The English-speaking peoples; their future relations and joint international obligations

Preface

Some twenty years ago, when the question of a formal political connection between the British Empire and the United States for the advancement of the general interests of the English-speaking peoples was quite prematurely raised, Admiral Mahan contributed to the discussion a characteristically thoughtful essay, entitled " Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion." The distinguished historian welcomed the " unmistakable growth of mutual kindly feelings between Great Britain and the United States " and pointed out that " this reviving affection well might fix the serious attention of those who watch the growth of world questions, recognizing how far imagination and sympathy rule the world." He likewise emphasized the common political traditions and moral ideals of the kindred peoples and, above all, " that singular combination of two essential but opposing factors — of individual freedom with subjection to law — which finds its most vigorous working in Great Britain and the United States." Naturally, the interpreter of sea power did not fail to point out that, of the Great Powers these two alone were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies, " while at the same time they must depend upon the sea, in chief measure, for that intercourse with other

vii

Vlll

PREFACE members of the body upon which national well-being depends."

Though recognizing the great potency of these converging forces and " though desirous as any one can be to see the fact accomplished," Admiral Mahan rejected the project as premature, because neither nation, but more especially the American, had as yet sufficiently realized its own interest in the sea and the identity of these separate interests. This identity, he said, " cannot be established firmly in men's minds antecedent to the great teacher, Experience." " The ground," he concluded, " is not prepared yet in the hearts and understandings of Americans, and I doubt whether in those of British citizens."

A great gulf separates 19 17 from 1894 when Admiral Mahan wrote these words. Since then all the unifying forces have been constantly at work and the needed lessons of " Experience " have come from an unwelcome war. Nor is the bitter process of education yet concluded. The question of the future relations of the English-speaking peoples has in consequence assumed an entirely different aspect. What in 1894 was unripe and academic, has to-day become urgent and practical. The purpose of this book is to examine the question in a comprehensive manner, though on a compact scale, taking into account not only the obligations and interests of the peoples immediately concerned, but also the future of civilization as a whole.

The opinions expressed therein have not been impro-

PREFACE ix

vised. They are the result of prolonged and intensive study of the relations between the two great branches of the English-speaking people. Ten years ago, in an account of British colonial policy during the critical years of the old Empire's history, the writer said : " It is easily conceivable, and not at all improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar economic and social conditions." It is not the object of this book to discuss the possibility of such a political reunion. If this outcome be in the lap of the gods, it will come in the fulness of time, be the date near or far. Any premature forcing of the pace would probably merely retard such an eventual consummation, which in itself should be welcomed by all who realize that the effective extension of law and justice can be accomplished only by the voluntary integration of progressively larger political entities. Hide-bound as we are by the traditions of the sovereign state demanding from its citizens supreme and undivided dedication, the world does not yet realize the possibilities of new forms of political organization which will permanently unite in a common co-operative purpose different nations and at the same time allow free play to distinct, but not discordant, loyalties of great intensity. However this may be, the object of this book x PREFACE

is the more immediate one of explaining the advisability and necessity of a co-operative democratic alliance of all the English-speaking peoples, from which may possibly in time be developed such a new type of permanent political association.

The co-operation of these culturally kindred peoples in the present war is patently a step in this general direction and is a happy augury. It calls to mind the inspired lines from the " Areopagitica," that inalienable heritage of all English-speaking people, whatever be their physical race or geographical origin. " Methinks I see in my mind," so Milton describes his purely English vision which it is hoped will be realized jointly by all the associated English-speaking peoples, " a noble and puissant Nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks : Methinks I see her as an Eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazl'd eyes at the full midday beam; purging and unsealing her long abused sight at the fountain it self of heav'nly radiance."

When so broad a range of fact and of theory is covered in a limited space, it is impossible even by the free use of qualifications to give the intermediate shades that so vastly outnumber the blacks and whites of history. Even with the best of intentions a complex fact cannot be summarized in a brief sentence. Every effort has, however, been made to state the facts accurately and to weigh them impartially. But apart from its historical and scientific background, this is essentially a livre de

PREFACE xi

circonstance, devoted to the discussion of public policy and hence dealing largely with an unpredictable future. The arrangement of the material and the relative degree of emphasis upon the various phases of the subject were naturally conditioned by the fact that the writer is, in the main, addressing his fellow citizens of the United States. It may seem strange to append to a volume of this character a series of notes. Their function is in part to acknowledge indebtedness for fact or thought and, in part also, to substantiate and corroborate the text. Their chief purpose, however, is to furnish a running bibliography to easily accessible and non-technical literature for such of the readers whose interest may be stimulated to inquire further into matters that could be discussed only summarily in the text itself. In conclusion, it should be mentioned that some of the material in this book had already appeared in The Political Quarterly, The New Republic, The Forum, The Annals of the American Academy and elsewhere.

George Louis Beer.

New York, June first, 1917.

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I International Anarchy 3

II Nationalism and Sovereignty 31

Chapter I

Introductory — Mediaeval Unity — Modern System of Sovereign States — International Law — Its Nature and Sanction ■ — Its Limited Content — Its Ambiguity — Treaties — International Commissions and Unions — Conferences and Congresses — Alliances.

The present world-wide war, both in its outbreak and in its devastating course, has forcibly driven into the minds of most thinking men the firm conviction that the existing system of international relations is out of harmony with the fundamental facts of modern life. In all quarters where the problems of the present and future torment the soul and perplex the mind of man there is the keenest of realizations that western civilization will in the future continue to be grievously imperilled unless some measures be devised to limit at least, if not entirely to eliminate, recourse to the ordeal by battle in the adjustment of interstate disputes.

Some considerable measure of good will probably come from the holocaust. Presumably, the future boundaries of Europe will be determined more in consonance with the wishes of those most directly interested than was the custom of a past when strategic considerations and dynastic interests played an unfortunately large part in the disposition of voiceless peoples. Subject nations, exploited politically and economically by dominant races, seem to be on the verge of emancipation and are looking forward to complete independence or to the guaranteed assurance of full opportunities for self-expression under a system of federal autonomy. The spirit of nationality is again working with that of democracy. Russia has already burst the fetters of autocracy, and the leaven of liberalism is not only working in a Prussianized Germany, but it is also quickening the democratic impulse in those countries that stand pre-eminently as the champions of freedom.

Some of these anticipated benefits, possibly the most far-reaching ones — such as the democratization of Russia, the unification of the British Empire, and the final healing of the breach between the two great branches of the English-speaking people — if they be realized, cannot be attributed to the war, which will merely have hastened the course of already progressing movements. Their consummation was dependent upon different factors. But other expected advantages, such as the re-unification and re-establishment of the Polish nation in an autonomous state, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or its reorganization so that the suppressed Slav nationalities may be freed from Magyar and Austro-German oppression, the emancipation of the Armenians from the murderous Turkish yoke, could not have been effected except by force of arms under the existing international dispensation.

Provided the lesson of the present agony be indelibly seared in the heart and mind of future ages, the coming generations will be able to lead a fuller and a freer life. In a measure the war has not only purified the peoples who have met the onslaught against the fundamental principles of western civilization, 1 but it may also chasten the spirit of the militaristic aggressor as soon as defeat has afforded the leisure for reflection. There is every prospect that the selfishness, materialism, and class-feelings so prevalent in all present-day communities will be markedly lessened by the intimate association of all ranks and classes in unmeasured sacrifices for a high purpose and by the resulting orientation of the mind and spirit towards quite other than predominantly self-regarding aims.

The war may prove to be a turning point in the world's history. If it result in the definitive vindication of the democratic concepts of liberty and law, future generations will probably somewhat overlook the evil from which the good has sprung. But for the portion of living mankind subjected to its destructive blast, the war is an almost unqualified evil of most momentous dimensions. No matter what be the exact military outcome, even if right fully prevail against might, the war cannot but cause misery in almost equal measure to both vanquished and victor. If it be only by such self-immolation that western civilization can be purged of the evils of military aggression then the outlook is indeed dark. Civilization is bankrupt if free peoples can preserve their liberties only at such heavy cost. The supreme good that can come out of the war is the complete demonstration of its baleful nature and the consequent determination of free peoples to devise effective means of preventing in the future a recurrence of the evil even if as a result a measure of their cherished, but somewhat illusory, independence of action should have to be sacrificed.

In the great intellectual travail engendered by this well-nigh universal abhorrence of the present dominion of force throughout the world, there is one point of almost complete agreement. It is generally recognized that, apart from the distinct condemnation that unequivocally attaches itself to those whose imperious will to power either thwarted all efforts toward peaceful composition or welcomed the arbitrament of force, the war is a direct outcome of the prevailing international anarchy and of the current selfish nationalism that is intimately connected with this lack of organization. That such a calamity was at all possible is due both to an actual condition and to a closely related state of mind. All states are in varying degrees infected with the self -regarding nationalism of the day. No one is quite free from it. The stress ordinarily placed upon so-called national interests with its almost inevitable concomitant, the tendency to disregard the conflicting rights of other states, the marked propensity to base foreign policy upon the mere enforcement of national rights to the neglect of their inseparable complementary obligations, has inevitably enshrouded interstate intercourse with a murky atmosphere of fear and suspicion. But even if the mental attitude were far other, there is no organization in which the international mind can express itself. The lack of any interstate political system, the prevailing international anarchy, leaves the world's peace at the mercy of whichsoever one of the Great Powers is dissatisfied with existing territorial arrangements and is willing and prepared to employ force to gain its ends. So long as the community of states remains unorganized, " the will to war " of one of its members will always be able to thwart the pacific purposes of the majority.

This international anarchy is the direct product of modern historical development. In mediaeval thought, mankind was generally conceived as constituting one vast community, a universal church-state with no territorial limits. 2 There were, it is true, endless and acrimonious disputes as to the respective positions of Church and State in this world-wide commonwealth, but both Papalist and Imperialist agreed in regarding mankind as constituting one society. 3 According to Dante, a pre-eminent member of the latter group, general peace was the indispensable prerequisite of man's perfect existence and this condition was obtainable only by a unified governmental system. 4 This mediaeval ideal, which was by no means ever realized, was generally discarded after the rise of the national states of Western Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Despite superficial analogies, the gulf that separates the modern from the mediaeval political system is profound. " The change is from a world-empire to a territorial State, and from ecclesiastical to civil predominance." 5 The mediaeval ideal of an inclusive unity was replaced by the modern view that the political world is composed of distinct communities " entirely independent, territorially omnipotent, and to some extent morally responsible." 6

The governments of the national states — England, France, Spain — whose consolidation marks the dawn of the modern era successfully claimed for these bodies politic absolute freedom from all external control. Although basing their views to a considerable extent upon actual political facts and influenced largely by the analogy of the plenitudo potestatis that the Papacy had taken over from the Roman Empire, a series of remarkable thinkers — Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes — deductively developed an abstract theory of unlimited state sovereignty both in internal and in external affairs. Mankind, instead of being regarded as one all-embracing community, was divided into distinct and separate political units connected by no legal bonds. Even the existence of moral ties was not infrequently denied. Politics, if not completely divorced from ethics, led intermittently a separate life; and raison d'etat was held to be sufficient justification for heinous deeds and gross breaches of faith. This theory of unlimited state sovereignty still largely holds sway. In the political world of to-day the concrete realities are the sovereign states, each one of which is conceived by its government to be more or less a law unto itself.

With their uncritical worship of success, historians have, as a rule, seen nothing but good in the downfall of medievalism and the rise of the modern system of sovereign states. Some ten years before the present war so conclusively opened the eyes of many to the fundamental defects of existing interstate relations, the present Master of Balliol somewhat cautiously questioned whether the substitution of modern disunion for mediaeval unity had been all for the best and he denied the necessity of assuming " that anarchy and disruption are things good in themselves." 7 But almost from the very outset it was recognized that the Renaissance theory of state sovereignty led logically to the continuous warfare that was then devastating Europe and that some limits had to be set to the self-regarding actions of the sovereign state if civilization were to perdure. In fact, just as the mediaeval ideal of unity was never realized in practice, equally little was its superseding ideal of a world of self-sufficing, isolated political units in complete harmony with actual facts. The great Dutch thinker of the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius, perceived this clearly and, in contradistinction to Machiavelli and his followers, asserted that " human life is essentially a society, and that certain laws, of which fidelity to plighted word is the most important, are therefore as immutable as human io THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

nature." 8 With this idea in view, he elaborated a system oi rights and duties governing the relations of state to state. Grotius's work was essentially a protest against the international anarchy of his day, but his conclusions were by no means fully accepted by the statesmen and publicists of the three following centuries. His assertion of the binding force of natural law in interstate relations 9 has met with scant acceptance in practice. Yet it was recognized that some palliatives had to be adopted to restrict the war of all against all that was rapidly ruining great sections of seventeenth-century Europe. Hence, largely upon the basis of Grotius's epoch-making book, was gradually erected the structure of modern international law.

It is idle in this connection to enter upon the vexed question whether international law is really law at all. For obviously, the answer depends primarily upon the definition of law that is adopted. International lawyers, partly as the result of something akin to the hero-worship that animates most biographers, naturally as a rule maintain the affirmative of this proposition. Such also is the contention of so notable a jurist as Sir Frederick Pollock. 10 But other equally eminent authorities dissent. 11 It is unquestionably true that international law has in great part developed gradually through custom, just as has the most vital portion of municipal law. But whereas the common law is regularly enforced by courts with authority to impose the judgments, international law has not passed beyond the customary stage.

INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY n

There are in existence no tribunals for its general enforcement and, no matter how strong or weak be its authority, its sanction is distinctly moral rather than legal in nature. Whether in its essence it be law or not, it certainly differs radically from what English-speaking peoples confined to a tongue that does not distinguish between jus and lex, Recht and Gesetz, droit and loi, understand by that term. An intrepid champion of the claims of international law to full legal recognition virtually concedes that there is a vital distinction when he says that " as, however, there cannot be a sovereign authority above the several sovereign states, the Law of Nations is a law between, not above the several states." 12 In actual practice, international law is merely a code of rules to which the states profess general adherence, but to which they actually render only a somewhat reluctant and fitful obedience. As a profound student aptly expressed it :

" International Law is like schoolboy honour or good form, it does not destroy selfishness or quarrelling or cheating; but it proclaims that certain things are to be avoided and others are obligatory, and it unites even those most sharply divided as members in a single society. It does not solve the problem of man in society, but it recognizes it." 13

When one turns from the nature and sanction of international law to its content, one cannot but be struck by its limited scope. The fundamental function of law is to establish the rule o'f reason and justice in the relations of man to man and of group to group. But international law has made scant progress toward such a consummation. In considerable part, it is merely a code of etiquette prescribing the punctilio of interstate intercourse in times of peace. But in possibly even greater measure it is devoted to the formulation of the rules of war. 14 Although international lawyers insist that war is no illegality, still there is a distinct inconsistency between war and law because, no matter whether the decision reached by such a contention of hostile forces be just or unjust, the means themselves are the negation of reason and are in no way adapted to securing an equitable issue of the dispute. If it be admitted that justice is " the effort to eliminate from our social conditions the effects of the inequalities of Nature upon the happiness and advancement of men," 15 then war is its very antithesis, for its so-called " biologically just decisions " allow these inequalities full sway.

So restricted in its scope is international law that the most vital questions do not come within its purview. The most fundamental issues, such as are most likely to lead to war, as for instance the open door in the dependencies of European states and in other backward, but still independent, countries, the Monroe Doctrine, the far-reaching problems involved in the attempts of Asiatics to settle within Caucasian communities, are outside its narrow range. It is of the utmost significance that all political subjects, whether of such contentious nature or otherwise, were rigorously excluded from the discussions at the Hague Conferences and that the general arbitration treaties which have been adopted, as a rule, absolutely exclude from such adjudication all questions involving the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the parties to them. 16

Not alone is the moral sanction of international law only intermittently effective and not alone is its scope decidedly inadequate, but the existing war has furnished complete demonstration that much of its content is ambiguous. This criticism applies even to that part of international law which is embodied in general treaties. This is entirely apart from the fact both that the binding force of such treaties has not infrequently been challenged with impunity, 17 and also that the Hague Conventions are not binding on the signatories if any one of the belligerents, no matter how insignificant, 18 be not a party to them. In addition, these treaties, which constitute what might be called the statutory as opposed to the customary part of international law, are not infrequently open to contradictory interpretations. This is in part due to the fact that at times no agreement at all could have been reached if the terms had been absolutely explicit and the document was signed only because from the very outset the diplomats were interpreting its meaning differently. A conspicuous instance is the Treaty of London of 1867 guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg. When this question came up for European decision, Bismarck was insistent that the guarantee should bind each one of the signatories individually, while the British statesmen were tenaciously unwilling to assume i 4 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

such unlimited obligations. In this impasse the Russian representative suggested a phrase susceptible of different interpretations, " collective guarantee," 19 whose exact meaning has to this day remained undetermined. 20 Similarly, there is some confusion as to the treaty of 1839 neutralizing Belgium. There are, of course, no qualifications whatsoever as to the obligations assumed by the parties of the treaty to respect the neutrality of that kingdom, but questions have frequently been raised as to the duties of the signatories to proceed against those delinquent in this respect. Gladstone especially was insistent in maintaining that Great Britain had not assumed an unlimited obligation, one that was irrespective of circumstances, to proceed by force of arms against any and all violations of Belgium's neutrality. 21 Other British statesmen have taken the same view. 22

Naturally even more indefinite than are these treaties, is that portion of international law based upon custom. Sharp differences of opinion that existed in an academic state before the war have since then become acute. Apart from the German practice that rests upon the anarchic, non-moral, and purely self -regarding precept that neither the usages nor the laws of war should be allowed to obstruct military ends, 23 it is in general true that when military needs demanded a measure, some more or less cogent argument or some more or less pertinent precedent could as a rule be found to justify its application. Especially contentious are the questions arising out of the inevitable conflict between the rights of belligerents and those of neutrals. The disputes about contraband, continuous voyage, blockade, neutral mails, all testify to the indefiniteness of international usage. Under such circumstances, when the allegation of illegality can be so readily denied, if not completely refuted, it is not surprising that states should refrain from opposing such actions on the part of other states as do not immediately affect their own interests.

But only to a minor extent is such non-action the result of the vagueness of interstate usage. Under existing conditions, a state does not as a rule feel justified, even if it be so inclined, to raise its voice against the most heinous and palpable violation of international law unless it itself is wronged. Much less does it recognize an obligation to intervene by act. While a. crime within the body politic is deemed an injury to society as well as to the individual adversely affected, a violation of international law is not considered an offence against the community of states. It is plain that until this condition changes, until the community of states has become organized, the rule of law as the approximate embodiment of justice and reason cannot be said to obtain in international relations. In the present unorganized world, there prevails an anarchy somewhat tempered on the one hand by international law, but even more so, on the other, by moral inhibitions that are recognized in varying degrees by the different states. This is the unavoidable result of the modern system based upon the absolute sovereignty of the independent state.

While this abstract theory of sovereignty divided the world in sharply segregated politico-legal units, each one of these states was developing distinct interests outside its territorial confines and the intercourse between their respective citizens was becoming ever closer and more vital. In response to the need for some regulation of these important relations, there was developed not only the restricted and indefinite system of interstate usage known as international law, but there were also concluded between the states a lengthy series of special treaties granting to their respective citizens civil, commercial, and property rights within each other's territorial limits. In addition to such special treaties, others of broader scope were passed regulating the navigation of the Danube, the Congo, and the Suez Canal, controlling interstate communications by post, telegraph, and other means, giving international protection to commercial, artistic, and literary property. In these instances, as well as in others, permanent international offices have been established for the administration of these interstate interests. 24

Many have hopefully, and possibly too sanguinely, welcomed these international organs, which have increased rapidly in numbers and in effectiveness since the middle of the nineteenth century as the real beginnings of international government. Be such optimism well or illfounded, it should always be remembered that these international administrative bureaus are largely economic and exclusively non-political in nature. They have, however, not only accomplished an immensely important work, but they have also greatly decreased interstate friction by removing from the diplomatic field many subjects that might have given rise to dispute. While not infrequently contentious, the questions handled in this way are such as do not affect what really are, or delusively are held to be, the vital interests of the state.

Such interests are not handled by these international unions and commissions, but they are the subject of direct negotiation between the immediately interested parties or an attempt is made to decide them by general international conferences. Only very rarely and then virtually solely when the matter in dispute turns upon a question of fact or upon a well-defined legal principle, is there recourse to arbitration. If these means fail, the settlement is left to the adjudication of arms. In the all-pervading atmosphere of a world-wide war, it is not generally realized to what an extent interstate disputes have been settled by peaceful means. Arbitration has played a significant part, however minor a one it be, in such settlements. The saying of the Greek philosopher that war is the father of all things is decisively contradicted by the fact that all Africa has in the past hundred years been divided up by peaceful negotiations between the European Powers. Other territorial changes elsewhere and even in Europe, though not on so vast a scale as this one, have likewise been peacefully effected. These facts should give pause to those who oppose a supernational world organization merely on the ground that it would perpetuate an existing status that in time would become increasingly out of accord with the changing conditions of the world. This argument could with equal validity be directed against the state itself. If, as a rule, the state's organization can without violence be readjusted to dynamic conditions, so could that of the world state whose ultimate advent has been the hope of many a prescient philosopher, poet, and statesman.

Direct negotiations between the Great Powers have disposed of many fundamental questions in all quarters of the globe. It is only necessary to mention the frontier between the United States and Canada, Heligoland, Persia, Morocco, Siam, and the South Sea Islands. But even more important is the work that has been performed by international congresses and conferences. After the collapse of Napoleon's attempt to establish a military dominion over all Europe, the war-weary Powers tried to perpetuate their alliance in order to give permanent peace to Europe. 25 The Holy Alliance, a project of the Tzar Alexander to which Austria and Prussia gave their adherence, was based upon lofty ethical principles, but it quickly proved impracticable in a world dominated by ideals far different from those of its mystic progenitor. But, at the same time, another plan with similar though more limited objects in view was developed by the less visionary statesmen of Europe. One of the articles of the coalition treaty of 1814 against Napoleon provided that the four contracting Great Powers — Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia — should remain in alliance for twenty years in order to maintain " the Balance of Europe, to secure the repose and independence of the Powers, and to prevent the invasions which for so many years have devastated the world." As the war was waged against Napoleon, not against France, within a few years of his overthrow, that state was admitted to this league of the Great Powers.