Building a new world

Foreword

"This will be a different world after the war." How often have we heard this said ! Because the winning of the war is essential, if a new world is to be built, nations are giving themselves to it with the spirit of the Crusaders.

President Wilson, in his remarkable messages, has been the spokesman not only for the United States but for the people of all nations who are hoping and working for a new world; but President Wilson in his world leadership has been the champion of free government and the equal opportunity of democracy, not alone for Europe, not alone for the stronger nations, not alone for the favored races — but for the world. It is essential that every true American, that every champion of democratic institutions, shall think through carefully the meaning of President Wilson's challenge that "the world shall be made safe for democracy," and shall join heroically in the great mission of America, not to dominate the world as the Prussian autocracy attempted to do, but to help in making freedom possible everywhere.

This outline is planned as a guide to thinking and discussion on the issues and aims of the war, and to lead to clear conviction in regard to the relation of winning the war to the building of a new world ; and then to furnish the basis for facing what is involved if America's war aims as stated by President Wilson are to be made operative in the great continents of Asia, Africa, and South America, which in land area, in available man power, in undeveloped resources of coal, iron, lumber, and agriculture, and in possibilities of dey^lopment, bulk the largest in the new world,

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In each chapter are first given in the Suggestions for Thought and Discussion the topics or questions most important to be considered in personal thought and group discussion; and then Reading References from a few selected books and current literature, and Reference Quotations containing material pertinent to the topic. This reference material is in no sense furnished as answers to the questions. It simply makes available information which may be necessary as a background to the discussions and gives the viewpoint of certain present-day thinkers and leaders.

The author wishes to thank Doctor Halford E. Luccock of the Methodist Centenary Commission for making available the results of his own work ; also Miss A. Haslup of the same Commission for certain research material, and Miss Annabelle Miller for her help in collecting Reading References and Reference Quotations.

For the Leader

This outline is intended as a guide for discussion, not as the outline for a lecture. There are manifestly many more questions in each chapter than can be covered in any one group hour. Any attempt to follow slavishly the questions as printed will prove disastrous. Each leader must first know his group, the needs, the problems, the interests, the attainment of the group members. Then, in the light of his knowledge of this group, he must decide just what, under the topic to be considered, is the outstanding need of the group, what must be accomplished in the group hour, what most should be emphasized. With this knowledge of his group and his purpose in the discussion, he will go over the questions, selecting, revising, adding-^-in short making out: his own briefer set of questions to be used in the group hour.

Topics covering historical and geographical data or significant utterances of present-day leaders should be assigned

iv in advance. This can best be done by giving to each of several members of the group a topic for report. In such assignments be definite. Give the group member both the topic and references. Help on this will be found in the Reading References and Reference Quotations.

References are given so far as possible to a standard Encyclopedia, to the documents of the Committee on Public Information, and to current magazines. It is strongly urged that in addition the reference books enumerated on pages 140 and 141 be made available for the groups in each center.

Contents

PAGE CHAPTER

Foreword ^^^

I. Winning the War and a New World i

CHAPTER I Winning the War and a New World

I. Why Must We Win the War?

II. What Is the Real Issue of the War?

1. To what extent is it to punish German atro cities f To stop Germany's use of the U Boat? To prevent German expansion? To what degree are these the fundamental issues, and to what degree simply symptoms of the general situation?

2. For what does Germany stand in the modern world?

a. What are the basic ideas of her greatest teachers of nationaHty: Treitschke, Nietzsche, and von Bernhardi? Just what is the place of force and might in German thought?

b. In German thought what is the relation of the individual to the state, and the state to the individual? What is the German doctrine of the super-state?

c. On what ground does Germany attempt to justify her atrocities, U-boat raids, and breaking of treaties?

d. What place do Germans feel their country must occupy in the world ? What is meant by ''D^w^^c/j/awc/ ilber alles?" What light does Germany's action in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk throw on her world aims?

e. What is the form of Germany's government? How much freedom has the individual?

f. What relation has German religion to German ambitions and practices? What is meant by the German war god? Super-man? Super-state?

g. Fundamentally, what emphasis in religion, government, and international affairs has Germany represented in the modern world?

3. For what do the Allies stand in the modern world?

a. How far have the Allies in their practice before . the war been guided by the German idea of the super-state and the place of might and force ? How much influence has this philosophy had in America ?

b. What evidences are there in the modern history of Great Britain that she stands for democracy? France? United States? How far can the Allies be said to be true representatives of democracy?

c. How strong in the Allied countries are the groups who wish to see. the war settled on the basis of imperialism ?

d. How far can President Wilson's slogan, ''Make the world safe for democracy," be considered really the Allies' war aim?

4. To what extent can it he said that the Allies represent democracy and the Central Powers autocracy and empire in the modern world?

5. Just why is it essential to defeat Germany as the first step toward a Christian world?

6. To what extent can the war he said to he the use of international police power to stop the ravages of outlazvs in the world life?

III. What Is the Hope for a New World?

1. Who are hoping and working for a new world?

2. Why is there so much talk about a new world after this war? How does the hope of the nations today differ from the hopes during other wars?

3. Some say we must commence the preparation for the next great war as soon as this one has been terminated, and no hope is before us save repeated conflicts between nations. Others express a conviction that if the common people of the different nations felt there was no hope as the result of all the sacrifice and bloodshed and no outlook save continuous armed conflict and perennial catastrophes, they would lay down their arms tomorrow. What do you think about it? Why do the common people support the wdr? What hope is there for tomorrozvf

4. Some say this war is an evidence of the failure of Christianity and of the Christian Church; others that the quickened conscience in the world as indicated in the attempts of every nation, through public documents and in other ways, to justify its participation in the war is an evidence of quickened conscience and of the success of Christianity. War heretofore has been taken for granted. Still others claim that the war has come because Christianity has never been tried. Just how and to what extent is the Christian religion a factor in the causes of the war? In the war itself? How far will Christianity influence the peace settlements?

5. Important questions facing Christians are these:

a. Why must every Christian help win the war ?

b. Can the war be settled on the basis of Jesus' principles?

For quotations from German writings showing the basis of the teaching in Germany on the place of force, the supremacy of the state, the justification for f rightfulness, and the relation of religion to the state, see :

"Conquest and Kultur — the Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words." Issued by the Committee pn Public Information, jFree on request. ; J. P. Bang, ''Hurrah and Hallelujah."

"VVilliam Archer,. "Gems of German Thought,"

Thayer, "Out of Their Own Mouths."

Three major modern prophets of Prussianism should be read, if time for further study is available:

Treitschkej historian; born 1836, died 1896. For a generation he preached in the German universities the doctrine of Germany's mission, and that the state is essentially power.

Nietssche, philosopher; born 1848, went insane 1888, died 1900. For some twenty years following the seventies he preached in German schools the doctrine of frightfulness. This is the first war Germany has waged since Nietzsche's teaching.

Von Bernhardt, general; for many years was general of the German Military Staff ; now one of the generals on the Western front; consistent exponent of German military power and of the fundamental principle that "Might Makes Right." — Summary quoted from lecture by Professor H. H. Home.

For the record of the Prussian philosophy in action see :

(i) "German War Practices," and (2) "German Treatment of Conquered Territory," issued by the Committee on Public Information. Free on request.

For an understanding of the German form of government,

Charles D. Hazen, "The Government of Germany." Issued by the Committee on Public Information. Free on request.

For a historical understanding of the issues back of the war,

Charles Seymour, "The Diplomatic Background of the War," especially Chapters IV-V, German World Policy; Chapter VI, British Foreign Policy; Chapter VII, Diplomatic Revolution; Chapter VIII, Conflict of Alliances.

The Supreme Issue

..." *We must fight it out.' In those five words the answer lies. Whatever the original causes and circumstances of the war, it seems apparent that the situation has now come to this — we are in one of those periods of human development when two great ideas have reached an issue which admits of the continuance of but one. Behind all questions of economic progress and necessity, world dominion or balance of power, the rights of small states, freedom of the seas, stands the stark antagonisni of militarism and the security of non-military states. Between thejji no compromise is possible; one must fail. Either the

Germanic powers will be overthrown or the world must enter upon that competition in armaments whose neglect cost the Allies the first year of the war, and was like to cost them, if not their existence, at least the terms on which that existence might be maintained. . . . We face the necessity of determining, once for all, the standards of civilization which we are to endeavor to maintain for the future. This is no so-called academic question. It is an issue far surpassing in importance all problems of international supremacy and forms of government; and, in particular, it is the one fundamental question of the conflict in whose solution the United States has a deciding voice." — Wilber C. Abbot, "The War and American Democracy," The Yale Review, Vol. 5, pp. 486, 487, 489.

"In every part of the world, the sentiments expressed in the large, vague phrases of the Declaration of Independence — 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' — have come suddenly to have a personal and specific meaning to millions of men, which they have long lacked. And the second thought is not unlike the first. It is a hope that from this great conflict may come some good, that, through an infinity of suffering, humanity may somehow win to a higher and nobler existence than the material prosperity which recent generations have so plentifully enjoyed, and which we have come to reckon as the chief if not the sole end of man. There is a growing determination to see that these men shall not have died in vain. Whatever vast mirage of world dominion and places in the sun may fill the minds of the lords of war, there is preeminent in the minds of those beyond that narrow circle of great ones a vision of a higher and a greater peace." — Wilber C. Abbot, "The War and American Democracy," The Yale Review, Vol. 5, pp. 484-485.

The Place of Force in German Thought

"Might is the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war." — Bernhardi (I, p. 23).

"But while for the individual the highest duty is self-sacrifice, for the State the first duty is self-preservation; hence the necessity of power and force for the State. Tts highest moral duty is to increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for the higher community of which he is a member; but the State is the highest conception in the wider community of men, and therefore the duty of self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, since there is nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to something higher.' (Treitschke, "Politik.")

Since the State is supreme and what is right for it is determined by its interests, any self-limitation that it may have placed upon itself is purely voluntary, and may be repudiated when the State considers it best. International treaties need not be kept and international law loses its stability. In the last instance, questions can only be settled by the sword; in the performance of what it conceives to be right the State must be prepared to carry out its duty with all possible force. 'When a State sees its downfall staring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. A sacrifice made to an alien nation is not only immoral, but contradicts the idea of self-preservation which is the highest ideal of a State.' And again: 'Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost.' (Treitschke, "Politik.")

We are less concerned with Treitschke's philosophy than with the way in which it affected the German nation. His audience was enormous and among certain classes, not the least influential, his ideas were accepted without question. But the nuances of his philosophy disappeared, as his doctrines were absorbed by the masses, and there remained only the idea most easily caught by the popular intelligence, namely, that the beall and end-all of a State is power, and that 'he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle in politics.' " — Charles Seymour, "The Diplomatic Background of the War," pp. 102, 103.

Prussian Justification for Frightfulness

"Hatred, delight in mischief, rapacity, ambition, and whatever else is called evil, belong to the marvelous economy of the conservation of the race." — Nietzsche.

"Life is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation at the least, and in its mildest form exploitation." — Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil," section 259. (From "Conquest and Kultur," p. 29.)

"Whoever cannot prevail upon himself to approve from the bottom of his heart the sinking of the Lusitania — whoever cannot conquer his sense of the gigantic cruelty to unnumbered perfectly innocent victims . . . and give himself up to honest delight at this victorious exploit of German defensive power — him we judge to be no true German." — Pastor Baumgarten.

"Use your weapons in such a way that for a thousand years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance. Be as terrible as Attila's Huns." — The Kaiser to his troops going to China, 1900.

"I shall only add the interesting information which Deissmann gives, that in answer to an inquiry at his bookseller's as to what books were mostly bought by soldiers called to the front, he was told: The New Testament, Goethe's 'Faust,' and Nietzsche's 'Zarathustra' ! This shows how the Nietzschean gospel of might as the highest right, his 'revaluation of all values,' competes, in modern 'Christian' Germany, not only with Goethe's 'Faust,' but even with the New Testament."— J. P. Bang, "Hurrah and Hallelujah," p. 167.

Germany's Mission

" 'Not merely Alsace and Lorraine/ wrote Heine, 'but all France, Europe, and the whole world will be ours. Yes, the whole world will be German. I have often thought of this mission, of this universal domination of Germany.'

A study of the Kaiser's speeches leaves no doubt that he was penetrated with the idea of the German mission. Witness his famous speech at the Saalburg Museum in 1900: 'I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman world empire was, and that just as in old times they said, Civis romanus sum, one may in the future need only to say, Ich bin ein deutscher Burger.' A few years later at Bremen he said: 'God has called us to civilize the world: we are the missionaries of human progress.' "—Charles Seymour, "The Diplomatic Background of the War," pp. 95, 96.

"It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us voluntarily. . . .Till the world comes to an end, the ultimate decision must rest with the sword." — German Crown Prince, in Introduction to "Germany in Arms," 1913.

"The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and the physical powers of man, to use the passive races in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur." — Ludwig Woltmann, "Politische Anthropologic," 1903. Quoted by Andler, "Le Pangermanisme Philosophique," 1917^ p. 273. (From "Conquest and Kultur," p. 17.)

"The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps of his glorious ancestor. ... None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him;' none of them did he postpone as long as possible.' . . . The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results." — Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War/' 191 1.

The German God

"The German soul is the world's soul, that God and Germany belong to one another."

"World-history will write in letters of fire these words: The Germans conquered with their God."

"What is at stake for us in this struggle is the preservation of the highest blessings which God has bestowed upon mankind."

"My brethren ! the spectacle we are witnessing is God striding through the nations. Him they have challenged, against His Majesty they have offended; therefore He fights for us!" — J. P. Bang, "Hurrah and Hallelujah," p. 79.

German Attitude on International Affairs

"These various elements in the German, and especially the Prussian, mentality, which we have briefly considered, help to explain the German attitude towards international affairs at the beginning of the twentieth century. The sense of their own superiority over other nations and of their world-civilizing mission impelled them to an ambition for world empire. The longing for expansion was gradually transferred from the economic to the broader political field. Germans were also acutely conscious of the necessity of force if they were to win their world empire, and they were largely convinced of the righteousness and beauty of the use of force. Inevitably the attitude of the nation began to assume an aggressive and at the same time a defiant character: aggressive, because with some, confidence in German strength and in the weakness of her enemies predominated; defiant, since with others, there existed the anxiety that Germany might not be allowed by the other nations to fulfil her dream." — Charles Seymour, "The Diplomatic Background of the War," pp. 105, 106,

"Nc candid person will deny that the modern German has some justification for his docile acceptance of the doctrine of Power (Macht). The Germany which he knows has been made by force. The Prussia which has made Germany owes its national existence to the steady application of the same principle. Prussia is not a natural phenomenon, but an artificial, a manufactured product. The methods so successfully employed by her have been the methods of war. Spoliation is, according to the late Lord Salisbury, the hereditary tradition of the Hohenzollern race. The whole history of the Kingdom over which he (Frederick the Great) ruled was a history of lawless annexation. It was formed of territories filched from other races and other powers.' A tradition of this kind cannot be ignored. It is more potent than the will of any individual ruler or any single statesman. Prussia has been made, made in defiance of nature, in the teeth of every imaginable difficulty and discouragement, by the genius of her rulers and the valor of her soldiers. The methods so successfully employed in the making of Prussia were subsequently applied by the Prussians to the making of Germany." — J. A. R. Marriott, "The Supreme Issue," The Nineteenth Century, April, 1917, Vol. 81, pp. 714- 715.

Has Christianity Failed?

"Even a little observation of popular reactions to the great war reveals many men inwardly looking at the catastrophe in unrelieved dismay. . . . One natural consequence of such a reaction to the war is a lavish accusation of failure against the ideal agencies on which men had counted to improve the world. . . . What most we had relied upon, seeing that it has not saved us from the very evil its purpose was to cure, we now in exasperated disillusionment throw upon the scrap-heap. Christianity is a failure — how often has the charge been spoken and how much oftener has the doubt been thought."

Dr. Fosdick then suggests that if we call Christianity a failure because it has not forestalled this war; so also must we call education, commerce, social idealism, and international law.

"Does any sane man think, however, that it is possible to be content with such a sweeping charge of failure against our ideal agencies? Are they hopelessly to be thrown into the discard? A man who has fallen into a pit might as well saw off his own legs in despite because they did not prevent him from falling in. On second thought, he will do well to keep those legs; they are his only hope of ever climbing out again. His attitude toward them is sadly incomplete if he sits at the pit's bottom, blaspheming the feet that he should have walked straight with. And in the reconstructive age that shall succeed the war, mankind must keep and confidently rely upon those ideal agencies which, with two facile tongues, some folk call failures. Education, fraternalized commerce, social idealism, international law, and Christianity — these are not ready for the discard. They are humanity's great hope. This war is not so much an occasion for despair concerning them as it is a challenge to a better understanding and a finer use of them." — H. E. Fosdick, "The Challenge of the Present Crisis," pp. 2, 3, 6, 7.

(CHAPTER II

The Significance of America's Entrance Into the War

I. Why Did America Enter the War?

1. How far was America really neutral before she entered the warf

2. How far was the sinking of the Lusitania and Germany's U-boat policy the cause of America's entering the warf If this was the reason, why did she not declare war when Germany crossed Belgium or as a protest against jGermany's atrocities f

3. Why did America wait so long before entering the warf

a. In discussing this question think of the following . possible factors:

America's historic policy of isolation.

Her nationalistic aims.

Her possible misunderstanding of the real issues. The clearer revelation of Germany's true purpose as the war progressed.

Possible changes in the attitude of the Allies. The clarifying of the issues.

b. If America had entered at the beginning of the war, how far could she have maintained that it was to help make the world safe for democracy? To what extent at that time could President Wilson have assigned the reasons he finally did assign for American entrance ?

4. What do you think of the reason assigned that America could not see the Allies defeated and therefore she was hound to place herself with themf

5. What place had self-protection and what place a new sense of obligation for other nations in America's decision?

6. To what extent is America's entrance in the war really an expansion of her principle of the Monroe Doctrine to cover world affairs: namely, that democracy shall have a chance, not only in the Americas, but in the world?

II. What is the Real Significance of America's Part in the War?

1. How far would armed neutrality have met the demands of national honor in defense against U-boat attacks?

2. Why did many Americans, when we first entered the war, say we would furnish money and defend ourselves, but would not send troops to Europe?

3. What interest has America in European rivalries? How does this weaken and how does it strengthen her position?

4. How strong is President Wilson's leadership among the

Allied nations? Why?

5. How can America help democracy in all the nations as against autocracy and imperialism?

6. What chance has America to insist on righteous peace terms? Should she have made her peace terms a prerequisite of entering the war?

III. How Can We Be Sure That America Will Remain True to Her Democratic Ideals?

*'How the War Came to America," issued by Committee on Public Information. A summary of the elements in America's foreign policy previous to the great war, the neutrality of the United States in the earlier months, and the factors which

n changed her attitude and led her into the war. Free on request.

Andrew C. McLaughlin, Professor of History, University of Chicago, 'The Great War: From Spectator to Participant," War Information Series, August, 1917. Published by Committee on Public Information. A discussion of why America did not enter the war at first and why she entered when she did. Free on request.

Walter E. Weyl, "The End of the War." Chapter II, The Conversion of America.

Henry M. Brailsford, "A League of Nations." Chapter II, America and the League of Peace.

Why America Entered the War

"It was the shrinking of the earth that flung us so violently against the European continent. What actually ended our neutrality long before we recognized that it had ended, was the supreme fact that the growth of industry, interlacing the nations of the world, had made a complete and real neutrality impossible. The traditional concept of neutrality had been based upon the idea of one independent and self-contained nation fighting another independent and self-contained nation while the neutrals held the ring, kept the scales even, and did 'nothing either way.' But today there are no economically independent and self-contained nations. The change in the nature of war, with the ultimate dependence of each state upon its neighbors, completely alters the character of neutrality. A nation may be technically neutral and yet trade ad libitum with either belligerent. It is, however, this peaceful trading which today is of enormous and even decisive influence. . . .

Here geographical position plays the controlling role. Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Switzerland may love Germany, or hate her, but cannot in the circumstances be anything but her partial economic allies, except by a policy which would make them actual enemies. Sweden either sends Germany iron or does not; if she does, she aids Germany; if she does not, she injures her disastrously and invites reprisals. . . .

Of all neutrals America was incomparably the most important. Indeed, when the war had settled down to a test of endurance, American influence became decisive. The Allies, controlling the sea, could import munitions and food from America, and as a corollary borrow money. In other words, the United

J2

States automatically became the economic ally of the nations opposed to Germany. The German-American farmer in Illinois freed a British agricultural laborer for the trenches; the Hungarian laborer at Wilkesbarre or Bridgeport unintentionally fought against his native country. To Germany, on the other hand, no imports, and therefore no direct economic aid could come from America. Even had our antagonism to Germany been less strong, that country would have borne the brunt of our economic alliance with her enemies. . . .

Only when it became obvious that we were already in the war and that we were forced to choose sides did we issue our declaration. We could either aid the Allies to defeat Germany or, by accepting Germany's ultimatum, withhold the assistance without which the Allies would have been defeated. . . .

We had learned much during the past two and a half years, and our early impressions of German policy derived from Liege, Louvain, and Rheims had been reenforced by the 'Lusitania' and other incidents. We began to dread the power and ulterior ambitions of a greater Germany. More or less vaguely we realized that England stood as a bulwark between us and this great continental military power, as France and Belgium stood between her and England. Our commercial expansion had more to fear from a successful Germany than from a successful Britain or France. While we discovered imperialistic ambitions on both sides, we believed that the preponderance of responsibility both for the war and for autocracy and militarism, lay with Germany, and if imperialism were to triumph, we preferred a British to a German imperialism. We felt that in taking our stand with the Allies we were contributing upon the whole to the hope of democracy and international peace, and in these we had both a sentimental and a material interest. . . .