Sea power in American history; the influence of the navy and the merchant marine upon American development

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Preface

The term "sea power," though not invented by Admiral Mahan in his "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," owes its wide use to him, and no writer since his day has been able to do much more than follow in his footsteps. But though Admiral Mahan constantly discussed the influence of sea power upon American history, and even dealt exhaustively with some periods, he never incorporated those ideas in a single volume. If the present book, therefore, in its endeavor to express succinctly many of these same views seems to echo Mahan 's pages, it is only because later writers can do little more than repeat the words of America's — and the world's — foremost historian of the sea.

The greater need, however, in a history of sea power for the average reader, is to connect the sea and the naval and commercial contests which have been waged upon its waters, with the political and military movements with which they were contemporary. The authors have therefore consistently tried to keep before the reader some idea of what was going on upon the land while military and commercial navies were active upon the ocean highways.

In their treatment of purely naval matters the authors have aimed to strike a happy mean between those naval histories, which relate simply the traditions and stirring incidents of our maritime wars, and those rather professional discussions of strategy and tactics which can be understood and appreciated only by naval officers, — both neglect to place in true perspective the far-reaching and decisive influence of sea power upon the history of the American Continent. The authors have not forgotten heroic deeds vi PREFACE

but they have tried to assign a larger place to those silent and unspectacular forces in American life and character which have sprung from the nation's mercantile and military fleets. If the reader thus finds that more space has been devoted to the participation of the French Navy in the Revolutionary struggle than to the sea fights of Paul Jones, or if he notes that more details are given of the progress of the blockade of the South in the Civil War than to Gushing 's daring expedition against the Alhemarle, it is because in the results achieved the former forces stand higher.

The authors, however, have not neglected the human side, for men are, after all, the final factors in history. Such personalities as Paul Jones, Stephen Decatur, David Porter, John Ericsson, David G. Farragut, and Alfred T. Mahan have had more weight in determining the course of sea power than the ships or guns which they commanded or constructed. The authors have, accordingly, in separate biographical sketches, endeavored to trace the personal influence on sea power and national ideals of some of the great masters of seafaring and sea warfare.

The merchant marine, though usually recognized as a vital element in sea power, has rarely been given much attention in histories of that subject. It is coming to be understood, however, that it has been an important influence in our national life and a force to be reckoned with in history. With the revival in the last few years of an American high-seas merchant fleet, it is peculiarly appropriate that the large part which this peaceful branch of sea power has played in our history should be given recognition. If from the pages of this volume the importance of sea power in both its military and commercial aspects is made clearer to the American citizen of to-day, such a result will furnish the authors satisfaction and reward.

PREFACE vii

For assistance in securing historical material and illustrations the authors wish to record their special obligations and thanks to the authorities of the Library and Department of English of the Naval Academy, the New York Public Library, and the Bureau of "War Records and Library of the Navy Department. Without their assistance and that of many others the present work would have been impossible.

Introduction

The authors of "Sea Power in American History" have realized the desirability of, if not the absolute necessity for, a work that would breathe the spirit of the present, and at the same time bring out the strong points emphasized by recent events, especially the World War, in this allimportant question of sea power. The authors have been most happy in giving proper weight and emphasis to each phase of the subject.

Without going too much into detail, sufficient is said to trace out and connect up into one continuous story the rise, development, and present condition of both branches of sea power, commercial and naval. The authors have shown how mutually dependent each is upon the other. They show how, after commerce had been developed on the sea, it became necessary to have an organized fighting force or navy to protect commerce, and then the further development of naval strength to repel invasion by enemy naval force, or the destruction of one's commerce on the high sea by enemy naval vessels. They show how exchange of commodities was followed by interchange of ideas, modification of customs, habits, etc., the discovery, settlement, and development of new lands through commercial enterprises seeking new fields and ne<v markets.

It has been said that men will not go to sea unless actually pushed into the sea. Careful analysis of the periods of our merchant marine will show that at each period in our history in which we paid particular attention to our mer-

X INTRODUCTION

chant marine, our internal conditions were such as to encourage effort on the sea, even if a trend seaward was not absolutely necessary at the moment. For example, prior to the war of 1861-65 our western country was beset by the Indians; there were many hardships tc be encountered by those daring the wilderness. While there was a good market abroad, and remembering the success of the past in human enterprise on the sea, our people along the eastern coast, yielding to the lure of the sea, rather than to the hardships of the West and the wilderness, took to the sea and built up that wonderful merchant marine that was the pride of our country and the envy of the world in 1861. The destruction of this splendid fleet during the Civil War, the production of a restless, and at the same time more or less daring spirit during this war, impelled many of our men to wander into the far West just after the war, and the great success that attended their efforts induced others to follow, so that the attraction was away from rather than toward the sea.

Throughout the book the authors bring out the significance of our merchant marine's development. It struck me perhaps with greater force because as Chairman of the United States Shipping Board I have had close contact with our present peace fleet and the many problems attending the rehabilitation of our merchant marine. "Sea Power in American History" points out this fact: Before the War of Independence we had a merchant marine second to Great Britain's, and before the War of 1812 and the Civil War, we had a commerce equal to Britain's. In other words, in three different periods of our history we possessed a large merchant marine that was a source of vast wealth to our people. In all three of these periods of our history our navy was at a very low ebb. The authors in dwelling upon this in Chapter VI state : * ' Dur-

INTRODUCTION xi

ing the decade before 1812, when the war was plainly approaching, Congress appropriated money for two new brigs and two sloops-of-war to protect a conunerce as great as England's, — as if a city, growing from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand, added four policemen to its force." The navy, I think, should exist for the nation 's commerce, so as to protect it and make safe the avenues of trade. Of course a sea-going marine provides shipbuilding and engineering plants, skilled artisans and seamen, all of which contribute to the creating and maintaining of the navy. But we must not therefore regard the merchant marine as existing only for this purpose.

In the spring of 1917, faced by the necessity of having "ships, more ships and MOKE SHIPS" to transport troops and supplies overseas, America engaged in the most stupendous ship-building in the history of the world. That huge machine, stretching out to every part of our land, which was then set in motion has not ceased its work. Had we attempted suddenly to stop it with the signing of the Armistice, untold hardship to the workmen of this count rjwould have been the result. Only a short time ago the whirl of this machine was heard all over the face of the globe as a world's record in ship-launching was broken by the launching from Hog Island of seven ships in one day. More tonnage was flung into the Delaware from one shipyard in one day upon this occasion than our merchant marine could show had been added to it in thirty days during the pre-war time through the output of all our yards. When this war program is completed we shall have constructed more than two thousand modern type ships.

Once more we are in a position to take our rightful place among the maritime powers of the world. The World War eliminated one of the leading maritime powers and gave us our chance to rehabilitate ourselves as a maritime lii INTRODUCTION

nation. Not by choice but forced by national emergency, we are to-day in possession of sufficient ships again to resume the proud position we had prior to the Civil War, when this nation played a leading role among the sea powers. We should be governed by the lessons pointed out by the authors of "Sea Power in American History," Acquainting ourselves with the historical development of our navy and merchant marine should renew our faith in America's ability again to sail the seven seas as of old when our clipper-ships had no peers.

The Congress of the United States in the closing hours of the sixty-sixth session passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. This splendid piece of constructive legislation was the result of non-partizan effort. By it the United States Shipping Board is vested with vast powers. By this Act Congress has given the Shipping Board all necessary power to develop a permanent and efficient merchant marine, and at the same time protect it against the unfair practices of other nations. The spirit of the Act is so American that I shall refresh your minds by quoting from its preamble, which reads in part:

That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States; and it is herebj' declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine, and, in so far as may not be inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, the United States Shipping Board shall, in the disposition of vessels and shipping property as hereafter provided, in the making of rules and regulations, and in the administration of the shipping laws

INTRODUCTION xiii

keep always in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be attained.

Every man, woman, and child should study this legislative measure which again makes possible a permanent American Merchant Marine worthy of our pride. It should kindle anew a belief in our power to come back upon the seas. All over the world our ships now reach, and American vessels are being placed in established trade routes as quickly as possible consistent with good business judgment. We are spreading the products of our country so that all seaports will have their just share of the overseas trade.

"We have made it our policy to establish shipping concerns in all ports so that products raised or manufactured near those ports will have sufficient tonnage to take care of their transportation. This natural flow of commerce will provide cheaper and quicker transportation than is now so often the case, when goods are sent over a long rail haul to a few important shipping centers before being put aboard vessels for overseas shipment. Some of the trade routes will, of course, not pay at first, but it is necessary under the present law to operate vessels in these routes until they do pay or after a fair trial prove to be too unprofitable to maintain.

Our merchant marine will be established permanently through the private ownership of the vessels now the property of the United States. And the law of the land so directs the sale of the ships as soon as practicable, consistent with good business methods, to individuals or shipping companies who intend to operate them on established trade routes.

Every collateral activity necessary for the efficient and satisfactory functioning of a merchant marine has been xiv INTRODUCTION

established ; such as an American Classification Bureau, an American Bureau of Survey to supervise repairs, and an American Marine Insurance Syndicate, in which all American vessels can be amply and properly insured, thus rendering our merchant marine independent of foreign aids in any particular.

"Sea Power in American History" is a theme that should stir every patriotic American. It is timely, now that all eyes are turned toward the capture of world markets. In the race for trade, let us not forget that a merchant marine is as necessary for the national defense as it is to take care of the proper growth of our foreign and domestic commerce. Therefore it is our solemn duty to do everything possible to build up this merchant marine. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is notwithstanding the truth that when all is said and done we are not nearly so dependent upon a successful merchant marine as other nations. But we must have a sufficient number of merchant ships to meet emergencies when they arise and to carry on our normal trade.

Recently a determined drive began in the public press against Section 28 of the new Merchant Marine Act. The discriminatory features of that section of the law are not intended as a club over foreign competitors. The section is there merely as a means to force our competitors in international trade to play the game fairly. It is our intention to play fair. The least we may expect is that our competitors will follow suit. Once and for all it should be understood that America no longer proposes to stand for discriminations against her ships. It would be a sorry day for this country should the time ever come when the fact that a ship floated our flag would automatically bar it from securing a fair chance to acquire a foothold in the commerce-carrying business of the world. We have in

INTRODUCTION rv

Section 28 a remedy for just such a contingency, and should the time ever arrive that made it necessary to put it into effect, uo foreign influence should be allowed to sway us in our decision to act.

The authors of this book make another point clear. It is this: Though at times, during the last hundred years, Great Britain and the United States have had serious differences, these have always been settled by peaceful means, England's support of President Monroe a century ago, her willingness to settle the Canadian border disputes by diplomacy and arbitration, her final refusal to join Napoleon III in the intervention against the Union, her cooperation with our Secretary of State, John Hay, in regard to the Panama Canal and the Open Door in China, are evidences of her good will in the past — a good will that has again been shown by her splendid service for human liberty in the late war. The century of peace between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race is full of good omen for the future.

The authors of *'Sea Power in American History" in their biographical chapters on men like John Paul Jones, Stephen Decatur, David Porter, Fulton and Ericsson, Farragut and Mahan, have furnished most useful lessons, lessons that should prove of special value at this time to the young Americans entering our navy and merchant marine. These young men are to visit all parts of the world, they are to be the sample of American manhood, character, energy, and integrity exhibited to the people at large of foreign countries, and by their actions will all of their fellow citizens be judged. From them will all foreigners get their impression of our country. Hence the great responsibility resting upon our young Americans engaging in a seafaring life, either in the navy or the merchant service. For this reason, the special attention given in this xvi INTRODUCTION

book to character makes it of unusual value and interest at this time.

The history of the American Navy and the American Merchant Marine shows that some of the finest types of American character have been produced there. These men were not dreamers with word or pen. They were strong, active men who participated in the serious things of life and had experienced all its hardships and temptations, yet they show most of all an even balance of character. They were not prone to fly off on a tangent due to a single idea, but faced facts four square and arrived at sound conclusions that endure. The men of the navy and the merchant marine labor far from the view of their countrymen, especially in times of peace. And the best appreciation of their labors which the patriotic American can show is to read and become familiar with their work, so as to know of their sacrifices and appreciate what part in the country's development is due to their efforts.

The naval officer is not, as popularly supposed, a fireeater, but is often from his wide experience in the world an earnest advocate and a diligent worker for international friendship. He is, like the upholders of law and order everywhere, more anxious to prevent trouble than to promote it.

The lesson of all naval history, as of all history, is that men more than materials accomplish results. If America of this generation wishes to achieve success upon the seas it must produce men who have the vision to discover what is necessary and how it can be achieved. It must produce men who have the same genius for seafaring and all the maritime occupations connected with it as had the men of the earlier periods when the American flag was found flying upon ships in every port.

History that is worth while, historv^ that is reliable and

INTRODUCTION xvii

inspiring, is always the record of men of character, loyalty, and self-sacrifice for country and mankind. In no profession is the importance of character more forcibly exemplified than in the seafaring life. Careful study of the naval heroes of the past who have accomplished constructive and lasting results for the good of mankind shows that they have not, as a rule, been men of genius, but men of strong character, loyalty, and true patriotism. Such men as Sir John Jervis (Earl St. Vincent) in the British Navy and Farragut in the American Navy have been, during my forty-seven years of active naval life, the ideals towards which I have striven.

W. H. Benson.

Washington, D. C, July 29, 1920.

Contents

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Preface v

Introduction ix

Chapter I British Sea Power Wins An Empire In America

THE World War aroused a new interest in *'sea power," as Admiral Mahan, its interpreter and historian, called it. This world-wide conflict verified virtually all that Mahan had said of the influence of sea power on events, so much so that his volumes, written years before 1914, now seem full of prophetic vision. Just as in ancient times Xerxes, King of Persia, and Hannibal, the personification of the military imperialism of Carthage, were conquered by the sea power of Greece and Rome, and as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte were crushed by sea power, so in the twentieth century William HohenzoUern and his Prussian military ambitions fell victims to the sea supremacy of the Allied nations, a supremacy without which the efforts of Haig, Foch, and Pershing would have been powerless. Thus in the last analysis freedom and democracy owe a large debt to sea power.

The term "sea power" covers a wider range of activities than is commonly supposed. In general it comprehends all those forces in national life which tend to give a nation strength upon the sea. Under it are included commercial fleets as well as naval forces, the capacious merchantman as well as the steel-clad dreadnaught. Not only the craft employed in the foreign trade but also the domestic shipping of a nation, — the schooners, steamers, and barges which navigate its rivers and lakes and pass between its ports, near or distant, — are an important part of sea power. This was strikingly illustrated in the World War, when the American mine-layers in the North Sea were almost all converted coastwise steamships.

The various means by which these fleets are constructed and maintained are another vital feature of sea power. Without shipyards for the manufacture of ships, without resources of the materials needed, or easy access to such supplies, without genius for naval architecture, no nation can long hold supremacy upon the sea. For the fueling and protection of armed shipping, and to secure commercial fleets against discrimination by other nations there are generally colonies and bases which greatly strengthen the nation possessing them. Such factors affect considerably the sea power of a country. The very situation of the nation itself may also be an important factor. Not accidentally have islands been frequently the seats of sea power.

The population which is engaged in maritime pursuits is much more extensive than is usually supposed. Besides the officers and men of the navy, whether they serve on board ship or remain to labor in the navy-yards and bases of the fleet, there are the men of the merchant marine, whether they are engaged in ocean or coastwise or lake traffic, and the fishermen and the whalers. There should also be added the merchants, brokers, ship-owners, ship-builders, and all those who in any way draw their livelihoods from the sea. And those men whose minds on land or sea direct the water-borne commerce of the world or command and manoeuver the naval forces, those men who invent new types of ships, or new methods of warfare, those who explore the depths of the sea as others seek for pole or tropic upon its surface, are not to be excluded from the scope of sea power.

The influence of sea power also has been greater and more far-reaching than is generally thought. Nautical enterprise and skill have done more than any other force to build up civilization. In ancient times the nations that advanced in civilization were usually in touch with the sea (witness the Egyptians and the Greeks), and over the sea routes of the Mediterranean came Western civilization. The freedom inherent in the sea also has been a stimulating force in creating and preserving free institutions. Thus, even navies have usually proved to be of little danger to democracy and liberty, and the great sea powers have been the chief bulwarks against autocracy and militarism.

In the development of the American continent sea power has played a more important part than is usually believed. Seven out of the eight wars in which the United States has engaged have been won by sea power. The Western Hemisphere is what it is to-day, free and democratic, largely through sea power, — sometimes American, sometimes British, and at least once French. The United States owed its independence to it, the Latin-American states maintained their early-won independence through the sea power behind the Monroe Doctrine, and secession in the South and misrule in Cuba were overcome by sea power. Few events in American history are entirely free from the touch of the sea, whether the touch be commercial or naval, whether the nation be Spain, France, Great Britain, or the. United States. Beginning with the discovery of the New World by the ships of Spain, then the chief sea nation of the time, we shall endeavor to trace the influence of the sea and sea power upon American character and history.

The discovery of America, destined to be a curse to Spain, was to inure to the benefit of the English and the Dutch. Spain, unlike France and Holland, and especially unlike

^ England, showed itself in the years that succeeded incapable of creating a lasting sea power,. "With a supercilious contempt for manual labor and trade, jjthe Spaniard estab- 1 lished no industries, developed no natural resources in his ' new dependencies, and entrusted his ships to Portuguese and ; Italian navigators. He could not identify himself with his colonies. Master of the Western seas for a hundred years after Columbus, he lost his opportunity for permanent control by his lust for quick-gotten wealth and by his mismanagement of his subject races. The cargoes he took back to Spain were precious in content, small in bulk, and scattered far and wide in a few galleons, — in striking contrast to the ships of Britain and Holland, which, laden with the bulky freight of tobacco, spices, fish, and furs, returned from all the quarters of the world. Hence the seizure of a single Spanish galleon was a very different matter from the capture of a British or a Dutch merchantman. When Drake, during his circumnavigation of the globe, entered the Pacific and captured ''the great galleon" on her annual trip from Lima to Cadiz, he got a cargo of gold dust, pearls, emeralds, and diamonds, valued at half a million sterling. The Spaniards, on the other hand, in seizing a Dutch ship were as likely as not to get a cargo of salt herrings. In other words, Spain at the very height of her mastery of the seas was a debtor nation; she had to hire Dutch ships to bring to her shores the common necessaries of existence, which she paid for in gold wrung from Mexico and Peru. "The discovery of America was therefore destined to build up Britain's sea power on the ruins of Spain's."^

England's mastery of the seas is generally considered by historians as dating from the defeat of the great Spanish Armada in 1588, in the reign of Elizabeth. The wars in 1 Silborne, The Evolution of Sea Power, p. 95.

whicli Spain, France, and Holland engaged from 1572 onward offered adventurous English seamen altogether too tempting opportunities for privateering in the English Channel. And when peace came the profits of the slave-trade between Guinea and the plantations of the Spanish Main drew many an Englishman besides Hawkins, who first attempted it in 1562. Little did it matter that Spain reserved all this for her own ships; religious fanaticism added fuel to economic rivalry. Drake, the greatest of Elizabethan sailors and freebooters, was actuated by an intense Puritan hatred of the Spaniards. "To break through the Catholic monopoly of the New World, to kill Spaniards, to sell negroes, to sack gold-ships, were in these men's minds a seemly work for the 'elect of God.'"^ This religious, political, and economic antagonism of the two peoples came to a climax in the destruction of the Spanish Armada by the storms of the North Sea, powerfully seconded by British seamen led by Howard, Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher.

From the defeat of the Armada came far-reaching results, Holland secured her independence and began her rise as a commercial and naval power, which in turn made her develop trade and colonization in America, remnants of which still exist in Guiana and Curacao. But as Britain had been the victor against the Armada, the scepter of the seas passed in a very real sense to her. The decisiveness of the Armada victory could not be altered by later naval expeditions by both countries, such as the stirring fight of Sir Richard Grenville in one ship, the Revenge, against fifty-three Spanish, or the joint enterprise of Hawkins and Drake to the West Indies, — a ghastly record of discord, disease, and death, for both commanders died and were buried

1 J. R. Green, A Short History of the English People, Revised Edition, New York, 1889; p. 415.

in American waters in 1795-6). By reason of Britain's control of the Atlantic, her colonizers could now use unmolested the southern route to America, safer for the small vessels of the period, — the route via the Azores, the Canaries, the "West Indies, and thence to Virginia, as Raleigh had named the theater of future British colonization.

By reason also of this victory, England, realizing only gradually the rich possibilities of her new power on the sea, instituted under the East India and Virginia companies that great expansion of trade and colonization toward both East and West which gathered momentum as English enterprise gained confidence and the safety of the seas became assured. Her earlier attempts had been made against great odds of Spanish interference and loss of communication with the mother country such as blotted out Raleigh's band of settlers at Roanoke Island before ships could return after the Armada. But in another half-century she could seize such an exposed outpost as Jamaica in the very center of the Caribbean, and hold it against all Spanish attempts at recovery.