The winning of the war; a sequel to "Pan-Germanism"

Front matter

Class

Book_

GopyriiM?-

Chapter I. The New Pan-Germanism 3

The War Itself Changes Problem of Victory — Germans Change Their Strategy — The New Pan-Germanism — Vital Effect Upon German and Allied Strategy of Russian Revolution — Optimism of Allies Wavers for First Time — True Difficulty the Failure of Allies to Understand the War — Victory Already Assured for Allies — What Remains to Be Achieved.

Chapter II. The Original German Strategy of Victory 13 German Strategy Based on Physical Position of Germany — The Formula for Defense and Offense — The Necessity for the Creation of Central Europe — Strategic Problem of Its Creation — Original Military Problem in the North — Possibility of British Participation Discounted — Diplomacy to Simplify Military Problem — Logic of a Casus Belli in the Balkans.

Chapter III. The Invisible Army 29

Victory Dependent Upon Ratio of German Strength to That of Foes — This Dependent Upon Exact Information and Scientific Calculation — This to Be Provided by Spy System — Spies Also to Weaken Striking Force of Foe — Projects to Stimulate Revolt and Disloyalty in Enemy Countries — Spy System in Neutral Countries.

Chapter IV. Disagreeable Complications 36

Original German Calculations Wrong — Problem of Victory at Maximum— Liege, Entrance of Great Britain, the Marne — Loss of Moral Issue — Failure to Win in

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France: Trench Warfare — Failure in Africa, India, Pacific — British Empire Rallies: Army Trained — Complications Accumulate as Years Lapse — Italy, United States, and Others Enter War.

Chapter V. The German Solution op the Deadlock in France 49

The New Strategic Problem — The Solution: Assault on Rear of Trench Line in France — Necessary Preliminaries in Italy, Balkans, Poland — Russian Army to Be Crushed — Political and Diplomatic Results of War in East — Work of the Submarine.

Chapter VI. The Strategy op Defeat 62

Necessity of Providing for Defeat in Field — Necessity of Turning Allied Strategy of Victory Against Them — War Permits Weakening of France and Great Britain in Men — Economic Wastage of Enemy Territory — German Navy and Merchant Marine to Be Preserved — Submarine to Reduce British Supremacy on Sea — Treatment of Belgium, Serbia, Poland — Moral Justification of This Policy.

Chapter VII. The Economic Defensive 75

Long War Essential to New Strategy — Ability to Prolong the War Without Economic Exhaustion Vital — Fighting the Blockade — Germany Must Retain Relative Economic Strength After War — Must Fight It at Lower Cost — Without Depletion of Permanent Plant — Effect of Blockade Favorable to Central Europe — War to Insure German Predominance — Cost of War to Enemies to Be at Maximum — Probability that Defeat Not Be Disastrous if War Properly Fought — Case of France, 1792-1815.

Chapter VIII. Utilizing the Russian Revolution . . 89 German View of Economic and Political Problem of Russia — Its Relation to That of Germany — Anti-German policy of Tsars Prevented Rapprochement — Germany Could Not Afford to Develop Russia — Pan-Germanism an Attempt to Thwart Russian Strength and Enmity — Revolution Makes Russia Safe Ground for Economic Expansion — Immediate Significance of Revolution During the War — Difficulty in Way of Its Immediate Use-

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. fulness— Value of New Relationship to Russia — Revolution Makes Militarism in Germany No Longer Essential.

Chapter IX. The Democratic Defensive ..... 105 Undemocratic Character of German Empire— Application to It of Democracy Fatal— The Defense Against Weakening of Germany by Its Introduction— Case of France in 1814— Germany Must Adopt Democracy Before Defeat Is Final— Allied Terms of Peace Then Become Impossible— If German People Loyal to Fatherland Can Govern Through Democracy as Well as Through Empire— Key to Situation Attitude of People at Large.

Chapter X. The Basis of German Confidence ... 119 Superiority of Scientific Calculation and Long Preparation — Unity of Purpose, of Command, and of Action — New Strategy Successful Thus Far— Defensive in France Assured — Expectation of Economic Assistance from Russia— Submarine Successful— American Army Will Be Too Late or Not Well Trained— Reliance Upon the Invisible Army to Delay It— Central Europe Already a Fact — Future Economic Needs of Germany Already Assured— War Continues Merely to Determine the Extent of Victory.

Book II. Postponement Of Allied Victory

Chapter XI. The Heavy Cost of Optimism .... 135 Allied Optimism Based on Superiority in Resources — Expectation of Aid from German People— Time Would Win for Them: Economic Exhaustion and the Blockade — Military Victory Scarcely Essential — Result in Retarding Preparations in England — Allies Also Based Strategy of Victory on Same Figures which German Strategy Was Meant to Obviate— Allied Strategy Also Involved Frontal Attack on Prepared German Positions.

Chapter XII. The Price of German Isolation ... 149 Character of Allied Coalition— Result Upon War Aims of Allies— These Aims Lacked Unity— Military Objectives Did Not Possess Same Value for All Allied Nations — Adhesion of Some Nations Involved Military

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Operations More Difficult than They Could Perform Unaided — Case of Italy — Case of Greece — Case of Japan — Effect Upon Formulation of Terms of Peace — Allied Diplomacy Sets Armies Task of Maximum Difficulty — Diplomatic Explanation of Lack of Unity of Command — Cause of Such Policy — Allied Notion that Real Task of Armies Not Winning the War, But Preparing the Way for Maximum Peace Terms — This One Cause of Postponement of Victory.

Chapter XIII. Politics in War-time 167

Efficiency of Conduct of War Dependent Upon Democracy — Political System Planned for Peace and Not for War — Democratic Handicap Upon the Armies Great — Difficulty of Finding Experienced Men — Difficulty of Securing Administrative Co-operation; of Providing Industrial Co-operation — Lack of Legal Authority to Act — Fear that the War Would Destroy Democracy — Attitude of Political Parties to the Conduct of War — Parliamentary Difficulties in France— Attitude of Labor Toward Prosecution of War — Hostility of Legislature for Executive — Hostility of Civilians to Army and Navy Experts — Administrative and Political Causes of Lack of Unity of Command — Solutions of Administrative Problems in England; in France; in United States.

Chapter XIV. Probability op German Economic Exhaustion 188

Exhaustion Not a Positive But a Relative Fact — Depends Really Upon Lack of Morale of German People; Upon Their Disloyalty; Upon Their Unwillingness to Suffer; Upon Unlimited Resources for Allies; Upon Immediate Restoration of Plenty by Peace; Upon No Assistance from Russia — Fallacy of Fighting War on This Expectation.

Chapter XV. Probability of Democratic Revolt in

Germany 199

Expectation that War Would Be Won with Aid of German People — Assumes that the Constitutional Issues Decided in Germany on Basis Purely of Administrative Convenience — Constitutional Settlement Regarded by Germans as Diplomatic and International Fact — Assumes Also that German People Hoodwinked by

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Rulers — Germans Believe that Germany Is Not Democratic Because of Foreign Interference in German Domestic Affairs — Bismarck's View of Governmental Problem — German Notions of German History — How Germans Regard Allied Insistence Upon Democracy fop Germany — Attitude of Majority to Democrats and Socialists — Attitude of Sr laller States Toward Prussia — Importance of Definite Conclusion as to What German People Are.

Chapter XVI. The Solidarity op Central Europe . . 216 Allied Diplomacy Attempted to Separate Germany and Her Allies — Belief that Austrian and Hungarian Peoples Desired to Revolt — Allies Were to Aid Them to Throw Off Yoke, Not to Conquer Them— Effect of These Con^ elusions Upon Military Strategy — The Allied Formula of Victory Not Really Military — Allies Assumed a Real Lack of Autonomy and Liberty in Austria — Allies Assumed that Notion of Democracy and Liberty Same in Central Empires as Their Own — Allies Underestimate Power of Economics of Nationalization — Internal Problem in Central Europe Complex, Not Simple — Allied Diplomacy Failed to Create Revolt — It Also Gave Color to Official Explanations of War as One of Aggression and Conquest by Allies — Effect of Allied Objectives as First Announced, on Austria; on Hungary; on Balkans — Probable Solidarity of Peoples of Central Europe.

Chapter XVII. Failure on the West Front .... 235 Success and Failure Relative Terms — What Victory Must Mean — Why It Seemed Easier to Win in France — Diplomatic Objections to Offensive in Balkans — Disadvantages of Offensive in France — Why It Was Undertaken — The Result Has Been Failure — What Is Necessary to Win in the West Now — Expediency of Campaign There Determined by Cost of Victory to Allies; Its Value to Germans During the War.

Chapter XVIII. Cardinal Military Errors .... 248 Allied Strategy Directed Against Original German Strategy Only — Allied Campaign Gave New German Plans Opportunity for Success — Value of Russia Its Potential Aggression — Sacrifice of Russian Army — Its Result —

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Half-hearted Offensives in Balkans — The Error of the Rumanian Offensive — The Italian Campaign Against Trieste — Result of These Successive Defeats.

Book III. The Winning Of The War

Chapter XIX. The Certainty of Victory 267

Postponement of Victory Due to Idea It Need Not Be Won in Field — Notion that Victory Certain Only with Aid of People in Central Empires — Sponsors of This Solution — Rests for Its Certainty Upon Dependability of Such Aid — Difficulty Is that It Is Not Dependable — Elaborate Character of Preventive Measures in Central Empires Against Revolts — Assumes that Subject Peoples Might Thus Win Literal Independence — True Objection to Reliance Upon Popular Aid Its Inconsistency with Moral Stand of Allies — Allied Case Rests Upon Aggressive War — Reliance of Allies Upon History and Religion — Attitude of American People — Degree of Victory Depends Upon the Trust We Can Repose in Peoples of Central Empires — Impossibility of Now Trusting Them Completely — To Base Victory Upon Their Assistance Is to Put Ourselves Defenseless into Their Hands.

Chapter XX. Defeat Through Victory 285

Without Aid of German People Military Victory Necessary — What Will Maximum Victory Comprise? — Its Cost Too Great to Make It Expedient— Man Power and Economic Resources of Allies Not Unlimited — Extent of Effort Not Possible Under Old Industrial System; Under Old Financial System — Superiority of Resources of Allies Altered by Russian Revolution — Continued Strength of Great Britain, France, Italy After War Imperative — Military Victory Not Likely to Affect True Strength of Central Europe — Nor Convert the People to Democracy — Ultimate Safety Only Possible with Their Co-operation — Must Not So Fight the War as to Increase Difficulty of Securing It — Our Own Professions Regarding Democracy and Civilization Limit Character of Our Victory and Terms of Peace.

Chapter XXI. The Old Europe and the New . . . 298 Allied Notions of Victory Based Upon Old Strategy and Diplomacy — They Called for Old Formula: Weak Ger-

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many and Strong Russia— On This Basis Germans Have Already Won the War— Old Europe Destroyed by War Itself— And by the Russian Revolution— Without Russia, First Objectives of Allies Impossible to Win— Factors which Destroyed Old Europe Not to Be Destroyed by Armies— No Victory Can Restore Old Position of France in 1814 or 1870— Or the England of 1814 or 1870— Effect of Nineteenth Century on Sea Power— Military Control of Old Objectives Can No Longer Have Old Results.

Chapter XXII. The Positive Assurance of German

Defeat 314

Allies Have Lost Europe and Won the World— World Controlled No Longer by Europe But by a New Internationalism—New Victory Is Ready for Allies— Strategy and Diplomacy Merely Need to Utilize It— German Victory Cannot Achieve Their Real Objectives— Or Imperil the Allies in Future— Control of Europe Now to Depend Upon Non-European Factors— These the Allies Already Control— True German Offense Against Democracy Refusal to Recognize International Equality and Law — Old European Council of Six which Germans Expected to Control Is Already Dead — New World a Fact— New Non-European Sanction for European States— Positive Assurance of German Defeat Lies in Fact that German Strategy and Diplomacy Purely European — Moral Isolation of Germany Measure of Extent of Her Defeat— International Weakness of Central Europe— Necessity of Exclusion of Central Powers from International Council Until They Can Be Trusted — Vast Gains of Internationalism During the War.

Chapter XXIII. The Invincible Entente 331

Offensive and Defensive Strength of Atlantic Powers— The Greater Strength of the New British Empire- Gains of All in Administrative and Industrial Efficiency During the War— The Atlantic Powers Will Control the World's Supply of Capital— Their Monopoly of Cotton, Rubber, and Wool— Their Practical Monopoly of Iron and Coal— They Will Be Economically Self-sufficing— Conspicuous Weakness of Central Empires- Sea Power Assures Defense and Offense of Atlantic Powers— New Freedom of Seas Will Strengthen the

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Present Sea Power — Why Old Sea Power Was Vulnerable — Why It Will Be Invulnerable in Hands of Atlantic Powers — Weakness of Offensive Position of Central Empires — Homogeneity of Atlantic Powers — Victory in Europe Likely to Weaken Central Empires at Home.

Chapter XXIV. The Logic of Victory on the West

Front 352

Original Logic of Victory in France — The Offensive Position in Europe — Strategic Position of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine — Secret of Transfer in 1870 to Germany of Latter — Effect Upon Neutrality of Belgium — Consequent Weakness of French Defense — Effect of Their Retention by Germany at End of War — Military Frontier of United States in Belgium — Imperative Necessity for United States of Freedom of Access to Europe — Imperative for United States that Sea Power of Great Britain Remain Unimpaired.

Chapter XXV. The True Military Objective . . . 363 Necessary Premises of Victory— First Objectives of Allies Now Impossible and Inexpedient Because Dependent Upon Continued Strength of Russia — True Objective of Allies to Protect European Members of Atlantic Powers Against Aggression — Military Position in Europe of Atlantic Powers — Position of Great Britain and France Stronger than Before — True Weapon of New Allies Is Sea Power — Nothing Now Needed Except Natural Military Frontiers in Alsace-Lorraine, Trentino, and Isonzo — Four Essentials: (1) Continued Strength of France, Italy, and Great Britain After the War; (2) Continued Supremacy on the Sea; (3) No Foothold on Atlantic for Germany in Europe or Africa; (4) Temporary Isolation of Central Powers After the War — Limited Victory in West and Italy All that Is Needed — Expediency of a Defensive War for Two Years —No Offensive Until Absolutely Full Strength Thoroughly Organized — Victory Certain Beyond a Doubt.

ILLUSTRATIONS

The Cathedral above the Devastated

HOUSES OF RHEIMS Frontispiece '

Central Europe Facing p. 130

The Balkans in 1914 " 150'

The West Front, March 1918 " 238'

The Italian Front 260

Preface

This is an optimistic book for pessimistic people. At the moment when the American army is about to enter the trenches, a very general feeling of despondency and a fear of actual defeat has spread through the Allied world. I believe that this is not difficult to explain, but impossible to justify. I have sought, therefore, by an analysis of the situation to show the true basis of apprehension, the valid reasons in the past conduct of the war for the present pessimism, and in the last section of the book the dim outlines, already distinguishable, of the victory the Allies will beyond doubt win. The true difficulty which most people now experience is the definite realization that certain conceptions about the method of winning the war and the character of victory have become during the last year impossible of realization. I am prepared to go so far as to maintain that they never were founded in reason or expediency, but upon a misconception of the European and international situation the falsity of which the progress of the war has so clearly demonstrated.

I feel that the postponement of Allied victory has been due partially to the belief that the

PREFACE

war would be won in time by non-military forces, like economic exhaustion or a democratic revolt in Germany. But it has primarily been due to the fact that the Allied strategy of victory has been formulated to defeat the old Pan- Germanism, which was abandoned in the second year of the war, and has yet to reckon adequately with the newer and more brutal scheme which has taken its place. I feel that the Germans have dealt with the Russian Revolution as a fact, while the Allies, in the main, have treated it as a hope deferred. The former accordingly reconstructed their own policy to utilize the Revolution; the Allies have clung to their original strategy in the expectation that the co-operation of Russia might be again secured. The new Pan-Germanism and the Russian Revolution have altered, to my thinking, the international equation for every country in the world and have transformed the problems of victory and of a permanent settlement. Much of my space is devoted, therefore, to a statement of the new Pan-Germanism, an analysis of its influence and of the Russian Revolution upon German and Allied objectives, upon the political and military situation, and upon the direct issue of the winning of the war.

I hold that by the old European formulas the Allies cannot win, but I maintain that in the light of the new formulas, by which the world is now and henceforth will be controlled, the Allies have already won a victory of a scope and finality unparalleled in past wars. To

PREFACE

understand this transformation of Europe and of the world by the war itself and its effect upon our past notions and policies, is our first step toward the winning of the war.

Victory indeed is to my thinking not really at stake. I see a new Europe in which the Central Empires have unfortunately increased their power and influence, solely because of the collapse of Russia. I also see a new world, truly international, controlled beyond peradventure by what I think may be best described as the Atlantic Powers, an intra-continental, literally international combination of states, already possessed of the supremacy of the seas, of the bulk of the economic resources of the globe, of the willing allegiance of Africa and India, and which exemplify in their institutions the ideals of democracy, liberty, and law. And the new world will dominate the new Europe. We have only to understand the war to be optimistic about the future. Europe as we thought it was, the war has proved never did exist; Europe as the Allies first believed it would become is now impossible; but there is a new Europe and there is a new world, created by the war itself, and which, if not exactly what we meant to make them, will certainly serve the cause of democracy and of civilization more dependably, more conclusively, and more permanently than our first notions about the winning of the war. Let us not reject the gifts the gods provide because they are not the expected answers to our prayers.

Book I The German Menace

THERE is a new Europe and a new world, created by the war, and a new Pan-Germanism intent on the domination of both. It was born of the war, suckled in the fear of defeat, nourished in the expectation of dominion. Like the old, it is the product of Machiavellian craft and of Teutonic ruthlessness; it sees nothing too great for its aspiration, nothing too mean to be utilized for victory. It believes its ambition so lofty as to consecrate the baseness of its methods. From the slime and muck of merciless warfare it aims to build a new Kultur, dazzling in its purity and splendor, surpassing the glories of Athens and the achievements of the Renaissance. Out of the eater will come forth meat and out of the strong will come forth sweetness. For ingenuity, for intuitive grasp of European issues, and for downright villainy, it surpasses the original dreams of Mittel-Europa by as much as the latter transcended the victory over France in 1870 and the creation of the Empire. Its menace lies in its method of fighting the war and renders the continuation of the conflict as serious a problem to meet as defeat itself. It portends no longer the conquest of Belgium, but its annihilation; it expects not merely the defeat of France, but the destruction of her economic and political strength for a generation, if not for all time. It will exact the utmost farthing and the last fraction of its pound of flesh during the war and after its conclusion. It sees in the war itself the golden opportunity for conquest, in its continuation the certainty of eventual victory, and in the manner of its prosecution the assurance of the destruction of its enemies. If the old Pan-Germanism entered the war stained with the disgrace of aggression, the new will end it branded with the infamy of the strategy of defeat, compared with which the original sin against Belgium, the sinking of the Lusitania, and unrestricted submarine warfare appear like acts of a mild and beneficent neutrality.

This new Pan-Germanism, the strategy of the Allies did not at first adequately meet. Indeed, the postponement of Allied victory was due fundamentally, though not primarily, to their unwillingness to transform their own offensive and defensive measures, probably certain of success against the older Pan-Germanism, in order to meet a new German strategy of victory and defeat, the existence of which was by no means as well demonstrated. To-day the reality of the

new Pan-Germanism is no longer to be denied.

The old Europe was destroyed by the Russian Revolution and from its ashes the Pan-Germanic Confederation rose — a European and international fact, unassailable to armies and impermeable to diplomacy. At once the strategic equation in Europe and in the world was transformed. Some Allied objectives became impossible of achievement, others undesirable, others inexpedient. The effect of this single event upon the policies of both belligerent coalitions, upon the manner of conducting the war, upon its strategy, upon the character of the subsequent reorganization of Europe, was instantly impossible to exaggerate or to ignore. In it, the new Pan-Germanism found an ally and a friend; from it, the Allies continued to hope, might come a reorganization of Russia which would make unnecessary the thorough reconstruction of their objectives and the methods for attaining them which the final collapse of Russia would make imperative. The Germans continued the war upon the assumption that the old Russia was dead and the new Russia theirs. The Allies fought the campaigns of 1917 upon the belief that somehow the lame might be made to leap, the blind to see, and the dead brought to life. They were reluctant to conclude that no military victories could restore the old Russia or insure the strength and dependability of the new. Still less were they willing to admit that the Revolution had cemented, strengthened, and perpetuated the Pan- Germanic Confederation, already a fact as the result of the German victories in eastern Europe, and had consequently rendered inexpedient the reconstruction of Europe they had undertaken in 1914.

But in time the conviction grew that Russia was not only lost to the Allies, but all too probably won by the Germans — a Russia, to be sure, broken in strength, lacking administrative coherence, and almost certainly condemned to half a century of civil turmoil and disorder, but none the less an economic ally of the first consequence and a political and diplomatic asset of no little potential value. The Germans had by no means gained all that the Allies had lost, but they had won enough to render problematical indeed the victory the Allies had set their hearts upon winning. Men began to be dimly conscious that the old victory could no longer be won by armies, that the new Pan-Germanism could not be destroyed by a strategy aimed at the defeat of the old. For the first time since the battle of the Marne the possibility of defeat gripped Allied hearts and minds with conviction. To many the mere thought that victory was not a mathematical and logical certainty seemed almost equivalent to the announcement that the war was lost. The Allied world had been drunk with optimism, careless with confidence. Because victory seemed certain men had believed it inevitable; because the first German strategy of victory had been defeated men assumed the problem solved and only its execution left to accomplish. When they saw themselves wrong in certain assumptions they had no reason to make, they cried out in an agony of apprehension that all was lost. But nothing worse was lost than a degree of selfconfidence the Allies ought never to have entertained, a type of optimism the situation never warranted, an intellectual conception about the war and about the way it should be won which was created in its first year and which had since dominated public opinion in Europe and America. Unquestionably the new anxiety and depression had its roots in the inability of the majority to provide any satisfactory substitute.

The Allies did not at first understand the war because they saw it in the light of the old diplomacy and the old traditions, in the light, too, of the old Pan-Germanism, as a European and not an international fact. To them it was necessarily a struggle of European powers, fought on European soil, for continental aims and ends. It was a subjective rather than an objective fact. Nothing was more natural nor perhaps more regrettable than the almost hypnotic effect of the West Front upon the statesmen and people of France and Great Britain. They saw the war as the military operations conducted by their husbands, sons, and brothers for the achievement of the objectives nearest to their own hearts. They could not view it with detachment and impartiality, or study the campaigns in Poland or Serbia with the same intensity as the shifts of position along the trench line in France. What mattered the victories of Hindenburg in Poland, so long as the Germans were held at Verdun? What mattered campaigns in Rumania, so long as the war could not end until France had been reconquered and Alsace-Lorraine occupied? Nor could they conceive that the battle for France might more expediently be fought in the east. Two parties, sharply aligned, appeared in the General Staffs, the Westerners and the Easterners, those who insisted upon fighting the war in France and those who believed a more conclusive victory more cheaply to be had elsewhere. The political authorities decided for the west and the people accepted the decision without being fully conscious of all it involved. The result was a failure to see the war as a whole, a tendency to study it in detail rather than in perspective, to attach a value to the offensive in France far greater than the Germans came to assign to the defense, to forget that the war might be lost in the east, and that it could be won in France only on the basis of assumptions and calculations by no means mathematically certain or dependable. The British, French, and American people saw the war out of focus, and ignored the interrelations and correlations of its parts. They did not realize that the Allied victories of consequence were not being won in France, nor that the Allied defeats of moment had not been suffered there.

The progress of the war they did not grasp because they looked at it through the spectacles of an unquenchable optimism which refused to see the darker aspects of the problem, the lions in the path before the castle. Time was when the battle of the Marne was still gloriously new, when men congratulated one another on the disappearance of the German menace. It is to-day greater than ever, not because the Allies have not made progress toward victory, but because the scope of German ambition is greater than before. Optimism led the Allied people in general to accept a picture of the Germans cowering in the trenches, chained to the guns, driven to the assault with whips, rioting for food, making fertilizer out of the bodies of their own dead — a nation easily to be beaten, a strategic problem which could have no terrors for a sane man. Optimism also concealed the indirect results of the otherwise brilliant diplomacy of the Allies upon the military campaign. There lay the root of the defeat in Italy. It also led men to believe that time would work on the side of the Allies and against the Germans, that a long war would be inevitably to the advantage of the former. They have been slow to wake to the fact that time was not working invariably in the Allies' favor and that it might not be to their advantage to prolong the war indefinitely.

Victory was postponed because the defense of the Allies was not calculated to meet the offense of the Germans. For the latter the war has been a long series of diplomatic, political, and economic defeats; for the Allies it has been thus far a military failure, a term, by the way, which it is highly essential to analyze and understand, for it means merely that the Allied objectives are not as yet attained. A true victory for either side must comprise results of both natures. Germany may win the war and lose it. The Allies may lose the war and win it, because it is fought not primarily for military results, but for its effect upon the reorganization of Europe when the war is over. They have merely to understand the war to see that they have already won security, safety, and significant objectives far more important than those sketched in the first speeches of their statesmen. The war was from the outset an international fact, fought by European and non-European armies on the plains of France and Poland and in the mountains of the Balkans. There east met west and the struggle began for the maintenance of the old domination of the world by Europe. There could be but one result: the war destroyed the old Europe and emancipated the world. For the first time the independence of America, Asia, and Africa became a fact and no longer an aspiration. No Pan-Germanic victory in central and eastern Europe can restore the domination of the world by the old European conference of the Six Powers. No Allied defeat can alter the vital fact that if France, Great Britain, and Italy may lose a portion of their old heritage in Europe, they have already won a commanding international position as the European members of the alliance of the Atlantic Powers.