The nations at war

Chapter I

German Responsibility for the War — Diplomacy and Intrigue — The Austrian Ultimatum — The Declaration of War — France Springing to Arms — England and Belgium — Invasion of Belgium — Comparative Military Strength of Belligerents — British Military Preparations — The Fall of Liege — German " Frightfulness" in Belgium — Louvain — The Rush on Paris — Battle of the Marne i

Chapter II

Battle of the Aisne — The German Blunder at Calais — Reaching Out on the Coast — The Occupation of Antwerp — A Populace in Flight — Germans Reach the Sea — Hard Fighting in Flanders — The French in Alsace-Lorraine — Christmas in the Trenches . . . 31

Chapter III

The War in the East — Russia Strikes First — German Troops Called from France — Battle of Tannenburg — First Appearance of Hindenburg — Austria in the War — The Fighting in Poland — Freachery in Russian Camps — The Long Struggle for Warsaw — Sweeping German Successes — Death of Lord Kitchener — Galicia and Bukovina — Distress of Austria — Russia's Internal Weakness — The Monk R-isputin 67

Chapter IV

The Pan-German Plan — The Kaiser's Diplomatic Pilgrimage — The "Goeben" and "Breslau" — Turkey in the War — The Hesitation of Greece — The Crushing of Serbia — Roumania's Overthrow — The Dardanelles — Armenia and Mesopotamia — Fall of Bagdad and Jerusalem 103

Chapter V

The Navies in the War — Zeal of the Germans — British Control the Seas — The End of the Commerce Destroyers — Battle off Falkland Islands — Battle of the Bight of Heligoland — Weddigen's Exploit — Battle of Coronel — Battle off Dogger Bank — Bombardment of British Coastwise Towns — Battle of Jutland 123

Chapter VI

The War in the Air — Duels in the Skies — Raids on England — The United States Enters Aeronautics — The Brief Boer Revolt — War in Asia and Africa — Fate of the German Colonies — The Rebellion in Ireland — The Career of the "Emden" — Mucke's Amazing Retreat '59

Chapter VII

Again the West — The French Offensive in Champagne — The British Operations about Loos and Lens — The Historic Battle of Verdun — Nature of the Fortress- Boasts of the Germans — "They Shall Not Pass!" — The Road to Verdun — French Victory — Heavy Losses of the Germans — Battle of the Somme — Fighting at Peronne — The British Tanks— Battle of Arras 179

CONTENTS

Chapter VIII

Italy in the War — Why the Triple Alliance was Broken — D'Annunzio's Appeal for War — Early Italian Successes — Sturdy Resistance of Gorizia — The Austrian Counte r Attack — Italy Rallies — Gorizia Falls — Trieste Menaced — Treachery in Italian Ranks — The Great Disaster 215

Chapter IX

The Russian Revolution — Degradation of the Court — Ease with which the Government was Overthrown — Abdication of the Czar — The Army with the People — Lenine and Trotzky — German Intrigues — Failure of the Brest-Litovsk Conference — The Outlook 2J5

Chapter X

The United States and the War — The Long Submarine Controversy — Sinking of the "Lusitania" — The Presidential Campaign — Activity of Pacifists — German Diplomatic Intrigues — Dumba and Count BernstorfF — Germany's Final Ultimatum — Von Bernstorff Dismissed — The United States Declares War 255

CHAPTER XT.

Military and Naval Weakness of the United States — Our Financial Strength — Ships and Aircraft — The Government takes the Railroads — Food Regulation — The Call to Arms — Success of Conscription — Method of the Draft — Rapid Increase of Army and Navy — Our Men Abroad 275

Chapter XII

Moving the Armv to Europe — Our Soldiers in Training — The Ship Shortage — Loss of the "Tuscania"— Americans in Action — Proportions of the Great War — ItsCost in Life 311

Introduction

TO tell the story of the Great War, now approaching the end of its fourth year, in a single volume is a difficult but by no means an impossible task. The salient features of the struggle, the great clashes of armies, the sharp actions which won this or that point of high vantage for one or the other belligerent can readily be described in swift phrases without sacrifice of the picturesque. Verdun was fought over for more than two years, yet after the first four days of fighting the story of Verdun is but one of persistent attack and dogged resistance along lines that changed hardly a score of yards in as many weeks. The true story of Verdun is the story of the almost spiritual consecration which held the French to its defense so long. But that is a story which takes little time for the telling.

I have seen two volumes given to an account of the Battle of Gettysburg which lasted three days. I have seen, too, eighteen volumes given over to the history of this great war up to the beginning of the year 191 7. But the former was a treatise intended for the professional tactician; the latter a very excellent history in which the multitude of military details, interesting chiefly to the specialist, are set forth with so much particularity that the reader can not see the battles for the multitude of subsidiary things by which the picture is obscured.

To Americans, particularly, is a clear, straightforward and brief description of this war a most desirable work. We are in it up to the hilt; in it with a determination to conquer. But nevertheless we are in it somewhat to our own amaze, and the most determined among us may be pardoned if now and again he stops to ask just why a nation loving peace and strongly set against European entanglements should be thus embroiled.

This book tells with painstaking and dispassionate accuracy of the causes of the war, and of the developments that made it inevitable that the United States should take up its part of the bloody burder of which magnificent France, and devoted Britain so long bore the major share. And the author feels that he has fallen short of his fullest purpose if he has not shown that something deeper and more fundamental than the submarine outrages furnished the real reason for the entry of the United States upon a war that shall crush autocracy and militarism and make the world safe for its people.

The political strategy of this war has been no less important, no less interesting than its military operations, and in this book the fullest attention has been paid to this feature. Why Italy was justified in repudiating its ancient alliance with the Teutonic empires; what justification the Allies had for landing troops on Greek soil after denouncing Germany for violating Belgian neutrality; what Bolshevism promised and what it did; why Bagdad was worth fighting for are all matters somewhat in controversy but here made clear.

This war cannot be properly visualized in all its various phases, scenes and characteristics without the lavish use of pictures. The illustrations in this book exceed in number any collection made for an historical work. They are in the main from photographs taken at the front and accurately representative of the scenes and places more

INTRODUCTION

haltingly described in the text. Scores of photographers have risked their lives that the world may know what war is like, and the reader of "The Nations at War" gets the carefully skimmed cream of their work.

This edition — the fourth to be issued — of "The Nations at War" brings the narrative down to March, 1918. From it is omitted no vital, no significant episode of the titanic struggle which is beggaring the world today. The reader is conducted by paths of pleasant narrative through the long and cruel way from the opening of the Austrian howitzers upon Liege, to the betrayal of Russia by the Bolsheviki. When he has ended he knows that story of the war in all its horror, and in all the glorious stimulation it furnishes to manhood.

With knowledge thus gained no American can doubt that the course adopted by his country alter much questioning and self-communion was the only one in accord with its standing among nations, and with its national honor. We have had but few wars and, please God, shall have fewer in future. Our only war not fought specifically for national defense was in a cause purely altruistic, and as thoroughly humanitarian as any issue on which a civilized people has ever taken up arms. Its righteousness is shown by free and prosperous Cuba, and the orderly and advancing Philippines.

The war in which we are now engaged is a war for the extinction of war. We are in it technically to protect our people who go down into the sea in ships from the murderous aggressions of the Germans. But the whole purpose is broader and more far-reaching. We send our sons to the trenches, mobilize our daughters in auxiliary forces, give heartily of our savings and endure privations in order that war lords may be shown for all time that possession of the tools of a robber and murderer gives no license to use them, and that peace-loving, industrious and God-fearing states shall no longer be condemned to constant dread of the murderous assaults of autocracies which have devoted their highest endeavors to the heaping up of cannon and explosives, and the transformation of their citizens into skilled and ruthless soldiery. Our soldiers will die in war that the world may live in peace.

WILLIS J. ABBOT

New York, March i, 1918.

NATIONS AT WAR

Chapter I German Responsibility For The War — Diplomacy And Intrigue

THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM — THE DECLARATION OF WAR — FRANCE SPRING- ING TO ARMS — ENGLAND AND BELGIUM INVASION OF BELGIUM — COM- PARATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF BELLIGERENTS BRITISH MILITARY

PREPARATIONS — THE FALL OF LIEGE — GERMAN " FRIGHTFULNESS " IN BELGIUM LOUVAIN — THE RUSH ON PARIS — BATTLE OF THE MARNE

^T^HE Great War fell like a scourge on humanity and millions of men who had no thought of war or bloodshed in their minds laid down their lives because a group of men, dominant in the German Empire, so willed it. No other verdict is possible in the light of history. And it is important that the verdict be fixed in the consciousness of nations for when the war shall end the damages must be assessed, so far as that may be humanly possible, and they must be laid against the government responsible — namely Imperial Germany.

It is needless to go into detail here concerning the prolonged struggle in the southeast of Europe between the Slavs and the Teutons, out of which grew the jealousies ending in war. It would be idle in a volume of such brief compass as this to attempt to recount all the clashes of rival nationalities in the Balkans. The Pan-German ambitions of the Teutons, the glittering conception of a Mittel Europa under Hohenzollern control must for the moment be passed over. The quarrel over France in Morocco, the crisis of Agadir must be ignored. Enough to say here that all the materials for a blaze that should engulf all Europe were in southeastern Europe, and when the assassination, by a fanatic, of the Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his morganatic wife at Sarajevo, in Bosnia, June 28, 1914, touched the match to the pile Germany heaped on more combustibles instead of joining other nations of western Europe in endeavors to extinguish the conflagration.

The youth who slew the royal pair escaped with a brief term of imprisonment, but more than five million men of all countries of the world paid the death penalty for his crime.

The German autocracy, the military caste, had long sought war. The Crown Prince of Germany had repeatedly said that if no war came under his father's rule he himself would start one on coming to the throne. Ambassador Gerard quotes him as having

Archduke I' rancis Ferdinand (heir to the Austrian throne) with his morganatic wife. Both were assassinated at Sarajevo, Bosnia, said that the plan would be to attack and conquer Fiance, then England and after that the United States. Whatever Prussianized Germany is to-day, it has been made by war. Frederick the Great, founder of Prussia's greatness, by his own admission went to war " in order to get myself talked about. " Napoleon forcefully said, "Prussia was hatched from cannon-balls."

To-day Prussia dominates all Germany, and in 1914 as since, the military caste dominated Prussia. But prior to the war there were incidents which made that caste fear for its continuance in power. Its growing arrogance was a source of constant irritation to the people. A beardless and penniless subaltern in a uniform untarnished by service held himself immeasurably the superior of a captain of industry whose life work had been worth uncounted millions to the Empire — and all the power of the army was exerted to maintain his pretensions. The political agitation which followed the affair at Zabern, in which a young officer cut down a crippled shoemaker who laughed at him, showed that the country was ripe for revolt against military arrogance. The army recognized that to hold its privileges a war would be essential.

And it thought to have a short war. When the Kaiser, speaking from the portal of his

♦palace on the day of mobilization, assured the soldiers below: " Before the leaves have fallen from the trees you will be back in your homes," he undoubtedly expressed what was his sincere belief. Ambassador Gerard has since hazarded the conjecture that perhaps he was thinking of evergreen trees. At that moment Great Britain had not signified her purpose of entering upon the war, and all Germany believed that their armies would romp to Pans, strike France to her knees, seize her colonies, and then demolish Russia at their leisure.

There were plausible reasons which the militarists could urge for forcing a war at this moment. Germany was never stronger relatively to the other powers. Her fleet, it is true, was still vastly inferior to that of Great Britain, but it was superior to that ot France and there was every reason to believe that the British would keep out of the war. The German Ambassador to London had so reported. Prince Henry, the Kaiser's brother, had telegraphed that he had assurance, to that effect from King George. The Irish disaffection was at its height, and Sir Edward Carson's spectacular organization of an army in Ulster to set at defiance the laws of Parliament gave to foreign observers an exaggerated idea of its importance.

The Kiel Canal had just been opened doubling almost the efficiency of the German fleet. The Zeppelins had been brought to such perfection that German military authorities thought they would be a decisive factor in the war — an expectation destined to be sadly disappointed. The war chest was full to overflowing; 317,000,000 marks in gold in the German Imperial Bank, where two years before there had been but 174,000,000. Among the High Command it was known that the army chemists had perfected a new and deadly weapon — an asphyxiating gas that clung close to the face of the earth, and rolled along before a favoring breeze. Nothing living could withstand a breath of it. The German army was at its greatest proportions, while the French law calling for three years' military service, and the Belgian law for universal service had not yet gone into effect.

It was easy for the militarists to convince the handful of men — the people had nothing whatever to say — with whom rested the authority to declare war or peace, that if Germany was ever to strike that was the moment.

After the assassination of the royal couple in June it seemed for some time that the incident as a casus belli would pass over as so many had before it. It was discussed in the dark and devious ways of secret diplomacv, but the world had forgotten it and was going its peaceful ways when on the 23 rd of July the government of Austria dispatched to Servia an ultimatum so arrogant in its demands, so brutal in its terms that the world suddenly awoke to the fact that this meant war. It practically demanded that Servia surrender its sovereignty, put Austrian officials in charge of its courts, and permit its people to be tried by Austrian tribunals. Forty-eight hours was allowed for a response — a period which as George Bernard Shaw remarked "would have been indecent in presenting a board bill. " When the threatened nation conceded almost everything — more than any other country expected it to concede — Austria backed by Germany remorselessly adhered to the letter of its ultimatum and began the bombardment of Belgrade on the day fixed.

Europe was of course divided into hostile camps and alliances. Germany, Austria and Italy constituted the Triple Alliance or Dreibund. But Italy was bound only to aid the others in case of an attack upon their territory- Accordingly she held aloof from her allies for nearly a year, and finally entered the war as an ally of their enemies — the Triple Entente, of England, France and Russia, with whom the agonies of invasion united Belgium. Pending the outbreak of war we find each group of nations working in concert diplomatically. England, France

The arrest of the assassin of the Archduke. Although Austria declared that the plot originated in Belgrade, it has never been definitely proved, and it is known that the assassin is an Austrian subject

This photograph was taken amidst bursting shells, and shows the Belgian soldiers in the trenches and Russia strove to avert war; Germany and Austria to provoke it.

After the Austrian ultimatum had been delivered the wires buzzed with the endeavors of the peace seeking nations to check the rush to war. England took the lead. Looking back on those crowded days of diplomatic effort one is convinced that Great Britain sincerely desired that peace be kept, but also that her foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, omitted the one thing necessary to secure it. Until the last moment he left the German ambassador to London in doubt whether jn any contingency whatsoever Great Britain would fight. The general temper of the British people was so clearly against war, and there seemed to be so many conditions making their entrance upon war at that moment more than ordinarilv precarious, that Ambassador Lichnowsky reported from London that Great Britain could safely be counted upon as neutral. Believing this Germany pursued its provocative course. The Kaiser and his advisers were never so astonished and dismaved as when notice came of the British declaration of war, and the populace of Germany straightway began the development and practice of that policy of hate which may have kept them a unit in the war, but certainly made them ridiculous in the eyes of other peoples.

But prior to taking the final step Sir Edward Grev exhausted every device to secure peace, or at least to delav the declaration of war. His notes flew along the wires to every chancellery of Europe. He urged that Vienna and Petrograd discuss the situation directly; that the case between Russia and Austria be left to the other four Great Powers — Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy. But Austria turned a deaf ear to all suggestions, while Germany insisted that the quarrel between Austria and Servia should be fought out by those parties alone, and that England should restrain her ally Russia. While urging this, Germany stolidly refused to restrain or even openly to advise her ally Austria. In all the records of diplomatic correspondence issued by Germany and Austria in a belated effort to escape the odium of having caused the world war there is not one letter or dispatch from the former to the latter urging delay, moderation or concilia tory tactics. It is evident that the policy of the Kaiser was to preach ostentatiously to the world his desire for peace, while giving private assurances to Austria of support in all that she might do to make peace impossible.

The die was cast August ist, 1914, when Germany formally declared war upon Russia upon the ground that the mobilization of that country was a menace to Germany- It is alleged, and with convincing proof, that in fact the German government tricked Russia into this mobilization. A Berlin newspaper, controlled absolutely by the government, appeared on the streets with the news that the War Department had ordered the mobilization of the army- The paper was allowed to circulate until the news was widely disseminated, and could not have failed to reach the Russian ambassador. Then it was suddenly called in, all copies sequestrated and an extra issued denying the mobilization. Meantime the "news" had been wired to Russia, and mobilization ordered there for fear that the German armies were already in motion. It seems a pettifogging trick to accomplish an execrable purpose. But since Bismarck — a man incomparably greater than any in power in Germany to-day — did not scruple to forge the telegram of Ems to bring on the Franco- Prussian War at the moment he wished, it is not inconceivable that the Kaiser and his entourage may have hurried the war for which •they were eager, by the device, familiar to American cities, of a "faked extra."

Germany's declaration of war upon Russia determined automatically France's entrance upon the struggle. No nation desired war less; none was at that moment enjoving more the blessings of peace and contentment. Her prosperity and widespread happiness were such that; the world was a little inclined to rate her as decadent — a theory which she disproved before the guns had roared for thirty days. But, however, averse to war, France was compelled to enter it both by her treaty obligations to Russia and by considerations of self-protection. Germany was the wolf hungry for her blood, and her territory- All the prodigious military preparation of the German Empire had been made avowedly with the purpose of crushing France, extorting more indemnity and seizing more territory. The theft of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870 had made Germany the greatest iron and steel producer in Europe. If she could now get the line of northern provinces with the cities of Lens, Lille and neighboring mineral fields she would be the only continental producer of iron and steel in large quantities. France knew that she faced spoliation again, faced mutilation, perhaps faced final assassination and her people rose with a grandeur of determination which baffles description while it compels admiration. There was perhaps no more stimulating sight to the thoughtful mind than the spectacle of

1* l nderwood i.v l ulhtwuuu ["he Imperial Guard passing in review before Emperor William. At the left of the Kaiser is General l.owenfeldt and at the

extreme right Genera! von Buelow

King Albert of Belgium, the fighting king of Europe

Belgian Ca

Her little the Paris regiments going to the front. It was no martial pageant. Never headed by a military band, the men often marched along without either drum or bugle.

They never sang — as did the Germans under orders. But every now and then some one would set up a deep determined intonation of a patriotic watchword. " Jusqu'au boutV "Unto the end !" was one — "France d ' abord!" — "France first" and " Coute que coute!" — "Cost what it may ! " were others. They went out against heavy odds, but they acquitted themselves like a nation born to a new immortality.

England's position at the outset of war was one to disprove the charge that she helped to provoke it. She was utterly unprepared for war except by sea. army of perhaps 1 50,000 men was scattered beyond the seas. Her people not only did not want war, but did not even dream that it was impending. Her political offices, army, navy and diplomatic services were full of German sympathizers and even of German spies. Except perhaps in France the execrable system of German espionage had nowhere reached such development as in England. Every branch of society was honeycombed by it, and the whole attitude of the British people when suddenly confronted by the prospect of war with Germany was inevitably tinctured by the views artfully instilled for years by German secret agents.

No actual treaty forced England into war. She was perhaps morally bound to France but not by ties so compelling that a government facing a people intent on peace could make them the sole basis of appeal. And the English people, many of the politicians and most of their press were for peace. Sir Edward Grey and other cabinet officers saw that the German menace was as much against England as against France. The fevered navy building, the ill-concealed malevolence of "Der Tag," the

International News Service valry passing through Furness on then- way to the f.o..t

revelations of the spy system all showed England as the future object of German aggression. The nation must fight, but an excuse must be given to the people for asking them to fight. While the cabinet was still in indecision this excuse was furnished by Germany.

The determination of that government to attack France through the neutral territories of Belgium and the Duchy of Luxembourg put that nation in the wrong at the very outset of the war, alienated public sentiment

The results of one well-directed shot from a German 42-centimeter gun. It completely wrecked this Belgian fort all over the world and furnished the British government with the grounds for demanding that the people uphold them in making common cause with France and Russia. For this was a wanton violation of a treaty to which Great Britain itself was a party.

By a treaty made in 1839, and reaffirmed in 1 870, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia — the German Empire not having been in existence at that time — agreed to mutually defend the neutrality of Belgium. Inthe emergency of 191 4 France promptly declared her purpose of respecting that neutrality.

Germany, though a party to the treaty, admitted, at Sir Edward Grey's demand, her intention of violating it.

It was a dishonest and dishonorable decision and cost the Germans dear. It was dictated absolutely by the determination to win victory with all possible speed, and it ended in making victory impossible. It was conceived in a cowardly intent to outrage a friendly but weak nation, rather than to assault

boldly the line of forts which France had erected for self-defense, and the outcome was that Germany made for herself two powerful enemies in Belgium and Great Britain, neither of whom, possibly, would have entered the war had Germany not thrown honor to the winds. Undoubtedly, too, the ultimate entrance of the United States as a foe to the Kaiser was based in some degree upon resentment of the treatment of Belgium.

Immediately after the Franco-Prussian

1 he armed liust of the Kaiser poured into Belgium during the harvest and destroyed everything in its

path

war of 1870 the French recognized that their powerful and aggressive neighbor did not intend to permit France to rest in peace. The German maw had gulped Alsace-Lorraine and the five milliards of tribute and was hungry for more. Indeed, in 1875, Bismarck had tried to provoke another war but was warned oft" by England. Then France, still bleeding from cruel wounds, saw clearly enough that she must prepare to defend her soil once more. Accordingly she built the line of ponderous fortresses that frowned upon the frontier, between the Swiss border and that of Luxembourg — the only part of France directly bordering upon Germany. The Belgian frontier was left undefended. It was a nation from which nothing was to be feared, and the neutrality repudiating their own treaty and violating Belgian neutrality. It is quite true that the one of these fortresses they did attack — Verdun — resisted them successfully through persistent assaults lasting over two years. But this attack was begun after a year of war had produced new defensive tactics. The comparative worthlessness of ponderous fortifications had been demonstrated. The position at Verdun was defended; the fortress itself was abandoned, its stone casemates and galleries used for storage and cookshops and its

Kins; t jtrorge inspecting portion oi the British expeditionary forces of which was guaranteed by the strongest nations of Europe including Prussia. Only one fortress, that of Mauberge, was situated on that border, and it was largely dismantled. France, too trustingly, relied upon Teutonic honor.

Fronting the German frontier were the fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Epinal and Belfort. In the light of recent history it seems probable that had the Germans played the part of men and attacked these fortresses at the very outset of the war they would have demolished them with their heavy artillery and opened their road to Paris without bringing upon themselves the odium of great guns taken away and mounted in the earthworks that spread far and wide over the adjacent hills. This defense was the fruit of experience gained in more than a year of actual war. In its first days the French would probably have shut themselves up in their fortresses, as did the Belgians at Liege and Namur, and been destroyed by the unprecedented and undreamed-of German 42-cm. howitzers.

However, the Germans made no movement toward attacking France on its defended side. It was made plain enough later that for years they had contemplated attack through Belgium. The plan of their strategic

IO

Recruits from the Bavarian mountains arriving at Munich to enter the army railroads demonstrated that. And with knowledge of this intent full in mind the queries of Sir Edward Grey to the German ambassador at London, and of Sir Edward Goschen to the Chancellor at Berlin as to Germany's purpose of respecting or violating Belgian neutrality became embarrassing. It was with unfeigned amazement that the German chancellor finally discovered that upon this issue Great Britain would fight. "You surely would not fight for a mere scrap of paper," said the German ambassador to Sir Edward Grey, referring to the treaty of 1 870 which bore the royal seal of the Kingdom