Sea power and freedom; a historical study

Foreword

The conquest of the sea is man's greatest triumph. The stages of this triumph from the time when the savage first took advantage of the floating properties of the log, down through all the ages until the present day, are shown in moving pictures by this book. Sea Power and Freedom depicts mainly the career and achievements of the British Navy; because the British Navy is the greatest embodiment of sea power that has ever been attained, and because it has accompHshed more than any other agency, to achieve the conquest^ of the sea. The career and achievements of other navies and of various merchant marines as well are picturesquely shown; and the scenes succeed each other in such rapid but well-ordered fashion, that the story runs uninterrupted and harmonious from the first page to the last.

There is nothing a man fears more naturally and more profoundly than the water. While the ordinary man remains on land, though subjected to dangers of various kinds, he has a feeling of being where he belongs; but once in the water, or in a vessel floating on the water, fear that his breathing will suddenly be stopped has to be subdued by force of will; and it is only after familiarity with the danger has been attained that the fear is entirely overcome. If this feeling exists at the present day, when people know that millions of men have sailed over the seas during thousands of years, and that the

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vessels now constructed are so strong that they can defy even hurricanes and typhoons, what must it have been in remote times and among savage tribes !

Man's long and often painful contest with the sea is a story of adventure, labour, skill, courage, science, and achievement, which has no parallel in any other of man's endeavours. No other achievement has triumphed over such great obstacles, no other achievement has brought about such great results. No forces of Nature have assailed man with such success as have storms at sea, no forces of Nature have been so bravely faced and so successfully overcome. Courage was needed to do this; but mere courage accomplished little, till Engineering came to its assistance, and gradually brought into being those giants of mechanism that now cross the ocean with mathematical precision, alike in calm and storm. These steamships represent the highest point attained in the contest of men with Nature; and the highest development of the steamship is the battleship. No other engineering product of equal size is so delicate, so manageable, or so perfect ; no watch or chronometer, no wireless telegraph apparatus, no astronomical instrument, is constructed with more scientific accuracy, or fitted with more delicate care. And a battleship is not merely a battleship in the sense that it is a kind of ship; because, aside from being a ship, it is an organism containing hundreds of mechanism of different kinds, each ready to do its part in the work of fighting battles. A like remark may be made of the other types which make up a navy, such as destroyers, battle-cruisers, cruisers of different kinds, and submarines; — and now a new type of unit is being added, in the shape of dirigible balloons, and seaplanes of many kinds.

FOREWORD V

Sea Power and Freedom shows how the early efforts of the seaman started near the shores of rivers and afterwards of lakes and seas; how, as the seaman's art progressed, and the mechanic arts as well, their craft became stronger, and instruments of propulsion and navigation were devised . Then the navigator slowly enlarged the radius of his trips from shore, then cautiously ventured out upon the ocean, and finally launched out bravely into the unknown, leaving behind him the solid safety of the land.

For the most part, the efforts of navigators were directed then to navigating vessels which were built and used for the purposes of trade ; and, for the most part, the efforts of navigators are similarly directed now. In those days, transportation over the water was undertaken for the same reason as was transportation over the land — ^for trade. This is the fact now, and the reason is the same. In those days, the water separated portions of the land from other portions, and dwellers in one place could usually find in other places certain products of the soil or handiwork which they did not themselves possess but which they could obtain in exchange •for certain products of their own. This was sea commerce in the earliest days, and it is sea commerce now. The main difference is in the number and quantity of the things produced and traded for.

There was no supreme law upon the sea then, and there is none now. No place upon the sea had a police force which protected the lives and property of people as is now done in cities ; and so it came about that each trading vessel carried with it the laws of its own country, and carried weapons with which to protect itself. From these armed vessels which carried commerce, there were afterwards developed vessels which were armed, but vi FOREWORD

did not cany commerce, their task being to protect commerce-carrying vessels. One armed vessel, or naval vessel, could protect many merchant vessels on a voyage, convoying them from one port to another. Thus was the convoy system started.

It was not until the late Admiral Mahan published his epochal book. The Influence oj Sea Power upon History, in 1890, that the truth was finally apprehended that sea power has had any distinctive influence upon history. Such an idea had occurred to many men and had appeared sometimes in print; but the book of Mahan was so attractive, so complete, and so convincing, that it woke men suddenly to a perception of the truth, and at the same time to a realisation of the fact that this truth was of supreme importance to mankind.

That men should not have realised the importance to any nation of having a large commerce on the sea, with sufficient naval force to guard it, can easily be understood ; because the sea is so far away from the lives and experience of most people, that its very existence is hard to realise; and it is so associated in some minds with stories of suffering and danger, that it has seemed to them an agency of evil only. Furthermore, to most people, the battle of life is so strenuous, and the necessity for earning the daily bread is so imperious, that they are forced to concern themselves with the things which they can see with their eyes at the moment, and hear with their ears, and taste with their lips. Few people can take a comprehensive view of any subject, so concerned are they forced to be with its details. Few men and women have a clear idea of even the main facts in the government of their own cities !

In order to look at any subject as a whole, one must get high enough above the subject to see all parts of it

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unobstructed by other parts; just as one must do, in order to look at a city as a whole.

If one desires to look at sea power in this way, let him take an atlas of the world and note how three-quarters of the globe is covered with water, while only one-quarter is covered with land; and let him also note how small a part of even the land is possessed by people who have very much to say about the government of that land. Let him note how nearly one-quarter of all the land in the globe is under the British Government, and how most of the rest of it is under the governments of France, Germany, Russia, and the United States. Let him also note that, in many of the civilised countries such as Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium, the most important work of the people is in manufacturing; while in many countries, such as those in Africa, and in most of those of Asia, Australia, and South America, comparatively little manufacturing is done, while there are millions of square miles of productive soil; and he will realise that, while the sea separates countries, the ships which sail upon it act like bridges over it, joining the countries together, and permitting a world-wide commerce.

But, in one way or another, men always have to pay for what they get, and they pay for the benefits of ocean commerce by the necessity of guarding that commerce, and by incurring the dangers which result from any failure to guard it adequately. The benefits of ocean commerce bring about competition among maritime nations to obtain the most they can; and in this competition, as in all great competitions, the rewards go to him who is the most diligent, the most wise, and the most brave. The nation which has been the most diUgent, wise, and brave in carrying on commerce on the viii FOREWORD

sea, has gotten the most commerce on the sea, and has employed the most complete measures for its protection. The sails of her ships and the smoke of her steamers' funnels, in both merchant craft and men-of-war, rise above all the waters that cover three-quarters of the earth, and attest the omnipresence of her sea power.

Is this omnipresence of sea power an unimportant matter? Imagine a city in which there were a hundred business firms in competition with each other, but in which there was no protection for the goods of any firm in transportation through the city, except such protection as the employees of that firm could give. In such a condition of affairs, the wagons of each firm would probably carry armed employees; contests between the employees of one firm with those of another firm would be possible; and the advantage possessed by the firm that had the most and the biggest wagons and the best guards would be obvious. Now such a condition is much like the condition on the sea, over which each nation transports its goods, with no protection except that given by its employees.

To a greater degree than any other nation. Great Britain has carried on and has protected commerce on all the oceans of the world. The power she has exerted has been greater than any other nation ever exerted before, and has been so obvious that in recent years it has come almost to be accepted as a law. Great power is a curse if it is misused, but a blessing if it is well used. Fortunately for the world, her power has been exerted in the main for the benefit of mankind. As this book so clearly and beautifully shows, the sea power of Great Britain has been exerted in the main to preserve the freedom of the seas, in the sense that it has made the sea free to travellers, and has assisted commerce by

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assuring safety to it, and by bringing about the removal of narrow rules and needless and burdensome restrictions.

This does not mean that all the acts which have established and maintained the sea power of Great Britain have been unselfish; but it does mean that, even if the British sea policy has been guided by self-interest, that self-interest has been intelHgent; and that, even if we may justly find fault with some things, we must admit that the far-sightedness and broad-mindedness shown by Great Britain in the use of the unprecedented power given her by her predominance at sea, has no parallel in history.

Possibly, one explanation is that many of the selfish acts of men, and perhaps nearly all their cruelties, have been because of short-sightedness, a narrow view of life, a tendency to exaggerate the importance of things near in place or time, and a failure to realise how trivial and how fleeting are many of the things men strive for. If this be so, large undertakings, involving great bodies of men, and extending over continents and seas, tend so to broaden men's views and elevate their aims, as to reduce the temptation to gain small personal advantages, or gratify petty spites.

Such an effect seems to be in the mind of the author of this book; and for this reason, as well as others, his narrative of events and the conclusions which he reaches are of vital interest to the world at large, and especially to the people of the countries that border on the sea.

Bradley A. Fiske.

New York, February 9, 191 8.

Preface

It was while revising the lectures of which this book is chiefly composed, that the vital part played by the maritime races in establishing and maintaining the freedom of mankind was borne in upon my mind. Hence the title of this volume, expressive, as I venture to think, of much which is in our thoughts to-day, and cheering withal.

I would ask my readers to remember that I did not set out to write a treatise on the relation of Sea Power to Freedom, but to prepare a set of lectures on the Meaning and Function of Sea Power which should interest an audience of Teachers, in whose hands rests so great an opportunity for impressing on the minds of those who are to follow us the lessons of duty and devotion which the history of maritime nations affords. The idea of the connection of Sea Power with Freedom is only one strain of thought out of many. The stress of the time did not admit of extensive revision and rewriting. Therefore I hope I may be forgiven a certain discursiveness of matter and colloquialism of style less proper to the printed page than to the spoken word.

The history of the world marches in orderly sequence. No study convinces one so clearly of this fact in the case of our own country as the study of Sea Power. Approached from this standpoint, the events of the ages show one steady stream of development, rich with purpose and promise. In the issue of to-day, Great xii PREFACE

Britain, her children oversea, and the United States could not have been but where they are, without being false to their past and prodigal of their future. Nor can they, without certain disaster, sheathe the sword till all that for which they are fighting is fully won. " Here stand we. We can no other. "

Those acquainted with the writings of Admiral Mahan will be at no loss to trace their influence in the following pages. I can hope for nothing better than that this book may induce others at present unfamiliar with those writings to study them at first hand, and also the no less valuable works of Sir John Knox Laughton, Sir Julian Corbet, and other British naval writers of far deeper learning and greater authority than I can pretend to. I must also acknowledge the debt I owe to Mr. E. Hallam Moorhouse for his invaluable volume, Letters of the English Seamen; to Mr. Archibald Hurd, most painstaking of naval writers, and Mr. Henry Castle for the information supplied by their German Sea Power : Its Rise, Progress, and Economic Basis; to Miss Alethea Wiel's engrossing study of The Navy of Venice, and to Mr. Ernest Law's England's First Great War Minister, a book which casts light on a period of English history much overlaid by prejudice. For the early history of Sea Power, I derived great help from The Historian's History of the World, published by the Times.

Gerard Fiennes.

Contents

I. — Introductory ....

II. — Sea Power in the Ancient World III.— "A Place Where Two Seas Meet" IV. — The Making of England V. — The Mediterranean in the Middle Ages VI. — The Age of Discovery .

VII. — The Mastery to Britain VIII. — Pride and a Fall .

Chapter I

As the Great War has taken its course, from August, 1914, when Great Britain and her Allies, aroused from their dreams of peace, stood up all unprepared, against the Central Empires which had made them ready for battle, till the time when, at last, they are bringing their full might to bear, it has become more and more evident that the bed-rock on which the hope of victory rests is sea power. The events of the years just past have taught us more of the meaning of the word than has been popularly understood, at least since Trafalgar. We have seen — or rather we have not seen, save with the eye of faith — the Grand Fleet standing ever on guard in "the Northern mists," and we have realised, more or less, that, so long as it retains what is known as the "Command of the Sea," we cannot be invaded. The war is being fought on other soil than that of Great Britain by reason of the predominance of that Grand Fleet. Great armies have been transported, not only across the Channel, but from the uttermost parts of the earth, with the loss of scarce a man or a

I pound of stores, again because the Grand Fleet has "banged, barred, and bolted" the gates of the world against the Germans and their allies. We have learned that the reason why we suffer — but not unbearably — from high prices is that the demands upon our mercantile marine and the depredations of the "U " boats have caused a scarcity of tonnage for the carrying of trade. We have been taught, by the logic of events, that, for us, security and prosperity rest upon the power to use the sea.

Sea power means that, and it means nothing more — save the corollary: the power to deny the use of the sea to the enemy in time of war. This definition should be kept clearly in mind. It is all-important to what is to follow. The military navy is a necessary instrument of sea power, since it is on the military navy that a maritime State must rely to "impeach" the enemy, as the Elizabethans said, in his use of the sea-routes. But, in itself, it is only a part, though a most important part of the whole. The sea has no owner. It has been compared to a wide common, free to the use of all mankind. The right of ownership only begins within the curtilage of the house, so to speak : with the carriage-drive, the estuaries of the rivers and the harbours. Even within territorial waters — the muchquoted three-mile limit — there is no right of possession until low water-mark is reached. It follows, then, that sea power is not the monopoly of any one nation. All nations who have the requisite natural facilities may possess it in measure. Conceivably, all nations might possess it in an equal degree, so long as they remain at peace with one another.

In effect, however, though the right of all be equal, the possession of sea power is limited by natiural conditions. Switzerland has the same right as Britain to use the sea, but she has no more the power than has ♦a paralysed man the power to cross the common. All she needs from over-sea must be brought her in the ships of other nations. The first condition of sea power is, obviously, access to the sea: favourable geographical position, an easily accessible coast, secure and commodious harbours. Thus baldly stated, it appears a mere platitude to enunciate this condition. But there are many degrees of ability and disability, ranging between Switzerland, cut off entirely from access to the sea, and Britain or Japan, with the sea surrounding them, and ports, always possible of access, on all their coasts. There is Russia, for instance, with her Baltic ports sealed for nearly half the year by ice, and Rumania, whose only approach to the outer seas is through the Dardanelles, the control of which is destined for ever to rest in the hands of another Power. Or, again, there is Belgium, with her great port of Antwerp situated on a river, the mouths of which are controlled by Holland. The gradations are endless; but the instances given show that, in peace as well as in war, geographical position, apart from actual exclusion from the shore, is the first and most important factor in the incidence of sea power.

Next in importance comes the need of the nation for over-sea commerce. So far as geographical position is concerned, France and Spain are but little less favourably situated than Great Britain. Yet neither of these countries has succeeded in maintaining a really developed sea power. Why?

The answer is partly to be found in the condition stated above. The first thing necessary to the life of man is eatables. When a nation produces at home all, or almost all, it requires in the way of eatables; when its soil is the true mother of the people; when they have, perhaps, a surplus of corn and wine and oil to barter for manufactures, or for luxuries of other kinds, they do not take that surplus in their own ships, seeking a market among the hungry. Just as, when Egypt was in plenty and there was scarcity outside the borders, Joseph hoarded the produce of the fat years and the patriarchs went down into Egypt to buy food for the famine of their houses, so the nation similarly situated nowadays will say, in effect, to the world: "If you wish to partake of our superfluity, come down in your ships and fetch it, and bring with you your goods in exchange." The importing country is not, of course, necessarily a poor country, or short of resources. That could not be said of Britain with her coal and iron and immense industries, nor of Germany. But it is true, all through history, that the nations which have had to exchange their products for foodstuffs have been the great Sea Powers. Phoenicia, Greece, Venice, Holland, Britain stand on the one hand; ancient Egypt, Babylonia, France, and the United States stand on the other. The instance of the United States is peculiarly instructive, for, until she began to develop her natural resources in the great lands of the West, she was a great Sea Power, with a mercantile marine at one time only second to that of Great Britain. Now she is one of the greatest exporting countries in the world, but, in comparison with the bulk of her trade, her mercantile marine is insignificant. As regards this country, which, of course, has a great agriculture, and, in early times, was at least self-supporting, it is interesting to note that her sea commerce was small, and that she relied on Venetian and Hanseatic ships to bring her what she required from abroad — chiefly articles of luxury — up to Tudor times. Why was there then a change, and why did she become a maritime State?

Partly, no doubt, the change was due to the fostering care of her kings. Partly it was due to the discovery of America and of the passage round the Cape, which, in the long run, ruined Venice. But, in addition to these political and external causes, it may be remembered that during the fourteenth century the population was reduced to one-half by the Black Death, the whole system of villenage, on which agriculture depended, was overthrown, and that large tracts of land went out of cultivation, while, during almost the whole of the fifteenth, the land was distracted and recovery retarded by the troubles leading up to and ensuing upon the Wars of the Roses. These events upset the balance between town and country and compelled the importation of necessaries. Much has been attributed to the Black Death; but its possible effect upon our sea power has been overlooked by historians. Were the latter accustomed to pay much heed to maritime matters, their silence might condemn the conjecture as of little value. But it is an extraordinary fact that, with the exception of the few who specialise in the subject, our historians seem oblivious of the immense effect which the sea and the use thereof have had on the making of Britain and her history.

Next in order of the factors which go to building up sea power must be placed the character and habits of the people, a factor which depends, in part at least, on the condition just discussed. The need of food first drives men to seek the harvest of the sea, and, thus, fisheries are invariably the nurseries of mariners.

But also it is to be noticed that the great seafaring peoples have been a stiff-necked breed, little wont to accept either foreign domination or tyrannical government at home. The docile subjects of the Pharaohs, the Chaldean and Persian kings, of Louis XIV., and the Spanish monarchy were never imbued with the true sea spirit, although, from time to time, some of them have shone as soldiers at sea. The temperament which endures personal rule is lacking in initiative and self-reliance. It was widely different with the Phoenicians, the Athenians, the Norsemen, the Venetians, the Dutch, and the English. The restless mind, the independent and individualistic spirit with its love of adventure and desire for gain, have made of these true seafaring peoples, when once it was fairly aroused. True, the awakening may take centuries. It has been noted that the English people of the Middle Ages were of almost Oriental docility save for the turbulent Normans among them. But, in those centuries, their dwelling-place was wide enough for them, and the conditions of life, for all but the villeins and serfs, at any rate, easy. They had not yet begun to find the incentive to use the sea. The French are a people with many of the qualities which go to make a great colonising and seafaring nation. But the true maritime spirit has never yet come to life in the people as a whole. No lands have offered them a fairer prospect than sunny France. They have always had elbowroom and plenty, and, to the detriment of the national life, they take care that there are never too many Frenchmen for the soil of France. They are a thrifty and home-loving nation. They lack the incentive to seek their fortunes over-seas, or, if they do, they look back with yearning and a determination to return to their native land. They have developed at least a theoretical passion for political freedom, and, in these latter years, seem to have acquired a practical capacity for self-government. But the causes noted above continue to operate to prevent the growth of the maritime and colonising spirit.

It will be gathered that what is meant by sea power is by no means confined to the military navy. The division of the maritime strength of a country into fighting and mercantile ships is, indeed, a plant of comparatively recent growth. After fishing, the earHest development of sea power was piracy. No need to boggle at the word. Piracy and empiricism have both the same derivation, though the pirate is regarded as a bloodthirsty ruffian and the empiric, at worst, as a harmless lunatic. They are both people who try experiments, discoverers. In Elizabethan times, pirates were known by the more endearing name of merchant, or even gentlemen, adventurers.

Regard the Phoenicians who first fared forth with their freights to Cyprus and, later, to Tarshish and beyond, seeking copper and tin. They went armed, for they knew not whom or what they might meet. They were not perhaps too nice in their methods of barter with the strangers they met in the lands they sought. It has not infrequently happened since that the simple savage has held views on the subject of the comparative value of copra and beads which have led to a difference of opinion between him and the seafaring man, who has felt himself obliged to chastise him for the benefit of his commercial morals.

But there was no law on the sea, or in the lands beyond, to protect these early voyagers. Their safety and their success depended on the arms they carried and their ability to use them. When the Greeks in turn sought the riches of Spain, the Phoenicians fought the Greeks at sea, though here was no war between Phoenicia and Hellas, but trading relations continued. Merchants and merchantmen went armed for protection, but their object was not war but wealth. It was the same with the "adventurers" of our own land, though they had the added joy of striking a blow for the Protestant cause by snapping their fingers at the King of Spain and the Bull of Alexander VI, Merdiantmen went armed at least down to the Peace of 1815, and many are the instances in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of combats and captures at sea while peace still nominally reigned between the home governments. That there was — perhaps still is — no law on the sea save that of the States which use it is shown by the fact that, until quite recently, every crime committed on the high seas and cognisable by the British Courts was deemed to have been committed "in the County of Middlesex," and was triable at the Old Bailey alone.

That special types of ships fitted for war were early evolved by the maritime nations does not alter the case, nor that certain States which were not strictly speaking maritime built navies for the special purpose of war. It is in the main true that the military navy, so far from constituting the substance of sea power, is rather its accident, and that the need to possess the military "command of the sea" is exactly proportioned to the dependence of a State on sea communications for its wealth and subsistence. To take the instance nearest at hand: If Germany were at war with us alone,! [she could still draw her necessary supplies of food from the sources whence she, in the main, draws them in time of peace: wheat and rye from Russia and Rumania, dairy produce and meat from Holland, Denmark, France, Italy, Switzerland, and so forth. She could draw raw materials for her industries from all the ports of Europe. She would have lost nothing but the power to carry these things in her own ships — a severe economic loss, but not fatal. As it is, she has, by her own act, turned herself into an island. She has failed to gain the advantage of the sea power for which she strove, and she has lost that of her continental position. "Bitter is the need," not only of a strong German navy, but of one strong enough to keep open her sea communications, and this all the millions she has lavished have failed to provide. Her sea power for the time being has vanished, for she has lost the power to use the sea. With the impotence of her battle-fleet, there has disappeared her great mercantile marine.