A system of general ethics

Front matter

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Prefatory Note

HIS work aims to present a system of robust Ethics. Its purpose is to inculcate virile moral principles, produce stalwart moral character, and lead to the practice of uncompromising virtue. While the author is interested — deeply interested, indeed — in the philosophical and scientific aspects of the ethical scheme, he is frank to acknowledge that his interest has not been only, nor even chiefly, academic, but largely practical and earnest.

A robust ethic does not mean a stern, unbending and ascetic system of rigorism. Far from it! True morality is surcharged with joy in contemplating ethical excellence and in trying to incarnate it in human life. It has Spartan sterlingness without Spartan austerity.

By a robust ethical system the author has several distinct things in mind. He firmly believes that the Law of Right is the Law of God, and therefore that the Right is eternally and fundamentally Right. He also holds that the Right is inherently opposed to the Wrong; therefore he does not, will not, dare not blur or efface Moral Distinctions. He has no sympathy with those writers who make an apology or a semi-apology for wrong being and wrong doing. He regards the wrong as actual sin and guilt, and frankly calls it by those terms, whether they have a euphonious sound to modern ears or not.

He also believes that Conscience is a divinely implanted functioning power of the mind, a specialized faculty for perceiving and sensing Moral Distinctions. No less firmly does he advocate the freedom of the Will over against the Determinists of the day of whatever school or cult. Just as earnestly does he believe that man is in the world to perform, willingly and gladly, a definite moral task, and to achieve a moral destiny which is eternal.

Thus it will be seen that the author does not advocate a weak or emasculated morality — one that minimizes or obliterates Moral Distinctions, or denies the supremacy of the Conscience, or teaches a namby-pamby doctrine of the Will. He feels very keenly that there is need today of sound and thorough-going moral teaching in the home, the school, the college, the university, and likewise in the civil and social relations of life. If we shall rear good, upright and incorruptible citizens for our country, we must instil clear and virile moral principles in the minds of the young. While they are in school and college is the psychological moment to do this.

Therefore the author hopes that the present work will find its way as a text-book into the curricula of many of our colleges, alike those of the Church and those of the State; and this hope he cherishes out of the disinterested motive of real concern for the moral and spiritual welfare of the future citizenship of our country. He believes that the reader or student who masters the contents of this book will have a heightened appreciation of the Right and an increased abhorrence of the Wrong.

Educators in some of our church colleges have expressed to the author a desire for a work on General Ethics, written in a simple and lucid style, that would not undermine the principles of Christian morality. The author has done his

Prefatory Note 5

utmost to write such a work, and herewith submits it. He believes the Christian instructor will find that it prepares the way for Christian Ethics and Christian Practice. At the same time, teachers in other academic institutions will, the author sincerely hopes, find the work adapted to the preparation of their students for the highest and noblest service to their country and their age.

The systematic arrangement of the ethical material, the articulated heads and subheads, and the various fonts of type will surely not mar the work for the intelligent general reader, and will be of much service, as the author knows by experience, to both teacher and student when the work is used for pedagogical purposes.

If this book shall do some good in the world, shall give its readers clear conceptions of moral reality, shall help to make them more stalwart in virtue, and shall cheer them in the use of their ethical privileges and in the performance of their ethical tasks, the author will feel that his labor has achieved its greatest reward.

Wittenberg College, The Author.

Springfield, Ohio.

Contents

Chapter Page

Prefatory Note 3

General Outline of the System 9

II. Man's Chief Duties

1. To Himself.

2. To Nature.

3. To His Fellowmen.

4. To God.

PART I THEORETICAL ETHICS

DIVISION I INTRODUCTORY DATA

DEFINITIONS.

1. Importance of a correct definition.

2. Definition of General Ethics.

3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics.

4. Definition of Practical Ethics.

5. Defective definitions.

6. Definition of the text justified.

II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION.

1. The term "Ethics/

2. The terms "Moral Science" and "Moral Philosophy.

3. Deontology.

III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE.

1. Its distinctive data.

2. Its distinctive question.

3. Its distinctive vocabulary.

IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.

1. It deals with observed facts.

2. It assembles them into a system.

3. It makes legitimate inductions from them.

V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS.

2. Application to Ethics.

VI. HISTORICAL SKETCH.

1. Moral intuitions innate.

2. Hebrew Ethics.

3. Heathen Ethics.

4. Earliest scientific efforts.

5. Later attempts.

6. From the first to the seventeenth centuries.

7. From the seventeenth century to the present time.

VII. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES.

1. To Psychology.

2. To Philosophy.

3. To Natural Science.

4. To Sociology.

5. To Natural Theism.

6. To Christian Theology and Ethics.

DIVISION II THE GROUND OF RIGHT

I. DEFINITION.

II. THE TRUE VIEW.

2. Rationale and argument (eight sub-divisions),

3. The Highest Good (Summum Bonum).

(1) What it is.

(2) Other views.

III. VARIOUS THEORIES EXAMINED AND ANALYZED.

1. The Sophists.

2. Socrates.

3. Plato.

4. Aristotle.

5. Hedonism (including Epicureanism and Eudemonism).

6. Stoicism.

7. Divine Absolutism.

8. Civil Authority.

9. Altruism.

10. Utilitarianism.

11. Opportunism.

12. Naturalistic Evolution.

13. Theistic Evolution.

DIVISION III THE LAW OF RIGHT

I. CONNECTING LINKS.

1. God created a cosmos.

2. He created it a moral economy.

II. PROOFS OF MORAL ORDER IN NATURE.

1. The reign of law.

2. Design in nature.

3. Nature affords a moral arena for man.

III. MORAL AGENTS.

1. Definitions.

(1) Of moral agency.

(2) Of a moral agent.

2. Man as a moral agent.

(1) The only moral agent in the cosmos (known to

Natural Ethics).

(2) Source of man's moral character.

(3) Man a unique figure in the cosmos.

3. Constituents of moral agency.

(1) Rational intelligence.

(2) Conscience.

a. Definition.

b. Other terms for conscience.

c. Etymology of the term.

d. Psychology of the conscience.

(a) A perception.

(b) A feeling.

(c) Its relation to other psychical powers.

e. Origin of the Conscience.

f. Conscience a distinct mental faculty.

g. The supremacy of Conscience.

(a) Definition.

(b) Nature of its authority.

(c) Why Conscience should be supreme.

(d) Though supreme, Conscience is not

infallible.

(e) Conscience, though fallible, is man's

ethical guide. (3) The Will.

a. Definition of the Will.

b. Its unique powers.

(a) Of attention.

(b) Of originating motion and action.

(c) Of alternate choice.

(d) Of execution.

c. Freedom of Will a sine qua non of morality.

d. Proofs of the freedom of the Will.

(a) The testimony of consciousness.

(b) The test of experiment.

(c) The demands of man's environment.

(d) The mind's intuitive distinction be-

tween free and forced acts.

(e) Determinism inconsistent with itself.

(f) Experience versus speculation.

(g) Harmful results of Determinism, (h) Objections stated and confuted, (i) Limitations of freedom.

4. Motives or Intentions.

(2) Motives essential to moral agency.

(3) Varied relations of motives.

a. To the Will.

b. To the actor.

c. To the action.

DIVISION IV THE ANTITHESIS OF RIGHT

I. CONNECTING LINKS.

II. DEFINITION AND TERM.

1. Definition of Sin.

2. The term Sin.

III. THE FACT OF SIN.

1. Universal experience.

2. Moral Distinctions.

(2) Proofs.

a. Universal consciousness.

b. A postulate of human society.

c. A postulate of human government.

d. Argument from the constitution of the hu-

man body.

e. Difficulties considered.

(3) The morally indifferent sphere (so-called).

(4) A higher and a lower good.

(5) Questions of casuistry.

IV. THE GENESIS OF SIN.

1. Nature of the problem.

2. The true view.

(1) Sin the act of a free moral agent.

(2) Sin an eternal possibility, but not a necessity.

(3) An adequate test necessary to moral agency.

3. Erroneous views.

(1) God not the author of sin.

(2) Sin not eternal.

(3) Sin not posited in matter.

(4) Sin not a lapse of the Infinite.

(5) Sin not due to man's primitive animalism.

(6) Agnosticism not satisfactory.

V. THE CURE OF SIN.

1. The answer of Natural Ethics.

(1) An enigma.

(2) God might forgive sin.

(3) God might help man morally.

(4) Man may strive morally.

(5) But assurance is lacking.

2. The answer of Christian Ethics.

(1) God is loving and merciful.

(2) God is also just.

(3) The moral antimony adjusted through vicarious

atonement.

(4) God regenerates and sanctifies.

(5) Assurance of the moral victory and goal.

(6) The inner witness of the Spirit.

PART II PRACTICAL ETHICS

DIVISION I INTRODUCTORY DATA

I. DEFINITION OF PRACTICAL ETHICS.

II. ITS RELATION TO THEORETICAL ETHICS.

1. A vital relation.

2. A vitally important relation.

III. ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES.

1. Duties classified.

2. The term duty.

3. Duties and rights.

DIVISION II MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES

I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (Individual Ethics).

1. To his body.

(1) He should not despise his body.

(2) He should preserve it in health.

(3) He should control and regulate its passions.

(4) He should remember its dignity.

2. To his mind.

(1) The process of culture.

a. The Intellect.

b. The Sensibilities.

c. The Will.

(2) Motives for culture.

a. Wrong motives.

b. Right motives.

3. To his whole personality.

(1) A strong personality.

(2) A symmetrical personality.

(3) A virtuous personality.

a. Relation of virtue to character.

b. Definition of virtue and virtues.

c. Classification of virtues.

d. List of virtues.

(a) Positive content.

(b) Antithesis.

(c) Perversion.

II. MAN'S DUTIES TO NATURE (Nature Ethics).

1. To trace the divine purpose in her phenomena.

2. To study her scientifically.

3. To preserve, mould and develop her.

4. To show mercy to all her sentient creatures.

III. MAN' 1.

5 DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN

(Social Ethics)

General relation.

Love.

a.

Neighbor love.

b.

Patriotic love.

c.

Philanthropic love.

d.

Love for enemies.

e.

Other graces flowing from love.

Justice.

a.

In the industrial sphere.

b.

In the civic sphere.

Specific relation.

The

: family.

a.

Husband and wife.

b.

Parents and children.

(2) The social organism.

(3) The State.

a. Duties of private citizens.

b. Duties of public officials.

(4) The Church.

a. General Ethics and the Church.

b. The duty of church membership.

c. Duties of church members.

d. Duties of ministers.

IV. MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD (Theistic Ethics).

1. To believe in His existence.

2. To recognize Him in the affairs of life.

3. To trust and serve Him.

5. To anticipate eternal fellowship with Him.

Summary and concluding observations.

PART I

THEORETICAL ETHICS

DIVISION I INTRODUCTORY DATA

Chapter I

I. DEFINITIONS.

1. Importance of a correct definition.

2. Definition of General Ethics.

3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics.

4. Definition of Practical Ethics.

5. Defective definitions.

6. Definition of the text justified.

II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION.

1. The term Ethics.

2. Moral Science and Moral Philosophy.

3. Deontology.

III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE.

1. Its distinctive data.

2. Its distinctive question.

3. Its distinctive vocabulary.

IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE.

1. It deals with observed facts.

2. It assembles them into a system.

3. It makes legitimate inductions from them.

V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS.

2. Application to Ethics.

I. DEFINITIONS.

1. Importance of a correct definition:

At the beginning of the study of any theme a clear-cut and comprehensive definition is all-important. It may be compared to getting a proper general view of a landscape which is subsequently to be investigated in detail. It is getting the true geography of a subject. Not only at the beginning of our discipline, but also all along the way, a decided advantage will be gained if we can agree on a correct and lucid definition.

2. Definition of General Ethics:

GENERALi ETHICS IS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN PRINCIPLE, CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.

3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics.

Theoretical Ethics is the scientific treatment of the fundamental principles of morality. It deals with the ground, nature and laws of right and wrong, and may therefore be called the profounder part of our science.

4. Definition of Practical Ethics:

Practical Ethics is the systematic treatment of the application of moral principles to human life. It deals with life, duty and conduct, and thus may be called the plainer part of our science.

5. Defective Definitions:

(1) "Ethics is the science of conduct; it considers the actions of human beings in reference to their Tightness or wrongness, their tendency to good or evil" (Mackenzie). 2

1. The word "General" is used in the title of this work, not to distinguish our science from Special Ethics, but from Christian Ethics. For reasons that are satisfactory to the author he prefers the adjective "General" in the title to either of the adjectives "Natural" or "Rational."

2. "Manual of Ethics," page 1.

First, this definition is defective because it limits Ethics to the sphere of conduct, whereas, in reality, our science deals primarily with principles, motives and character, and secondarily with outward deportment. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he," says a great ethical writer. "Blessed are the pure in heart : for they shall see God." The inside of the platter, and not merely the outside, should be made clean. A man's external conduct might be correct according to all the canons of Practical Ethics, and yet he might be a very immoral man, because his heart, his motives, were evil. It is, in fact, the intention that determines the morality of the actor. The hypocrite, as soon as his true character becomes known, is universally despised. "Ethics is quite as much a study of character as it is of conduct'*' (Hyslop). 3

In the second place, the above definition is defective because it lacks philosophical foundation; it deals only with man, and does not go back to find the ultimate principle and home of the right and the good.

(2) Ethics is "the science of the phenomena of human character and conduct, and the art of directing the human will toward the ideal order of life"' (Hyslop). 4

Acute and analytical as Dr. Hyslop is, we think this definition, which is his formal one, lacks definiteness and proper limitation ; for every definition of Ethics ought to point out specifically, and in so many words, that it deals with moral realities and phenomena. Therefore it ought to contain the word "moral" or the phrase "right and wrong/' The phrase, "the ideal order of life," sounds well, but it is not specific enough, and itself needs explication. Besides,

3. "The Elements of Ethics," p. 3.

4. "The Elements of Ethics," p. 1.

as we shall try to show further on in this book, morality is not limited to the human world; it must also be sought in its ultimate philosophical basis.

(3) "Ethics, or Moral Science, is the science of man's life of duty, or what man ought to do in the present world" (Gregory). 5

No! the noble science of Ethics does not deal only, or even chiefly, with what man ought to do, but with what man ought to be. Nor is it limited merely to the human realm; it must go back to the Primal Moral Personality. Moreover, to say that it treats only of duty and ought puts such a strain upon the moral life as to rob it of all joy and rebound. There is a realm of moral privilege and blessedness as well as a realm of duty. Neither is there good reason for believing that the uplifting principles of ethical science should be limited to "the present world ;" well may it have an outlook into futurity.

6. Definition of the text justified:

We think the definition given under 2 above will be found to be the simplest and most inclusive that can well be framed, and that for a number of reasons : ( 1 ) It clearly determines and marks off the ethical sphere, namely, the realm of the right, and its opposite, the wrong, the conception of which is easily grasped by human intuition. (2) It goes to the root of the matter by seeking the ultimate principle and the objective law of right, and also of it antithesis, the wrong. (3) The truly ethical must have its dwelling in the character of the moral agent, and must not be limited to the external deportment. (4) Yet the ethical in character must blossom out in true conduct in order to verify itself as genuine and prove of benefit to the world.

5. "Christian Ethics," p. 13.

Men are to "let their light shine," and not "hide it under a bushel."

An objection must be dealt with at this point. There are persons who question whether a science of the wrong can be formulated. The objection is not valid for these reasons: First, we are able to investigate the ultimate principle and source of wrong, and in doing so we are obliged to use scientific and philosophical methods ; second, although wrong is per se the principle of moral anarchy, yet, on account of the superior power of God and the right, evil has not succeeded in throwing the world into chaos ; third, for this reason wrong — or sin — is capable of scientific treatment and classification ; thus the theologian is able to divide sins into various genera and species, as, for example, original sin and actual sin, sins of omission and sins of commission, inner sins and overt sins, etc. Therefore we conclude logically that the definition of Ethics ought to include the word "wrong" as well as the word "right." 6

6. We do not wish to confuse the reader with definitions ; yet we believe it will be instructive to give a few others that are almost, if not quite, adequate from recent standard works : "Ethics is the science of rectitude and duty; it treats of the right and its obligations" (Valentine: "Theoretical Ethics," p. 15). "The subject-matter of Ethics is morality, the phenomenon of right and wrong" (Thilly: "Introduction to Ethics," p. 5). "Ethics may be defined as the science of morality, or the science of moral distinctions" (DeLaguna: "Introduction to the Science of Ethics," pp. 3, 4). "Ethics . . . the science of moral personality and of moral good" (Hyslop: "The Elements of Ethics," p. 4). The virtue of Dr. Hyslop's definition is that it defines the science both concretely ("moral personality") and abstractly ("moral good"). It must be said, however, that the above definition is given incidentally by Dr. Hyslop, whereas his formal definition, given on page 1 of his book, is not so good, and therefore we have ventured to criticise it in a preceding section.

We frankly admit that we have more than once been almost on the point of adopting the following definition as the formal one in this book: Ethics is the scientific treatment of the sources, principles and practice of right and wrong. At all events, this definition would include all the topics treated in our ethical system.

II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION.

1. The term Ethics:

The term "Ethics" is derived from the Greek, r\0ixct, moral, which comes from n^oc;, character, which, according to Aristotle, grew from the root, e$oc„ meaning custom or habit. However, the noble science of Ethics, as it is now developed, should not be judged by the etymology of the term, for it means far more than merely the habits or customs of the people. As we shall have occasion to show again and again in our work, the right and the wrong have a real and distinctive basis and place in the economy of the universe, and are not rooted in the shallow soil of mere social and civil convenances.

2. Moral Science and Moral Philosophy:

Ethics used to be called Moral Science or Moral Philosophy. The word "moral" is derived from the Latin mos (adjective, moralis), which also means custom or usage. Here again it will be seen that the word "moral" has come to have a higher meaning than its derivation would indicate. The same is true of many other words in modern use, as, for example, virtue and conscience, as will be shown further on.

The terms "Moral Science" and "Moral Philosophy" are seldom used at present to designate our discipline, but have given way to the briefer and more descriptive term "Ethics."

3. Deontology :

This word has been suggested as a name for our science. 7 Its derivation is, to beov, what is due, and, Xoyoc;, dis-

7. See the remarks of Valentine in his "Theoretical Ethics," p. 16, footnote. Also Davis : "Elements of Ethics," p. 36.

course ; therefore a discourse about duty. The term, however, has never come into vogue, and it would not be a good name, because Ethics deals with rights, privileges and moral joy, as well as with duties.

III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE. 1. Its distinctive data:

The science of Ethics deals with a specific and well-defined body of facts. Its data are not something nebulous, far-away, hard to define, and difficult to grasp with the mental faculties, as some men seem to think, but stand out clear and distinct. What are some of these outstanding phenomena? They are morality itself, the right and the wrong, the law of righteousness, moral distinctions, the conscience and its imperative, moral obligation, moral approval, moral aversion, rewards and penalties, moral freedom, the choice between good and evil. These are plain, every-day facts with which all rational men are familiar, and by which their lives are largely controlled and their characters largely moulded. Many of these data are known intuitively, just as men know themselves and outward realities by intuition rather than by rational processes.

A few simple differentiations may be profitable at this point. Physical science deals with matter, its laws and varied phenomena ; Psychology deals with mind and its functioning powers ; Philosophy searches after the nature and essence of being itself, and tries to formulate a world-view ; but our science of Ethics treats solely of moral realities and phenomena, of the principles and practice of right and wrong.

It should be observed, too, that ethical data are just as clearly recognizable in human life and experience as are those of Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Psychology, or any other science. A little thought will make this thesis plain. You and I are just as vividly conscious that we ought to be true to our highest moral ideals ; that we ought to treat our fellowmen justly and kindly, — we are just as clearly conscious of these facts as we are that a tree is growing on the campus, that a bird is singing in the tree, and that the sun is shining in the sky. That we have a moral nature — a conscience and a will — is just as patent and persistent a fact of consciousness as that we have bodies and cognition and feeling. Indeed, long before many — or perhaps we should say, any — of the physical sciences were known, men obeyed the moral imperative within them; they recognized the authority of the Ought in their souls and above them.

Besides, moral data are just as open for study and scientific classification as are those of botany and geology. Also, in formulating definitions we are able to delimit the ethical sphere just as clearly as the physical and psychical fields.

Perhaps the reason some scholars have made so much of a "problem" of ethical phenomena is this : They have been too speculative; they have wanted to know ethical reality in its very essence — what it is in its inmost nature. Such an achievement, however, is impossible in any sphere of study and knowledge. Elementally we do not know any more about the substance of matter than we do about the substance of mind or spirit. What is matter? is just as much of a "problem" as is, What is morality? In the last analysis we know only phenomena in both the physical and psychical realms. The noumena, or the essence of things, we do not know. If it is an unsolved problem as to how the mind functions ethically, it is no less an unsolved problem how the mind functions in other ways — in sense-perception, in self-consciousness, in feeling, in volition. In all these matters we must simply fall back on consciousness and intuition. To deny the validity of human consciousness when it reports moral content and experience, and yet accept its testimony in other matters, is manifestly so inconsistent and ex parte as to be irrational; and to doubt its witness altogether is to nullify the very basis of knowledge, render all thought abortive, make all science impossible, and land us in the mist and bog of absolute agnosticism. Still more, it would be perilous to the well-being of individuals, society and government.

A concrete example will show how vividly ethical reality impinges on human experience. The author of this book has made the following test a number of times with his classes in the college and seminary in which he is engaged as a teacher of ethics : Suppose a member of this class should commit a mental error during the session, and should also tell a wilful falsehood ; now suppose both lapses should be exposed before the entire class — in which case would he feel the greater shame and humiliation? Every time the answer was prompt and emphatic : In the case of the falsehood. Could a more convincing proof be given that ethical facts stand out in human consciousness with unique distinctness and power? The ethical "problem" is a problem only to the man who has left the sphere of plain, every-day experience, and has lost himself in the mistland of metaphysical speculation.

2. Its distinctive question:

The distinctive question of Ethics is this : "Is it right ?" implying, of course, its obverse, "Is it wrong?" Whenever the student is in doubt as to whether a proposition belongs to the ethical sphere or not, let him test it with the simple question, "Is it right?" In that way much confusion will be avoided.

To impress the matter, let us differentiate between the fundamental question of Psychology and Ethics. In the former the primary question is, "Is it mental ?" This question may be expanded thus : What is mind ? What is the relation of mind to matter, or of mind to the brain ? What are the various faculties or functioning powers of the mind ? Thus all propositions that belong to mentality per se belong to the science of Psychology. Now, while the ethical principle runs through all psychic acts and relations, its fundamental question is different, for here we must put the interrogation, "Is it right?" before every proposition. Thus: Is it right to use the mind in this way or that? Is it right to cultivate and employ the Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will in the way I am doing? Is it right to make conscience supreme in all mental functioning? What is the highest good to be attained by human culture?

Compare the fundamental question of Philosophy with that of ethical science? In Philosophy the elemental question is, "Is it ultimate ?" This means, Is it the ultimate reality? What is the essence of things, their inner nature and composition, their ontology, their very being? What is matter? What is mind? What is God? What is the ultimate unifying principle of the universe? 8 True, Ethics is also concerned with ultimate questions, but only insofar as they bear upon moral reality. In its own right it enters the field of philosophical inquiry, not to solve all problems, but only its own special problem of the ultimate ground of right. In the philosophical province Ethics will consider such questions as these: What is the moral status of the

8. Philosophy deals with experience as a whole (Cf. Jevons : 'Philosophy: What is it?").

ultimate reality? Is it good or bad? Is the ultimate reality a moral personality or not? What is the law of right that holds its "categorical imperative" over the human conscience? Has the mind an innate moral constitution, and, if so, whence has it been derived ? Is the law of moral distinctions based upon ultimate reality, or is it merely an illusory or arbitrary distinction? Thus Theoretical Ethics invades the sphere of Philosophy, but only to determine its own problem, that of moral reality. The ultimate question of Ethics is, therefore, sui generis.

3. Its distinctive vocabulary:

It is interesting to observe that our science has a nomenclature all its own. The more advanced a people become, the larger and richer will be their ethical terminology. A good discipline for the student would be to make as long a list of ethical words as he can; then, if he were to think of eliminating them from the language, under the notion that they do not stand for realities, but only for illusions, he would see how sadly human speech would be impoverished. Indeed, it would lose most of its dignity, distinction and worth.

We shall note a few of the more important ethical words. There is the word "moral." What a clear-cut conception it at once conveys to the mind! We speak of moral principle, a moral cause, a moral reform, a moral man, and every person of ordinary intelligence intuitively grasps the peculiar idea conveyed by the term.