John Stuart Mill and the philosophy of mediation

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I. Philosophia Mediatrix

This expression smacks of limitation; but the object of the following discussion is not to circumscribe that inquiry which, on account of its comprehensiveness and its depth, is the greatest reflective effort of the human mind. The purpose is rather to claim for philosophy complete emancipation and enfranchisement as a perfectly free inquiry, capable of moving without let or hindrance whithersoever there is any medium, however tenuous, which will make motion at all possible. We do not recognize for philosophy any limitations as a particular science ; for it there are no necessary presuppositions whatever. No postulates exist, no so-called fundamentals, no ends or aims, which are not part of itself, developments of its own characteristic activity. There are no necessary principles, there is no necessary order of its development ; for philosophy is principle, and is order, in its very essence. Philosophy is as it were organism expressed in terms of thought.

The underlying presupposition of this essay may be briefly stated. It is, that philosophy, despite its air of sophistication, is still (like Paul's Athenian audience) "too superstitious"; or, if one prefer the RV, "very religious" ; either phrase will serve here. Political liberty was at least promoted by the separation of church and state. Full liberty of speculation can only come as the result of the separation of philosophy and religion. This statement is made in the interest alike of both these activities. What is needed is an irreligious philosophy and an unphilosophical religion. Or, to state the problem somewhat dfferently, we desiderate a philosophy and a religion which are both undogmatic, — except indeed where there is question of a fact ; facts always announce themselves dogmatically, that is to say, categorically, and they are entitled to this privilege. To put it in still another way, it is the theological element, now blending with religion properly so-called, now with "philosophy," which brings not a little confusion into our thought concerning both these ancient and precious expressions of the spirit of man. Time is undoubtedly assisting in the rather rapid elimination of the confusion; modernity is anti-theological. But, to descend to the vernacular, "One's afraid, and t'other daresn't!" An influential school of thought is still frankly apologetical in method, sometimes unctuous in manner, and visibly suprarational in aspiration. And religion, while getting rather cold comfort from philosophy, still has the habit of craving rational foundations, and feeling ashamed of the mysticism which is its power and life, apart, that is, from its practical expressions.

Historically a certain ambiguity has attached to the character, position and function of that universal speculation which we call philosophy. This situation reflects the problem arising from the conflict of two points of view, made inevitable by the existence of two interests, between which philosophic speculation functions as in some sense a mediatrix. The problem has been, whether philosophy should assimilate to theosophy or to science ; whether it should assume the character of a technic and revelation of divine mysteries, or that of an instrument of human knowledge and wisdom ; not scorning practical ends, — if only those ends be comprehensive, and adapted to fit into a comity of all human ends. The problem was and is, whether philosophy is to be a method of theology, or a higher synthesis of the principles of the sciences, and so of "science" in general, — that is, of knowledge in the widest sense ; and thus to become eventually the method of universal science. Or again, — formulating the problem in terms of Comte's wellknown "three stages" of man's intellectual evolution, — Is philosophy to remain in the "theological" stage, — which for the archpriest of Positivism meant virtually superstition, and even "animism" ; or, in the "metaphysical" stage, in Comte's narrow sense of Platonic realism, the stage of a purely abstract philosophy, or an "existential logic"; or, is philosophy to be the "positive" science of positive sciences, a system of the implications and of the general laws of thought, knowledge, nature and life itself, — culminating in a science of man's own life in relation to his natural environment, and also to his social environment or place and function in the social "organism."

Before the Christian era philosophy, under the spell of Egyptian sunshine, became intoxicated with divinity, and the divine afflatus has not yet evaporated. She was thus found a meet handmaid for Religion during many centuries. And Catholicism heaped much honor on her faithful handmaid; for having chosen to establish dogmatically historical and scientific foundations for the Church, she sorely needed a philosophic apologetic. Pre-Christian neo-Platonism, the original handmaid, in process of time led to the same service ancient philosophy, as brought to its apogee by the master of them that know and untainted with Oriental mysticism ; and this new handmaid was even more honored. But she was more sober and sophisticated, and in due time injected the virus of scepticism into certain who thenceforth labored to emancipate philosophy, adumbrating more or less dimly that philosophy was the higher concept, the larger context, the genus of intellectual activity in general ; while religion was a species of experience, a technic of salvation, though an all-pervading influence.

Philosophy being a sort of presiding genius of science has direct relation to religion thru the relation of the latter to certain of the special sciences. For instance sociology studies religion as historically a very important factor in social evolution. Above all, as James showed so sympathetically and with such penetrating analysis, the phenomena of religious "experience" are a varied and important field for psychological inquiry and speculation. But philosophy and religion, if both should be emancipated, would be contrasted in that the former would be an inquiry of the reason and senses and powers of the mind; while the latter would be a quest of the spirit, a suprarational realization, or rather direct apprehension of something incommunicable, undemonstrable ; an elevation, enthusiasm, chastening mood, private to the individual soul.

Thruout its history philosophy has occupied a more or less ambiguous position. As the most intelligent attempt to understand the world, it was at first identical with science, and as such came into opposition with religion. For religion was born in the emotional and imaginative and instinctive simplicity of family life, and was essentially the noblest expression of the consciousness of blood kinship. The opposition was the opposition between intelligence and instinct. It may be said that early Greek philosophy was a kind of naturalism, and as such, an antithesis to the religion of the hearthfire ; just as it continued to be antithetical to the imaginative nature-cult which grew out of, and was simply a more imposing form of, primitive ancestor-worship.

Now in a sense both this religion and this philosophy are what we term "natural/' — and by this we mean spontaneous and unconscious — at any rate not self-conscious. What we know as the existential question was unthought of, would perhaps have been deemed irrelevant, in reference to the imaginative objects of religious reverence. What we know alas too well as the epistemological problem had not laid its ghostly hand on the cool brow of a philosophy which thought of itself only as "science," if it thought of itself at all ; certainly it never thought of itself "subjectively."

Again, both this religion and this philosophy were what we term imaginative also; but both were so unconsciously. The opposition that grew up between them was due to the difference in scope, in distinterestedness, in dispassionateness; between a work of cosmic imagination, and the idealism of love and filial veneration. Thus wisdom becomes divorced from worship, and the seeds are sown of the later warfare of science and religion, or (more suitably expressed) of science and dogmatic theology ; which we may venture to call the conflict of knowledge with superstition and ignorance ; the immediate question of the hour being, for theology and apologetic philosophy, just what is included in the term "superstition."

Presumably the archaic character which religion retains so persistently, its ultarconservative tendency, is due in indefinite measure to the fact that its ideal objects of reverence have provoked in abundant extent artistic expression. Even among our American Indians, whose religion is the only one we know as indigenously Occidental, we find a folklore which enshrines their cultus, and at the same time constitutes their literature.

This reactionary spirit of religion is usually attributed apologetically to a reverence due to a feeling of the extreme value attached to the conceptions. But it is a fair question whether the natural permanence of the works of art created so spontaneously in the days of its youthful vigor — including literature, as well as architecture and sculpture and painting — has not been about equally accountable. But this is a digression.

The discussion is as to the historically ambiguous place of philosophy, which has not yet been made out. We have seen it suggesting by implication the criticism of religion. Now religion enshrined in art had transfixed religious conceptions in their naivete ; and unhappily for them, time revealed them not alone in their anthropomorphism but in their immorality. Meanwhile the sceptical movement in philosophy discredited metaphysics (and that meant or included, "science") and threw interest upon man, — that is, upon ethical problems. But so wide had become the breach between philosophy and religion that the ethical philosophers incurred suspicion of "atheism." His moral idealism could not save, in fact destroyed, a Socrates.

We are dealing in this situation of course with a decadent religion, and one which was state-sanctioned and bigoted. But the hostility seen is characteristic; and the fact also, that just because the ethical inquiry took a more or less rational, that is to say scientific, form, this was enough to identify it with philosophy, and to condemn it as critical of sacrosanct tradition.

It is a fact passing strange that what we know as science, natural science, grew not from the roots of early Greek naturalism, — altho it may well be regarded as a revival of that physical speculation, controlled however by an experimental method, — but arose out of the last stage — and lowest — of an expiring religion. For there came a time when religion turned for aid to philosophy. This was the period of the Egyptian episode alluded to above. The noble efforts of a Philo and of a Plotinus to fuse philosophy and religion could only result in a theosophy which, while it exercised a notable influence as a mystical element in the new Christian cult, has hardly been esteemed philosophy, at least by the Western world. Moreover, on what we may call its native heath, this theosophy, by an everincreasing emphasis of its greatest exponents upon the realism credited to Plato, passed in a few generations from physics to theurgy or magic, — a form of religion so sinister as to confuse as it were heaven and hell.

Magic persists not merely in certain wellknown religious ceremonies, but in certain common notions and habits as well. But as to its origin honors are even for altho magic is primitive in appearance and found among tribes of low culture, it was used with all solemnity by the antique civilizations, and indeed only in the era of strictly modern science has become formally discredited. When philosophy and the ancient religion however descended hand and hand into the witches' cavern, their reconciliation and their degradation were, alike complete.

Yet magic, which considered as a religious practice is coercion of the gods, has a quasi-scientific aspect ; it is essentially experimental in method ; it proceeds by trial and error ; it seeks to imitate nature and produce natural results under conditions artificially arranged and controlled. In a word, magic is a method of investigation. Split into astrology and alchemy this character became emphasized in the pseudo-science of the mediaeval period. The idea of control is implicit in the search for the philosophers' stone, while the conception that the stars operate in human destiny is not wholly mythological.

Given a young, vigorous and highly supernatural religion on the one hand, and a science claiming to be natural and becoming progressively so, and which was almost as clearly differentiated from philosophy in the higher sense of that term, as from religion itself, — we have the conditions of a renewed antithesis, and the ambiguity of philosophy's position is revealed. It is clear that in the history of modern philosophy she has had to mediate between a supernatural religion and a natural science. Her office has been in some way to explain and reconcile an inevitable antagonism. But thruout its history an analogous situation may be descried.

Now there was an obvious solution for this situation. For we need only change the terms in order to see that philosophy was to mediate between old knowledge and new ; and that means that its office was to acknowledge the new additions to science and give them their place in the sun, or guarantee their logical validity in relation to the comity of knowledge. Incidentally to declare a truce for the purpose of burying the dead! For philosophy is the judicial attitude per se ; it fortunately has no interests to serve in the way of harmonizing by any tour de force facts or theories to a characteristic content or subject-matter of its own. It is as disinterested as a trained nurse. Philosophy is the arbiter, and is well satisfied with the judges' seat. Philosophy is not truth ; it is the judge of truth, and acknowledges the suzerainty of science, in the sense of knowledge genuinely verified or verifiable experimentally.

It would seem to be inevitable that the authority of a knowledge which rests securely on the method of observation, should be mediated by the judgment of philosophy even to that most treasured inheritance and possession of mankind — religion. But this judgment will not reflect the authority of the narrowly scientific and often purblind specialist, who is really interested not in scientific truth, but in the facts of a particular science only. The comprehensiveness of view and impartiality of philosophy, its depth and sobriety, guarantee religion in all its just claims. But first this trinity, this triune manifestation of the restless quest of man's spirit, must be differentiated; and that task is seemingly incomplete.

But to return to the question why philosophy did not make the (as we may see) obvious solution of its ambiguous position.

The loyalty of philosphy cannt be impugned. But an imperial Church holding not alone the keys of spiritual destiny, but the sword of temporal power, decreed a supernatural philosophy of history. Such a power was able to bend the intellect of man to its will ; by virtue of certain invaluable services to political society, and to mankind in treasuring the vestiges of antique culture, the Church became the heir of the ages. And by holding philosophy in thrall, by confining speculation within the charmed circle of authoritative dogma, she held science at bay for a millennium. So mighty was her spell that in certain realms of inquiry science has become enfranchised only within the memory of living men.

Having thus ventured the opinion that philosophy has always suffered from the dubiety of its character and function, and attempted to account for the endurance of that disadvantage, one may remark quite simply that philosophy, naturally representing the summit of man's knowledge, rather than the mystic vision of his faith and spiritual aspiration, has been too partial to religion. The Mediatrice sometimes wears the mien of high-priestess. This is an evident survival from the historic situation, and especially the long Scholastic subjection. A millennium of ecclesiastical monopoly of education could not fail to produce a characteristically religious, or rather, theological, philosophy; one, religious in interest and in subject-matter, and theological in method.

Now these words are not meant to imply any denunciation of this theological philosophy but merely attempt to picture and account for its character. It has represented truth and reality, and has been a great force in molding social organization and institutions. Speaking pragmatically, it has been true, — is true still, — and is still a great social force. Wherever it has been or is effective, its validity as the expression of a certain type of experience is a simple matter of fact. But if, from what we can only regard as a more modern and scientific point of view, this philosophy appears more or less a picturesque ruin, it is without irony that we say, it is more beautiful thus ; we would not have it restored, — tho its aspect is not devoid of pathos. But better a ruined Parthenon than a "restored" one !

One of the most striking things in the history of modern philosophy has been the oft-repeated situation in which the thinker has started with a very conscious revolt against dogmatism, and with scientific presuppositions and purposes, and speedily back-slidden to a scholastic and theological position and technic. Old metaphysical habits of the tribe seem to have regained a disappointing ascendancy. Had philosophy remained aware of its ambiguous position, and that the solution of the problem lay in its acting as mediator between religion and science, what confusion might have been avoided. Even when based on the rejection of the supernatural, and conceived with practical ends in view, thought was generally dominated by an impracticable ideal of rationality. And this produced metaphysical conceptions as unfruitful as those of the older theological dogmatism. Indeed it may be questioned whether any rational system of ethics (on any principle of "rationality" known to traditional logic, at any rate) can become and remain a permanent and developing force in shaping conduct. Such a system shares the formalism of its deduction and becomes fixed, artificial and at length archaic, and takes its niche in the museum of philosophical heirlooms.

If philosophy is to become scientific in character it must make an entente with common sense. For it is the character of scientific truth when formulated, to be accessible to common intelligence, — at least where general education (however faulty) has reached the average and attained the social scope it has at present. Scientific truth is clear and obvious in the main, and common sense has an avidity for such truth. Science realizes the ideals of common sense, in a manner fulfils, and will yet more greatly fulfil, its hopes, and verify its judgments and discernments. The conventional antithesis of philosophy versus common sense ought to become discredited along with dogmatic and transcendental philosophy. One means in this connection by "common sense," not that misnamed common sense which credulously receives all manner of time-honored superstitions, religious, political and philosophical ; but the up-to-date, sophisticated, perhaps over-positivistic and sceptical common sense, which gives ungrudging credence and unprejudiced moral support to scientific discovery and effort, and abhors superstition ; the "common sense" which unconsciously created the pragmatical method.

It is true that the doctrines presented and defended by apologetic philosophy are too anaemic to be deemed religiously, or even theologically, adequate, except by the most rationalistic schools of theology, most opposing them thru a true instinct of self-preservation, as most subtilly undermining faith. Still, a philosophy of the Absolute, or an "idealistic" system, is an apologetic weapon of a sort against types of criticism and empiricism or of scientific materialism, which are more menacing to supernatural faith, — in as far as its alleged rational and historical, or scientific, basis is concerned. It is not for philosophy to deny to faith its legitimate objects, its spiritual or ideal realities. But in as far as faith asserts existences, claims historical foundations staged with a certain definite cosmological background, these data become subject-matter of special sciences, and thru the medium of these are reflected in the domain of philosophy as logical and ontological problems. Similarly with dogma ; considered as a system of existential or metaphysical formulae, corresponding to, representing, and attempting logical expression of, the ideals of faith, with a view to propagating and conserving these ideals, thru the medium of reason, — religious dogma enters the purview of philosophy, and may conceivably from a metaphysical and logical standpoint be invalidated, as incompatible with the general state of human knowledge.

With regard to the "postulation" by philosophy of certain religious "truths," either as ideals of pure reason, after the Kantian technic, or as working assumptions (certainly much preferable), according to the method suggested by early pragmatism, — it may be doubted whether this will not delay the emancipation of philosophy, and postpone its assuming a truly scientific character. The object of such postulation is of course the attainment of moral ends ; but it may be asked, and has yet to be proved, whether results would differ for the worse if nothing were "postulated," but the desired ends consciously proposed. For if these ideals are thus set up as reals, it must needs be upon some kind of dialectical support, where they remain inaccessible to "observation" ; and we have once more the apologetic question and the old problem of their reality. What the dogmatists forget apparently is, the originally supposed empirical foundations of belief in types of reality we are now asked to accept on dialectical evidence alone. Philosophy may claim to be emancipated from supernaturalism in its sanctioned theological forms, but this type of dialectic throws us back at least to the position of metaphysical realism.

The fundamental fallacy of transcendental dialectic is, that it appears to disregard the fact — which history reveals — that originally the transcendence of itself by the mind rested on an empirical basis. The feat was performed by the primitive imagination, which deemed that it had concrete evidence of the existence of beings it dimly conceived from the supposed manifestations of certain powers, characters, purposes and relations to mankind. The loftiest pantheism, the most mysterious and obscure theosophy, the "blindest" speculative dogmatism, have the same humble origin, — the origin we may presume, — of all religion, — the general animistic or spiritualistic outlook of primitive man. Positive science has transformed the primitive "facts." Today, no transcendental dialectic can be an adequate substitute for the earlier empirical proofs. It only reveals (as critical philosophy shows) the mind's limitation to the sphere of experience.

"Experience" however is (may we not assert?) more than "phenomenal." That is, phenomena, — barring inaccurate observation and experiment, and false inference, — present directly reality; for a "reality" or being the mind cannot know is meaningless. To posit the unknowable is to indulge in a fruitless mysticism. To take as postulate somewhat unknown, to which is attributed by hypothesis characters for which the mind has "categories" or analogies, properties in some degree or manner related to known reality, — this process is as it were the salient in the firing-line of advancing thought. But to seek the unknowable is indeed to plunge into the utter darkness of unreality, with no possibility of a rational result. It is thinking in empty concepts ; it is talking a solemn nonsense. Not without a true instinct did theologians of the XlXth century denounce "agnosticism." Its modest attitude, its doctrine that God is unknowable, was as deadly to theism — far more deadly in fact, than the militant atheism which was ever uncongenial to the temper of scholarship — especially to that of philosophy. Truly an unknowable being is non-existent. It is inconceivable that the mere name of the "Being" should be revealed by some dialectical hocus-pocus transcending reason, and nothing or nothing definite, of its character or nature be knowable.

People justify "faith," that is, belief in the existence and relation to themselves, of supernatural beings and a supernatural world, on the ground that belief controls conduct. But is not the very opposite a truer account? Religion is made apologist for the status quo. It commonly does not judge movements, which are the judges of it, rather; but it is wont to be "interpreted" in terms of the movements, — in so far as these prove irresistible to an opposition often none too heroic. Historically, the West has formed its views, its ideals, especially its economic ideals, and forced Christianity to conform. The Occidental ideals of so-called success, of business, of imperialism, of "materialism," refuse to be related save by a veritable tour de force to the religion which is supposed to have created the civilization of the West. The social forces of the West, even in the pre-Renaissance period, were too strong and "positive" for a religion of passive Oriental detachment and other-worldliness to cope with very successfully. Nothing is more amazing, as nothing is more picturesque, than the mediaeval blend of anarchic feudal confusion and violence, and the Church of the Nazarene sweeping on in the most superb pride ever mortal or mortal estate assumed, to the greatest power, wealth and ostentation among the world's institutions. The extraordinary thing is, that the West ever accepted to the extent that it did, the pessimism of Christianity ; but the Church had created sacraments which should mitigate its rigors. Originally, it is apparent that "faith" was by no means based on moral grounds. Mere belief was the all-important thing. Belief must be justified in itself ; it was conceived as the very essence of spiritual life. The fact that moderns attempt to justify it by something else, shows vividly how they have lost the original position, and forgotten the original dialectic.

But in that age-long strife which it is the mediating office of philosophy to reconcile, science has been wont to meet dogmatism with dogmatism. Science, properly uncompromising where fact and theory strictly verified or verifiable are concerned, sharing the eager habit of human thought, of pressing on to ultimate "unity" and systematization, became almost inevitably and unconsciously dogmatic in its own characteristic way; it tends to create its own kind of transcendental illusion, and generate its own species of faith. Faith often very short-sighted and narrow, and sufficiently bigoted, — not to say unsympathetic. It must be noticed however that scientific belief appeals to only one kind of evidence; and does not hesitate to yield ground when that evidence is really against it. Its dogmatism is the result of an exuberant optimism, leading to a premature generalizing and universalizing of its deductions. It has the nature of primitive "faith" in that it is due to vision, and not to mere tradition and the authority of the dead hand. There is another sharp distinction, also, between the two types of dogmatism, and that is, — that the objects about which science makes affirmations are verifiable in their nature, their character, even if not in their universality. As for example the force of gravitation ; the existence of this force can certainly be asserted, its properties investigated, and its operations formulated as scientific and ''natural" law ; altho its presence thruout the indefinite extension of space cannot be actually or immediately known. Its laws however are not contingent on such universal verification.

Another very important fact to remember is, — that aside from the obvious unverifiability in a scientific sense of the "objects" of theological dogmatism, theology, in making use as an apologetic defense of philosophic systems of the a priori or intuitive type, is leaning on a broken reed. For while it is true that God may be identified with the "Absolute" or the "Infinite," and so an apparent philosophic verification of theological dogma appealed to, the theologian is obliged to ignore the fact that the reverse is impossible. Sir Leslie Stephen in the third volume of his English Utilitarians points this out, as well as the further truth that the metaphysical absolute and infinite are incompatible. The author is discussing J. S. Mill's Examinaiton of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. This philosophy was especially abhorrent to Mill, because of its implications for education and the science of morals, on which his hopes for social and human improvement were placed. To base morality on intuitive foundations was to transport the ethical problem beyond the possibility of scientific treatment and solution. Mr. Stephen speaks we presume as an "Agnostic," but his remarks are instructive. To be sure, the discussion is purely "dialectical," — a fact however, due to the nature of the subject, and itself an illustration of the typical method of a philosophic apologetic. It is hardly necessary, or even useful, to discuss the subject here in any detail; altho few of those who feel in the metaphysical ultimates, support for their religious beliefs (they commonly do not admit a distinction of religious and theological beliefs), ever stop to reflect that philosophy (even such philosophy) does not — cannot — return the compliment! Clearly, neither the "Absolute" nor the "Infinite" is — godlike. There may be some faint resemblance of the 'O theos of Greek speculation. But "he" too had nothing in common with the Olympian company. Far fainter is their likeness to a "personal God." As regards the incompatibility of these terms, used in their apologetic meaning as synonyms, Mr. Stephen notes that an "absolute" is something absolutely limited, — so that anything or any fact is, as such, an absolute, — and thus it is the very antithesis of the "infinite"; unless it be a "limited infinite" (which is a formal mathematical conception) ; but that is just„what the Infinite in apologetic usage is not.

We have mentioned John Stuart Mill in this connection, and it is our purpose to study his thought (and not apart from his character and aims) under various heads, and to portray him, as a result of an impartial and "objective" but appreciative examination, in a character as philosophic thinker corresponding essentially to the view of philosophy presented in this essay. His apparent extremes, if one admit them at all, seem to have been due to his antagonism — more pronounced than our own age demands — to the "ancient ideas" which he saw obstructing progress. But he frees himself, according to all accounts, — including his own memoirs, and the evidence of his writings, from all orthodoxies, or mere partisanships.