastily to construct cantonments each of which was as large as a city, and to produce quantities of munitions, food, clothing, aeroplanes, and other essentials on a scale that dwarfed into insignificance any former activities of the Government. The United States faced an unprecedented production program. To meet it successfully required an augmented supply of labor and continuous work, unhampered by strikes and other causes of inefficiency; it was absolutely essential to remove every factor that would interfere with production and to take advantage of every factor that would promote it.

Obviously it was not a time for social experimentation. Yet if to prevent strikes, to augment morale, and to increase efficiency, it was necessary to attack fundamental industrial wrongs of long standing, then such action can be justified as a war measure to the extent to which it was useful for this purpose.

To form an intelligent estimate of the problem, a knowledge of industrial conditions before the war is as essential as a knowledge of the effects upon industry of the war itself. The labor problem

1 In one year and a half the army grew to twenty times its former size. In March, 1917, it consisted of 189,674 men and in November, 1918, of 3.554)000. Report of Secretary of War for 1918, page 9. Similar figures could be quoted for the Navy and other branches of the service.

which confronted the nation, upon our entry into the European conflict, resulted from adding to the existing causes of bad industrial relations those emergency elements which magnified and intensified the factors of unrest that had previously been present. The most important causes of strife in the pre-war period were inadequate wages, long hours, and opposition to collective bargaining and unionism. These, together with others of lesser importance, will be briefly examined before considering the effect of the war upon the industry of the country, and the labor disturbances which followed.

GENERAL CAUSES OF UNREST— WAGES

The United States Commission on Industrial Relations, reporting in 191 5, found that "between one- fourth and one-third of the male workers 18 years of age and over, in factories and mines, earn less than $10 a week; from two-thirds to three- fourths earn less than $15, and only about one-tenth earn more than $20 a week . . . from two-thirds to three-fourths of the women workers . . . in industrial occupations generally, work at wages of less than $8 per week." x

The Railroad Wage Commission reporting in May, 191 8, to the Director General of Railroads found that 51% of all railroad employees during December, 191 7 (at a time when costs of living had already gone up materially), were receiving $75 per month, or less; 80% were receiving $100 per month, or less. Less than 3% received from $150 to $250 a month. 2 The average weekly earnings of laborers in Western sawmills for 191 5 was $9.58; 3 in the steel mills and the packing plants and other trustcontrolled industries up to 1915, prevailing wages for unskilled men varied from 15 cents to 20 cents per hour, averaging about 18 cents. 4 For ten hours a day and six days a week, this meant weekly earnings of $10.80 or $562.60 per year. Stockers in 191 5 averaged 74.8 hours and earned $13.95 per week. And these

1 Report of B. M. Manly, Director of Research and Investigation, Final Report of Commission on Industrial Relations, page 31. a Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1918.

3 Bulletin 225 of Bureau of Labor Statistics, page 11.

4 N. C. Adams in a study of wages for the steel industry says that the rates for common labor in 1915 were 15 cents to 16 cents in the eastern district, and 19 cents in the Pittsburgh and Great Lakes districts. Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March, 1918.

figures are typical of the wages paid, prior to the war, to semi-skilled and unskilled labor in the United States. Nor were low wages in all cases confined to workers of little skill; in many cases skilled men and women fared little better. 1

The history of industry, since the inauguration of the era of factoiy production, is the story of constant struggle by the workers for the reduction of hours of work. In the years immediately preceding our entry into the war, considerable progress had been made in the introduction of the eight-hour day (that is to say, the forty-eight-hour week), yet there were still many industries in which the normal working week was over seventy-two hours. The rule was still twelve hours a day and seven days a week in a substantial number of places. 2

OPPOSITION TO UNIONISM

A large part of our industrial workers, in addition, were prevented from joining labor unions by the bitter opposition of their employers and were refused the benefits of collective bargaining. Among the large trusts where, prior to 191 5, wages had been lowest, this attitude particularly prevailed, but it was also to be found in the metal trades and in hundreds of other occupations. Although the employers themselves had increasingly united in industrial combinations — that is to say, in trade associations and in chambers of commerce — there existed on the part of a large proportion of the emp^ers of the country the determination to treat with their employees as individuals only and to prevent them by every means in their power from associating themselves with their fellow workmen in organizations "of their choice." Perhaps the most striking, as certainly the most unfortunate, survival

1 President Wharton of the Railway Employees Department, A. F. of L., in addressing the Fourth Biennial Convention of that Department, said that an examination of Railroad payrolls showed hourly wages in some cases as low as the following : machinists, 24 cents ; machinist helpers, 18 cents; millwrights, 21 cents; pattern workers, 30 cents; pipe fitters, 26 cents. Official Proceedings, page 130.

2 The President's Second Industrial Conference, reporting as late as March 6, 1920, says at page 33 : "There are large basic industries which still employ substantial numbers of men in exhausting work for eighty-four hours per week and longer."

of this opposition was manifest in the first of the President's recent Industrial Conferences at Washington, which ended by the withdrawal of the labor delegates. 1

OTHER CAUSES

Another source of unrest was the bad sanitary conditions under which many men and women worked, and the absence of adequate protection against accidents. Much progress had been made in both of these respects yet much remained to be done. Some of the large corporations, which offended most with respect to inadequate wages, long hours, and anti-union discrimination, had nevertheless done splendid work toward the prevention of accidents and, to a lesser degree, toward the betterment of sanitary conditions. In some of the hazardous occupations, however, such as mining and in many less dangerous callings, there was a failure to observe State and Federal law and an indifference to obvious dangers, which were followed by an unnecessarily large number of fatal accidents. Inevitably unrest increased because of the workers' feeling that the laws had been violated and that many injuries and. deaths could have been prevented. So also with respect to conditions of health and sanitation: Dissatisfaction and resentment were augmented by bad physical conditions, especially in labor camps and isolated communities, although by no means there alone. In fact, because sanitation was immeasurably better, in some places, than it had been in previous years, was precisely the reason why those industries and localities that had failed to keep up with the progress which elsewhere had been accomplished were made all the more irritatingly conspicuous.

There can also be no doubt that the employer had not given adequate thought to the problem of labor management. His attention had been absorbed by other difficulties of production, as well as by questions of distribution and finance. His relations with labor questions — whether or not his workers were able to live on the wages which they received; how they were affected by seasonal idleness or the monotony of their daily task, whether or not general working conditions were as they should have been —

1 See New York Times, Sunday, October 26, 1919, for statement by the late Mr. Endicott, a "public" delegate although himself a large employer.

these, and dozens of similar questions, were quite outside the horizon of most business men. It is only in the last few years when all employers have experienced great difficulty in getting and keeping men that these questions have received any appreciable amount of study. It is only recently, for example, that labor turnover has been recognized by the employer as an industrial evil, costly alike to the worker, the employer, and the community. The employment manager, in whom responsibility is now vested for better relations between management and men, is a late development in industry. Prior to the war, very few firms realized the need for this expert service, and in addition very few men or women were available to supply it.

Moreover, the large number of foreign born workers, millions of whom were unable to speak our language, the overcrowding in large industrial centers, and the bad housing and sanitary conditions which resulted (from which small communities were also sufferers) contributed to the awakening of that antagonism and that dissatisfaction which were part of our general industrial unpreparedness.

Not only were relations between employers and employees bad for the reasons recited above, but two things were lacking which would have been of inestimable value in the crisis that was about to confront the nation.

First: A public opinion at least moderately informed as to actual industrial conditions, and reasonably in agreement as to general policies to be adopted and measures immediately to be taken.

Second: Government machinery ready to aid in making the necessary adjustments from a state of peace to one of war, including (i) means for handling the problems incident to a shifting of the working population to new industries; (2) means for the training of workers to supply emergency needs; (3) means for giving aid to private employers in increasing the efficiency of their labor force by better management, especially with respect to those matters making for better industrial relations; and (4) the necessary machinery for the avoidance or prompt adjustment of industrial disputes so that production might proceed uninterruptedly.

We needed not only the knowledge of industrial conditions and the physical equipment necessary to cope with the emergencies that confronted the nation, but also an expert personnel reenforced by an enlightened public opinion. Every one of these elements was almost completely lacking.

THE WAR AND OUR INDUSTRIAL UNPREPAREDNESS

With the outbreak of the European War in 19 14 there was at first a cessation of all industry in the warring countries. Widespread unemployment occurred in spite of the fact that millions of men were being inducted into the armies, a fact which under normal conditions would have created an acute labor shortage. Much of the normal production of peace time came to a standstill simultaneously with the universal consternation that followed the beginning of the war. A considerable period was needed before the idle men could be absorbed into the newly organized war-making industries. But the growth of the munition plants and the manufacture of other articles needed to carry on the war on the gigantic scale on which it was being waged, together with the increasingly heavy drafts upon the male population of the Allied countries for military service, soon did absorb the men whom a general stoppage of industry had made idle. Gradually, too, peace industries were resumed, creating additional demands for workers. 1

In a short time, in fact, a labor shortage was created, which as the months wore on became more and more acute. This shortage was partly met by the introduction of women workers into industry in ever increasing numbers, 2 partly by the abrogation of trade union customs which tended to curtail production, and partly by the absorption into industry of old men and others who, in normal times, for one reason or another, were unemployed and in some cases unemployable. In these ways, principally of course by the first, means were found to provide enough men for the

1 See Alary Conyngton, Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April, 1918, p. 204, for an account of the effect of the war upon the employment of women in England. At first they were thrown out of work in large numbers, relief work having been needed in thousands of resulting cases of destitution. Gradually the unemployed women were reabsorbed into industry and hundreds of thousands of others drafted into it.

2 Thus, The Labour Gazette, London, November, 1917, quoted in Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Jan., 1918, p. 65, states that there were 1,421,000 more females employed in Great Britain in July, 191 7, than at the outbreak of the war (an increase of almost 50%).

armies and enough workers to meet the enormous demands made by modern warfare for manufactured articles of every description.

In the United States there occurred a similar industrial crisis in August, 1 9 14, not so severe, however, as that originally experienced in European countries. Our ordinary peace industries were slowed down, whereas in Europe many of them were almost wiped out. It was several months before the full resumption of normal peace industries in this country, together with the demand for war materials from abroad, absorbed our unemployed man power. Gradually, as factory after factory was built to supply I the needs of the Entente Nations, as our shipbuilding plans began to develop, and as the demand for food products at home and abroad constantly increased, an oversupply of labor was changed to a Iabor_ shortage. __

Upon our own entry into the European war in 191 7, industrial conditions were once more disturbed and large numbers of men were thrown out of employment. These, however, were soon absorbed by the recruitments for the army and navy and by our rapidly expanding war production program, which during 1918 assumed gigantic proportions. As a result, our labor shortage soon became acute.

SPECIFIC CAUSES OF UNREST

Our difficulties, like those of England (and other European countries), were much complicated by the concentration of v/ar industries into certain sections of the country where housing and transportation, all too poor before the war, became, by reason of the influx of additional workers, almost unbearable. In addition, from August, 1915, on, there occurred a constant and increasingly rapid rise in the cost of living. By June, 191 7, the increase amounted to 29%; by June, 1918, 58%; by December, 1918, 74%; by December, 1919, the cost had almost doubled. 1 Up to the fall of 191 7, in spite of the great increase in the cost of practically every article that entered into the workingmen's budget, there were many industries and localities in which no substantial wage increases had occurred.

1 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau Labor Statistics, June, 1920, p. 79. The estimates of the National Industrial Conference Board, Research Reports Nos. 9, 14 and 25, are somewhat more conservative : June, 1918, 52.3% ; November, 1918, 65.9% ; November, 1919, 82.2%.

We have seen that the general wage level prior to the war was :in a majority of cases too low to permit of proper living standards. If our workers were to avoid acute suffering, adequate wage increases became imperative. Moreover, the injustice resulting from the lessened purchasing power of the worker's wages was felt with added keenness because of the general belief (which ras substantially correct) that the employers were making large >rofits and that the mounting costs of the necessities of life were lue in part at least to profiteering.

Furthermore great irregularity in wages and conditions of employment attended the changing of the nation from a peace to a war footing. There were numerous causes responsible for this result. Most important of these was the stealing of labor which accompanied the efforts of Government contractors and departments to speed up their work. After our entrance into the war the Government awarded contracts on cost plus basis. 1 War psychology, as well as the demands of Government departments, laid emphasis on speed rather than economy. Contractors and Government officials, in their eagerness to get their particular ; pieces of work done, disregarded the effect of their actions en I other Government work, and' the stealing of men from one plant [to another was freely indulged in, Government departments and \employers bidding against each other for men and supplies. Many firms, when they wanted men, showed themselves absolutely unscrupulous in the manner in which they disregarded the Swishes and even the express orders of Government officials regarding wages and overtime.

As a result, some workers remained at the old wages, whereas others doing the same work in the same community were paid much more by aggressive employers — or perhaps by some agency of the Government itself — having profitable contracts to fill and eager to get men. Wages in one branch of an industry might remain stationary, while another part of the same industry received large increases. These inequalities affected men in different parts of the Government service as well as in private plants. 2 Thus a mechanic in the shipyards might be receiving 50% more

*H. B. Endicott in the New York Times, March, 1918, says that "the cost plus method was apparently the cause of more unrest among workingmen than any other single factor."

2 Specific instances of these inequalities will be cited in subsequent chapters.

than an equally skilled worker in the same community and trade, working, for instance, in a munition plant.

The unrest which was bound to follow inequalities of this kind was greatly augmented, not only by the high living costs and the bad conditions produced by overcrowding and inadequate transportation, but also by the continued refusal of many employers to grant collective bargaining, and by their persistence in practices of discrimination against labor unions. To make matters worse, the urgent need for production and the publicity which this need received, in an effort to make the best use of every particle of the nation's resources, gave the workers a realization of a strength which before they had neither realized nor possessed.

But now, both realizing and possessing this new power, they desired, naturally enough, not merely to have their wages keep pace with the rising cost of living but also to effect an improvement in pre-war conditions. Even in 19 16 there occurred the ^ largest number of strikes in any one year of the country's preyious history, 1 and in addition a tie-up of the entire railway sys- 1 tern was averted only by Congressional action which forced the? railroads to grant the men's demands. Furthermore, the workers realized that the time to enforce demands was when men were scarce, not when they were plentiful. 2

As against these factors making for conflicts of great magnitude can be set the war psychology, making powerfully for the maintenance of industrial peace. Patriotic fervor demanded universal sacrifices for the nation, and it was realized that increased production was essential for the winning of the war. Interruption of the manufacture of munitions or ships or of the production or transportation of food, might result in national defeat. Yet the patriotic motive, although genuine and potent, was not of itself sufficiently strong to overcome the many adverse conditions making for severe industrial conflicts. It was a real element in the situation, but never a determining one, and in the first

1 See Appendix No. 1 for statistics relative to strikes.

3 The correctness of this point of view has been demonstrated by the events of 1920. Curtailment of credits together with excessive prices of commodities made it necessary to decrease production in many industries. Taking advantage of this condition there were employers who not only refused legitimate wage demands but deliberately closed their factories to weaken the strategic position of the workers.

io WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT

year of our participation in the war there occurred an even larger

/ number of strikes than in the record }^ear of 191 6. t

PRE-WAR MEDIATING AGENCIES

What the war disclosed was the fundamental need of a method by which the workers could obtain redress of grievances without resorting to the strike. Machinery for mediating these grievances was utterly lacking as was also any compulsion — other than fragmentary and ill-informed public opinion — to procure the acceptance of arbitral decisions by either side.

Prior to our entry into the war, the only governmental machinery for the adjustment of labor disputes was as follows:

(a) The Department of Labor. The Conciliation Bureau of the department did excellent work in some cases, but it was for several reasons inadequate to meet the emergency. In the first place, the Labor Department was insufficiently supplied with funds 1 and Congress was unwilling to make additional appropriations. It was furthermore thought by many of the largest employers that the department was under the control of organized labor. The law under which the department was organized states its purpose to be "to foster, promote and develop the welfare of the wage-earners of the United States."

In fact, the purpose of the department is regarded by most people as that of protecting the interests of labor rather than of administrating measures for the improvement of relations between employer and employee — which would include projects to secure increased productive power as well as improved working conditions. The fact, too, that the Secretary of Labor is the exofficial of a powerful national labor union has helped to secure for the department the confidence of organized labor, but has had the opposite effect on employers who are unsympathetic with labor organizations. The members of the Secretary's staff had also been more successful in gaining the confidence of the men than of the employers, although these members had been recruited from different walks of life, some having been lawyers and employers, others, labor leaders and college professors. Another reason why the department could not take care of the war emergency was that it has always been opposed to the undertaking

1 Report, Secretary of Labor, 1917, page 10.

THE INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND n

of arbitral functions by its commissioners, believing that the usefulness of the department, in the long run, would be greater if it confined its efforts to mediation and conciliation. But the war called for the exercise of larger powers than the Labor Department possessed and made the exercise by other agencies of arbitral determinations of wages and other questions absolutely necessary.

(b) The Board of Mediation appointed under the Newlands Act of 19 13 for the settlement of industrial disputes on the railways. The jurisdiction of this board was limited to men engaged in the movement of the trains, and in the absence of agreement between the parties it had no powers of arbitration but only of conciliation. It had an excellent record, and continued its work for those railroads — only the smaller and less important ones — which were not taken over by the Government.