The American army in the European conflict

Front matter

Class ^Ij.

Book

COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT

Chapter I Page

The Declaration of War — Universal Military Service I

CHAPTER n

Arrival of General Pershing in France — First Plans — Formation of the General Staff — Organization OF Fighting Units — Selection of Ordnance Material and Other Equipment — Methods of Training — Camps — Schools — Establishment OF General Headquarters at Chau- MONT 33

CHAPTER HI

Establishment of the Lines of Communication —

Organization of the Services of the Rear . . 78

CHAPTER IV

First Appearance of American Contingents on the French Front — The First, Second, Twenty- Sixth, AND Forty-Second Divisions 116

CHAPTER V

Participation of American Forces in the Spring Defensive AND IN THE SuMMER CoUNTER-OfFENSIVE OF I918 133

CHAPTER VI

Organization of the Main Services of the Expeditionary Forces — Chief of Artillery — Tank Corps — Chief Engineer — Air Service — Signal

Contents

PAGE

Corps — Medical Department — Quartermaster

— Ordnance — Chemical Warfare — Inspector General — Judge- Advocate i86

CHAPTER VII

Situation of the Expeditionary Forces at the Beginning OF September, 191 8 247

CHAPTER VIII

The American Army During the General Offensive, September-November, 191 8 (Battle of St. Mihiel)

CHAPTER IX The March to the Rhine 307

CHAPTER X

Part Taken by American Units in the Operations on British Front — And in Secondary Theaters of the War 320

CHAPTER XI

Development of the Lines of Communication — Organization IN America — Sea Transportation — Growth of the Services of the Rear in France — Director General of Transportation — Motor Transport Service — Military Board of Allied Supply 33 1

CHAPTER XII

Great Benevolent Associations Under the Military Authority — American Red Cross — Young Men's Christian Association — Knights of Columbus — Salvation Army — American Library Association — Jewish Welfare — Young Women's Christian Association, etc., etc 361

Contents

CHAPTER XIII PAGE

Franco-American Cooperation — Conclusion . . . 385

Appendix I — Order of Battle of the American Expeditionary Forces at the Date of December i, 1918 391

Appendix II — Organizations of the American Expeditionary Fc«.CES Cited in General Orders by THE French High Command 410

Index 421

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Marshal Petain and General Pershing at Chaumont . Frontispiece

Situation of American Units before the summer counter-offensive Facing page 162

Location of American Divisions on the 1st of September,

1918 248

Plan for Attack of the Saint-Mihiel Salient 266

Organization of the Services of the War 340

CHAPTER I

THE DECLARATION OF WAR UNIVERSAL MILITARY

SERVICE

Although the American people have ever been patient and slow to anger they are not incapable of warlike resolution, and since 1776 have more than once given proof of their fighting spirit. But before taking up arms the nation must be permeated with a sense of the responsibilities involved, and possess a clear notion of the inherent justice of her cause.

Placed by nature in a position of independence and political isolation, untroubled by international disputes, the United States has watched foreign conflict from afar. War has seemed an eventuality too fearful to be lightly invoked, and many grave persons considered that nothing short of a territorial invasion would ever arouse the Great Republic to an ordeal by battle.

Such has never been our personal opinion.

If the country, as a whole, seems peaceful and patient, the citizen is often a militant idealist, prompt to redress a wrong, proud of his independence, and ready to fight at a moment's notice on a question of personal or national honor.

The difference between his individual characteristics and those of the mass may perhaps be explained by the country's vast dimensions and the particularism of each state or city, which tends to concentrate popular attention upon affairs of local importance and to limit the range of political interest and activity to each special district or community.

It is thus natural that the first appeal to a broader national sentiment should penetrate slowly through these vast areas, that a long interval must follow the first alarm and precede executive decision.

This phenomenon has been noticed on previous occasions of political unrest.^ American wars have been remarkable for breaking out with sudden violence after a protracted period of hesitation, contradiction, party polemics, and sometimes even apparent public indifference. Thus the country passed through many gradations of feeling during the months which preceded the conflict with Spain; long also were the years of tension that preceded the Civil War; McKinley, like Lincoln, was for a long time considered as a " temporizer." -

^ It took all the veneration and military prestige of Washington to enable him to run counter to the strong trend of public opinion which, in America, favored the great French Revolution; when the violence of the American sentiment was such that nothing short of the President's inflexible character and the immense popularity which he enjoyed could have availed to prevent a declaration of war against England. (See Tocqucville and Marshall.)

2 A long period of political tension and press provocation preceded the war with Spain. President McKinley, a warm advocate of arbitration, had declared that he would never allow outside pressure to force him into war, but the sinking of an American battleship in Havana Harbor; aroused the belligerent spirit to such an extent that the President was compelled to follow the pronouncement of the Investigating Commission. The specialist verdict that the Maine had been blown up from without at once precipitated the country into war.

Germany's great diplomatic error was her failure to judge the country's moral evolution during the period of neutrality.

The Imperial Government was incapable of understanding that a people which had not sprung to arms at the first provocation might yet be goaded beyond endurance by the second or third repetition of a grave offense.

It was only when the nation was ablaze with anger that the military psychologist beyond the Rhine realized that the fires of wrath had been a long time smoldering. And yet a brief survey of Foreign Office reports concerning past wars clearly indicates that this Is not the first occasion on which European statesmen and diplomatists have been misled into thinking that American patience was national apathy.

Few in the Old World foresaw the formidable struggle between South and North. Contemporary argument tended to show that neither of the opposing factions would actually come to a trial of force, that President Lincoln, with his peace-loving nature, his horror of fratricidal strife, with what was then supposed to be his " hesitating " character, could never give the signal for battle.

It was repeatedly declared that a commercial and agricultural people would not and could not make the sacrifices which such a war must entail. That logically — then as now — war could not he.

Such was the onlookers' conclusion in 1 861 when the first gun fired upon Fort Sumter was echoed by Lincoln's thrilling proclamation. Such was the conclusion of Germany in 19 1 6.

A country which had submitted to a violation of her inherent rights at sea was one which would never fight.

Germany proclaimed that although some occasional American Don Quixote, led perhaps as much by a taste for adventure as by chivalrous impulse, might enlist under the British flag or enroll in our Foreign Legion, such isolated cases counted for nothing in the mass of American commercialism, and that the people, as a whole, were far too busied in the pursuit of material welfare to be aroused in a cause pertaining merely to abstract right and wrong. That, in short, America would have " Peace at any Price."

And yet America had endured in her Civil War a bitter four years' struggle which has since been aptly characterized as " right fighting with right." How could those who witnessed the titanic combat of brother against brother suppose that this same country would hesitate in a clearly defined cause of Right and Wrong? of Humanity against Barbarism? How could the Great Republic, founded on the doctrine of Thomas Paine, bred in the cult of liberty and social justice, stand passively aside and watch the ideals her fathers bled for trampled beneath the iron heel?

As we in France watched from the trenches at Verdun the flaming of the war beacon in the western sky, as we followed the impassioned utterances of those representative statesmen who in House, Senate, Press and on the public platform, called on their fellows to remember the country's honor and arise in the cause of freedom no doubt ever entered our minds as to the eventual outcome of America's moral crisis.

We knew that though many of us would not live to see the triumph of her ideals, yet her ideals would one day triumph; that if America hesitated longer than some who loved her might have wished, before taking the final decision, it was rather the hesitation of one who asks how and when and not whether to act.

A complete study of the causes which led up to the eventual rupture between the United States and Germany is not within the scope of this work, nor could French soldiers with propriety discuss the divergent opinions and different political tenets of American public men.

Neither can we, for the same reasons, examine into the far-reaching influence of overt and concealed German propaganda, acting as an effective brake on the native impulse of the country to " take sides " in the European conflict.

The stirring events which preceded America's entry into the war are still fresh in every mind. They are, perhaps, as yet too near for any author to view them with the necessary mental perspective, or to embody their history in permanent literary form.

It must be our rule — except in describing certain material organizations where ofliicial statistics are given — to speak only of those things which have come under our personal observation and which occurred upon our own theater of war.

Those who desire a more complete picture than we can give of certain personalities who played an active part in the drama of America's development as a world power, and who wish to study the two schools of thought which struggled with equal ardor to impose their respective convictions upon the mass of their fellow-citizens, will find a quantity of such records among the files of contemporary journalism during the war, among American state papers and official publications.

The President's published addresses, proclamations, and epistles, together with the correspondence between the Secretary of War and Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, will give the searcher for historical data a comprehensive view of both sides of the question of military preparedness.

As for us we must limit ourselves rigidly to a brief recital of the facts — for in these pages facts alone import.

Their dates mark the steady progress of the moral preparation of the citizen-soldier whom the nation was soon to send into battle on a foreign soil.

Toward the end of April, 19 15, certain Americans contemplating passage on the British liner Liisitania received warning from the German embassy in Washington that they would do better to abandon their project of sailing on this vessel, it being the intention of the German Admiralty to sink her during the voyage.

The threat was generally considered absurd; such a crime was thought to be too flagrant a breach of neutral rights for Germany to attempt.

Nevertheless the fact that foreign officials should dare to make this threat and had even utilized the American press to sound the warning, ar-oused great wrath among certain Americans. Quite a general demand was made that the German Ambassador who had thus overstepped diplomatic prerogatives should at once be given his passports.

On the seventh of May, the great liner was attacked by two German submarines — one of which was identified as the U21 — and sunk without warning near the head of Old Kinsale off the Irish coast, no effort being made to save either passengers or crew, of whom upwards of eleven hundred, including more than a hundred Americans, perished.

From this moment we may date the rise and growth of an active belligerent spirit among the American people.

During the horrified pause which followed this latest German atrocity a declaration was made and sworn to that the ship carried munitions of war and that Germany's action was justifiable on that ground, although it was subsequently proved and confessed that the witness who alleged having seen guns on the Ltisitania was paid to say so by funds collected for that purpose by the German propaganda. The check on popular indignation which the debates on this 'question involved had been effective. When, on May 15th, the President of the United States sent a formal warning to Germany that no further outrage of the sort would be tolerated or go unpunished, this threat elicited a very humble response from the Imperial Government, offering indemnities for loss of American life and expressing sincere regret for the incident.

The occasion to declare war on account of the Lusitan'ta had by this time passed. Nevertheless American opinion had been much incensed. In many public centers " Remember the Lusitania " was placarded. Memorial meetings were called. Money for the allied cause and for the widows and orphans of the war as well as for the victims of the submarines, poured Into Europe from the United States. The youth of America began to group itself together and form societies of military preparation.^ In some schools, practical efforts were made toward obtaining a certain amount of soldierly discipline.

Nine months elapsed without any definite incident tending toward a rupture of friendly relations, for, although

3 General Leonard Wood's untiring crusade on platform and in the press for military preparedness elicited a warm response from the military elements of the country.

submarine attacks continued against vessels carrying Americans on board the cases generally admitted of discussion on technical grounds and terminated either with apologies and indemnities, or the proof that the aggressors, as in the case of the Ancona, belonged to the Austrian, and not the German, Navy.

American indignation, however, had been excited. The exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and Germany became, on the part of the former, progressively menacing until the climax was reached.

On August 19, 19 1 5, the English steamer Arabic was sunk off the Irish coast. Two Americans were numbered among the forty-four victims. On November 9th the Italian ship Ancona met a similar fate in the Mediterranean. On January 2, 191 6, the Persia also was sunk without warning.

Finally on March 24th the Channel packet Sussex, carrying American passengers and mails, was sunk in the narrow seas by a German submarine.

This new outrage elicited a message to Germany far more aggressive in tone than the former notes relating to like incidents and terminated with a clearly defined warning that should such another crime be perpetrated, the American Government would feel obliged to sever on the instant, all diplomatic relations with the German Empire.

The Imperial Government reflected seriously upon this message and at length gave solemn assurances to the President of the United States that no more ships would be sunk without previous warning and without legitimate steps being taken to safeguard the lives of passengers. It should, however, be noted that Germany did not hesitate to demand America's intervention with a view to lessening the rigors of the British blockade.

This mild answer and the careful observance of her word during the rest of the year were probably induced by a very serious shortage in Germany's sea flotilla which required several months to reconstitute. Whatever her motive, the result was satisfactory to America, who appeared to have obtained a great moral victory in forcing the Imperial Government to " back down," and it was generally declared that by his vindication of neutral rights and humanitarian principles, President Wilson's diplomacy had triumphed.

From the German point of view, also, the policy was not unsuccessful. During eight months, America, reassured by the peaceful and friendly declarations of Germany, took no step in military preparation. Much of that spiritual " readiness for war " which had begun to be felt in the country at large had even been checked and more or less undone by the idea that Germany was pledged henceforward and forever to respect American rights at sea and definitely abandon her terrorization of all neutral nations by her submarine menace.

In reality it was far from that country's intention to revoke a policy so essential to the prestige of her sea command.

No sooner had a more numerous and powerful submarine fleet been constructed, than the German Ambassador in Washington handed to the Secretary of State a note dated January 31st, 19 17, revoking all former promises. This note now declared it to be the inherent right as well as the irrevocable intention of the Admiralty to sink without warning, any vessel, whether neutral or belligerent, in a zone defined by her as forbidden.

lo The American Army in the European Conflict

The indignation in America was now at fever heat. The national press, while loudly censuring Germany's duplicity, called upon the President of the United States to make a definite and hostile declaration. Mr. Wilson's patience was indeed at an end. Although on February 3d he once more expressed incredulity concerning Germany's actual intention to carry out her monstrous threat, he nevertheless felt it incumbent upon him to fulfill his own menace to that power by taking the course indicated by him in the previous year and recalling his ambassador from Berlin.

The presidential message concluded with the following words:

"... We shall not believe they are hostile to us until we are obliged to believe it: and we purpose nothing more than a reasonable defense of the undoubted rights of our people."

The world was not long to remain in doubt regarding the definition of Germany's hostile attitude by an overt act.

Within a few days two American vessels were sunk — the Housatonic and the Lyman M. Law — and, on February 26, 19 1 7, the President appeared before Congress to ask a special grant of power authorizing him to arm American ships against similar aggressions.^ At the same time he confessed himself

" For a time unable to believe that such things would be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations."

* The Cunarder Laconia with two Americans aboard was sunk at the same time. On the eighteenth of March the American ships, City of Memphis, Illinois, and Vigilancia, met the same fate. On March 21st the Healdton, crossing from Philadelphia to Rotterdam, was sunk without warning and with twenty-one victims. On April 1st the Aztec was sent to the bottom.

The die had now been cast and wave upon wave of popular enthusiasm arose as one epoch-making event succeeded another.

On April 2, the President branded:

" The present warfare of Germany against commerce a warfare against mankind."

And this statement was followed in four days by the solemn declaration of a state of war between the United States and Germany. Orders were also given for the removal of alien enemies from the civil territory of the Union and their forcible detention in concentration camps.

The presidential address was.a strong denunciation of the actions in the United States of the German governmental agents during the three years of America's neutrality.

" It has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against the National Unity of Council, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began and it is a matter of fact that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support and even the personal direction, of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the United States."

After a further arraignment of such procedures, the President continued with a very noble and eloquent statement of American aims, now that her final participation in the European struggle was definitely decided.

" We have no selfish ends to serve, we desire no conquest, no dominion ; we seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifice we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind."

Although the public mind was ripe, the country was materially quite unready for combat. With characteristic boldness America had in fact declared war without the slightest military preparation at a moment when the withdrawal of Russia from our alliance had placed the allied cause in a precarious situation.

No one as yet knew what form American participation might be called on to take. Was an army to be raised? Was a fleet to be sent abroad or to guard the coast at home against a submarine aggression or bombardment from the sea? Was a rising of the dissatisfied pro- Germans to be feared from within?

In order to discuss some of those questions it was decided on the part of both France and England to send missions to the United States.

On the tenth of March accordingly, the French Prime Minister, M. Ribot, organized a war mission.^

No one better than Marshal Joffre could have been selected for such an embassage, nor could a more powerful appeal have been made to the public imagination.

His personality was already familiar in the United States, where his simplicity, strength, and practical common sense would lend weight to any proposition he might suggest.

The wave of enthusiasm which greeted the arrival of the French war mission gave new energy to the conscription movement.

It is scarcely too much to say that the eventual triumph of the Allies was assured on the day when House and

5 This mission was headed by M. Viviani, Minister of Justice and Vice-President of the Cabinet Council. The members were: Marshal Joffre, Vice-Admiral Chocheprat, and Marquis de Chambrun, deputy, who left Paris on April 15, 1917.

Senate voted the measure for universal and compulsory military service in the United States.

When, after a tour of the great cities of the Union and the French-speaking provinces of Canada, the French and British missions joined forces in New Yorlc and marched through the city, acclaimed by perhaps the largest throng of human beings ever assembled for such an occasion, it was evident to all that the tide of war was about to turn; that America was entering the European conflict determined to achieve success and ready to fight for it as of old " to the last dollar and to the last man." On that day no one in America doubted the eventual triumph of the allied cause.

Political tension was at an end; the war spirit coursed through every vein and artery of the vast continent. It only remained to organize this great moral force, to give practical instruction to the youth of America eager to learn how best to develop their martial spirit into military efficiency.

On the day that war was declared, April 6, 19 17, the permanent army of the United States counted 190,000 men distributed in small detachments — regiments, battalions, and even companies — over the immense territory of the Union and her colonial dependencies. An expeditionary corps recently equipped for service in Mexico had just been disbanded upon the completion of their mission.

The regular army had recrossed the Rio Grande, leaving upon the border a large force of cavalry and some elements of infantry, which latter would have scarcely amounted to a brigade. The National Guard units, which 'had also been employed upon the border, had been relieved and sent to their respective States, only a small number of Pennsylvania militia still lingered near the Mexican frontier. Thus war surprised the American army, reestablished upon a peace footing and entirely unprepared by any previous attempt at mobilization, for taking part in a foreign war.^

Although the country had been recently divided into military departments this reorganization was purely territorial in character, corresponding approximately to the regional distribution in France before the war of 1870.

The formation of divisions, which was contemplated in some of the new mihtary departments, remained only in prospect, and it may be stated that the only appreciable advantage which had accrued to the army during the period of political tension was that the ranks of existing organizations were increased by numerous voluntary enlistments.'

This army before November i, 19 18, was to swell to the formidable array of 181,095 officers and 3,483,444 men, of whom more than two miUions crossed the Atlantic.

To carry out this gigantic mobilization, to secure the number, form the commanding officers, and organize the fighting units, an immense effort was necessary.

6 It should not be forgotten that Colonel Roosevelt, since two years, had never ceased to advocate military preparedness. Through personal prestige he was able to enroll a sufficient number of volunteers to make up a division which was complete on paper.

7 The enlistments for the fiscal year 1917 totalled 160,084. If must be also considered that the Mexican expedition resulted in perfecting the training of the regular troops which participated. The National Guards who remained on the border also took advantage of this situation to improve their military training.

Under the modest title, " An act authorizing the President temporarily to increase the military establishments of the United States " was voted. This epoch-making law, on May i8th, created compulsory military service by selection ^^ and thus secured the number necessary to create an army.

8 In 1814, in spite of the political influence of President Madison and the no less great prestige of Secretary of War Monroe, a bill was introduced with a view of obtaining for the Executive the power to raise, by means of draft, a national army. Opposition developed and peace came before this bill was enacted. But in 1863, when the war of secession was at its height, America had recourse to conscription. From the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the draft law of 1917, we extract the following quotation which serves to show that the Federal Congress in passing the act, " Authorizing the President to increase temporarily the military establishment of the United States " remained completely within the constitutional tradition:

" In that year, when the mutterings of the dread conflict which was to come began to be heard and the proclamation of the President calling a force into existence was issued, it was addressed to the body organized out of the militia and trained by the States in accordance with previous acts of Congress. (Proclamation of April 15, 1861.) That force being inadequate to meet the situation, an act was passed authorizing the acceptance of 500,000 volunteers by the President to be by him organized into a national army (Act of July 22, i86i). This was soon followed by another act increasing the force of the militia to be organized by the States for the purpose of being drawn upon when trained under the direction of Congress (Act of July 29, 1861). The two acts when considered together present in the clearest possible form the distinction between the power of Congress to raise armies and its authority under the militia clause. But it soon became manifest that more men were required. As a result, the act of March 3, 1863, was adopted, entitled, 'An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces and for other purposes.' By that act, which was clearly intended to directly exert upon all the citizens of the United States the national power which it had been proposed in 1814 on the recommendation of the then Secretary of War, Mr. Monroe, every male citizen of the United States between the ages of twenty and forty-five was made subject by the direct action of Congress to be called by compulsory draft to the service in a national army at such time and in such numbers as the President in his discretion might find necessary. In that act, as in the one of 1814, and in this one, the means by which the act was to be enforced were directly Federal and the force to be raised as a

Never before had so great a country and in so brief a time realized such a basic transformation of its fundamental principles and most inveterate customs, and this with the unanimous consent and enthusiastic approval of all parties concerned.

The drafting of this measure not only determined the general sources from which the new contingents were to be drawn, but also arranged the principle of their distribution. The simple mechanism of this law gave, when put into application, an even greater result than that which had been foreseen.^

From the fifth of June, 19 17, to the twenty-fourth of August, 19 1 8, 10,481,000 citizens between twenty-one and thirty years of age inscribed themselves at the registration boards.

This age limit was the one first determined upon; but later on, with a view to avoid weakening any one category of worker and thereby defeating the economic interests of the country which it was so important to uphold, the age limit was extended to embrace those from eighteen to forty-five. In consequence of this extension, the number of inscriptions rose to 23,709,000. It thus became evident that " The act authorizing the President to

result of the draft was therefore typically national, as distinct from the call into active service of the militia as such. And under the power thus exerted, four separate calls for draft were made by the President and enforced. That of July, 1863, of February and March, 1864, of July and December, 1864, producing a force of about a quarter of a million of men."