Freedom of mind

Front matter

FREEDOM

OF

MIND IN WILLING;

Book I. Freedom Of Mind In Willing

PAoa CHAPTER I.— Of the Existence of Spibit, ....... I

Postulates of the argument— Knowledge, thought, sensation, emotion, want and effort recognized as in one combination ; one mind — Each of such combinations, associated with a particular form, constitutes what each denominates I — Idea of form not essential to oar idea of spirit, or intelligent being — Certain sensations, which we can and do ourselves produce ; some of the same kind, which we know that we do not produce, and, attributing to others, get the idea of other finite minds ; and others, which we cannot produce ; and thus get the idea of Superior Power — This power really infinite, or to us the same as if it were so— "We thus come to know ourselves, our fellow beings, and God, as Cause.

CHAPTER II.— Of the Existence of Matter, 5

We know of it only by our sensations — Sensations not conclusive proof of its existence — Sensations may be the thought and imagery of the mind of God directly imparted to us — In either case they represent His thought, and are equally real — That they are thought and imagery directly imparted to us, the more simple hypothesis, and more in accordance with our own conscious powers — Matter not necessary for Spirit to act upon — This illustrated by geometrical science— To ignore matter would simplify the question of freedom of the mind and make creation more intelligible — Not sufficient proof to warrant this course ; but, in either case, the phenomena are the same, and matter is unintelligent and inert.

CHAPTER III.— Of Mind, . 9

Its attributes and its faculty of will— Its sensations and emotions not dependent on its will — Its knowledge also not so dependent — But act of will may be essential to the acquisition of knowledge — Feeling a property, or susceptibility, rather than a faculty— Ability to acquire knowledge a capacity, or sense, rather than a faculty — Object of act of will always is to produce some effect in

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the future — Supposed faculties of mind, other than will, all but naxces of some form of knowledge, or of some mode of effort to acquire it — All knowledge, in the last analysis, a simple mental perception — Objection, that these supposed faculties sometimes seem to act of themselves, considered — Definition of knowledge and of metaphysical certainty.

CHAPTER IV.— Liberty, or Fbeedom, 19

Opposing terms, compulsion, control, constraint, and restraint— That which controls its own action, acts freely.

CHAPTER V.— Of Cause, 21

Cause used as that which produces change — Four distinct conceivable kinds enumerated — Two of them material, and two intelligent.

CHAPTER VI— Of the Will, 24

Confusion in treating will as a distinct, active entity — "Will defined as the power or faculty of the mind for effort — Mind cannot be inert cause— Mind has two distinct spheres for its activity ; in one, it seeks to learn what is, and in the other to influence the course of events in the future — These connected by the mind's prophetic power.

CHAPTER VII.— Of Want, 27

The term want used to express the conscious condition of the mind, and not the thing wanted — A mere sensation, or emotion, or its absence, is not in itself a want — The idea of change an essential element of want — Primary and secondary wants — Natural, acquired, and cultivated wants — Natural wants not the result of volition — Acquired want results from some increase of knowledge — Influence of want on will not varied by the cause of it.

CHAPTER VIIL— Of Matter as Cause, 32

All changes in matter must arise from motion in it— Cannot move itself, and hence cannot be cause, except by first being in motion — Can it thus become cause ? If so, as it may have been in motion from eternity, may always have been cause — Other questions upon which this depends— If motion gives it causative power, that power is diminished in producing effects ; and hence, in an eternity, must be reduced to an infinitesimal — Matter in motion subjected to intelligent control — Matter cannot be made cause by impressing laws upon it — Matter an instrument, a means, by which one intelligence communicates with, or produces effects upon another — If matter be cause, its effects cannot affect the freedom of the mind in willing, any more than the effects of intelligent causes can — Action of mind on matter — Independent action of matter.

CHAPTER IX.— Of Spirit as Cause, 42

Spirit is an indispensable, if not the only cause — Relations of the finite to the Supreme Intelligence, as cause — Creative powers of the finite mind of man similar to those of the Infinite — Man has no faculty by which he can create, or even conceive of the creation of matter as a distinct entity, and there is no necessity, or reason to suppose that God has— Tho human mind, within the

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sphere of its knowledge, with a coordinate finite presence, is creative — Its incipient creations are conceptions of its own mind — Its creative power exerted in the same manner as that of the Infinite — Creative power of man may be secondary in its character — That is, moulds its conceptions in the same material which God has previously used for a like purpose — Our own ideal conceptions distinguishable from the external creation only by their subjection to our will— God's conceptions, or creations, also subject to change or annihilation by His will— Man's limited power to transfer the conceptions of his own to other minds— Finite mind can create not only new forms and new combinations, but new thought and-new beauty.

CHAPTER X. — Fkeedom of Intelligence, 51

The question should be, not, Is the will free ? but, Does the mind will freely ? — The willing distinct from its sequence or effect — Connection between volition and its effect — Intelligence must have an object for acting, rather than not acting — This object must be an effect which it wants to produce ; must arise from a want — With this want must be associated knowledge of the means of its gratification — Action different under different circumstances, and the first step must be to examine, or to ascertain the circumstances, and this fact is probably intuitively known — Want and knowledge the source in which volitions originate and receive their direction — Sources of volition resolvable into an active being with knowledge and want- Want and knowledge may be without volition — A want may itself be the object wanted — We do not make, but find knowledge ; and for intuitive knowledge do not have to seek — Deliberation necessary in applying acquired knowledge — Without the knowledge of a choice in means, the first perceived would be adopted — Experience teaches deliberation — Deliberation still but the application of knowledge to action — Deliberation is the considered application of knowledge, leading to a judgment — Time devoted to it decided by the mind — Mind can arrest its impulse to gratify its want by the first perceived means, to consider its proposed action — This power makes one distinction between instinctive and rational actions — We do not make any effort for what already is— Every effort is a beginning to do, and is an exercise of creative powei'— Finite mind has creative powers, and capacity to use them — Circumstances, examination of which is essential to proper effort — We never will to do what we know we tfannot do — Mind does not always adopt the easiest mode of attaining the ultimate object of its effort — Illustration from the want of food — Efforts must be in a certain order, otherwise abor tive — Effects of a series of finite efforts as clearly manifest design as the plan etary system — Deliberation illustrated — We do not will as to what is past, but to produce some effect in the future — Mind forms preconceptions of this future effect of effort — To will requires a prophetic view of the future, making a broad distinction between intelligent and unintelligent cause — The mind's prophetic power fits it for ajirst cause — The mind must determine what change it will try to produce — For this, if want and knowledge were not fixed and independent of will, the data would be insufficient — If want and knowledge not fixed, the mind must form hypothesis to act upon — No power, ignorant of the want and th/e perceptions of the agent, could determine the will of that agent — That want and knowledge are not subject to the will, facilitates the mind in the exercise of its freedom in willing — Whether the mind's preconceptions are realized by its own power, not material to the question of its freedom in will- A*

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ing — Finite mind exerts its creative power in same manner as the Infinite — Each, respectively, subject to its own conditions — Conflicting wants and wants of activity and repose (note)— Supposed commencement of creation — A creative God must make effort — Intelligence a cause, which produces various effects — Another step in creation supposed — Every creative act a beginning of a new creation — (Supreme Intelligence acting with coexisting blind causes — Acting also with coexisting intelligent causes — In either case, must will freely— Amount of its power makes no difference to the freedom of intelligent being in willing — Nor does the amount of its knowledge — Hence, the finite intelligence may be as free as the Infinite— One intelligence may shape circumstances to influence the will of another, which may be effective if that other acts freely — The period of creation at which the finite mind begins to act does not affect its freedom — Every act of will the same, in some respects, as a first act— Is the finite mind, in willing, controlled by any other power ? — Conceivable modes of external control — These modes considered — Influence of other intelligences — Influence of circumstances — If mind wills at all, it must will freely — Same result more concisely reached through the logical relation of terms.

CHAPTER XL— Instinct and Habit, 9»

The sphere of liberty varies in different orders of intelligence — Each equally free in its own sphere of knowledge — Matter has no such sphere, aud hence, if it had the essential attributes, could manifest no freedom — Being, with sensation, but no want, could not will — Knowledge, to be available for willing, must extend to the future — The lowest order of intelligence, admitting of will, is that with one want and one known means of gratifying it, and this intuitive — Instinctive action still voluntary and free — And free, not merely as not counteracted — In the instinctive, the spheres of knowledge and freedom reach their minimum, but are still coexistent — But for the element of knowledge, instinctive action would be mechanical — Conceivable that first instinctive actions may be mechanical — Knowledge that we can will, and how to will, and that by will we can produce change in ourselves, could not be taught by practical examples, but must be intuitive — Hence, not mechanical — All the requisites of will incorporated in our being — Instinct may bwng the infant within easy effort of its object— Absence of deliberation in intuitive action — Muscular action the basis of our plans for external change — Bodily movement always instinctive — This is the point from which instinctive and rational actions take their departure—In the instinctive, not only the mode of making the action, but the plan, the successive order of volitions, is intuitively known — Inferior free agents may still subserve the purposes of a superior — Conflicting modes and wants are cases for the exercise of judgment— Imitative actions diverging from instinctive — Distinguishing features of instinctive action — Some cases of rational action liable to bo confounded with instinctive — When we are conscious of forming a plan of action this does not occur — "When we work from memory of a plan, intuitive or acquired, it is hakit — Peculiar characteristics of habit— Similarity of instinctive and habitual action — Analogy of habitual to mechauical action — Rational actions, in becoming habitual, approach the instinctive — Customary actions belong to the same group— Recapitulation of actions, mechanical, instinctive, rational, customary, and habitual— Habit has same relation to

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action that memory has to knowledge, and depends on memory and association — That habit applies to actions which we have most frequent occasion to perform, increases its benefits, yet often regarded as a vice of the mind — Reasons why it is so regarded.

CHAPTER XII.— Illustration from Chess, 126

Known laws of the game somewhat analogous to intuitive knowledge — First moves may he habitual— Subsequently the player deliberately forms preconceptions and compares them — Does not examine every possible move, but determines how long to examine by an exercise of judgment — Each volition to move the same as if he had never before moved — A more complicated game supposed, more nearly resembling that of real life — The skilful succeed against many opponents ; and Infinite Wisdom would accomplish Its end though opposed by any number of finite intelligences, all acting as freely as itself— The uninitiated see no order or design in the game— It is a creation having its own laws — Automaton chess-player — But for the uniformity of God's actions, the efforts of finite agents would be impossible — Case in which, by the laws of the game, only one move is possible, and analogous cases in real life— Compliance with the laws of the game, as with the laws of God, may become habitual, but this does not conflict with freedom — Influence of law on individual action — The word law, in such cases, used iu two distinct senses, but the knowledge of the law, in either sense, important in deciding our efforts.

CHAPTER XIII. — Of "Want and Effort in Various Orders of Intelligence, 136

Want requisite to all but the lowest forms of animated existence— Imputation of want to the Supreme Being — A sole first cause, without want, would immediately become inert — Intelligence must have a retaining power and some adaptation to put its retained power in action — If matter is cause, no application of a self-moving power to it is possible — If the activity of any intelligence ceases, it cannot put itself in action again — No intelligent being can do anything unless it makes effort to do something — Want rouses the mind to effort, but does not direct the effort — Effort the condition of cause in the Infinite as in the finite being — Some cause with power to produce change, which it does not of necessity immediately exert, is necessary— Mind and matter in motion the only such causes conceivable — The existence of God cannot, of itself, be the cause of anything which ever began to be — Effort makes the distinction between that condition of a being in which it seeks to produce change and that in which it does not — If in the Supreme Being there is no such distinction, all effects must be independent of His action — Reasons why it is thought Omnipotence may produce effects without effort — Omnipotence has its bound in the absolutely.impossible — Want has with it the germ of its own gratification — Man may design change, and make effort to actualize his design, though no other intelligence or power in existence — The mode of connection between volitions and their sequences not important to the act of will.

CHAPTER XIV.— Of Effort for Internal Change, 145

Question stated — Do we produce the sequences of volition? — The important fact is, that our volitions are necessary to them — Effects of effort for internal

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change as uniform and as inscrutible as for external— "We can induce spiritual as well as physical want, but cannot directly will either into existence — Increasing our knowledge the only means for this, and, though it may sometimes have the opposite effect, is still the only mode — Constitutional occurrence and recurrence of our spiritual wants — Want the source of effort for internal changes in all intelligent beings — General moral evil and individual depravity — Man's knowledge infallible as to what, for him, is morally right— Directs his efforts for internal change by means of his preconceptions — In forming these, need not recognize existing circumstances — An advantage of the purely ideal conceptions — In the moral nature the willing is the consummation, and hence, hi it, mind is a supreme creative first cause — Distinction between effort in the moral sphere and out of it — A man who does not want to be pure and noble may begin with the want to want to be pure and noble — Virtue all lies in the effort, and not in its sequence — Not any present moral wrong in want, or knowledge, and hence all moral right and wrong concentrated in the act of will — Efforts to bo pure and noble may become habitual — We may indirectly discard a want — A being with no want for what is unholy cannot be unholy — Cannot will what is contradictory to its own nature — Though many of our moral wants are innate, they may be cultivated, enabling us to influence our moral characteristics at their source — Conclusion from the foregoing, that man in the sphere of his moral nature is a supreme and a sole creative first cause — Man's will infinite, but limited in its range, because his power of conception is finite — This power may forever increase — Man responsible and accountable for his acts of will.

CHAPTER XV— Conclusion, * . .161

Recapitulation of the previous results and leading positions — Wants seemingly insignificant may be the basis of contests for the mastery of empires — Man bountifully provided with wants— Physical wants temporary — Made less inconstant by the secondary want of acquisition— They are preliminary to the soul's progress, teaching effort ; though this provision is often counteracted by acquisitiveness with a material bias— Spiritual want essential— Early ideal constructions and influence of the romantic passion—" Castle building" — The interest which attaches to the products of our labor — Influence of wants not left to accidental occurrences — Recurrence of both spiritual and bodily wants amply provided for — Each has within himself an inchoate and, to him, a boundless universe, which is his especial sphere of creative action — Constructing this universe within himself the principal, if not tho sole end of life.

Book II. Review Of Edwards On The Will

Introduction, . » 173

CHAPTER I.— Edwards's Definition of Will, 177

Edwards's definition of will— He identifies volition with choice and preference, and willing with choosing and preferring— His definition admits of vari-

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ous constructions— Confounds the process of choosing with the result of the process — Also asserts that an act of choice is a comparative act of the mind — Proof that tho comparative act is not itself the act of choice, and that the choice, "which in some cases is the result of a compai'ative act, is not an act of ■will, but is knowledge— The choice to will preceding the act of will considered — Edwards's definitions of choice as an act of will, and also as the result of a comparative act, involve an absurdity — In making choice an act of will, he makes it the last act of the mind in relation to the effect intended — Cases mentioned by Edwards in which the soul would rather have or do distinguishable, and the question whether choice is ever an act of will, examined— Edwards's use of the word choice confounds the understanding with the will — Further proof that choice is knowledge, and not act of will— Sophism admitted by making choice a synonym for will — Difficulties encountered by Edwards, growing out of his definition — Difference in a man's preferring to walk and preferring to fly — Edwards constrained to admit exertion, but having no space between choice and effect, must crowd it into one or the other— My views applied to explain the difference of the cases of preferring to walk and preferring to fly — Edwards's intention to use the word choice in its popular sense — Recapitulation.

CHAPTER II.— Liberty as Defined by Edwards, 201

Edwards asserts that the only liberty in man is power " to do as he pleases," or " conducting as he wills" — This places liberty in that in the doing of which we are not conscious of having any agency — In this case the mind has no liberty in willing, and the definition begs the question — The hypothesis that the willing is itself a doing considered.

CHAPTER III.— Natural and Moral Necessity, 204

Edwards's definitions of these terms — Much confusion from vague use of some of the terms— Every intelligent being with will a distinct cause — Hence our will cannot change the course of nature, except by being an independent cause — God's action or the counter-willing of finite minds may, either of them, control or influence the effect intended by another, without interfering with the freedom of that other in willing — The argument is rather against the freedom of man in doing than in willing— Edwards's definition admits three distinct intelligent causes, each acting freely — The term " necessity' 1 '' used in different -senses in defining natural and moral necessity — Edwards makes " motive" a cause, producing volition, or makes human volitions the direct action of God — The argument from these definitions stated — The hypothesis, that the same causes of necessity produce the same effects, essential to it — It assumes that human volitions are a part of a necessary chain of events — Yet asserts that the mind encounters difficulties in bringing them to pass — The assumption that the human will is finite shown to be an error, and especially if it is " choice' 1 ''— Supposed difficulty in willing examined, and found not to be in the -willing, but in finding or knowing what to will — The martyr and the craven equally free in willing — Difference in action indicates difference in character — Modes in which we form our own characters and aid each other in doing it — The difficulty spoken of by Edwards consists in the conflict between present pleasure, and right or future good— That a man may will against such convic-

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tians may prove that he is not pure and wise, but not that he is not free — The particular cases of moral inability Btated by Edwards — Examination of those cases — All analogous to those of inability to will, because there is no want — Inability to will what we do not want to will is not against freedom — No reason to suppose that a, previous bias or inclination will prevail over the present in the act of will— If it does, it is because the biased or inclined mind itself controls the act of will — As in the case of "nature of things,"- Edwards makes "habit" a power, or cause — No certainty and no necessity that habits will continue — Habits of a man influence his act of will only in case he wills freely — Man is said to be a slave to his habits ; reasons why — The argument from moral necessity only proves that a man wills in conformity to what he wills, and natural necessity only implies that he cannot always execute what he wills.

CHAPTER IV.— Self-Determination, 233

The argument against the self-determining power of the will irrelevant to my position — Edwards's statement of his argument against the soul's determining its volitions in the exercise of its power of willing— From which it can only be inferred, that whatever is true of acts of will is true of acts of choice — Changing the word "■£«." to "6y" vitiates the argument — Confusion from using choice as the process of choosing, and also as the result of the process, and "mind " and " will" as equivalents — Edwards does not recognize mind as cause — There must be something to move the mind, as it does not act without a reason— Edwards finds this prime mover in his " motives ; " I have ascribed it to "want" — Control, by a previous act of will, fatal to freedom in the present act — Edwards's favorite reductio ad absurdum that a self-determined or free act admits of no first free act, fallacious.

CHAPTER V.— No Event without a Cause, 24C

Edwards says he applies the word cause to what has no positive influence — This facilitates his proof, but makes it unavailing for his purpose — Edwards's positions being admitted, if mind is itself cause, they prove its freedom in willing — He assumes that the cause of a volition must be not only without the volition, but without the mind that wills — If the act of mind, as cause, must have a cause, for the reason that everything which begins to be must have a cause, there can be no flrst act of cause — The soul itself, being the cause of its volitions, is not, in them, the subject of effects which have no cause — The question why the soul exerts such an act and not another considered — Examination of Edwards's position that " activity of nature " cannot be the cause why the mind's action is thus and thus determined— This argument also vitiated by changing in to by, or by assuming that of two terms expressing the same thing one is the cause of the other — Volition cannot be determined by the "past."

CHAPTER VI.— Of the Will's Determining in Things Indifferent, . 259

Edwards's statement of the question imperfect, though warranted by extracts from his opponents— As he states it, one thing is indifferent, and another chooses — Other of his arguments founded on his assumption that will and choice are identical — nis use of the phrase " determining power" ambiguous, applying either to mind or will— Auother statement of the argument— Ed-

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wards supposes the mind to devise a way of getting itself out of a state of indifference, and illustrates by the touching of one of the squares of a chesB hoard — His argument denies that the mind can get itself out of a state of indifference, yet begins by showing how it can do so — Mind's doing, indirectly by volition, what it cannot do directly, is not against its freedom — In this case such indirection (the giving itself up to accident) does not obviate the supposed difficulty, but increases it — Just as difficult for the mind to determine what accident as what square of the chess board — Edwards might as well have made the movement of the finger as the movement of the eye determine the square to be touched — In either case, the difficulty of indifference may recur- There is the same difficulty of indifference in applying the accident, even if it can be selected — The whole causal efficacy must be, not in the accident, but in the rule which the mind makes to apply it, in doing which it again encounters indifference— The mind can as well make the rule to touch a particular square without the accident as with it — The whole efficacy of the proposed plan is in the mind's governing itself by an arbitrary rule which itself has created — The indirection would not aid the argument for necessity, but these supposed cases of indifference militate against it — If choice, among the objects of effort, is essential to will, a man never could will if there- was only one object — Not necessary to an act of will that we should select, or choose even, among objects which we know to be different — The bearing of the views elicited in Book I. on this question — Similarity of cases of indifference and those of wanting to will— The apparent analogy of Edwards's mode of deciding them to that of deciding between parties having equal claims — But this would as well be accomplished by a direct act of will — If decided by lot, or accident, an arbitrary rule must still be made — Analogy of the cases of indifference to matter kept at rest by equal counter forces.

CHAPTER VII. — Relation of Indifference to Freedom in Willing, . 284

Edwards uses the term indifference as directly opposed to preference — His argument against the soul's sovereign power in certain cases, only proves that if the soul wills when it does not will, then its willing is not wholly owing to itself— Much confusion from using the term inclination as identical with will, and yet as something which goes before it — Another of his arguments only proves that the mind is not free in willing when it is not willing at all— And this and the subsequent reasoning only proves that the mind cannot both will and not will at the same time — His statement that a free act of will cannot immediately arise out of a state of indifference, considered — He assumes that choice is a necessary element of free will — Argument thus far avails only on certain inadmissible premises, and has little application to my positions — For the purposes of this argument, Edwards's assumption that choice is a prerequisite of a free act of will may be admitted — Form in which this admission may be most plausibly used against freedom — The essential element of free action is not choice, but self-direction — Suspending volition — Edwards assumes that suspending volition must be an act of volition— If so, the mind never can stop willing, for suspending its willing is only another willing — Even then the mind could suspend action in one direction by acting in another — And liberty in every action might still be maintained — What is meant by suspending an act of will— Illustrations from reading aloud— Do we will either to will or not