The supply train; its organization and work

Preface

The first purpose of this book is to furnish National Army Supply Train Officers, now in the process of organizing Divisional Supply Trains, or who will be detailed for such a duty in the future, with complete information for their use in the organization, administration, training, and operation of their companies. It represents a compilation of all available data on the subject, from such widely varied sources as the experiences of motor truck companies organized at the time of the Punitive Expedition into Mexico, and information gathered from the French automobile service. This information the authors have endeavored to compile in as well organized and as well balanced a form as possible, though they have not tried to make it apply wholly to our special mission in France. With its complete detail as to the duties of all members of motor truck companies, as to the operation of motor trucks, and as to truck equipment, truck mechanism and the cause and remedy of truck troubles, it is designed to be of use to every truckmaster and chauffeur. As in the motor transport service each man is so largely a separate unit, he must be a man of intelligence and have a clear understanding of the make-up and operation of his organization.

It is hoped, too, that the book will be useful to officers of other arms. The authors know from experience what a hazy idea the majority of officers of other arms have of the Supply Train, just where it fits in the organization of the division and just what its function is ; they would be at a loss in the field to know whom to consult when the services of motor transportation were needed. Chapters II and III, it is believed, will be especially valuable to fill this need.

Introduction

The following notes on the conditions of Military roads on the Western front will give an idea of the setting for the work of each Supply Train and motor transportation unit, which will be sent with the American forces to France :

When a division moves to a new point, different units of the division may be ordered to move on different routes. Marching troops are slow moving and tend to obstruct motor traffic on the main roads ; side roads are better suited for them. Light motor ambulances can take a longer route using secondary roads. Horse-drawn supply wagons can take rough side roads which have been allowed to get in bad condition. Heavy motor trucks, with low gasoline mileage and costly to repair, must have the best roads and the direct route. In such movements, each unit is given its routing; it may or may not be designed to prevent congestion accordingly as the necessity exists. But the general scheme is there ready for use and it is made possible by the minute network of roads of all classes in the French system.

All cross roads and road junctions are plainly and permanently marked with distances and directions to neighboring points. This has proved an invaluable aid to effective movements of units in charge of officers, the great majority of whom are strangers in the particular locality. It is impossible to conceive of all the divergent movements of the present war being put through without the aid of these road signs, except with endless confusion and delay. On the other hand, they must be of similar aid to the enemy in the occupied territory. It would be an excellent plan in any retreat, or in time of invasion, to have men especially detailed to destroy all road signs before the retirement.

The road leading from Amiens to the front lines of the Peronne-Chaulnes sector, is a good example of extreme concentration of traffic on a main feeder of a busy front. From Proyar{ to the front, — a distance of about nine miles, — the bulk of the traffic must move at night, incidentally without lights, to avoid observation by the enemy. From Amiens to Proyart, it moves principally in the day time. In both instances it is practically continuous, — four solid lines of vehicles move in almost continuous procession. Slow moving horse-drawn vehicles hug the shoulders of the roadway, leaving the center for motor travel. Fleets of motor trucks pound steadily by, in hundreds ; spaced only about fifty feet apart, and traveling at an average rate of at least 12 miles per hour.

All convoys, or fleets of vehicles, move in a formation which provides an open space of 100 to 200 feet or more after a group of several vehicles. Certain vehicles in the convoy carry a large red disk about a foot in diameter to indicate to the driver following that he is to leave space. This is to expedite the passage of fast moving units such as officers' cars, despatch cars, or

10 Introduction

ambulances, which would otherwise be forced to proceed at the speed of the convoy. Even with four lines moving, an open space several feet in width is usually maintained in the center. Independent units move in this, dropping into convoy spaces to permit the passage of other independents going in the opposite direction.

The worst roads are encountered very near the front, in an active sector. The artillery fire of the enemy say, within five kilometers of the front line is very destructive to the roads and in a great measure, prevents effective repair work. This is particularly true in the Somme sector, where the country is flat and practically treeless, and so without protection to the roads or the traffic moving on them. Most of the time, the enemy fire ,is directed on the roads and batteries in the zone from two kilometers to four kilometers back of the line.

Here too, the entire area was swept with creeping barrage fire during the Allied offensive and advance. Roads were destroyed and there has been no opportunity to rebuild them in good shape. It is a fact therefore that even the main road is in very rough condition after one advances beyond the position of the FrencTi first line trenches before the offensive, — that is, in recaptured territory. Ambulances, for instance, are obliged to run largely in low gear from this point to and from the advanced dressing stations. The roads are passable but extremely rough. In this sector, too, upkeep of roads within about two kilometers of the front line is not attempted. Their position is too exposed and the shelling too severe. No vehicles approach the front beyond this limit, except the small "soup kitchens" and light supply wagons, and these only at night.

Tiie prevailing grades are very easy permitting heavy loads for horse-drawn vehicles and faster speeds for motor convoys. Location lines are found to follow contours in almost all cases. This has made for easier maintenance and easier rebuilding after destruction.

Width of traveling surface has been most important to army transport. Some of the grand highways, main feeders to the front, have a width of about thirty-three feet between shoulders. Even this is crowded to capacity most of the time. How great a factor these widths have been to the success of the French army, cannot be estimated nor can we guess the difference in offensive and defensive results, if they had been say, the 18-foot American standard.

The landscape is a veritable network of roads. The number of miles of road per square mile of territory must be at least double, — probably more, — than in the United States. Inasmuch as these are all improved roads this has been of great service to army movements. Between two given points, several routes ■ , may be selected, none of which will greatly exceed the most direct route in distance.

CHAPTER I THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE IN GENERAL

A BROAD VIEW OF THE SUPPLY SERVICE

ADAPTED TO THE WAR ZONE IN FRANCE

The first link in the chain of organization of the Supply Service in France is the base supply depot or station magazine, one of which exists for every army in France. Each one of our armies, then, will have such a depot somewhere in central France, which is fed from three different sources, (1) French ports of importation used by American forces, (2) Factories in southern France, and (3) Mediterranean ports. The supplies imported from America are immediately loaded in cars at the port of importation and sent to a base supply depot. In the French service, each depot is under the charge of the military member of the Station Commission, whose special function it is to supply from the depot the wants of the army in accordance with the demands which he receives. These demands he distributes among the different departments of the depot and states when the cars be loaded. He must not interfere with the internal administration of the station or with the technical direction and execution of the railway service. When supplies come to the depot, if they are wanted immediately they are sent forward at once, without unloading. Where single units need all supplies carried in any one car; if they are not wanted immediately, they are unloaded at the depot. As a general reserve, the Depot Quartermaster should have on hand at least eight days of reserve food.

The base supply depot is in the Zone of the Interior or the Rear. From there supplies go to the Regulating Stations, which are in the Zone of the Armies. The Regulation Station is under charge of a Regulating Commissioner who receives orders direct from the highest military authority only. This is the place of final regulation of supplies going to the front. The regulating commissioner alone knows exactly where the army units are and just where everything is wanted. There is a railroad yard at this station divided into receiving and forwarding sections, a yard sometimes as much as a mile long. The station must be able to supply the largest number of men which can be gotten into the army sector which it feeds. There is an officer in charge at the switch into the big yards, and when the trainloads come, he sees that they are divided up and routed to their proper division ; each track in the yard corresponds to a divisional train. One of these yards was built inside of a month in the Verdun sector, and communication not interfered with in the meanwhile. Near the regulating station there must be stored 2 days of reserve