French foreign policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)

Front matter

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Table Of Contents

CSAPTER PAGE

I France and the International, Situation in 1898

1. The Dual and Triple Alliances .... 3

Chapter I France And The International Situation In 1898

1. THE DUAL AND TRIPLE ALLIANCES

SPEAKING of the position of minister of foreign affairs, an old diplomat once remarked, ''II ne suffit pas d' avoir de genie, Vessentiel c'est de durer." In the Third French Republic, where there have been fifty changes of ministry from the promulgation of the present constitution in 1875 up to the outbreak of the World War, it would seem that there would be little chance for a successful minister of foreign affairs, if durability constitutes success. Therefore the regime of M. Delcasse, which commenced on June 28, 1898, and which was destined to endure practically seven years, would be noteworthy if for no other reason than that it holds the record by a wide margin for its sojourn at the Quai d 'Or say. But still more remarkable is the fact that, though ministries rose and fell, the guidance of foreign affairs was kept in the hands of the same man until he was able to carry out the policy that he had laid out for himself upon taking the position — a policy of rapprochement with Great Britain. During the four preceding years the foreign policy of France had for the most part been under the direction of Mr. Gabriel Hanotaux, a very able diplomat, but an Anglophobe in his tendencies. When, on June 28, 1898, M. Brisson formed a new Radical cabinet, and at the suggestion of M. Joseph Reinach chose M. Theophile Delcasse as minister of foreign affairs, it would have been only natural to expect that the new foreign minister, inexperienced and following a minister of exceptional ability, would attempt to carry out the policy of his predecessor. Instead M. Delcasse elected to blaze a new trail, to make a complete volte-face in the foreign policy of France. While maintaining the existing alliance with Russia, he was determined to seek new friendships, and from the day he entered the foreign office he was resolved that perfide Albion must be changed into the fidus Achates of France. The Entente Cordiale of April 8, 1904, which finally resolved itself into the Triple Entente, an understanding strong enough to resist the shock of a world war, will ever remain a monument to the success of his endeavors.

While a young man, M. Delcasse had been a member of a group of journalists associated with the *'Republique Francaise," and, like other members of the staff, was an ardent disciple of that grand old man of Republican France, Leon Gambetta. In such an entourage it would have been just as impossible for the young enthusiast from the Midi to avoid being drawn into politics as to avoid becoming impregnated with the doctrines and beliefs of the great tribune. Perhaps it was then that he first came to consider seriously Gambetta 's views on French foreign policy; but there is no doubt that lie knew that Gambetta believed that France would only recover the position that she lost in 1871, by obtaining the friendship of Eussia and Great Britain. The first part of this program had been completed several years before M, Delcasse took charge of the foreign office ; the second and more difficult part was to be his task, and it is not likely that France will ever forget that the glorious victory won at such cost in 1918 was due in great part to the policy which led to the Entente Cordiale, whose cornerstone was laid by M. Theophile Delcasse.

In order fully to appreciate the magnitude of the task to which M. Delcasse set himself when he took the office of foreign minister, it is essential that we take note of the situation in which France found herself at the close of the nineteenth century. In as much as the Eussian Alliance was the key-note to which the whole foreign policy of France was attuned, let us first consider her position in regard to Eussia.

When M. Eibot, on June 10, 1895, formally announced the Franco-Eussian Alliance, he was merely giving official sanction to an arrangement which was either known or suspected in all the chancellories of Europe. The acclamation with which the French squadron was received on its visit to Cronstadt in 1891, the equally enthusiastic reception given to the Grand Duke Constantine upon his visit to France to pay his respects to President Carnot in 1892, the ovation given to the Eussian squadron at Toulon in 1893, were such clear indications of a rapprochement, that the announcement of the fait accompli caused scarcely a ripple of surprise. From its inception the alliance was popular in France, and there is little question that the French nation as a whole looked upon it as ' * an understanding which warranted great hopes." In plainer terms, it was the means to an end, and the end was the revanche — for never since the debacle of 1870 was the hope absent from the hearts of the French that some day, somehow, the Treaty of Frankfort would be torn up and Alsace- Lorraine restored. The feeling that the alliance was the "dawn of a policy of reparation," that it was offensive as well as defensive in its nature, persisted until 1898, when the French gradually began to perceive that a mariage de raison between an autocracy and a democracy was not conducive to the vigorous progeny of a warlike spirit. In fact now that France no longer felt isolated, there was a tendency to relax, to forget the crisis of 1875, to indulge in intemationalistic idealism, to banish the thought of the perpetual menace which had long lain like a black, ominous cloud athwart the eastern frontier. Socialism became rampant, the army became honeycombed with intrigue, a "Dreyfus -Case" was rendered possible, the glorious soul of France itself became enervated. M. Emile Faguet declared that the Russian Alliance was the beginning of the moral and patriotic degradation of France; M. Millerand, who later was to prove himself one of the greatest ministers of war that the Third Republic has produced, arose in the Chamber and asked if France had not made '^un marche de dupes." ^ M. Jean Jaures summed up the sentiment of a large group when he declared that it was "a sort of seal placed upon the misfortunes of France."

THE INTEENATIONAL SITUATION 7

When in 1898 the Czar announced his intention of issuing a call for an international conference for the limitation of armament and for the purpose of the maintenance of peace upon the basis of the status quo, France felt as though the keystone of her arch of hope had been withdrawn. Yet even with the feeling of disillusionment came the realization that the appeal for disarmament and peace must be made upon the basis of the status quo, if made at all, and for the great ideal of world peace France was willing to make the sacrifice of her lost provinces. As a * ' Times ' ' correspondent aptly expressed it, *'The Czar has sown in the teeth of a driving Gallic wind the germs of pacifism in France. ' ' ^ Yet even if the Kussian Alliance had drawn in its wake a feeling of disillusionment, it was realized that without it France would not have been free to follow her policy of colonial expansion, which was now more than ever essential to maintain her position in the ranks of the great powers. Furthermore, by providing a counterweight to the Triple Alliance, France was enabled to draw closer to Italy, who was not entirely content with her position in the Triplice.

It was a matter of common knowledge that Italy had joined the Triple Alliance as much through fear of Austria as through hostility towards France, although France, by taking Tunis in 1881, had aroused the passionate jealousy of the Italians, who still saw the Carthage of Hannibal in the Tunis of to-day, and looked forward to a renaissance of the imperial city in all its ancient glory. With the disaster of Adowa in 1896, which brought about the final fall of Crispi,

2 FuUerton, "Problems of Power," p. 31.

the principal trouble-fete between the two Latin nations, an opportunity was made for a Franco-Italian rapprochement. Three months before he became minister of foreign affairs, M. Delcasse visited Rome, and in addition to consulting with M. Barrere, French ambassador to Italy, he had interviews with the Marquis di Rudini and with the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, minister of foreign affairs, and both showed a willingness to discuss a Mediterranean policy which should be more favorable to the two countries.

*' There is plenty of room for our two countries on the Mediterranean," declared M. Delcasse; ''the same thing which has separated us is able to reunite us. " * The seed did not fall upon barren soil. One of the first acts of M. Delcasse after becoming foreign minister was to bring about a treaty of commerce between France and Italy.* This was to prove a veritable godsend to Italy financially, and was destined to pave the way to a political arrangement a few years later. So although sixty years before M. Delcasse came into office, Mazzini had declared northern Africa to be Italy's inheritance, the Pyrenaean was enabled to outline and carry through a Mediterranean policy which recognized the interests of France in both Tunis and Morocco.

To understand Franco-German relations at this same period, it is necessary to go back to the Franco-Russian alliance. This alliance, coming so soon after Kaiser

8 Reynald, "L'Oeuvre de M. Delcasse," p. 30.

4 Arrangement announced by letters exchanged between M, Delcass6 and the Italian ambassador M. Tornielli Nov. 21, ratified by France Feb. 2, 1899, and by Italy Feb. 11, 1899. Archives Diplomatiques, Vol. 68, p. 333.

"William II had dropped his great pilot, Bismarck, necessitated very careful diplomacy on the part of the Emperor. He quickly determined to enter into more friendly relations with France, as the most feasible way to neutralize the new force which might counterbalance the weight of the Triplice. In 1891 he arranged the voyage of the Empress Frederica to Paris, but this visit was ill-advised, and failed completely to promote more friendly relations between the two powers. Nevertheless the Kaiser in a personal way continued to show his neighborly intentions. In 1893 it was a letter of condolence to the widow of ex-President McMahon who had fought against Germany in 1870, the following year a similar telegram of sympathy to Madame Carnot, and thereafter every year he found occasion to impress upon the minds of the French his personal good will.^ At one time it seemed as though the Dreyfus Affair might embitter the relations between the two countries, but the French wisely decided to circumscribe this scandal within the borders of France.^

The German government also sought various opportunities to enter into political relations with France. On March 15, 1894, there was signed a convention of delimitation of territory between the Congo and Cameroons and a mapping out of spheres of influence in the region of Lake Chad."^ The following year Germany induced France to join with her and with Russia to force a revision of the Shimoneseki Treaty in favor of

B "Kaiserreden," Klausman (ed.), PP- 37-62.

sDebidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe (1878-1904)," p. 205.

7 Text in British and Foreign State Papers (1894), p. 974.

China, though it was made to appear in this case as though the initiative came from Russia.^ In January, 189.6, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein suggested to M. Herbette, French ambassador in Berlin, the possibility of a Franco-German entente against Great Britain to save the independence of the South African Republics, which seemed about to be swallowed up in the maw of the British lion. Incidentally it was pointed out to France how detrimental British ambitions were to the reciprocal interests of the two powers in Africa. This conference was followed two days later by the famous Kruger telegram from the Kaiser, which provoked such hostility towards Germany throughout England that the German government, realizing that France might prove undependable in case of serious difficulties, quickly steered the imperial ship of state back into the haven of strict neutrality.^

The final effort made by Germany to reach a friendly understanding with France brings us to the appointment of M. Delcasse as French foreign minister. Early in 1898 it was rumored that Great Britain wished to make a loan to Portugal, with a lien upon the Portuguese colonies in Africa as security. Portugal, being in dire financial straits and fearing a quarrel with Great Britain over the award of the arbitral tribunal in the Delagoa Bay Affair, asked Germany for her protection, suggesting as compensation that she might have the right of preemption over the African colonies of Portugal. The German government authorized Count Miinster, German ambassador to Paris,

sM^vil, "De la Paix de Frankfort a Algesiras," p. 4. « M6vil, op. cit., p. 8.

to solicit the cooperation of the French. On June 19, Count Miinster handed a note to M. Hanotaux calling his attention to the danger of allowing Portugal to compromise her sovereign rights in order to procure money from Great Britain, and urged economic reprisals, or at least financial pressure. As the Meline ministry had already fallen, the whole question was turned over to M. Brisson and M. Delcasse. M. Andre Mevil, whose authority can hardly be questioned, says that M. Delcasse investigated, and finding the fears of Germany wholly without foundation, let the matter drop.^" However, three years later, March 20, 1902, when M. Gotteron interpolated M. Delcasse in the Senate on this subject, the Minister of Foreign Affairs denied the whole affair categorically, declaring :

''No proposition from Germany concerning the Portuguese colonies and for a decision about them with France was addressed to my predecessor in June, 1898. I add that as far as I am concerned it has been absolutely impossible for me to decline the proposals for the peremptory reason that no proposals were made to me." ^^

Whether definite proposals were made or not, the question did come up in some form or other,^^ and if M. Delcasse had nothing to do with it, the inference is that from the very beginning of his term of office, he was determined not to be a party to any arrangement with Germany which might tend in any way to increase the tension in the already strained relations

loM^vil, op. cit., p. 19.

11 Annales du S^nat, Vol. 61, p. 598.

12 See L^monon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," pp. 152-3 ; also Fortnightly Review, March 1, 1902.

between France and Great Britain.^^ His sails were trimmed to the steady winds from across the Channel rather than to the fitful gusts from across the Vosges.

2. FEANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS

When M. Delcasse entered upon his duties as minister of foreign affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, he is said to have remarked: ''I do not wish to leave here, I do not wish to leave this armchair, until I have reestablished a friendly understanding with England." ^* Inasmuch as he made this purpose the framework of his whole foreign policy, it is necessary to resume briefly the relations between the two powers just before he became foreign minister. Such a summary will show the magnitude of the task which the new incumbent of the French foreign office had mapped out for himself.

Ever since M. Waddington, the French representative, had returned from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 with Tunis in his pocket, as he phrased it, Great Britain, who had been the first to suggest this as compensation, began to look askance at the colonial ambitions of France. But with men like Gambetta and Jules Ferry leading the way, the Third Republic marched steadily ahead in its colonial enterprises, and at the beginning of 1898 it had practically doubled the

13 Directly after this an arrangement was concluded between Great Britain and Germany regarding the Portuguese colonies (see Lemonon, op. cit., p. 186), hut according to Prince Radziwell, representing the German emperor at the funeral of Felix Faure, "Nothing in this arrangement is in opposition to a rapprochement between my country and yours." Liberte, Feb. 26, 1899, quoted by Fullerton, op. cit., p. 55 note.

14 B^rard, "La Politique Francaise," Revue de Paris, July 1, 1905.

territories of France. During the period when M. Hanotaux was in charge of the French foreign office — a period when the colonial ambitions of France were especially conspicuous — Great Britain and France found themselves at odds in every part of the globe where their colonial interests were neighboring.

In Tunis, awarded to France by the kindness of Beaconsfield and Salisbury, the treaty of Kassar-Said, which established the French protectorate in 1881, recognized the validity of previous treaties entered into with European countries. Such capitulations giving these countries jurisdiction over their nationals, and granting them the most favored nation clause in all their commercial arrangements, interfered seriously with the policy of the French Colonial Office, M. Hanotaux took upon himself the task of trying to obtain the renunciation by the powers of these capitulations, and a revision of the commercial treaties to the advantage of France. By his astute and delicate handling of the situation, M. Hanotaux obtained new and satisfactory arrangements with all the powers ; but Great Britain was the last to give her consent, and then only after imposing irksome conditions.

The situation was even less satisfactory in Morocco, which, owing to its long frontier bordering upon Algeria, the French have always considered a natural prolongation of their sphere of influence in northern Africa. At the court of the Sultan we find two Englishmen in high esteem, a Mr. MacLean, formerly an officer of the garrison at Gibraltar, and a Mr. W. B. H. Harris, correspondent of the London ''Times," both of whom had been conducting a campaign of British propaganda based upon jealousy and hatred of France. France, although not strongly desirous at this time of destroying the power of the Sultan and of annexing Morocco, could not permit any other power to obtain preponderant interests there. For if, as Jules Ferry declared, with France possessing Algeria, Tunis is the key of her house, so with France possessing both Tunis and Algeria, Morocco is a most convenient and exposed back-door entrance. Nor was Great Britain ignorant of the special interests which France could with justice claim in Morocco. A report from Sir Henry Johnston, Consul-General at Tunis, who was exceptionally well posted on North African affairs, had in summing up the situation stated that ' * England ought not to oppose the extension of French interests in Morocco."

In Madagascar also we find the two powers at odds with each other. In 1896, when France wished to change her protectorate into full sovereignty, it was only after numerous arguments that she succeeded in persuading the British government to put into writing an acknowledgment of her position made orally ten years before. Even then she might have failed if she had not been able to point out her acceptance of Great Britain's high-handed action in Zanzibar in making a treaty with Germany in utter disregard of a previous treaty made with France.^^ There were also disputes in the region of the Congo, in the basin of the Niger, in Ethiopia, in the Egyptian Soudan, and in the valley of the Upper Nile — ^in this last a dispute which was to bring the two nations to the very brink of war.

15 See E. Lavisse, "France et Angleterre," Eevue de Paris, Feb. 1, 1899,

In the Orient we find the same antagonism. Dnring the period of 1897-1898 France was carrying on a very active policy in the Far East, gathering in the fruits of her support of China against dismemberment by Japan — railway concessions, mining concessions, treaties of commerce, a ninety-nine year lease on the bay of Kwang-Chou-Wan. But it was only against the constant opposition of Great Britain, who was already looking with favor upon Japan as a potential ally to arrest the steady progress of Russia, the ally of France, towards the warm open seas of the east. Proceeding south to Indo-China, where France possessed a great colonial area comprising Tonkin, Annam, Cochin-China, Cambodia and Laos, we again find the two nations with rival interests. Great Britain possessed Burma and was determined that Siam, which bordered on French Indo-China, should not fall under French influence. By the Convention of London, signed in 1896, both nations agreed to respect the independence of the valley of the Menam and of Bangkok, the capital of Siam; yet in the years which followed a constant struggle went on in which each side attempted to increase its power in this region at the other's expense, especially over Yunnan, which as the only route to the upper Yangtse must be kept open to both.

Nor could the French forget their interests in Egypt, where Napoleon had raised his victorious standards, where de Lesseps had made the shorter route to India possible, and where France had shared the power with Great Britain, only to withdraw ignominiously through the inexcusable vacillation of a weak-kneed foreign minister. But even if France had withdrawn of her

'own free will, she would not let Great Britain forget that she, too, had given many assurances that she had no intention of maintaining a permanent position there.

Finally there was the century-old conflict over the [fishing rights granted on what was called the French shore in Newfoundland. Here the French had to contend not only with Great Britain, but also with a colonial government which was not always willing to carry out arrangements made by the mother country.^^ But whether the question raised was, ''Is a lobster a fish under the Treaty of Utrecht ? " or whether the dispute was over a Chinese pagoda and a cemetery, the two powers were mutually engaged in a policy of "pin-pricks" that might at any moment bring them into active conflict. The Fashoda incident only too clearly showed the danger: — ''France and England were face to face like birds in a cock-pit, while Europe under German leadership, was fastening their spurs, and impatient to see them fight to the death." ^'^ Before taking up the Fashoda affair, with which our narrative proper begins — for although the roots of the affair go back to the regime of M. Hanotaux, it was M. Delcasse who was given the disagreeable task of finding a solution — a brief glance at French internal politics is essential.

Ever since 1894, when Captain Dreyfus was convicted of treason in a trial which left much to be desired from the point of view of justice, the Dreyfus affair hovered like a bird of ill omen over successive minis-

16 See L6monon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," pp. 136-169, for a very excellent discussion.

17 Fullerton, "Problems of Powers," p. 57.

tries, refusing to be driven away until the whole rotten carcass should be dragged forth and exposed to the light of publicity. Four successive ministers of war, after examining the famous dossier, upon whose contents Captain Dreyfus was convicted, had declared him guilty, and had opposed revision of the case. M. Meline, premier of the government preceding that of M. Brisson, swore on his honor that Dreyfus was guilty. M. Cavaignac, minister of war in the Brisson cabinet, declared in his speech announcing the policy of the government (July 7) that the door was closed upon the Dreyfus question. The murder or suicide of Col. Henry, chief witness against Dreyfus in 1894, and self confessed forger, coming at this time (August 1898), made it evident that a revision must take place in the near future, and that for some time to come the minister of foreign affairs had to count upon a war department weak and disorganized, unrespected either at home or abroad. Even in discussions on foreign affairs in the Chamber the ''affair" was dragged in. M. Jules Guesde, the Socialist, declared that the Quai d'Orsay was subject to occult influences, ''that the French Republic has a king who is named Rothschild," and M. Firmin Faure asserted that the government of M. Brisson was established with one purpose, — namely to obtain the acquittal of Dreyfus, a traitor, and recommended a French policy instead of a Jewish policy.^^ The Franco-Russian alliance itself was being undermined, and Russia could rightly question whether France with the Dreyfus incubus attached to its war department was a very valuable partner.

18 Aanales de la Chambre, Vol, 59iv, p. 167.

18 FRENCH FOEEION POLICY

So it was with the Dual Alliance weakening, with Italy jealous and disgruntled, with Germany dubiously friendly, and with Great Britain openly hostile, that France put her foreign policy into the hands of M. Delcasse, who for seven years was to guide her destinies and finally lead her into a friendly entente with Great Britain, the one power which for centuries had been her open and avowed enemy.

Chapter II Fashoda

1. THE TRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENT OF MARCH 21. 1899

THE Spanish- American War was in progress when M. Delcasse entered upon his duties as minister of foreign affairs, and he immediately conceived the idea that France as a sincere friend of both powers might be able to bring about an understanding between them. Admirals Schley and Sampson, at Santiago, had completed the destruction of Spanish sea power which Admiral Dewey had begun in Manila. Spain unable to continue the struggle, solicited the good offices of M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Washington, to ask for terms of peace. The United States was willing to offer reasonable terms, and on August 12, a protocol was signed by William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and M. Cambon, representing Spain. As a mark of appreciation of M. Delcasse 's position as mediator and M. Cambon 's valuable services towards ending the war, Paris was chosen as th^ plac^ where the peace, terms were arranged and signed.^ Although M. Delcasse had thus earned the right to the blessing conferred by the beatitudes upon the peacemaker, he was now to embark upon a dangerous course in which he would need all possible benedictions to escape the reefs of disaster.

1 Johnson, "America's Foreign Kelations," Vol. II, p. 264.

Ever since Lord Beaconsfield, in 1877, had given to the world that clever exhibition of haute finance worthy of the best traditions of his race, by purchasing on his own authority, for four million pounds, the hundred and seventy-seven thousand shares of the Suez Canal held by the Khedive, Great Britain had found herself unable to withdraw from Egypt. In the early eighties France, who had gone in as an equal partner, allowed herself to be forced out by the pusillanimity of a foreign minister. Great Britain gave notice on several occasions of her intention to withdraw, and in 1885, after the fall of Khartoum, did withdraw from the Egyptian Soudan. But from 1891 to 1894 she gave new impetus to her expansion both on the Upper Nile and in the territory between Lakes Albert Nyanza and Victoria. France countered with a treaty with the Congo Free State, August 14, 1894, opening to her influence territory north of the Bornu to the Nile.^ Towards the close of 1895 the French government was apprised of the fact that Great Britain intended to crush the Mahdi and retake the Soudan.^ The dream of Cecil Ehodes for a Cape to Cairo Eailroad was approaching the possibility of fulfillment. This scheme conflicted with a plan that the French had long cherished of extending their territory across the continent, and instructions to this effect had been given as far back as 1893 to M. Liotard by M. Delcasse, who was at that time Colonial Secretary. M. Liotard had been ordered

2 Doc. Dip., "Afrique, Arrangements, Actes et Conventions, 1881- 1898," No. 16. In reference to this convention M. Deloncle in the Chamber, Feb. 28, 1895, declared that "to-day the English dream of possessing all the upper Nile is, I believe, forever disturbed." Annales de la Chambre, Dgbats Pari., Vol. 451, p. 761.

3 Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 43.

to seek, by the Upper Ubanghi, an outlet upon the Nile for the French possessions in Central Africa.* The instructions for the Marchand expedition proper were not signed till February 24, 1896, more than two years later, an inexcusable fault in an expedition of this sort.^ The expedition left France in June of the same year, ** charged with relieving those troops which had completed their term of service and with assuring under the high direction of the government's commissioner, M. Liotard, the occupation and the defence of the regions that the Franco-Congo Convention had recognized as ours. ' ' " The instructions further ordered Captain Marchand to avoid all hostilities; in fact his expedition was purposely made small in order to avoid even the appearance of aggression.

Before continuing with Captain Marchand to his encounter with General Kitchener at Fashoda, we must take note of the diplomatic sparring between the two governments. Between the time when M. Liotard first received orders to seek an outlet upon the Nile in 1893, and the setting out of the Marchand expedition in 1896, both governments gave clear expressions of their views. On March 28, 1895, Sir Edward Grey, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons : ''We have no reason to suppose that any French expedition has instructions to enter, or the intention of entering, the Nile Valley . . . because the advance of a French expedition under secret instructions right from

■* Lebon, "La Mission Marchand et le Cabinet Meline," Kevue de Deux Mondes, March 15, 1900.

5 See Darcy, "Cent Annies de Rivalite Coloniale," Chap X, for an excellent discussion of the mistakes which led to the ultimate failure of the expedition.